[雙語翻譯]人民幣國際化外文翻譯--人民幣國際化：先例和影響（節(jié)選）

1、4000 英文單詞， 英文單詞，2.2 萬英文字符，中文 萬英文字符，中文 6650 字文獻出處： 文獻出處：Tobin D. Renminbi internationalisation: precedents and implications[J]. Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 2013, 11(2): 81-99Renminbi internationalisa

2、tion: precedents and implicationsDamian TobinAlthough it is commonly assumed that there are no precedents against which to benchmark Renminbi (RMB), this study argues that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) own develop

3、ment experience provides a useful perspective on the internationalisation debate. This study indicates that lessons can be learnt from both the successes and the shortcomings of efforts to internationalise the RMB in the

4、 1970s. During this period, state-owned banks in Hong Kong played a central role in mobilising finance for foreign trade. Access to Hong Kong’s financial institutions allowed the PRC to maximise international trade recei

5、pts while minimising the risk of undue swings in capital flows. This study shows that although China no longer faces foreign exchange scarcity, economic reforms have not yet resolved vulnerabilities in China’s financial

6、institutions. As a con- sequence, Hong Kong has retained its role in mitigating the risks of internationalisation and as a globalising force for China’s banking sector more generally.Keywords: China; Hong Kong; Renminbi;

7、 currency internationalisation; banking reform; trade1. IntroductionTaking the perspective that theory can only advance the understanding of pressing new macroeconomic developments so far and that history is the only tru

8、e laboratory for the study of pressing macroeconomic developments (e.g. Taylor 2012), this study argues that Renminbi (RMB) internationalisation is best understood in the context of the long- term importance attached by

9、the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to hard currency earnings as part of its objective of economic modernisation. This attachment has seen the China’s economy shift from a shortage of foreign currency pre-1979 to a post

10、-1979 surplus, but it has not necessarily resolved vulnerabilities in China’s financial institutions. A comparison between the two periods shows that although China is no longer faces of foreign exchange scarcity, the po

11、litical reluctance to allow capital mobility remains. Moreover, although the ideological opposition to openness has softened, the scale and risk of capital outflow, which is now implied as greater capital mobility, disti

12、nguishes the current policy conundrum. The study also explains how the banking sector has been playing a key participant in both periods. In the 1970s, the PRC’s Hong Kong-based financial institutions played a central ro

13、le in solving severe foreign exchange shortages. Since 2004 Chinese state-owned financial institutions in Hong Kong have again been to the fore in offering non-deliverable RMB deposits, but it has ultimately been the

14、pressing demand for further banking reform that has underpinned the need for further liberalisation.China’s economic reforms have given an unprecedented access to foreign capital for a developing economy. By 2012, China

15、had some 436,800 foreign invested enterprises with a registered paid up capital of US$1.79 trillion.1 Foreign exchange earnings from international trade have resulted in the accumulation of some US$3.2 trillion in foreig

16、n exchange reserves. These two features contrast sharply with the PRCs position in the mid-1970s, when there were widespread rumours regarding the perilous state of China’s foreign exchange reserves and the potential ina

17、bility of the PRC to pay for imports.2 A report by the State Planning Commission in 1974 There exist many reasons why developing countries seek greater currency internationali- sation. These range from the fundamental co

18、ncern of financing foreign trade to concerns over the value of reserve currencies and foreign exchange exposures. For many developing economies, particularly those with weak financial institutions or facing economic sanc

19、tions and trade embargos, access to a predictable and stable flow of hard currency earnings is a pressing issue. Despite the phenomenal growth in cross-border financial flows over the past few decades, many developing ec

20、onomies remain short of the capital necessary to finance development (Prasad et al. 2003). The PRC’s own development experience indicates that the reasons why countries seek greater currency internationalisation may vary

21、 over time and according to the level of institutional development. It also shows the importance of financial institutions in mobilising finance and trade settle-ment. The following section indicates that this is crucial

22、 in understanding Hong Kong’s role as a source of foreign exchange earnings and as a location that offers the type of secure institutions capable of supporting an offshore RMB market.2.1. Mobilising cross-border financeW

23、hile economists have long known that institutions matter, it has been argued that in order to determine how and why a source of exogenous variation in institutional quality is needed (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001

24、). As delineators of wealth and poverty as well as the extent to which societies have attained their potentials, borders offer a powerful example of such variation (Baumol 1990; Olson 1996). For developing economies, nat

25、ional borders also represent one of the most forceful examples of variation in the ability to mobilise finance. The PRC’s border with Hong Kong was not different. Access to Hong Kong’s free market helped to mitigate the

26、structural constraint that affected many developing economies of how to acquire foreign exchange earnings to maintain inputs and service debt and trade credit obligations (Diamond 1974). The reasons for this are intuitiv

27、e. External trade cannot be conducted without international exchange (Clauson 1944). Exchange cannot occur without the financial institutions that issue and redeem currency as goods and services are traded. The exchange

28、of currency often required elaborate and unusual institutional arrangements that extend beyond national borders. These have ranged from the Currency Authority that underpinned the British Colonial system to more recent s

29、chemes used by large banks to evade trade embargos.Such unusual arrangements are themselves a product of weak domestic financial intuitions. Gershenkron (1962) highlights the case of nineteenth-century Russia as an examp

30、le of the impossibility of building up a system of long-term bank credit in a sys- tem where mercantile activities and deceit were inextricably connected. Bloomfield (1957), writings on the problems facing central banki

31、ng in under-developed countries, argues that the growth in central banking in these countries was a reflection of their desire to pursue monetary policies that maximised economic development and mitigated undue swings in

32、 national incomes. The ability of these central banks to use open market operations to balance these two objectives was restricted by the limited scope of money markets in developing countries. In order to deal with such

33、 substantial and unpredictable fluctuations as large deposit withdrawals and bank runs, banks tended to maintain large reserves. The consequence of this liquidly concern was a short-term focus on trade finance in their c

34、ommercial operations and a preference for high reserve ratios.Gerschenkron (1962) required special institutional factors for remedying this problem. He argued that the more backward a country was, the more likely it woul