外文翻譯--融資偏好的西班牙企業(yè)優(yōu)序論證據(jù)（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　2000單詞，1.1萬英文字符，3700漢字</p><p>　　出處：Sánchez-Vidal J, Martín-Ugedo J F. Financing Preferences of Spanish Firms: Evidence on the Pecking Order Theory[J]. Review of Quantitative Finance and

2、Accounting, 2005, 25(4):341-355.</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Financing Preferences of Spanish Firms: Evidence on the Pecking Order Theory</p>

3、<p>　　J Sánchez-Vidal，JF Martín-Ugedo</p><p>　　This paper analyses some of the empirical implications of the pecking order theory in the Spanish market using a panel data analysis of 1,566 fi

4、rms over 1994–2000. The results show that the pecking order theory holds for most subsamples analyzed, particularly for the small and medium-sized enterprises and for the high-growth and highly leveraged companies. It is

5、 also shown that both the more and the less leveraged firms tend to converge towards more balanced capital structures. Finally, we obser</p><p>　　A prime contribution on information asymmetry in capital stru

6、cture theory is the Myers and Majluf (1984) model. Myers and Majluf observe that the empirical evidence is not consistent with a financial policy that is determined by a trade-off of the advantages and disadvantages of m

7、arket imperfections, mainly taxes, costs of financial distress, and agency costs. Rather, companies’ financial policies seem to be better explained by the behaviour described by Donaldson (1961).He establishes a hierarc&

8、lt;/p><p>　　Although they tend to be taken as the same thing, the pecking order theory and the Myers and Majluf (1984) model are not strictly speaking the same. The pecking order theory is merely a description

9、of companies’ financing policy, while the Myers and Majluf work represents the first model that attempts to describe this behaviour from a theoretical point of view, based on the presence of information asymmetry. Moreov

10、er, the Myers and Majluf (1984)model assumes listed companies and markets where eq</p><p>　　The aim of this paper is to provide evidence on the pecking order theory in the Spanish market. The analysis takes

11、two directions. First, we examine the evolution of the three largest accounting sources of funding for a company—retained earnings, equity issues and debt—using a model based on Watson and Wilson (2002).Second, we study

12、the role of long-term debt in making up financing deficits, following the flow of funds deficit equation of Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999).</p><p>　　There are several features which distinguish the Spanish fin

13、ancial system from the American one. Probably the main difference affecting the pecking order is the flotation method in equity issues. Equity securities are issued in a wide variety of ways, mainly firm commitments und

14、erwritten offers and rights issues. The relative importance of these methods depends on the issuing firm’s country. In the United States rights offerings have declined in frequency, having virtually disappeared by 1980.I

15、</p><p>　　The results show that small and medium-sized companies behave consistently with predictions of the pecking order theory. When we divide the sample into subsamples on the basis of growth and the lev

16、el of leverage, we see that high-growth companies base their growth on retained earnings, and firms with very high and very low debt ratios tend to converge towards more moderate debt ratios. Estimation of the flow of fu

17、nds deficit equation shows that fund deficits are met by the use of long-term debt.</p><p>　　The pecking order theory describes a hierarchy in companies’ financial policy as follows: (1)Firms prefer to finan

18、ce their investments with funds internally generated, namely, retained earnings and depreciation expenses; (2)firms base the dividend payout ratios on the future investment opportunity set and their expected cash flows;

19、 (3)payout ratios tend to be sticky in the short term, so in some years internally generated flows will be enough for financing company needs and in some years not; (</p><p>　　To explain this behaviour Myers

20、 and Majluf (1984) construct a model of information asymmetry assuming that firm managers act on behalf of current shareholders. If companies have enough financial slack, they will carry out all investments that have a p

21、ositive net present value. If external funds are needed to finance new investments, the market will interpret equity issues as evidence that company shares are overvalued and thus issue announcement will have a negative

22、impact on the share price.</p><p>　　Thus, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that, if the company does not have enough funds to finance new investments, it will issue equity only when there are very profitable in

23、vestments that can neither be postponed nor financed through debt, or when managers believe that the stock is overvalued enough that shareholders will be disposed to tolerate the market penalty. The information asymmetry

24、 may cause current shareholders to renounce positive net present value investment projects in order to avoid </p><p>　　However, the Myers and Majluf model (1984) has some limitations. The first is that it ap

25、plies to markets like the American market where shares are offered mainly through firm commitment underwritings and not through rights issues, which is the flotation method that prevails in most other markets. In an unde

26、rwritten firm commitment, shares are offered simultaneously to the public at large. Thus, if shares are overvalued, there will be a wealth transfer from new to current shareholders. In rights </p><p>　　Anoth

27、er limitation of the Myers and Majluf (1984) model is that it is generally intended to describe listed companies, leaving the rest, mainly the small and medium-sized enterprises(SME),out of the explanation. Because of th

28、is, authors since then have tried to explain the pecking order theory using alternative arguments appropriate to non-listed SME companies.</p><p>　　A major problem in SME financing, especially in non-Anglo-S

29、axon countries, is limited access to capital markets (a finance gap) (Holmes and Kent,1991).Financing choices for SME are thus usually reduced to retained earnings and bank loans. This finance gap can be divided into two

30、 components: a supply gap, because of limited availability of funds or higher cost, and a knowledge gap, because of limited knowledge about all the possibilities of external finance and a lack of awareness of the advanta

31、g</p><p>　　Another factor that may play a part in the hierarchy of firm choices is the motivation to retain control of the firm (Holmes and Kent, 1991; Hamilton and Fox, 1998).As we have noted, in a firm com

32、mitment offering stock is sold at one time to the general public; thus, current shareholders’ relative ownership of firm, as well as their control of the company may be diminished with new share offerings. Such a control

33、 problem may arise also in rights issues, but to a lesser extent, because current sh</p><p>　　These factors mentioned above imply a similar hierarchy to the one described by Myers and Majluf (1984); that is,

34、 the company would make use of retained earnings in the first place, then debt (bank loans) and, finally, equity issues. </p><p>　　Various authors have tried to test the empirical implications of the pecking

35、 order theory. Next, we briefly summarize some of them. Watson and Wilson(2002)use a descriptive model in the British market and confirm the pecking order theory, especially for closely-held companies(companies whose own

36、ership is very concentrated and whose manager is usually the main owner).</p><p>　　Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999)and Frank and Goyal(2003)study the way companies finance their flow of funds deficits. The forme

37、r authors find evidence to support the pecking order theory; the latter find evidence of a target debt ratio. Mato(1990),in the Spanish market, studies financing flow of fund deficits, using an accounting identity that i

38、ncludes share issues. He finds that companies tend not to use equity issues, but finance their needs primarily with debt. He also observes that debt and int</p><p>　　Fama and French(2002)use structural equat

39、ions that regress leverage and dividend payout as dependent variables on several explanatory variables from the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory. They find no conclusive evidence in support of one specific t

40、heory.</p><p>　　Lo′pez-Gracia and Aybar-Arias(2000)use Manova analysis to examine the relationship between variables proposed by the pecking order theory and financial constraints in the Spanish market. They

41、 find that the significance of internal finance varies according to company size. Saa′-Requejo(1996)uses a nested model with binary variables for Spanish companies to test the choice between internal or external finance

42、and between equity and debt. He finds that companies care about whether the funds are rai</p><p>　　Finally, Holmes and Kent(1991)and Ang and Jung(1992)use mail surveys to try to discern typical company finan

43、cing policies. Both authors find that company managers follow a hierarchy of funding choices similar to the one described by the pecking order theory. Holmes and Kent(1991)find a stricter pecking order in place at SME th

44、an at larger companies.</p><p>　　In short, many authors have tried to test the pecking order theory, but the evidence is not conclusive.</p><p>　　We have examined several empirical implications

45、of the pecking order theory for a sample of 1,566 Spanish companies partitioned by size, growth, and previous debt level over 1994–2000.</p><p>　　The pecking order theory states that firms follow a hierarchy

46、 when financing investments. Companies prefer internal funds to external funds; in case of external funds firms prefer debt first, with equity issues being their last choice. Given that Myers and Majluf’s (1984) argument

47、 is not valid in explaining this hierarchy in markets like the Spanish where rights issues prevail, a finance gap and the motivation to retain control could help to explain such a hierarchy in these markets.</p>&

48、lt;p>　　For the whole sample, we find that retained earnings and debt have similar coefficients, higher than the equity issues coefficient, providing evidence of the duality of retained earnings and debt noted by Holme

49、s and Kent(1991).In the case of different subsamples, small and medium-sized firms do seem to follow the pecking order predictions; the retained earnings coefficient exceeds the debt coefficient, which in turn exceeds th

50、e equity issues coefficient. Such results could be explained by a fina</p><p>　　Analysis of subsamples based on firms’ growth and previous debt level shows that these factors are very important in determinin

51、g companies’ financing policies. High-growth companies resort to retained earnings, and then to debt, and finally to equity issues. That is, these firms follow the pecking order theory. Low-growth firms by contrast take

52、a more balanced approach to financing. Analysis of high-leverage and low-leverage firms indicates these companies move towards more moderate debt levels.</p><p>　　Finally, estimation of a flow of funds defic

53、it equation reveals that companies tend to fund their financing deficits mainly with long-term debt.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　融資偏好的西班牙企業(yè)：優(yōu)序論證據(jù)</p><p>　　本文通過使用1994年—2

54、000年西班牙市場(chǎng)的1566家企業(yè)的固定樣本數(shù)據(jù)分析優(yōu)序融資理論的實(shí)證影響。結(jié)果表明優(yōu)序融資理論適用于大多數(shù)次級(jí)樣本分析，特別是中小型企業(yè)與高成長(zhǎng)和高杠桿比率的企業(yè)。它還表明，較大或較小杠桿作用的企業(yè)往往更傾向于保持一個(gè)平衡的資本結(jié)構(gòu)。最后，我們注意到企業(yè)用長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)來彌補(bǔ)資金赤字的問題。</p><p>　　一個(gè)關(guān)于信息不對(duì)稱的資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論的主要貢獻(xiàn)是梅葉斯和梅吉拉夫（1984年）提出的模型。梅葉斯和梅吉拉夫觀察

55、到實(shí)證結(jié)果與財(cái)政政策不一致，它取決于如何權(quán)衡不完善市場(chǎng)的利弊，主要是因?yàn)榇嬖诙愂?、?cái)務(wù)危機(jī)的成本和代理成本。相反，企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)政策似乎能夠由唐納森（1961年）提出的行為解釋說更好地說明。他建立了一個(gè)企業(yè)相對(duì)于外部資金更偏好內(nèi)部資金的的融資順序；在需要外部融資的情況下，企業(yè)更傾向于債務(wù)融資，然后是類似可轉(zhuǎn)換債券的混合工具，最后才是股權(quán)融資。這個(gè)順序擴(kuò)展了優(yōu)序融資理論應(yīng)用的范圍，并指出企業(yè)做融資決策并不是以獲得最佳財(cái)務(wù)杠桿為目的的。<

56、/p><p>　　雖然優(yōu)序融資理論與梅葉斯和梅吉拉夫（1984年)的模型不嚴(yán)格來說是一樣的，它們往往被視為相同。優(yōu)序融資理論只是描述企業(yè)的融資政策，而梅葉斯和梅吉拉夫的工作是第一個(gè)建立了試圖以信息不對(duì)稱的存在為基礎(chǔ)并從理論的角度來解釋這種行為的模型。此外，梅葉斯和梅吉拉夫（1984年)的模型假設(shè)前提為上市公司和通過承諾包銷發(fā)行股票的市場(chǎng)，如美國(guó)市場(chǎng)，而不是通過配股發(fā)行股票的市場(chǎng)，如西班牙和其他大多數(shù)國(guó)家的市場(chǎng)。<

57、;/p><p>　　本文的目的是為優(yōu)序融資理論在西班牙市場(chǎng)的體現(xiàn)提供證據(jù)。分析從兩個(gè)方向展開。首先，我們基于沃森和威爾遜（2002年)的模型考察了企業(yè)三個(gè)最大資金來源的演變——留存收益、股權(quán)融資和債務(wù)融資。其次，通過夏恩·桑德和梅葉斯（1999年）的方程計(jì)算出來資金赤字，我們研究了長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)在彌補(bǔ)資金赤字中的作用。</p><p>　　西班牙金融體系與美國(guó)相比有幾個(gè)不同的特點(diǎn)。影響啄食

58、順序的主要差異可能是在股權(quán)融資中的配股問題。發(fā)行權(quán)益性證券的方式多種多樣，主要有承諾包銷和配股。這些方法的相對(duì)重要性取決于發(fā)行企業(yè)的國(guó)家。美國(guó)配股的頻率有所下降，到1980年后幾乎消失。在西班牙，配股卻很流行。這種差異可能在優(yōu)序融資理論描述的順序中起了重要作用。此外：（a)西班牙的私人企業(yè)主要采用債務(wù)融資，因此，銀行發(fā)揮著非常重要的作用；（b)西班牙的資本市場(chǎng)與美國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)相比欠發(fā)達(dá)，資本化程度較低，成交量也較小。雖然一些文章已研究了西

59、班牙企業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)，其中大部分已經(jīng)分析了不同變量對(duì)杠桿的作用。然而，很少有證據(jù)關(guān)注啄食順序，也沒有運(yùn)用沃森和威爾遜（2002年)的方法進(jìn)行的研究。</p><p>　　結(jié)果表明，中小型企業(yè)的行為與優(yōu)序融資理論的預(yù)測(cè)是一致。當(dāng)我們基于成長(zhǎng)速度和杠桿水平分出的二次抽查樣本，我們看到，高成長(zhǎng)型企業(yè)以留存收益的增長(zhǎng)為基礎(chǔ)，具有極高或極低負(fù)債比率的企業(yè)會(huì)傾向于適度負(fù)債。資金流動(dòng)的估算公式得出赤字的結(jié)果顯示長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)彌補(bǔ)資金赤

60、字。</p><p>　　優(yōu)序融資理論描述的企業(yè)融資順序如下：（1)企業(yè)更偏好用企業(yè)內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生的資金，即留存收益和折舊費(fèi)用來進(jìn)行投資；（2)企業(yè)股息支付率的確定是以未來投資機(jī)會(huì)和預(yù)期現(xiàn)金流量為基礎(chǔ)的；（3)股息支付率在短期內(nèi)趨于一定，所以在一些年度企業(yè)內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金流量能夠滿足資金需要，而在另一些年度內(nèi)則不夠；（4)獲得多年資金盈余，是在支付股息和用于短期投資或減輕債務(wù)的融資費(fèi)用后的。當(dāng)企業(yè)出現(xiàn)赤字，便會(huì)尋求外部融

61、資，首先是借款，然后是像可轉(zhuǎn)換債券的混合債券，最后才是股權(quán)融資。</p><p>　　要解釋這種行為，梅葉斯和梅吉拉夫（1984年)構(gòu)建了一個(gè)信息不對(duì)稱模型，這個(gè)模型假定企業(yè)管理者代表現(xiàn)有股東。如果企業(yè)有足夠多的資金，他們將進(jìn)行所有凈現(xiàn)值為正的投資。如果需要利用外來資金進(jìn)行新的投資，市場(chǎng)會(huì)以發(fā)行股票為證據(jù)認(rèn)為該企業(yè)股票被高估，因此發(fā)行公告將對(duì)股價(jià)產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響。</p><p>　　因此，梅

62、葉斯和梅吉拉夫（1984年)認(rèn)為，如果沒有足夠的資金用于新的投資，企業(yè)只有在非常有利可圖且該投資既不能推遲也不能通過債務(wù)融資解決的情況下，或當(dāng)管理者認(rèn)為股價(jià)被高估，以至于股東將傾向于容忍市場(chǎng)處罰時(shí)，才會(huì)發(fā)行股票。信息不對(duì)稱可能導(dǎo)致現(xiàn)有股東放棄凈現(xiàn)值為正的投資項(xiàng)目，以避免因股價(jià)下跌，從而造成投資不足。為了避免這些結(jié)果，企業(yè)在他們?nèi)谫Y能力之內(nèi)執(zhí)行融資政策，避免外部融資似乎很合理。</p><p>　　但是，梅葉斯和梅

63、吉拉夫（1984年）的模型也有一定的局限性。首先，它適用于像美國(guó)這樣的股票市場(chǎng)，發(fā)行股票主要通過承諾包銷，而不是通過在大多數(shù)其他市場(chǎng)普遍存在的方法——配股。在承諾包銷的情況下，股份同時(shí)向廣大公眾發(fā)售。因此，如果股票被高估，將會(huì)有財(cái)富從新股東轉(zhuǎn)移到現(xiàn)有股東的身上。在配股時(shí)，現(xiàn)有股東享有優(yōu)先購買權(quán)，這樣可以最大限度地減少財(cái)富轉(zhuǎn)移的可能性。因此，梅葉斯和梅吉拉夫（1984年）認(rèn)為，發(fā)行股票在企業(yè)的融資政策中是最后的選擇，而在貨幣市場(chǎng)上發(fā)行股票

64、是股權(quán)融資的普遍做法。</p><p>　　另一個(gè)梅葉斯和梅吉拉夫（1984年）模型的局限性在于，它通常是用于描述上市公司，但是對(duì)于剩下的大多數(shù)中小型企業(yè)沒有給出解釋。正因?yàn)槿绱耍瑥哪菚r(shí)起學(xué)者們?cè)噲D用合適的非上市中小企業(yè)來解釋優(yōu)序融資理論。</p><p>　　中小企業(yè)融資的一個(gè)主要問題，特別是在非盎格魯撒克遜國(guó)家，進(jìn)入資本市場(chǎng)是有限制的（資金缺口）（福爾摩斯和肯特，1991年）。因此，中

65、小企業(yè)的融資選擇通常只有通過留存收益和銀行借款。這個(gè)資金缺口可分為兩部分：一個(gè)是供應(yīng)缺口，由于資金有限或成本較高，和知識(shí)缺乏，因?yàn)槭煜ね獠咳谫Y的方式是有限的以及對(duì)于債務(wù)融資的優(yōu)缺點(diǎn)缺乏認(rèn)識(shí)。資金缺口的這兩部分造成的后果：主要的長(zhǎng)期資金來源將是內(nèi)部資金，如果有必要，才會(huì)向銀行借款。</p><p>　　另一個(gè)因素在企業(yè)選擇融資順序中可能起重要作用的是保留控制權(quán)的動(dòng)機(jī)（福爾摩斯和肯特，1991年；漢密爾頓和福克斯，1

66、998年）。正如我們已經(jīng)注意到了發(fā)行股票時(shí)采用承諾包銷，同一時(shí)間向社會(huì)大眾發(fā)售，因此，目前的股東擁有相對(duì)堅(jiān)挺的所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)可能會(huì)阻礙新股的發(fā)行。這樣的控制問題也可能出現(xiàn)在配股方面，但在較小的程度，因?yàn)槟壳暗墓蓶|可能首先只擁有有限的資金進(jìn)行投資或可能要分散投資，所以他們不會(huì)購買額外股份以維持其持股比例。由于上述原因，目前的股東也不愿意發(fā)行股票。</p><p>　　上述所提到的這些因素影響著由梅葉斯和梅吉拉夫（1

67、984年）所描述的類似的融資順序，也就是說，企業(yè)將首先利用留存收益，然后債務(wù)融資（銀行借款)，最后才是股權(quán)融資。</p><p>　　各作者試圖驗(yàn)證優(yōu)序融資理論的實(shí)證影響。接下來，我們簡(jiǎn)要地概括了其中的一部分。沃森和威爾遜（2002年）在英國(guó)市場(chǎng)使用描述模型，確認(rèn)了優(yōu)序融資理論在其中的應(yīng)用，特別是密切持有的企業(yè)（企業(yè)的所有權(quán)非常集中，其管理者通常是主要的所有者）。</p><p>　　希亞

68、姆-破甲和梅葉斯（1999年）與法蘭克和宮婭（2003年）研究企業(yè)采取何種方式彌補(bǔ)赤字。前者發(fā)現(xiàn)支持優(yōu)序融資理論的證據(jù)，后者找到目標(biāo)負(fù)債比率的證據(jù)。馬托（1990年）在西班牙市場(chǎng)使用會(huì)計(jì)恒等式研究彌補(bǔ)赤字的資金流的融資方式，其中包括發(fā)行股票。他認(rèn)為，企業(yè)往往不使用股權(quán)融資，他們的資金來源以債務(wù)融資為主。他還指出，債務(wù)融資和內(nèi)部融資是可以相互替代的。</p><p>　　法瑪和弗倫奇（2002年）運(yùn)用了結(jié)構(gòu)方程，它

69、基于優(yōu)序融資理論和權(quán)衡理論中提出的自變量將回歸杠桿和派息作為因變量。他們沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)一個(gè)確鑿證據(jù)支持其中一種具體理論。</p><p>　　羅皮斯-格雷西亞和艾巴-阿里亞斯（2000年）利用多變量方差研究?jī)?yōu)序融資理論和在西班牙市場(chǎng)的財(cái)務(wù)約束下提出的兩者變量之間的關(guān)系。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，內(nèi)部融資的重要性根據(jù)企業(yè)規(guī)模的不同而有所不同。薩阿-雷克霍（1996年）使用二元變量嵌套模型來測(cè)試西班牙企業(yè)內(nèi)部或外部融資之間的選擇與股權(quán)融資

70、和債務(wù)融資之間的選擇。他認(rèn)為，企業(yè)關(guān)心籌集的資金是公開還是私下，是否受到類似的財(cái)務(wù)限制，是否控股。</p><p>　　最后，福爾摩斯和肯特（1991年）和安格和榮格（1992年）通過使用郵件調(diào)查來試圖辨別典型企業(yè)的融資政策。兩位學(xué)者都發(fā)現(xiàn)，企業(yè)管理者選擇遵循一個(gè)類似優(yōu)序融資理論所描述的融資順序。福爾摩斯和肯特（1991年）發(fā)現(xiàn)中小企業(yè)比大型的企業(yè)更嚴(yán)格地遵循優(yōu)序融資順序。</p><p>

71、;　　總之，許多學(xué)者試圖驗(yàn)證優(yōu)序融資理論，但證據(jù)不確鑿。</p><p>　　我們已通過對(duì)1566家不同大小、不同成長(zhǎng)階段和超過1994-2000年以前的債務(wù)水平的西班牙企業(yè)的研究驗(yàn)證了優(yōu)序融資理論的實(shí)證影響。</p><p>　　優(yōu)序融資理論認(rèn)為企業(yè)融資時(shí)通常遵循一個(gè)順序。相對(duì)外部資金，企業(yè)更偏好內(nèi)部資金；在需要外部融資的情況下，企業(yè)首先偏好債務(wù)融資，而股權(quán)融資是最后的選擇。鑒于梅葉斯和

72、梅吉拉夫（1984年)的論點(diǎn)在像西班牙這種市場(chǎng)解釋融資順序是無效的，配股盛行、資金缺口、保留控制權(quán)的動(dòng)機(jī)也許可以有助于解釋這些市場(chǎng)上的融資順序。</p><p>　　對(duì)于整個(gè)樣本，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，留存收益和債務(wù)也有類似的系數(shù)，比股權(quán)系數(shù)高，是由福爾摩斯和肯特（1991年）提供的留存收益和債務(wù)的二元性證據(jù)指出的。在不同的次級(jí)樣本中，中小型企業(yè)似乎確實(shí)遵循優(yōu)序融資理論的預(yù)測(cè)；留存收益系數(shù)超過了債務(wù)系數(shù)，從而超過了股權(quán)系數(shù)。

73、這樣的結(jié)果可以用資金缺口或保留控制權(quán)的動(dòng)機(jī)來解釋。</p><p>　　基于企業(yè)的成長(zhǎng)和以前債務(wù)水平的次級(jí)樣本分析顯示，這些因素在決定企業(yè)融資政策時(shí)是非常重要的。高成長(zhǎng)型企業(yè)采取留存收益，然后債務(wù)融資，最后股權(quán)融資的順序。也就是說，這些企業(yè)遵循優(yōu)序融資理論。相比之下低成長(zhǎng)的企業(yè)則采取更平衡的方式融資。針對(duì)高杠桿率和低杠桿率企業(yè)的分析表明，這些企業(yè)傾向更穩(wěn)健的債務(wù)水平。</p><p>