斯洛文尼亞后私有化時(shí)代的管理層持股與公司業(yè)績(jī)[文獻(xiàn)翻譯]

1、原文：原文：ManagerialOwnershipCpatePerfmanceinSlovenianPostPrivatizationPeriodAbstractWhileSlovenianpostprivatizationperiodhasbeenacterizedbyadeclineintheownershipofthenonmanagerialowners(employees)managershavebeenincreasingt

2、heircontrol.Meovergiventhattheoptimalownershipstake(asstatedbythemanagers)intheyear2002exceededtheiractualshareby10.8percentagepointsweexpectthemanagerstocontinueconsolidatingtheirownershipalsointhefuture.Theaimofourpape

3、ristodescribethemaintrendsintheownershipofSloveniancpationsinthepostprivatizationperiodtoprovideananswertothebasiceconomicquestion:whatistheinfluenceoftheongoingconsolidationofmanagerialownershipontheperfmanceofSlovenian

4、firms.Theempiricalanalysistestingthisrelationshipisbasedonapanelof182Slovenianfirmsintheperiod199599doesnotproviderelevantevidenceonpositiveeffectsoftheincreasingmanagerialcontrolontheperfmanceofSlovenianfirms.Ifanyposit

5、iveincentiveeffectisobservedonlyinthefirmswithmanagers’holdingsexceeding10percentonlywithregardstofirmfinancialperfmance(butnottotalfactproductivity)onlyinfirmsthatarenotlistedonthecapitalmarket.Furthermethenegativeeffec

6、tofthecurrentgapbetweentheoptimalactualmanagerialownershipseemstoprevailoveranypositiveincentiveeffectarisingoutofmanagerialownership.IntroductionTheincreasingmanagerialownershipapartfromthereductionintheownershipofState

7、controlledfundsemployeesrepresentoneofthemainfeaturesthatacterizetheownershipchangesintheSlovenianpostprivatizationperiod.Mostprominentaretheincreasesinmanagerialstakesinnonlistedfirmsinwhichthetransferofownershiprealize

8、satrelativelylowpricesmostlyremainpubliclyundisclosed.MeovergiventhatSlovenianmanagersstillclaimtobeunsatisfiedwiththeircurrentownershipstakes(attheendof2002theoptimalownershipstakeofhavethreeshareholderswithatleast5perc

9、entownershipblocks.HoweveronthecontrarytotheContinentalEuropeinstitutionalinvestsboardmembersholdmostoftheseblocks.Whilethefmerusuallystaypassivedon’tinterveneinthefirms’decisionmakingmanagersnmallyholdbetween2040percent

10、ofthevotingrightsdecisivelyparticipateinthegovernanceconsequentlyinfluencetheperfmanceofthefirmstheyown(Becht2001HoldernessSheehan2001).Similarlyfasampleof4200USAlistedcpationsHoldernessKrosznerSheehan(1999)rept21percent

11、averagemanagerialstakessince1935theshareofcapitalheldbythemanagersincreasedbyapproximately8percentagepoints.Otherempiricalstudiesconfirmthatuponthepracticeofboardremunerationswithsharesstockoptionsmanagerialownershipacte

12、rizesmostoftheUSAcpations.MeovermanagerialblockholdingscanbefoundinEuropeaswellboardmembersofthefirmslistedontheLondonStockExchangefexamplerepresentthesecondmostimptantgroupofblockholdersassuchonaveragehold11percentofthe

13、votingrightsamongwhichabout65percentisheldbychiefexecutives(GoergenReeneboog2001).Theinfluenceofmanagerialownershiponfirms’valueisrelatedtotheperspectivethatfirms’valuedependsonthedistributionofownershipbetweenmanagersot

14、herownersfirstunderlinedbytheBerleMeans(1932)JensenMeckling(1976).Withinthiscontestthesocalled‘incentiveargument’givingmanagerscpatesharesmakesthembehavelikeshareholders.Inanextremecase(JensenMeckling1976)wewouldhaveafir

15、mwithasingleownermanagertheagencycostsreducedtotherelationshipbetweentheownermanageritscredits，thatisnoequityrelatedagencycosts.Theoutstingperfmanceofthefirmswith100%ownershiphasbeenrecentlyconfirmedbyMuellerE.SpitzA.(20

16、02)theyarguethattheoutstingperfmancemightnotonlybeduetoincentivesbutalsoduetootherpsychologicalreasons.Thetheyoftheentrepreneurshipfurtherpromotestheideathatmanagerswhicharealsoblockholdersbetterperceivenewbusinessopptun