2013-2018年日本銀行的超級寬松貨幣政策（英文）

1、The Working Paper series is a continuation of the formerly named Discussion Paper series; the numbering of the papers continued without interruption or change. ADBI’s working papers reflect initial ideas on a topic and

2、 are posted online for discussion. Some working papers may develop into other forms of publication.Suggested citation:Shirai, S. 2018. The Bank of Japan’s Super-Easy Monetary Policy from 2013–2018. ADBI Working Pap

3、er 896. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. Available: https://www.adb.org/publications/bank-japan-super-easy-monetary-policy-2013-2018Please contact the authors for information about this paper. Email: sshirai@a

4、dbi.org,Sayuri Shirai is a visiting fellow at the Asian Development Bank Institute.The views expressed in this paper are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of ADBI, ADB, its Bo

5、ard of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not ne

6、cessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.Working papers are subject to formal revision and correction before they are finalized and considered published.,Asian Development Bank Institute Kasumigaseki Building,

7、8th Floor 3-2-5 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-kuTokyo 100-6008, Japan,Tel: Fax: URL:E-mail:,+81-3-3593-5500+81-3-3593-5571www.adbi.org info@adbi.org,© 2018 Asian Development Bank Institute,ADBI Working Paper 896,S.

8、Shirai,AbstractUnconventional monetary easing conducted by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) since 2013 has contributed to the yen’s depreciation, higher stock prices, and higher corporate profits. Meanwhile, the impacts on ag

9、gregate demand and inflation have not been as strong as the BOJ expected while the adverse impact on financial institutions and deep distortion in the financial and capital markets have become prevalent. Therefore, the

10、 BOJ will eventually need to make it more sustainable before underlying inflation approaches 2%. Leaving room for additional monetary accommodation in the event of severe recession is also essential. Keeping the possi

11、ble phasing out of the program in mind, the BOJ explicitly expanded the target range to ±0.2%, thereby effectively raising the yields of 10 years and longer and steepening the yield curve. At the same time, the BO

12、J introduced flexibility on exchange- traded fund (ETF) purchases that would enable “stealth tapering” or cutting the amount of annual purchase amount quietly without declaring it openly—as in the case of Japanese Gov

13、ernment Bond (JGB) purchases. The BOJ should interpret the 2% price stability target flexibly—such as the incorporation of the 1% upper and lower range (±1%) to the 2% target—in order to complete tapering of both

14、JGBs and ETFs, as well as ultimately eliminating the 10-year yield target. Since the Japanese economy is likely to face an economic slowdown after the 2019 consumption tax hike and the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games, it wil

15、l be much longer before the BOJ can take decisive steps to normalize monetary policy by raising the short-term policy rates like the Federal Reserve.Keywords: Bank of Japan, Japanese Government Bonds, Exchange-Traded

16、Funds, 2% Price Stability TargetJEL Classification: E3, E4, E5,ADBI Working Paper 896,S. Shirai,Contents,1.,INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................

17、......... 1,2.,ADOPTION OF QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE MONETARY EASINGAND ITS EXPANSION ................................................................................................ 2,2.1Features of QQE Adopted in

18、April 2013 .......................................................... 22.2Expansion of QQE Announced in October 2014 ............................................. 2,3.,NEGATIVE INTEREST RATE, YIELD CURVE COTROL, AND TH

19、E JULY2018 ADJUSTMENTS................................................................................................. 3,3.1The Negative Interest Rate Policy ...........................................................

20、........ 33.2The Yield Curve Control Policy ....................................................................... 73.3Monetary Policy Adjustments Announced in July 2018................................. 11,4.,EFFECT

21、IVENESS OF UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY EASING ........................ 12,Inflation Performance and the BOJ’s Optimistic Inflation Forecast ............... 12Sluggish Inflation Performance and Weak Households’ Spending ....

22、........... 15 4.3Weak Wage Performance and Wage Expectation ........................................ 154.4Upward Bias in Households’ Price Perception and Inflation Expectation...... 174.5Is Portfolio Rebalance Tak

23、ing Place in Japan? ............................................. 195.CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................ 19REFERENCES ..............

24、....................................................................................................... 21,1,ADBI Working Paper 896,S. Shirai,1. INTRODUCTIONIn January 2013, the Bank of Japan (BOJ), led by previous Gove

25、rnor Masaaki Shirakawa at the time, introduced its 2% price stability target. In April 2013, under current Governor Haruhiko Kuroda, the BOJ adopted massive and various monetary easing tools to achieve the target—so-c

26、alled Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE). This was expanded in October 2014, and supplemented with a negative interest rate in January 2016 and yield curve control in September 2016. The BOJ’s financia

27、l assets as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) recorded about 100% currently—much greater than the European Central Bank (about 30%) and the Federal Reserve (about 25% in 2014 when the maximum had been reached). W

28、hile the BOJ’s asset purchasing program was extended from the Comprehensive Monetary Easing (CME) under then Governor Shirakawa, its scale of monetary accommodation and diversity of monetary easing tools adopted are u

29、nprecedented and extraordinary. Moreover, raising inflation to achieve the 2% target in a low inflationary or mild deflationary environment like Japan is a rare experiment in the world. Many central banks have adopted

30、 the inflation-targeting framework, but in the context of a high- inflation environment, so containing inflation was their key objective.In April 2013, Governor Kuroda appeared certain that the 2% price stability targe

31、t would be achieved in around 2 years since all necessary measures had been taken. More than 5 years have since passed, and the BOJ continues to lag behind other major central banks including the Federal Reserve and t

32、he European Central Bank (ECB). While the Fed struggled to achieve the 2% long-run goal, inflation based on personal consumption expenditure (PCE) and core inflation (based on PCE excluding food and energy) have final

33、ly been at a level of around 2% since March 2018. In the eurozone, inflation based on the harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP) has been around 2% since April 2018, but core inflation has remained at around 1%—wel

34、l below their price stability target of “below, but close to, 2%.” The BOJ is the poorest performer among the three central banks since both headline and core inflation remained substantially weaker. According to the

35、latest September 2018 data, inflation based on the consumer price index (CPI) recorded 1.2% but CPI excluding all food and energy—an indicator that reflect goods and services mostly determined by domestic demand and s

36、upply conditions—was a mere 0.1%. In July 2018, the BOJ gave up expressing the expected timing to reach 2% inflation—after having postponed it six times after its initial claim of “around fiscal year 2015.” This is a c

37、lear indication that the BOJ has lost confidence in achieving the target in the foreseeable future.This paper takes an overview of the BOJ’s monetary policy since April 2013 when QQE was adopted and examines factors c

38、ontributing to the failure of achieving the 2% price stability target. The paper is comprised of five sections. Section II briefly focuses on QQE adopted in April 2013 and its expansion in October 2014. Section III sh

39、eds light on the negative interest rate, yield curve control, and the recent monetary policy adjustment announced in July 2018—all of which could be views as “steps towards monetary policy normalization”—not yet as “cl

40、ear steps of monetary policy normalization” but steps moving closer toward normalization—due to the clear deviation from the original QQE framework. These measures have given rise to ambiguity and complexity over the

41、monetary policy framework due to inconsistency with the BOJ’s communication strategies. Section IV reviews inflation performance and factors contributing to the failure of achieving the 2% price stability target. Sect

42、ion V concludes.,2,ADBI Working Paper 896,S. Shirai,ADOPTION OF QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE MONETARY EASING AND ITS EXPANSIONFeatures of QQE Adopted in April 2013The BOJ adopted QQE in April 2013 to achieve the price

43、 stability target of 2% at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about 2 years. The “quantitative” dimension referred to the expansion of the monetary base at an annual pace of \60–\70 trillion—monetary b

44、ase targeting (or monetary base control). The “qualitative” dimension referred mainly to the guideline for asset purchases comprising of (a) net JGB purchases at an annual pace of about \50 trillion (excluding the amou

45、nt of reinvestment); (b) the average remaining maturity of JGB purchases of about 7 years (6 to 8 years) by purchasing JGBs all up to the maximum 40 years; and, (c) Exchange- Traded Fund (ETF) and Real Estate Investme

46、nt Trust (J-REIT) purchases at an annual pace of about \1 trillion and about \30 billion, respectively. To demonstrate its intention to achieve 2% inflation in about 2 years, the BOJ announced that it would double the

47、 monetary base and the amounts outstanding of JGBs and ETFs in 2 years, and more than double the average remaining maturity of JGB purchases. At the same time, the BOJ adopted forward guidance that QQE would continue a

48、iming to achieve the price stability target of 2%, as long as it is necessary for maintaining that target in a stable manner.Monetary base control is the most important element of QQE; it indicated a shift of the mai

49、n operating target for money market operations from the uncollateralized overnight call rate to the monetary base. One of the major tasks of the BOJ’s operational department (Financial Markets Department) is to meet th

50、e operating target as closely as possible. This means that achieving the monetary base target is prioritized over other guidelines in the conduct of monetary policy. This operating target differs from that of the Fede

51、ral Reserve where the objective for open market operations continued to be specified as the federal funds rate (short-term policy rate). The Federal Reserve maintained this target even when it greatly expanded its hold

52、ings of longer-term securities through open market purchases with the goal of putting downward pressure on longer-term interest rates. This symbolizes the priority given to “quantity” under Mr. Kuroda’s Governorship,

53、while the Federal Reserve treated asset purchases as supplement to the federal funds rate. To achieve this scale of monetary base expansion, JGBs were the most important financial assets purchased. The BOJ’s purchases

54、 of longer-term JGBs would result in a decline in the net supply of these bonds circulating in the markets, so that the average remaining maturity of JGBs transacted in the markets would be shortened. This would lead t

55、o a decline in the term premium.Expansion of QQE Announced in October 2014About one and a half year after the initiation of QQE, the BOJ decided to expand the annual pace of increase in the monetary base from about

56、\60–\70 trillion to about\80 trillion in October 2013. The main reason was a sharp decline in household spending caused by a consumption tax hike in April 2014. A decline in long-terminflation expectations

57、 caused by weaker domestic demand and an oil price drop frommid-2014 were other factors leading to the decision to expand QQE. To achieve this monetary base targeting, the amount outstanding of JGB holdings was increas

58、ed by\30 trillion to about \80 trillion. With a view to encouraging a further decline in interest rates across the entire yield curve, moreover, the BOJ extended the average remaining,ADBI Working Paper 896,S. Shirai,

59、maturity target of JGB purchases from about 7 years (6–8 years) to about 7–10 years. In addition to the JGBs, the BOJ decided to increase purchases of risk assets such as ETFs and J-REITs, tripling their amounts outsta

60、nding and increasing their annual pace of purchase from about \1 trillion to about \3 trillion and from about \30 billion to about \90 billion, respectively. The average remaining maturity of JGB purchases was extende

61、d further from about 7–10 years to about 7–12 years in December 2015.3. NEGATIVE INTEREST RATE, YIELD CURVE COTROL, AND THE JULY 2018 ADJUSTMENTS3.1 The Negative Interest Rate PolicyIn January 2016, the BOJ surprise

62、d the public and the markets when it announced its decision to adopt a negative interest rate on part of excess reserves, with effect from 16 February, the possibility of which had been rejected by the BOJ for many yea

63、rs. The BOJ’s new view was that a negative interest rate would expand aggregate demand and inflation expectations, thereby accelerating the path toward 2% inflation. The negative interest rate policy is applicable to

64、current accounts that financial institutions hold at the BOJ. Since adopting the Complementary Deposit Facility in October 2008, the BOJ had initiated payment of positive interest on the current account balances and m

65、aintained 0.1% until adoption of a negative interest rate. 1 Out of the current account balances, no interest rate (zero interest rate) is applied to required reserve balances.3.1.1 The Negative Interest Rate Policy a

66、nd Three-Tier SystemThe negative interest rate policy gave rise to the complicated three-tier system where the outstanding current account balance was decomposed into three types to which a positive 0.1%, zero percent

67、, and –0.1% is applied, respectively. These respective balances are called Basic Balance, Macro Addon Balance, and Policy-Rate Balance, respectively. The specific amount has since been transferred regularly from the Po

68、licy- Rate Balance to the Macro Addon Balance using the Benchmark Ratio—to maintain the amount outstanding of around \10 in the Policy-Rate Balance on a monthly basis (see Shirai [2018a] for details). The rationale fo

69、r adopting the three-tier system was to mitigate adverse impacts of a negative interest rate on the profitability of financial institutions through a decline in interest income paid by the BOJ on the current account b

70、alance—as well as to maintain the functioning of call markets through promoting inter-bank transactions. The system is more complicated than the ECB system, where a negative interest rate (–0.4) has been applied to all

71、 excess reserves and the deposit facility.Hereafter, the BOJ announced that monetary easing would be pursued by making full use of possible measures in terms of three dimensions by adding interest rate to existing qu

72、antitative and qualitative dimensions—so called “QQE with a Negative Interest Rate.” On the quantitative dimension, the BOJ stressed again a willingness to expand the monetary base since it could technically continue t