ted演講【了解中國(guó)崛起】2016年0129【內(nèi)含中英文對(duì)照演講稿】

1、The world is changing with really remarkable speed. If you look at the chart at the top here, you'll see that in 2025, these Goldman Sachs projections suggest that the Chinese economy will be almost the same size as

2、the American economy. And if you look at the chart for 2050, it's projected that the Chinese economy will be twice the size of the American economy, and the Indian economy will be almost the same size as the American

3、 economy. And we should bear in mind here that these projections were drawn up before the Western financial crisis. 世界正在 以驚人的速度飛快得改變著。 如果你看著這上方的圖表， 你會(huì)看到在 2025 年，高盛投資公司的這些預(yù)測(cè) 表明中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模 會(huì)和美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)幾乎相當(dāng)。 如果看 2050 年的圖表，預(yù)測(cè)表明中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模

4、將會(huì)是美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的兩倍，印度的經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模將會(huì)和 美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)幾乎持平。 在這里，我們應(yīng)該記住 這些預(yù)測(cè)是在 西方經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)之前做出的。 A couple of weeks ago, I was looking at the latest projection by BNP Paribas for when China will have a larger economy than the United States. Goldman Sachs

5、 projected 2027. The post-crisis projection is 2020. That's just a decade away. China is going to change the world in two fundamental respects. First of all, it's a huge developing country with a population of 1.

6、3 billion people, which has been growing for over 30 years at around 10 percent a year. 幾周前， 我查看法國(guó)巴黎銀行的 最近預(yù)測(cè)， 中國(guó)在什么時(shí)候 會(huì)超越美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)， 成為第一大經(jīng)濟(jì)體。 高盛投資公司預(yù)測(cè) 2027 年。 危機(jī)過(guò)后的預(yù)測(cè) 是 2020 年。 這也不過(guò)只有10 年的光景。 中國(guó)將在兩個(gè)基本方面上 改變世界。 首先， 中國(guó)是一個(gè)幅員廣大的

7、發(fā)展中國(guó)家 它有 13 億人口， 在過(guò)去 30 年間 它以每年 10%左右的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率發(fā)展。 And within a decade, it will have the largest economy in the world. Never before in the modern era has the largest economy in the world been that of a developing country, ra

8、ther than a developed country. Secondly, for the first time in the modern era, the dominant country in the world -- which I think is what China will become -- will be not from the West and from very, very different civil

9、izational roots. 在未來(lái) 10 年間，它會(huì)有世界上最大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體。在世界現(xiàn)代史中， 以前從來(lái)都是發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家 還沒(méi)有一個(gè)發(fā)展中的國(guó)家 變成了世界上 最大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體。 第二， 在現(xiàn)代史中第一次 在世界上， 我認(rèn)為中國(guó)會(huì)變成大國(guó)， 它有別于西方國(guó)家 而它是從非常，非常不同的文明根源發(fā)展起的大國(guó)。 Now, I know it's a widespread assumption in the West that as cou

10、ntries modernize, they also westernize. This is an illusion. It's an assumption that modernity is a product simply of competition, markets and technology. It is not. It is also shaped equally by history and culture.

11、China is not like the West, and it will not become like the West. It will remain in very fundamental respects very different. Now the big question here is obviously, how do we make sense of China? How do we try to unders

12、tand what China is? And the problem we have in the West at the moment, by and large, is that the conventional approach is that 這點(diǎn)非同尋常的 是，它賦予了中國(guó)做為中國(guó)的意義， 也賦予了中國(guó)人 成為他們中國(guó)人的意義， 這不是從過(guò)去幾百年， 也不是從民族國(guó)家開(kāi)始形成這種認(rèn)識(shí)， 這跟西方發(fā)展也不一樣，而這一階段， 如

13、果你喜歡，可以說(shuō)是文明國(guó)家的階段。我想到這兒， 舉個(gè)例子吧， 傳統(tǒng)習(xí)慣例如：對(duì)祖先的崇拜， 非常有特色的國(guó)家概念， 諸如此類的，非常有特色的家庭觀念， 社交關(guān)系如關(guān)系， 儒家價(jià)值觀等等。 所有這些事都來(lái)自于 文明國(guó)家的階段。 換言之，中國(guó)不像世界上的西方國(guó)家和多數(shù)國(guó)家， 它由它自身文明所形成， 它是作為一個(gè)文明國(guó)家 而不是一個(gè)民族國(guó)家而存在的。 還有另一件事要加進(jìn)來(lái)，這就是： 當(dāng)然我們知道中國(guó)是幅員遼闊，人口眾多， 在人口統(tǒng)計(jì)和地理上都

14、是首屈一指， 它有 13 億人口。 我們常常沒(méi)關(guān)注的 事實(shí)是 中國(guó)也是極其多樣化 和非常多元化的，在許多方面甚至權(quán)力是非常分散化的。盡管我們認(rèn)為不能僅從北京中央政府來(lái)管理這龐大規(guī)模的國(guó)家，我們以為會(huì)是這樣， 但從來(lái)都不是這樣。 So this is China, a civilization-state, rather than a nation-state. And what does it mean? Well, I think i

15、t has all sorts of profound implications. I'll give you two quick ones. The first is that the most important political value for the Chinese is unity, is the maintenance of Chinese civilization. You know, 2,000 years

16、 ago, Europe: breakdown -- the fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire. It divided, and it's remained divided ever since. China, over the same time period, went in exactly the opposite direction, very painfully holdin

17、g this huge civilization, civilization-state, together. 所以這才是中國(guó)，一個(gè)文明國(guó)家， 而不是一個(gè)民族國(guó)家。 那這意味著什么呢？ 那么我想這有很多種深刻的含義。 我會(huì)給你兩個(gè)簡(jiǎn)短介紹。 第一個(gè)是 中國(guó)人最主要的政治價(jià)值觀 是統(tǒng)一， 用來(lái)維護(hù) 中華文明。 大家知道，2000 年前，歐洲: 滅亡，神圣羅馬帝國(guó)[羅馬帝國(guó)]的分裂。從那時(shí)到現(xiàn)在， 它不斷地分裂。在同一時(shí)間段， 中國(guó) 卻有

18、著完全相反的方向， 非常艱難地維系著這種強(qiáng)大的統(tǒng)一文明， 把文明國(guó)家統(tǒng)一在一起。 The second is maybe more prosaic, which is Hong Kong. Do you remember the handover of Hong Kong by Britain to China in 1997? You may remember what the Chinese constitutional propo

19、sition was. One country, two systems. And I'll lay a wager that barely anyone in the West believed them. “Window dressing. When China gets its hands on Hong Kong, that won't be the case.“ Thirteen years on, the p

20、olitical and legal system in Hong Kong is as different now as it was in 1997. We were wrong. Why were we wrong? We were wrong because we thought, naturally enough, in nation-state ways. Think of German unification, 1990.

21、 What happened? Well, basically the East was swallowed by the West. One nation, one system. That is the nation-state mentality. But you can't run a country like China, a civilization-state, on the basis of one civili

22、zation, one system. It doesn't work. So actually the response of China to the question of Hong Kong -- as it will be to the question of Taiwan -- was a natural response: one civilization, many systems. 第二 或許是更一般的例子