上市公司控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移與股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)關(guān)系研究.pdf

1、南京財經(jīng)大學(xué)碩士學(xué)位論文上市公司控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移與股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)關(guān)系研究姓名：常興華申請學(xué)位級別：碩士專業(yè)：會計學(xué)指導(dǎo)教師：王開田2008-01II ABSTRACT The key problem of this thesis is the relationship between corporate control transfer and ownership structure. The article de

2、fines the corporate control transfer as the first major shareholder shift, which is announced by the listed companies. We study certain quantities of sample companies to research the relationshi

3、p. There is a close relationship between ownership structure and corporate control transfer. Good ownership structure plays a critical role to the healthy operation of the corporation. We can an

4、alyze the mechanism of corporate governance to a deeper extent by researching the relationship. Corporate control transfer is a market behavior on the basis of the market of control rights. A number of

5、 theoretical and positive researches in western countries illustrate that a good control right market is an essential mechanism to outer corporate governance. The control transfer of our listed

6、companies appeared and has developed in the environment of particular institutional change of security market and policy in our country. Considering the special institutional background in our co

7、untry, it makes sense to do research on the relationship between the corporate control transfer and ownership structure and develop the control right market in order to improve the ownership s

8、tructure. The article systematically analyzes the degree that ownership structure influences corporate control transfer, on the basis of related theories, institutional background and some former researches

9、. We choose the companies, whose control rights have changed in 2005, and do descriptive statistics and Logistic analysis, by collecting the data in stock scale, the composition of ownership a

10、nd the degree of equity concentration. Our conclusions are as follows: Compared to the companies whose control rights have not changed, the characters of the companies, whose control rights have changed,

11、 are dramatic: the corporate control transfer has nothing to do with total stock scale, the owners’equity per share is obviously different, most of the share rights are concentrated in the st

12、ate owned shareholder; the degree of equity concentration is lower from an overall point, which shows that the degree of equity concentration changes in an apposite direction with the possibilit

13、y of takeover. According to the results of Logistic regression, the stock scale can put an opposite influence to corporate control transfer, so does owners’equity per share. Whereas the tradable