外文翻譯------人民幣在中國(guó)其價(jià)值、其可調(diào)節(jié)匯率和其未來(lái)發(fā)展

1、<p><b>　　外文原文</b></p><p>　　The Chinese RMB: Its Value, Its Peg, and Its Future</p><p>　　--TRADE IMBALANCES HAVE MORE TO DO WITH THE U.S. THAN WITH CHINA</p><p>　　Th

2、e valuation of the Chinese renminbi (RMB) has drawn lots of attention lately and a great deal of pressure on the part of developed nations for revaluation. In addressing the issue of valuation, this paper develops a new

3、purchasing power parity (PPP) index of China’s exchange rate and finds that the while undervalued, the undervaluation is neither unusual nor bad policy. Moreover, China’s overall external trade balance does not seem to b

4、e that far out of equilibrium. China’s desire to join the </p><p>　　The valuation of the Chinese renminbi (RMB) has drawn lots of attention lately. The IMF, theU.S. government, and the G-7 finance ministers

5、are urging China to revalue its currency,which is currently pegged at 8.28 to the dollar.The arguments for China to appreciate its currency roughly follow these lines:</p><p>　　? China’s currency is grossly

6、undervalued;</p><p>　　? the undervalued RMB is attracting a flood of hot money into China, complicating the authorities’ efforts to engineer a soft-landing for an overheated economy; and</p><p>

7、　　? the RMB’s undervaluation and its peg to the dollar are preventing other Asian countries from allowing currencies to rise against the dollar, since appreciation would damage competiveness relative to China.</p>

8、<p>　　This last point is of particular concern because, it is argued , U.S. external imbalances cannot be addressed in the face of China’s and other Asian nations’ historically unprecedented accumulations of U.S. d

9、ollar reserves in recent years .There have been many studies on the RMB’s valuation with inconclusive, contradictory results (see, e.g.,Wang, 2004). To address that difficult valuation question, this paper develops a new

10、 absolute PPP index that measures China’s PPP against the United States </p><p>　　Is the RMB Undervalued?</p><p>　　The RMB is undervalued in the conventional sense that there is too much demand

11、for it relative to the supply .Fundamentally, demand for foreign currency comes from three sources:</p><p>　　? to buy goods or services,</p><p>　　? to invest in physical or financial assets, and

12、</p><p>　　? to speculate on moves of the exchange rate itself.</p><p>　　With a closed capital account, China’s currency is largely, but not entirely, immune from currency speculators and short-t

13、erm portfolio investors. Recent studies at the China National Economic Research Institute (2003) indicate that much of the so-called “hot money” inflows are not a result of foreign hedge fund activities. Rather, they are

14、 a change in borrowing and deposit behaviors of domestic firms and individuals, taking advantage of the loopholes in the current foreign exchange regulations.</p><p>　　PPP is an ancient economic concept, dat

15、ing back at least to David Hume (1752), which has been experiencing something of a revival lately .The Economist (current) defines PPP as “the exchange rate that equates the price of a basket of identical traded goods an

16、d services in two countries.” The theory is that PPP exchange rates represent the equilibrium levels among the nations and that any departure from these levels causes potentially significant and distorting trade imbalanc

17、es. There are differe</p><p>　　Should China Bow to the Pressure?</p><p>　　Aside from political considerations, which we will discuss later, the question of whether China should move now is a com

18、plex one, relating to several considerations. First, market expectations of the RMB’s move have already caused a significant reversal of capital flight and increased upward speculative pressure. Second, cyclical global m

19、acroeconomic developments are likely to reduce upward pressure on the RMB. Third, China is in the midst of critical structural reforms, especially in the financ</p><p>　　Re-pegging the RMB</p><p&g

20、t;　　Re-pegging the RMB at a value, say, 15-20 percent higher against the U.S. dollar would instantly vindicate the currency speculators, although they are mostly domestic players. Over the last couple of years, the net e

21、rrors and omissions category in China’s balance of payment has shown a large swing from persistent deficits to a surplus of $7.5 billion in 2003. The net errors and emissions category is believed to capture illegal capit

22、al movements. During much of mid- to late-90s, China’s capital f</p><p>　　More Chinese Interest Rate Flexibility</p><p>　　As the Fed continues to boost U.S. interest rates, Chinese authorities h

23、ave more flexibility to raise domestic interest rates without worrying about widening the interest rate gap and encouraging further hot money inflows. With global economic growth only moderating a bit lately, demand for

24、energy and commodities remains strong, which is likely to keep oil and commodity prices high and to increase the import bill for China and other Asian countries—yet another source of reduced pressure on the R</p>

25、<p>　　China’s Shaky Fundamentals</p><p>　　Perhaps most important, the sharp cyclical upswing since the end of the SARS crisis is masking China’s shaky fundamentals to the outside world. Despite modern f

26、actories, spanking new airports, highways, and shopping malls, China’s social and financial institutions are perhaps comparable to those of the U.S. in the late 19th century period of the “Robber Barons.” A 2003 poll con

27、ducted by Peking University of about 100 China experts shows that one third of them believe there will be a major crisis</p><p>　　Reminiscent of the age of the U.S. “Robber Barons,” the widespread, systemati

28、c corruption and abuse of power is estimated to cost as much as 14 percent of China’s GDP per year. The financial system—which includes the banking, securities, and insurance sectors needs an urgent overhaul to improve e

29、fficiency and be ready for foreign competition under China’s WTO commitment. Job creation remains a daunting challenge given continued efforts at transforming the state-owned-enterprises and improving pr</p><p

30、>　　Weak Link between Revaluation and Internal Adjustment</p><p>　　Finally, based on international evidence (Rogoff, 2004) and China’s own experience, it is not at all clear that a revalued RMB will facili

31、tate internal reform efforts. Revaluation of the RMB may not help that much in terms of cyclical macroeconomic adjustment. Despite significant increases in the headline inflation, core inflation remains low. This is a sh

32、arp departure from China’s historical overheating periods and suggests that there is no systematic price push from aggregate demand, as was th</p><p>　　The Issue Is Mostly Political</p><p>　　The

33、 growing U.S. external deficits are clearly unsustainable and must be addressed. It has been argued that the longer the United States waits, the higher the potential shock or damage there will be (Mann, 2004; BCA, 2004;

34、Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2004). But is revaluing the RMB part of the solution to this problem? A close look at the situation suggests that at best it may reduce the problem only marginally in the near term, while the longer-

35、term impacts are unclear since foreign exchange policy ch</p><p>　　Looking to the Future</p><p>　　The central point of this paper is that while the RMB is clearly undervalued (especially by PPP

36、measures), there really has been no fundamental change in the valuation that warrants intensive market pressure for it to have depreciated in 1997-8 and to appreciate now. Looking at the broad picture, the relationship b

37、etween the RMB’s peg to the dollar and China’s external account surpluses and rising foreign reserves is not as clear as often argued. The contribution of the RMB’s undervaluation to e</p><p>　　China’s polit

38、ical capital is best invested in other areas of structural reform. Unfortunately, given its much larger influence on the global economy, China probably cannot say “no” this time to external political pressure and may mov

39、e sooner than it would like. If history proves that China de-pegged before it is capable of handling the shock, the lesson would be that the G-7 failed to recognize that a stable, orderly progressing China is in the best

40、 interest of all. For the longer term, few doub</p><p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p>　　人民幣在中國(guó)：其價(jià)值、其可調(diào)節(jié)匯率和其未來(lái)發(fā)展</p><p>　　————貿(mào)易不平衡對(duì)美國(guó)的影響大于對(duì)中國(guó)的影響</p><p>　　中國(guó)人民幣的估值最近已引

41、起很多關(guān)注，同時(shí)在人民幣升值方面承受著大量來(lái)自發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的壓力。在解決估值問(wèn)題中，本文新引用的購(gòu)買(mǎi)力平價(jià)（PPP）包含了中國(guó)的匯率指數(shù)，并認(rèn)為人民幣被低估，既不是不正常的低估，也不是糟糕的政策。此外，中國(guó)的整體外貿(mào)的平衡，似乎遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低于平衡。中國(guó)加入七國(guó)集團(tuán)俱樂(lè)部的希望很可能導(dǎo)致放棄聯(lián)系匯率，盡管增加的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)能促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展。</p><p>　　最近，我國(guó)人民幣的估值已經(jīng)引起了廣泛的關(guān)注。就連國(guó)際貨幣基金組織、美國(guó)政

42、府和金融七國(guó)的負(fù)責(zé)人都以人民幣來(lái)估計(jì)他們的通貨價(jià)值，人民幣對(duì)美元的匯率為8.28人民幣。對(duì)于我國(guó)人民幣匯率升值的討論大約有下列幾點(diǎn)：</p><p>　　中國(guó)人民幣被普遍的低估；被低估的人民幣正在吸引大量的熱通貨進(jìn)入中國(guó)，復(fù)雜的貨幣當(dāng)局努力致力于過(guò)熱的軟著陸經(jīng)濟(jì)。并且人民幣被低估和它對(duì)美元的匯率是用于防止允許對(duì)美元的通貨升值的其他亞洲國(guó)家的，因?yàn)槿嗣駧派祵⑵茐钠渌麌?guó)家與中國(guó)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系。</p>&

43、lt;p>　　競(jìng)爭(zhēng)理念的最重要核心是因?yàn)樗贿^(guò)度的討論。近年來(lái)，美國(guó)外部失衡觸及中國(guó)和其他亞洲國(guó)家的歷史上前所未有的美元儲(chǔ)備危機(jī)。出現(xiàn)了許多關(guān)于人民幣不確定估值的研究和自相矛盾的結(jié)果。為了解決這一困難的估價(jià)問(wèn)題，本文開(kāi)發(fā)了一個(gè)對(duì)美國(guó)和其他國(guó)家來(lái)說(shuō)是新的絕對(duì)購(gòu)買(mǎi)力平價(jià)指數(shù)：中國(guó)購(gòu)買(mǎi)力平價(jià)的措施。新指數(shù)顯示了“傳統(tǒng)智慧”下，人民幣被大幅低估的具體情況。然而，人民幣被低估是不同尋常的，鑒于中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展水平，傳統(tǒng)智慧并不適用于中國(guó)，因?yàn)?/p>

44、任何標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來(lái)衡量它都不是一個(gè)發(fā)達(dá)的國(guó)家，沒(méi)有發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家有較穩(wěn)定的貨幣匯率以維持國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治穩(wěn)定（普拉薩德等，2003）。對(duì)多邊外部平衡方面而言，我們覺(jué)得很難說(shuō)中國(guó)的貨幣對(duì)其貿(mào)易和國(guó)際收支盈余有很大的促進(jìn)作用，尤其是如果從1997年的角度來(lái)看，人民幣承受巨大的貶值壓力。事實(shí)上，有明確的證據(jù)表明，如果中國(guó)的貿(mào)易平衡，均勻地分布在其貿(mào)易伙伴，將幾乎沒(méi)有任何中國(guó)的貨幣升值的壓力。因此，從美國(guó)發(fā)起的范圍越來(lái)越大，次數(shù)越來(lái)越多的多邊貿(mào)易不平衡來(lái)看，壓

45、力是政治和結(jié)構(gòu)性的。不幸的是，它是非常容易的，而不是指責(zé)中國(guó)攻擊美國(guó)貿(mào)易赤字的結(jié)構(gòu)性根源。是對(duì)中國(guó)政府施加政治壓力，放棄人民幣只釘住美元，并</p><p><b>　　是人民幣被低估？</b></p><p>　　人民幣在傳統(tǒng)意義上被低估，從根本上講有太多的需求相對(duì)于供應(yīng)。從根本上來(lái)說(shuō)，對(duì)外幣的需求來(lái)自三個(gè)方面：</p><p><b&

46、gt;　　?購(gòu)買(mǎi)商品或服務(wù)，</b></p><p>　　?投資于實(shí)物或金融資產(chǎn)，</p><p>　　?要猜測(cè)匯率本身的變化。</p><p>　　隨著封閉的、獨(dú)立的資本賬戶(hù)的產(chǎn)生，中國(guó)的通貨變得數(shù)量較大而重要，但對(duì)于貨幣投機(jī)者和短期投資者的投資組合情況來(lái)看，這一事實(shí)也不完全適用。在中國(guó)國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所（2003）最近的科學(xué)研究表明，所謂的“熱錢(qián)”流入的

47、多少并不是國(guó)外對(duì)沖基金活動(dòng)的結(jié)果。相反，他們是利用在當(dāng)前外匯匯率管制規(guī)定存在漏洞這一優(yōu)勢(shì)，改變當(dāng)?shù)仄髽I(yè)和個(gè)人的借款和存款行為。因此，我們可以著眼于對(duì)中國(guó)的貿(mào)易和投資流動(dòng)的長(zhǎng)期關(guān)注，并期待產(chǎn)生標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的措施，例如購(gòu)買(mǎi)力平價(jià)（PPP）、貿(mào)易收支平衡、經(jīng)常帳差額、國(guó)際收支和外匯儲(chǔ)備。</p><p>　　購(gòu)買(mǎi)力平價(jià)學(xué)說(shuō)是一個(gè)古老的經(jīng)濟(jì)概念，至少可以追溯到大衛(wèi)休謨（1752），已經(jīng)經(jīng)歷了至少一次復(fù)興。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家（目前）將購(gòu)買(mǎi)力

48、平價(jià)學(xué)說(shuō)定義為“匯率，相當(dāng)于在兩個(gè)國(guó)家的商品交易和服務(wù)中的一籃子價(jià)格相同的購(gòu)買(mǎi)力平價(jià)的東西。”該理論認(rèn)為，購(gòu)買(mǎi)力平價(jià)的匯率代表國(guó)家之間的均衡水平，而從這些層面出發(fā)的任何潛在的重大原因和扭曲貿(mào)易存在不平衡。PPP有許多不同的購(gòu)買(mǎi)力平價(jià)措施：一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的版本或“絕對(duì)”的版本，強(qiáng)調(diào)了價(jià)格的絕對(duì)平等（有時(shí)稱(chēng)為“單一價(jià)格法則”）和“相對(duì)”的版本，強(qiáng)調(diào)隨著時(shí)間的推移，趨于平等運(yùn)動(dòng)。</p><p>　　中國(guó)會(huì)屈服于這些壓力嗎&

49、lt;/p><p>　　除了政治上的考慮，我們將在后面討論，人民幣是否流動(dòng)現(xiàn)在變成一個(gè)復(fù)雜的問(wèn)題，涉及到幾個(gè)因素。首先，人民幣的移動(dòng)市場(chǎng)預(yù)期已經(jīng)造成了重大逆轉(zhuǎn)資本外逃，并且增加了更多的投機(jī)壓力。第二，周期性的全球宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展有可能減少對(duì)人民幣升值的壓力。第三，中國(guó)正處于重要的結(jié)構(gòu)改革中期，尤其是在金融行業(yè)部分需要重點(diǎn)關(guān)注。第四，人們?cè)絹?lái)越清楚，目前的經(jīng)濟(jì)過(guò)熱的現(xiàn)象是暫時(shí)的，這與1993-4事件形成鮮明對(duì)比。這些因素表

50、明這個(gè)時(shí)候不是中國(guó)貨幣升值的關(guān)注點(diǎn)所在。讓我們來(lái)逐一看看這些問(wèn)題的討論。</p><p>　　重新盯住人民幣匯率變動(dòng)</p><p>　　在一定水平上重新盯住人民幣價(jià)值，也就是說(shuō)，貨幣對(duì)美元的匯率變動(dòng)15%-20%時(shí)投機(jī)者會(huì)立即平反貨幣，但它們大多是國(guó)內(nèi)的投資者。在過(guò)去幾年中，凈誤差與遺漏在中國(guó)的國(guó)際收支類(lèi)別都出現(xiàn)了持續(xù)的赤字，最大的變動(dòng)則為2003年盈余的75億元。凈誤差和排放類(lèi)被認(rèn)為是

51、非法獲取的資金流動(dòng)。在90年代中后期，大部分的中國(guó)的資本外逃，國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的百分比是世界倒數(shù)第二（只有俄羅斯是更糟）。事實(shí)上，在貨幣危機(jī)期間，它比1997年的墨西哥和1997年的韓國(guó)還差。但最近，由于人民幣升值預(yù)期已經(jīng)提高，這部分資本也在尋找升值的路。也有強(qiáng)烈的跡象表明，企業(yè)和個(gè)人都參與貨幣投機(jī)活動(dòng)，這促成了不動(dòng)產(chǎn)投資過(guò)熱的現(xiàn)象?，F(xiàn)在人民幣升值看好未來(lái)的預(yù)期收益，這可能加劇國(guó)際收支平衡的壓力。</p><p>　

52、　加大中國(guó)利率的浮動(dòng)幅度</p><p>　　更由于美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)繼續(xù)提高美元利率，中國(guó)當(dāng)局無(wú)需擔(dān)心利率差距拉大，有更大的靈活性來(lái)提高人民幣利率，并鼓勵(lì)進(jìn)一步的熱錢(qián)流入國(guó)內(nèi)利率。隨著全球經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)放緩，近來(lái)，對(duì)能源和大宗商品的需求依然強(qiáng)勁，這很可能使石油和商品價(jià)格居高不下，從而對(duì)中國(guó)和其他亞洲國(guó)家增加進(jìn)口費(fèi)用，又減少了對(duì)人民幣的壓力來(lái)源。的確，只要長(zhǎng)期石油需求和政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)仍然存在，對(duì)亞洲的石油進(jìn)口國(guó)的負(fù)面影響將隨之而來(lái)，以市

53、場(chǎng)為導(dǎo)向的貨幣壓力不會(huì)消失。</p><p><b>　　中國(guó)搖搖欲墜的基礎(chǔ)</b></p><p>　　在SARS危機(jī)結(jié)束后，也許中國(guó)最重要、尖銳的周期性回升是掩蓋中國(guó)對(duì)于外部世界的搖搖欲墜的基礎(chǔ)問(wèn)題。盡管現(xiàn)代化的廠房、嶄新的機(jī)場(chǎng)、公路和商場(chǎng)，中國(guó)的社會(huì)和金融機(jī)構(gòu)可以與美國(guó)的19世紀(jì)的中后期“Robber Barons”時(shí)期相比。2003年的北京大學(xué)進(jìn)行的約100名

54、中國(guó)專(zhuān)家的民意調(diào)查中顯示，他們其中有三分之一相信在2010年之前中國(guó)有重大危機(jī)。危機(jī)的最可能的來(lái)源是什么？最常提到的有社會(huì)（21%）、金融（19%）、經(jīng)濟(jì)（12%）和就業(yè)（10%），在過(guò)去兩十年收入的快速增長(zhǎng)和社會(huì)不平等、環(huán)境惡化、地區(qū)差距等。從中央計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)過(guò)渡到一個(gè)不完全的獨(dú)裁統(tǒng)治下的市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)，豐富了產(chǎn)生大量下層，侵蝕著社會(huì)財(cái)富精英和經(jīng)濟(jì)成本機(jī)會(huì)主義。正如一些中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家指出，許多中國(guó)的地方政府有效地打破了平衡，最終將需要一個(gè)中央政府

55、救市。</p><p>　　回想美國(guó)的“Robber Barons”時(shí)代的廣泛的腐敗和濫用權(quán)力每年所花費(fèi)的費(fèi)用估計(jì)是中國(guó)國(guó)民生產(chǎn)總值的14%。包括銀行、證券、保險(xiǎn)業(yè)的金融系統(tǒng)迫切需要改革來(lái)提高效率，并在中國(guó)的入世承諾下應(yīng)對(duì)國(guó)外的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。創(chuàng)造就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)，提高生產(chǎn)率仍然是給予改造國(guó)有企業(yè)的一個(gè)艱巨的挑戰(zhàn)，需要相關(guān)當(dāng)局繼續(xù)努力。同時(shí)有長(zhǎng)期的問(wèn)題存在，如人口老化、較低的退休金和不完善的社會(huì)保障系統(tǒng)，以及教育、衛(wèi)生保健和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)

56、施問(wèn)題。正如在北京的一位著名經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家最近觀察到，“比起中央銀行，其他一些高級(jí)官員更想談?wù)剠R率問(wèn)題，還有更迫切的事情要處理?！睂?duì)多戰(zhàn)線的問(wèn)題的沖擊，高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人顯然需要確保穩(wěn)定和集中一方面加強(qiáng)黨的有效性和效率，在其他方面改革國(guó)內(nèi)金融各個(gè)部分。</p><p>　　重估之間的薄弱環(huán)節(jié)和內(nèi)部調(diào)整</p><p>　　最后，在國(guó)際經(jīng)驗(yàn)（羅格夫，2004年）和中國(guó)本身的經(jīng)驗(yàn)的基礎(chǔ)上，人民幣升值是否將促

57、進(jìn)內(nèi)部改革的努力仍是不太確定的事。人民幣升值可能無(wú)助于宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)的周期性調(diào)整。盡管在整體通脹率顯示上升，但核心通貨膨脹率仍然很低。這是從中國(guó)的歷史過(guò)熱時(shí)期急劇離境，并且從總需求中顯示不出系統(tǒng)價(jià)格的推動(dòng)作用，正如在1993-4的案例（楚，2003年）。不可持續(xù)現(xiàn)象是指在一些領(lǐng)域的固定的投資增長(zhǎng)，而在其他領(lǐng)域的消費(fèi)和投資仍然需要鼓勵(lì)的情況。中國(guó)的投資情況體現(xiàn)在GDP上是40%以上的增長(zhǎng)，遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出了大多數(shù)發(fā)展中國(guó)家市場(chǎng)的20%-30%，也超過(guò)了

58、發(fā)展水平較好的日本和韓國(guó)。中央政府正在使用諸如信貸配給和行政命令以解決各部門(mén)的不平衡，但這并不表明，改變現(xiàn)在的匯率將是一個(gè)更好的選擇。相反，外匯制度突然變化會(huì)增加不確定性和損害微調(diào)的宏觀政策。的確，正如羅格夫建議，放棄盯住美元可以作為對(duì)中國(guó)的承諾來(lái)迎接穩(wěn)定和可持續(xù)的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)出現(xiàn)。</p><p><b>　　主要是政治的問(wèn)題</b></p><p>　　日益增長(zhǎng)的

59、美國(guó)的對(duì)外赤字是不可持續(xù)的，并且必須清楚地加以解決。據(jù)討論認(rèn)為，美國(guó)不再等待，因?yàn)檩^高的潛在沖擊或損害會(huì)存在（曼，2004年;基本能力評(píng)估，2004年Obstfeld和Rogoff，2004）。但是，重估人民幣對(duì)這個(gè)問(wèn)題的解決方案的一部分？在密切關(guān)注有關(guān)情況表明，它可能會(huì)減少，充其量只能勉強(qiáng)該問(wèn)題在短期內(nèi)存在，而長(zhǎng)期影響目前還不清楚，因?yàn)橥鈪R政策的變化可以帶來(lái)意想不到的后果。然而，政治現(xiàn)實(shí)的方式獲?。赫托枰@示針對(duì)時(shí)間價(jià)值和強(qiáng)大的游說(shuō)

60、團(tuán)體他們正在采取措施。匯率為他們唾手可得，即使是一個(gè)小水果，從中醫(yī)角度，一個(gè)不成熟的、真正有效的措施，如解決國(guó)內(nèi)需求的不平衡和促進(jìn)美國(guó)商品和服務(wù)出口，這不幸的政治并非在美國(guó)首發(fā)。人們認(rèn)為，人民幣低估是造成美國(guó)貿(mào)易赤字的元嬰。也意味著，通過(guò)非競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力調(diào)整出口方面，中國(guó)的外匯措施的努力已經(jīng)收到了政治辯論的重視。</p><p><b>　　展望未來(lái)</b></p><p>

61、　　本文的中心觀點(diǎn)是，迫于1997年8月貶值和現(xiàn)在升值的估值激烈的市場(chǎng)壓力，人民幣明顯被低估（特別是購(gòu)買(mǎi)力平價(jià)措施），但確實(shí)在估值上沒(méi)有太大的根本性改變?？傮w狀況看，人民幣盯住美元，中國(guó)的對(duì)外賬戶(hù)盈余和外匯儲(chǔ)備增加三者之間的關(guān)系，不是像經(jīng)常討論的那么容易說(shuō)清楚。人民幣的低估對(duì)美國(guó)和中國(guó)外部失衡的貢獻(xiàn)是體現(xiàn)在其它結(jié)構(gòu)性因素上，如國(guó)內(nèi)需求的不平衡，改善投資環(huán)境（外商直接投資—FDI）與中國(guó)相對(duì)于其他國(guó)家的出口競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。將來(lái)有更好的方式來(lái)解決中

62、國(guó)的國(guó)內(nèi)改革議程挑戰(zhàn)的不平衡，特別是如今中國(guó)的勞動(dòng)力成本正在上升。</p><p>　　在其他地區(qū)的結(jié)構(gòu)改革中，中國(guó)的政治資本是最好的投資典范。不幸的是，中國(guó)對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的影響還有待加強(qiáng)，中國(guó)可能就不會(huì)對(duì)這個(gè)時(shí)期外部政治壓力說(shuō)“不”并可能更快到來(lái)。如果歷史證明如此，中國(guó)就會(huì)在沖擊發(fā)生之前取消不合理制度，這將是世界7國(guó)集團(tuán)沒(méi)有認(rèn)識(shí)到，一個(gè)穩(wěn)定、有序的國(guó)際化進(jìn)展，是中國(guó)的最佳利益。長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)而言，毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)中國(guó)必須采取在后布雷

63、頓森林環(huán)境中更加靈活的匯率制度。靈活的人民幣將使中國(guó)進(jìn)行獨(dú)立的貨幣政策（以開(kāi)放的資本帳戶(hù)），減少對(duì)主要貨幣，尤其是美元兌歐元和日元波動(dòng)波動(dòng)的影響。中國(guó)的對(duì)外投資需求快速增長(zhǎng)，并受益于一個(gè)靈活的人民幣。但首先，中國(guó)需要清理銀行系統(tǒng)，調(diào)整資金賬戶(hù)，并發(fā)展健康，強(qiáng)勁的國(guó)內(nèi)金融市場(chǎng)。我們可以預(yù)期，一個(gè)靈活的匯率制度將提高中國(guó)的整體金融體系。中國(guó)迄今已從日本和東南亞開(kāi)放市場(chǎng)的太快，讓貨幣升值過(guò)快中吸取寶貴的教訓(xùn)。展望未來(lái)，中國(guó)需要研究開(kāi)放、積極的