外文翻譯--西班牙企業(yè)的融資偏好優(yōu)序融資理論的實證研究

1、<p>　　2600單詞，13600英文字符，4645漢字</p><p>　　外文題目： Financing Preferences of Spanish Firms:Evidence </p><p>　　on the Pecking Order Theory </p><p>　　出 處： Review of Quant

2、itative Finance and Accounting，</p><p>　　2005(25): pp341-355 </p><p>　　作 者：Javier Sanchez-Vidal， Juan Francisco Martin-Ugedo </p><p><b>　　原文</b

3、></p><p>　　Abstract :This paper analyses some of the empirical implications of the pecking order theory in the Spanish market using a panel data analysis of 1,566 firms over 1994–2000. The results show th

4、at the pecking order theory holds for most subsamples analyzed, particularly for the small and medium-sized enterprises and for the high-growth and highly leveraged companies. It is also shown that both the more and the

5、less leveraged firms tend to converge towards more balanced capital structures. Finally</p><p>　　Keywords: capital structure, pecking order theory</p><p>　　1、Introduction</p><p>　　A

6、 prime contribution on information asymmetry in capital structure theory is the Myers and Majluf (1984) model. Myers and Majluf observe that the empirical evidence is not consistent with a financial policy that is determ

7、ined by a trade-off of the advantages and disadvantages of market imperfections, mainly taxes, costs of financial distress, and agency costs. Rather, companies’ financial policies seem to be better explained by the behav

8、iour described by Donaldson (1961). He establishes a hierar</p><p>　　Although they tend to be taken as the same thing, the pecking order theory and the Myers and Majluf (1984) model are not strictly speaking

9、 the same. The pecking order theory is merely a description of companies’ financing policy, while the Myers and Majluf work represents the first model that attempts to describe this behaviour from a theoretical point of

10、view, based on the presence of information asymmetry. Moreover, the Myers and Majluf (1984) model assumes listed companies and markets where e</p><p>　　The aim of this paper is to provide evidence on the pec

11、king order theory in the Spanish market. The analysis takes two directions. First, we examine the evolution of the three largest accounting sources of funding for a company—retained earnings, equity issues and debt—using

12、 a model based on Watson and Wilson (2002). Second, we study the role of long-term debt in making up financing deficits, following the flow of funds deficit equation of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999).</p><p>

13、　　The results show that small and medium-sized companies behave consistently with predictions of the pecking order theory. When we divide the sample into subsamples on the basis of growth and the level of leverage, we se

14、e that high-growth companies base their growth on retained earnings, and firms with very high and very low debt ratios tend to converge towards more moderate debt ratios. Estimation of the flow of funds deficit equation

15、shows that fund deficits are met by the use of long-term debt.</p><p>　　The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the pecking order theory and briefly summarizes the previous empirica

16、l evidence. The models to be tested are presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the sample and the methodology. Section 5 contains empirical results. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 6.</p><p&

17、gt;　　2. The pecking order theory: Theoretical base and empirical evidence</p><p>　　Evidence of stock market reaction to the announcement of financial offerings in the American market seems to support this ar

18、gument, because it shows an average 3% negative abnormal return to underwritten firm commitments of industrial firms (Kolodny and Suhler, 1985; Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Hess and Bhagat, 1986; Masulis and Korwar, 1986;

19、Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; and Muhtaseb and Philippatos, 1991, among others); nonsignificant reactions to bond issues (Dann and Mikkelson, 1984; Eckbo, 198</p><p>　　Yet empirical evidence in Spanish capital

20、 market issues is similar to that described by the Myers and Majluf model (1984) and also similar to the empirical evidence in the U. S. Both Rubio (1986, 1987) with monthly data and Arrondo (2002) and Martin-Ugedo (2003

21、) using daily data find negative market reactions to equity issue announcements; Gonz´alez (1997) finds positive market reactions to bond issues. </p><p>　　Finally, Holmes and Kent (1991) and Ang and Ju

22、ng (1992) use mail surveys to try to discern typical company financing policies. Both authors find that company managers follow a hierarchy of funding choices similar to the one described by the pecking order theory. Hol

23、mes and Kent (1991) find a stricter pecking order in place at SME than at larger companies.</p><p>　　In short, many authors have tried to test the pecking order theory, but the evidence is not conclusive.<

24、;/p><p>　　4. Sample and methodology</p><p>　　We use the BASI database from Informa, S.A., considering firms that have data for the entire sample period 1994–2000. We also include firms created afte

25、r January 1, 1994, if we have data for a firm from establishment through 2000. Firms must be either limited companies or private limited companies, and not in the banking or insurance economic sector.</p><p>

26、;　　Information provided by companies sometimes shows some inconsistencies. To minimize mistakes, we use several filters. Firms are excluded if: (1) total assets were not equal to the sum of equity and total liabilities;

27、(2) there were not positive sales figures for all years; (3) total assets increased more than 400% or declined more than 75% one year to another; (4) firms do not have a positive equity figure; and (5) firms do not have

28、a positive net profit for the entire period.</p><p>　　As company financing may be influenced by company size, we divide the sample into subsamples by size. In Euro-info 88/ES (1996), the European Commission

29、classifies firms as small, medium, and large according to four different criteria: (1) employee number; (2) sales; (3) total assets; and (4) independence. We do not use this last criterion because of lack of data. Small

30、firms are companies with fewer than 50 employees, with sales lower than 7 million, and total assets of less than 5 million. Med</p><p>　　We adopt our own classification system based on the first three criter

31、ia defined by the Commission. That is, we include a company in a specific category size if it matches 2 of 3 criteria for every year of the sample. If a company does not fit in any of the categories, we exclude it from a

32、nalysis. Our intention is to be both strict and flexible enough to take into account that: (1) the period of analysis is seven years long, but the criteria are numerically the same, so we work with asset and sa</p>

33、<p>　　The final sample is composed of 1,566 firms, 584 small, 792 medium-sized, and 190 arge. Table 1 provides information on the sample, including descriptive statistics on the variables used to classify firms by

34、 size, financing source percentages and return ratios , and changes in the major financing sources with respect to increases in total assets.</p><p>　　Panel B indicates that funding source proportions vary l

35、ittle with respect to company size. Percentages for equity issues and retained earnings for our whole sample come close to the Watson and Wilson (2002) percentages for the British market, but our figures for the Spanish

36、market for debt are higher both for total and long term. The ROA and ROE variables are negatively related to size, especially the ROE.</p><p>　　Panel C reveals that for both the whole sample and all subsampl

37、es, companies tend to finance their growth with debt and retained earnings.</p><p>　　The sample comprises a panel data of 1,566 companies for a seven-year period. The advantage of panel data is that we can t

38、ake into account the individual heterogeneity, with observations of variables for several years for each individual panel. The main point is to determine whether the model is a fixed effects or a random effects model, wh

39、ich in turn determines the most consistent and efficient way of estimation: intragroup estimation versus generalized least squares. In our case, the Hausman t</p><p>　　Another question in estimation of equat

40、ions (4) and (5) is the endogeneity of the explanatory variables. One requirement of ordinary least squares is that the explanatory variables must be independent, a condition that is not met if the variables are correlat

41、ed with actual or past error terms. For example, in equation (4), the fact that retained earnings grow means total assets also increase, but the causality works in the other direction too; an increase in total assets mak

42、es retained earnings,</p><p>　　Finally, estimation of the flow of funds deficit equation presents the possibility of subspecification bias (see Gujarati, 1997).This equation represents an accounting identity

43、 in which equity issues are absent (Chirinko and Singha, 2000). It examines the financing of long-term assets by long-term debt, considering retained earnings as exogenous.</p><p>　　Because the omitted varia

44、ble, equity issues, is correlated in some cases with the increase in long-term debt, we take into account the possible bias when we estimate the flow of funds deficit equation of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) below.</

45、p><p>　　We use Stata statistical software in the regression analysis.</p><p>　　5. Results</p><p>　　We present results separately for the two models.</p><p>　　5.1. Results

46、of Watson and Wilson (2002) model</p><p>　　Table 2 presents the results of the estimation of equation (4) for the whole sample and for the size subsamples. For the whole sample, retained earnings and debt ha

47、ve similar coefficients, higher than the equity issues coefficient, evidence of the duality of retained earnings and debt noted by Holmes and Kent (1991). Results for the different subsamples seem to indicate that small

48、to medium-sized enterprises do follow a pecking order of choices. The coefficients of retained earnings are higher t</p><p>　　Higher coefficients for equity issues in the SME than for large firms could be at

49、tributable to funds supplied by manager-owners or by families or acquaintances. In fact, Ang (1992) ranks equity issues like this that do not mean a shift of control from owner in second place in the hierarchy of funds b

50、ehind retained earnings.</p><p>　　High growth firms versus low growth firms. Fama and French (2002) and Lemmon and Zender (2002) have shown we need to consider companies’ money needs when we examine capital

51、structures. There are differences in financing between high-growth and low-growth firms. To examine this, we select the quintile of companies with the highest annual average growth rate of total assets and the quintile o

52、f firms with no growth or lowest positive growth (average annual growth rates of 0 to 4%).</p><p>　　Table 3 reports the results for the whole sample and the high-growth and low-growth quintiles. The remarkab

53、le differences in coefficients of the two quintiles show that growth is an important element in company financing decisions. As would be expected, the coefficients for all variables are very similar for the low-growth fi

54、rms. The high-growth firms, however, tend to finance their growth with retained earnings. They also follow the hierarchy of funds proposed in the pecking order theory more c</p><p>　　It is notable that we fi

55、nd lower values of t-statistics and the R2 in high-growth firms, indicating a more heterogeneous financing. This result is similar to that obtained by Hughes (1997) who finds for a sample of SME in the UK that high-growt

56、h companies tend to finance their growth with a greater variety of sources than low-growth firms.</p><p>　　High-leveraged versus low-leveraged companies. According to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), we should

57、 expect that, even if firms do not follow a trade-off, they tend to revert towards moderate debt levels whenever they have previous very high or very low levels of leverage. As they say, “We do not believe that balance s

58、heets are irrelevant. We expect firms to find ways to add equity when debt ratios are painfully high, and to reduce equity when they fall near zero or the firm is a net lender” (Sh</p><p>　　To test this argu

59、ment, we compare the quintile of firms with the highest debt level ratios as of December 31, 1993, and the quintile with lowest debt levels at that date (Table 4). </p><p>　　We observe very different financi

60、ng patterns in the two quintiles, which would indicate previous debt level is an important factor in determining firms’ financing policies. The more leveraged companies follow the hierarchy of the pecking order theory. T

61、he most important result is that these companies tend to moderate their indebtedness; they have a lower debt coefficient than the low-leverage companies or the whole sample. In addition, they use retained earnings and eq

62、uity issues more than the l</p><p>　　5.2. Results of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) flow of funds deficit equation</p><p>　　In this subsection we estimate the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) flow o

63、f funds deficit equation. Given that the dependent variable is the long term debt, we have considered including an additional explanatory variable representing the cost of this financing; concretely, the yearly variation

64、 of the interest rate that the banking sector charge for loans of three years or more.</p><p>　　An increase in the financing costs of long-term debt could reduce the use of this source of finance. Therefore,

65、 a negative sign of bI is expected.</p><p>　　Table 5 reports the flow of funds deficit equation results for the whole sample and for the subsamples of small firms, medium-sized firms, and large firms; with t

66、he b coefficient corrected for the subspecification bias. The estimation takes into account the result of the Hausman test that the panel is a fixed-effects one.</p><p>　　For the whole sample and for all sub

67、samples, companies are financing their flow of funds deficit using long-term debt. The coefficients for bPO come close to those obtained by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), which range between 0.75 and 0.85. The high R2s s

68、upport the argument that most of the long-term debt variation is explained by the flow of funds deficit variable, especially for medium-sized and large firms. The lower R2s for the smaller firms may occur because they ha

69、ve long-term financial c</p><p>　　The interest rate coefficient is not significant for the whole sample. This result is opposite the results of Antoniou, Guney, and Paudial (2002). For the size subsamples, t

70、he coefficient is statistically significant for medium-sized and small firms, but has the expected sign only for small companies.</p><p><b>　　譯文（一）：</b></p><p>　　西班牙企業(yè)的融資偏好：優(yōu)序融資理論的實證

71、研究</p><p>　　摘要：本文使用在1994-2000年間西班牙市場上1566家公司的面板數(shù)據(jù)，分析了影響啄序理論的實證。結(jié)果表明,啄序理論對于大多數(shù)次級樣本,特別是中小企業(yè)和高增長和高杠桿率的公司是支持的。它還表明,無論是更高和更低杠桿的公司，都傾向于更加平衡的資本結(jié)構(gòu)。最后,我們觀察到企業(yè)的財政資金流動赤字與長期負(fù)債。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞：資本結(jié)構(gòu)，優(yōu)序融資理論</

72、p><p><b>　　1、介紹</b></p><p>　　在資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論中信息不對稱的主要貢獻者是邁爾斯和米勒(1984)模型。邁爾斯和米勒觀察到的經(jīng)驗性證據(jù)是不符合融資政策,是由一個不完善市場的優(yōu)點和缺點平衡的，主要是稅收,金融危機的成本和代理成本。相反,公司的融資政策似乎是融資行為更好的解釋(唐納森，1961)。他建立了一個層次結(jié)構(gòu)描述公司相對于外部資金更偏愛內(nèi)部

73、資金;對于外部資金,公司更喜歡債務(wù),然后混合工具像可轉(zhuǎn)換債券,最終發(fā)行股票。此層次結(jié)構(gòu),被廣泛視為啄序理論,表明公司融資決策目的是實現(xiàn)最佳利用。</p><p>　　盡管他們往往被認(rèn)為是同一件事,啄序理論和邁爾斯和Majluf(1984)模型不是嚴(yán)格相同的。優(yōu)序融資理論只是描述一個公司的融資政策,雖然邁爾斯和米勒代表第一個模型,試圖從理論的角度基于信息不對稱的存在描述這種行為。此外,邁爾斯和米勒(1984)模型假

74、定上市公司和市場發(fā)行股票是通過公司承諾,比如美國市場,而不是市場主要的分配方法，如西班牙和其他大多數(shù)國家。</p><p>　　本論文的目的是在西班牙市場提供啄序理論的證據(jù)。分析從兩個方向入手。首先,我們檢查演變的三大會計的資金來源，為公司發(fā)行股票、保留收益和債務(wù)。</p><p>　　結(jié)果表明,啄序理論的預(yù)測中中小企業(yè)的行為都是一致的。當(dāng)我們把樣本拆分到次級樣本的基礎(chǔ)上，我們看到, 高增

75、長企業(yè)在留存收益增長的基礎(chǔ)上, 債務(wù)比率非常高和非常低的公司傾向于更為溫和的債務(wù)比率。估計的資金流動的赤字方程表明資金赤字的公司都使用了長期債務(wù)。</p><p>　　文章是剩余部分主要由以下幾部分組成，如下所示。第二節(jié)解釋了啄序理論，簡要概述了之前的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)。第三節(jié)給出了要測試的模型。第4部分描述了示例和方法論。第五節(jié)包含實證結(jié)果。最后，結(jié)論在第六節(jié)。</p><p>　　2、優(yōu)序融資理

76、論理論:理論基礎(chǔ)和經(jīng)驗證據(jù)</p><p>　　股票市場對金融產(chǎn)品在美國市場的反應(yīng)這一個證據(jù)似乎支持這個觀點，因為它表明平均3%的負(fù)向變動會返還到承銷公司所承諾的工業(yè)企業(yè)(高樂德尼和蘇爾，1985；阿斯奎斯和幕勒斯表示，1986年，赫斯和巴加，1986馬斯勒和科沃， 1986；麥克爾森和帕奇，1986；和瑪特薩博和菲力帕托斯，1991等)；對發(fā)行債券不敏感性(丹和麥克爾森，1984；阿克博，1986；麥克爾森和帕

77、奇，1986；阿克黑比，伊斯托沃德和佩蒂特，1997)；與反應(yīng)介于兩者之間的可轉(zhuǎn)換債券問題(丹和麥克爾森，1984；阿克博，1986；麥克爾森和帕奇，1986)。</p><p>　　但是，梅耶斯和梅吉拉夫（1984）的模型也有一定的局限性。首先，他們適用于像美國這樣的股票市場，發(fā)行股票主要通過承諾包銷，而不是通過在大多數(shù)其他市場普遍存在的方法——配股。在承諾包銷的情況下，股份同時向廣大公眾發(fā)售。因此如果股票被高

78、估，將會有財富從新的股東轉(zhuǎn)移到現(xiàn)有股東的身上。在配股時，現(xiàn)有股東享有優(yōu)先購買權(quán)，這樣可以最大限度地減少財富轉(zhuǎn)移的可能性。因此，梅耶斯和梅吉拉夫（1984）認(rèn)為發(fā)行股票在企業(yè)的融資政策中是最后的選擇，而在貨幣市場上發(fā)行股票是股權(quán)融資的普遍做法。</p><p>　　然而經(jīng)驗證據(jù)在西班牙資本市場問題類似于邁爾斯和瑪基勒夫模型(1984)和經(jīng)驗的描述，也類似于在美國盧比奧(1986，1987)用月度數(shù)據(jù)和阿榮迵 (20

79、02)和馬丁-尤歌多 (2003)使用每日數(shù)據(jù)所發(fā)現(xiàn)的消極的市場反應(yīng)證券發(fā)行公告。</p><p>　　最后福爾摩斯和肯特（1991年）和安格和榮格（1992年）通過使用郵件調(diào)查來試用辨別典型企業(yè)的融資政策。兩位學(xué)者都發(fā)現(xiàn)，企業(yè)管理者選擇遵循一個類似優(yōu)序融資理論所描述的融資順序。福爾摩斯和肯特（1991年）發(fā)現(xiàn)中小企業(yè)比大型的企業(yè)更嚴(yán)格地遵循優(yōu)序融資順序。</p><p>　　總之，許多學(xué)

80、者試圖驗證優(yōu)序融資理論，但證據(jù)不確鑿。</p><p><b>　　4、樣本和方法論</b></p><p>　　我們使用Informa，S.A.中的基本的數(shù)據(jù)庫，將1994-2000年的公司數(shù)據(jù)考慮為整個樣本期。我們還包括公司自1994年1月1日創(chuàng)建以后的數(shù)據(jù)。如果我們有一個公司從成立到2000的數(shù)據(jù)，企業(yè)必須要么是有限公司要么是私人有限公司，而不是在銀行或保險經(jīng)濟

81、部門。</p><p>　　公司提供的信息有時展示了一些矛盾。為了減少錯誤，我們用幾個排除方法。如果公司滿足以下幾個方面的則排除:(1)總資產(chǎn)并不等于金額的股本和總負(fù)債；(2) 過去的所有年度中沒有積極的銷售數(shù)據(jù)；(3)從上一年到下一年總資產(chǎn)增長超過400%或下降超過75%；(4)公司沒有一個積極的股本計劃；(5)在整個周期內(nèi)公司沒有一個積極的凈利潤。</p><p>　　由于公司的融資可

82、能會受到公司規(guī)模的影響，我們把樣本數(shù)量降低到次級樣本的大小。歐盟委員會根據(jù)以下四種不同的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)將公司分為小、中、大三個等級:(1)員工數(shù)；(2)銷售；(3)總資產(chǎn)；(4)獨立。我們不使用這個最后的準(zhǔn)則，因為缺少數(shù)據(jù)。小規(guī)模公司少于50個員工，銷售額低于700萬，總資產(chǎn)不到500萬。中等規(guī)模的公司都在50到249名員工，從總銷售額為700萬到4000萬美元，而總資產(chǎn)從500萬到2700萬。如果他們擁有超過250員工，銷售額超過4000萬，總

83、資產(chǎn)超過2700萬，則公司被列為大型公司。</p><p>　　根據(jù)第一種委員會定義的三個標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，我們采用自己的分類系統(tǒng)。也就是說， 如果它符合每一年的示例中三分之二的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，我們就將這個公司定義在一個特定的類別中。如果一個公司不適合在任何的類別，我們在分析時將它排除。我們的意圖是在考慮時既要嚴(yán)格又要有足夠柔韌性:(1)時期的分析是漫長的七年，但因為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)都是相同的數(shù)值，所以我們考慮資產(chǎn)和銷售額這種與通脹是異構(gòu)的數(shù)據(jù)。

84、(2)沒有雇員數(shù)據(jù)的一些公司。</p><p>　　最后的示例是由1566家公司、584個小公司，792中型規(guī)模的公司和190個大規(guī)模公司組成。表1提供了信息的示例，包括描述性統(tǒng)計分類公司使用的變量的大小，融資來源百分比和回報比率，以及為了增加總資產(chǎn)所引起的主要融資來源的變化。</p><p>　　樣本B表明，不同資金來源比例對公司的規(guī)模影響很小。在我們整個樣本中股本發(fā)行比率和留存收益問題

85、與沃森和威爾遜(2002)所研究的英國市場百分比十分接近，但我們關(guān)于西班牙市場的數(shù)據(jù)對整體和長期的負(fù)債而言是相對較高的。資產(chǎn)回報率和股本回報率變量是與公司規(guī)模大小是負(fù)相關(guān)的，尤其是股本回報率。</p><p>　　樣本C顯示，對于整個樣本和所有次級樣本，企業(yè)傾向于債務(wù)融資和使用留存收益。</p><p>　　在示例中包括1566家公司在7年時間內(nèi)的一個樣本數(shù)據(jù)。樣本數(shù)據(jù)的優(yōu)勢是，我們可以考

86、慮個人的異質(zhì)性，以變量在幾年內(nèi)的變化為每個單獨的樣本數(shù)據(jù)。主要的一點是可以決定一個模型是究竟是一個固定效應(yīng)模型還是隨機效應(yīng)模型，進而確定最一致的和最有效的估計:社會團體內(nèi)部的估計和廣義最小二乘法。在我們的示例中，豪斯曼試驗表明，社會團體內(nèi)部的估計是適當(dāng)?shù)?，因為該模型是一個固定效應(yīng)模型。</p><p>　　另一個問題在估計方程(4)和(5)是解釋變量的解釋。普通最小二乘法的一個基本要求是解釋性變量必須是獨立的。有

87、一種情況是不滿足條件的，那就是如果變量與現(xiàn)在或過去的錯誤條件是相關(guān)的。例如，在方程(4)，事實上，留存收益增長意味著總資產(chǎn)也會增加，但是在因果關(guān)系的另一個方向也同樣起作用；增加總資產(chǎn)會使留存收益，債務(wù)和股本發(fā)行增加。關(guān)于赤字的資金流動對方程(5)有一個類似的效應(yīng)。因此，我們對這些滯后的解釋變量進行了假設(shè)(安尼諾拉說道，債券，1991)。豪斯曼規(guī)范的測試被再次證實，這個過程是一致的，比估計更有效的沒有納入考慮。</p>&l

88、t;p>　　最后，資金流動的赤字方程的估計給出了不規(guī)范、有偏見的可能性(參見古吉拉特，1997)。這個方程表示一個會計恒等式，股權(quán)發(fā)行缺失(池琳鈳和幸哈，2000)。它用長期債務(wù)來檢查融資的長期資產(chǎn)，將留存收益視作外生變量。</p><p>　　因為變量遺漏，股權(quán)問題，在長期債務(wù)增加的某些情況下，當(dāng)我們估計的資金流動赤字方程我們考慮到薩姆-桑德爾和米勒以下可能的偏見 (1999)。</p>

89、<p><b>　　5、結(jié)果</b></p><p>　　我們報告結(jié)果分別為兩個模型。</p><p>　　5.1沃森和威爾遜(2002)模型的結(jié)果</p><p>　　表2展示了估計方程(4)關(guān)于整個樣本和樣本的大小的結(jié)果。福爾摩斯和肯特(1991) 指出對整個樣本而言，留存收益和債務(wù)也有類似的系數(shù)，高于股本融資系數(shù)、證據(jù)的二元性的

90、留存收益和債務(wù)。不同的樣本結(jié)果似乎表明，中小企業(yè)做了一個遵循優(yōu)序融資理論的選擇。留存收益的系數(shù)均高于債務(wù)，債務(wù)融資系數(shù)反過來高于股本融資系數(shù)。這些結(jié)果與比楊，阿姆和卡普特(2002)、沃森和威爾遜(2002) 的發(fā)現(xiàn)很相似。這者獲得了中小企業(yè)的這個結(jié)論，后者獲得了股份有限公司的這個結(jié)論。象這樣的結(jié)果突出創(chuàng)造收益對中小企業(yè)融資增長的重要性。</p><p>　　中小企業(yè)中比大公司更高的股本融資系數(shù)要歸功于基金經(jīng)理所

91、有者提供的家庭或熟人。事實上，安(1992)對股票發(fā)行率排序，并不意味著所有者的控制權(quán)在第二位的一個轉(zhuǎn)變。</p><p>　　高增長公司和低增長的公司。法瑪和法蘭斯 (2002)和萊蒙和正德爾(2002)已經(jīng)顯示在我們檢驗資本結(jié)構(gòu)時我們需要考慮企業(yè)的資金需求。高增長和低增長的公司之間的融資是有差異的。為了研究這一點，我們選擇總資產(chǎn)年平均增長率排位最高的公司和沒有增長或者最低正增長的公司 (平均年增長率為0至4%

92、)。</p><p>　　表3報告結(jié)果反映了整個樣本和高成長型與低成長型的公司。兩組樣本在系數(shù)的差異表明成長性在公司融資決策中是一個重要的元素。和預(yù)想的一樣，低成長型的公司的所有變量系數(shù)都非常相似。然而高成長型公司更傾向于用留存收益融資。很顯然他們也遵循這個優(yōu)序融資理論。</p><p>　　值得注意的是，我們在高成長型公司中發(fā)現(xiàn)了更低的t統(tǒng)計值和R2，這表明他們有一個更多樣化的融資結(jié)構(gòu)。

93、這個結(jié)果與休斯(1997)發(fā)現(xiàn)的一個結(jié)論是十分相似的，休斯(1997)發(fā)現(xiàn)在英國的中小企業(yè)，高成長型公司比低成長型的公司更加傾向于不同資金來源的融資方式。</p><p>　　高杠桿和低杠桿公司。根據(jù)薩姆-桑德爾和米勒(1999)，即使公司不遵循一種權(quán)衡，我們也應(yīng)該期待，他們傾向于溫和的債務(wù)水平，無論他們以前喲較高水平的還是較低水平的杠桿。正如他們所說的，“我們相信資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表不是無關(guān)緊要的。當(dāng)債務(wù)比率非常高我們希

94、望公司設(shè)法增加股本，當(dāng)公司降至接近零或是一個凈貸款公司時能減少股本”(薩姆-桑德爾和米勒，1999，第226頁)。</p><p>　　為了驗證這個論點，我們將與在1993年12月31日債務(wù)水平最高的公司進行比較，將數(shù)據(jù)與在那個日期最低債務(wù)水平的公司進行比較 (表4)。</p><p>　　我們觀察融資模式非常不同的的兩個數(shù)據(jù)，這表明之前的債務(wù)水平在決定公司的融資策略是一個重要的因素。更高

95、的杠桿公司遵循優(yōu)序融資理論。最重要的結(jié)果是，這些公司傾向于較低較穩(wěn)定的負(fù)債率；他們比低杠桿公司或整個樣本有一個更低的債務(wù)系數(shù)。此外，他們比低杠桿的公司更多地利用留存收益和股權(quán)融資。對低杠桿的公司而言最著名的發(fā)現(xiàn)是他們更多利用債務(wù)融資，沒有遵循優(yōu)序融資理論。</p><p>　　5.2. 薩姆-桑德爾和米勒的資金流動赤字方程的結(jié)果</p><p>　　在本節(jié)中我們將對薩姆-桑德爾和米勒(19

96、99)的資金流動赤字方程進行判斷。鑒于因變量是長期債務(wù)，我們已經(jīng)考慮了額外的解釋變量代表的融資成本；具體地說， 銀行業(yè)三年或更長時間的貸款利率作為年度變化的利率，。</p><p>　　長期債務(wù)融資成本的增加能減少這種融資方式的使用。因此，一個負(fù)號的bI是在預(yù)計內(nèi)的。</p><p>　　表5的結(jié)果顯示整個樣本和次級樣本的小公司，中型公司和大型公司都符合資金流動赤字方程，b系數(shù)修正出現(xiàn)了不

97、規(guī)范的趨勢。預(yù)估把豪斯曼的結(jié)果測試考慮進去之后樣本是一個固定后果。</p><p>　　從整個樣本和所有次級樣本來看，企業(yè)使用長期債務(wù)為他們的資金流動赤字融資。bPO系數(shù)范圍在0.75和0.85之間，接近薩姆-桑德爾和米勒(1999)，得到的測算。較高的R2s支持流動資金赤字變量解釋了大部分的長期債務(wù)變動，尤其是對中型和大型企業(yè)這個論點。較低的R2s值，小公司就可能會發(fā)生，因為他們有長期的財政約束(Ang，199