金融專業(yè)外文翻譯---金融機(jī)構(gòu)在中國上市公司治理中的作用

1、<p>　　金融機(jī)構(gòu)在中國上市公司治理中的作用</p><p>　　Rongli Yuan, Jason Zezhong Xiao, Nikolaos Milonas, Joe Hong Zou</p><p>　　British Journal of Management, Dec2009,Vol.20: p562-580</p><p>　　最近，一個

2、重大的監(jiān)管工作在中國被實施，在改善公司治理和穩(wěn)定股市的過程中，給予金融機(jī)構(gòu)一個重要的角色。例如，在2000年，政府做出了發(fā)展中國家（中國證券監(jiān)督管理委員會，2000年）金融機(jī)構(gòu)的戰(zhàn)略決策，大力鼓勵金融機(jī)構(gòu)，特別是共同基金和證券公司，投資于上市公司，使他們能夠監(jiān)督公司管理和打擊投機(jī)行為的個人投資者。在此背景下，共同基金和證券公司都經(jīng)歷了前所未有的增長。截至2003年底開展了這項研究時，有133個證券公司和54只封閉式和41只開放式基金。&

3、lt;/p><p>　　不幸的是，迄今為止金融機(jī)構(gòu)的作用在中國很少受到學(xué)術(shù)界的關(guān)注，這部分是因為金融機(jī)構(gòu)在公司治理中沒有被察覺到有任何重大作用（Gen，2002年）。然而，沒有文獻(xiàn)提供經(jīng)驗證據(jù)支持這種看法。事實上，最近金融機(jī)構(gòu)試圖干預(yù)企業(yè)管治問題，表明他們中的一些在保護(hù)少數(shù)股東的權(quán)利方面正起著重要的作用。因此，這是一個重要的經(jīng)驗，對于重新評估其目前在公司治理和近期監(jiān)管工作的有效性中的角色。本研究是朝著填補(bǔ)文學(xué)差距的第

4、一次嘗試。如果經(jīng)驗證據(jù)表明，金融在企業(yè)機(jī)構(gòu)發(fā)揮了一定的作用治理，那么這將是一個跡象，表明監(jiān)管工作在方法上取得了一定的成功，并且也許應(yīng)該延長。如果有證據(jù)證明以前的看法，普遍認(rèn)為金融機(jī)構(gòu)發(fā)揮小或在公司治理中沒有發(fā)揮作用，那么應(yīng)查明為什么會這樣的原因，并且找到克服這些困難的途徑。</p><p>　　為了探討金融機(jī)構(gòu)在上市公司治理中的作用，我們采訪了金融機(jī)構(gòu)和上市公司的董事和高級管理人員。通過聽取他們的觀點，我們能夠提

5、供均衡和全面的關(guān)于公司治理的參與和金融機(jī)構(gòu)的作用的證據(jù)。這次訪談的證據(jù)表明，多數(shù)證券公司是被動的投資者，而一些積極的嘗試獲得共同基金介入在其投資組合公司的治理工作。這一發(fā)現(xiàn)表明，在促進(jìn)發(fā)展的共同基金監(jiān)管工作似乎已經(jīng)對公司治理產(chǎn)生積極的影響，盡管是有限的。文章還指出，這一作用有限，可以歸因于幾個因素。有些因素是其他經(jīng)濟(jì)體系所進(jìn)行研究提出的一致論點。這些因素包括與投資公司，監(jiān)督成本高和缺乏專門知識的利益沖突。其他的似乎是具體到中國的背景下，

6、如高濃度的國家所有權(quán)，不成熟的監(jiān)管環(huán)境，財務(wù)信息披露不充分，和金融機(jī)構(gòu)本身薄弱的公司治理。</p><p>　　由于大多數(shù)上市公司已經(jīng)從中國的原國有企業(yè)的改造，有一個國家所有權(quán)和法人所有權(quán)（由機(jī)構(gòu)發(fā)起人和其他法人，其中大部分也是國有或控制，通過高比例持有股份即國有企業(yè)或者其他國有機(jī)構(gòu)）和所有權(quán)的濃度（Xiao,Dahya和Lin，2004）大的程度。2003年數(shù)據(jù)（根據(jù)Sinofin數(shù)據(jù)庫北京大學(xué)中國大學(xué)編制）表

7、明，國有股和法人股占上市公司總股本的64%以上。根據(jù)法律規(guī)定，這些股份不公開交易，但是他們在政府批準(zhǔn)的情況下可以交易，因此只留下大約三分之一的股份公開交易。此外，最大的三個股東平均持有約48%股份，其中由第一大股東平均持股約42%。在集中的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)下，代理問題成為了業(yè)主之間的控制和少數(shù)股東（Claessens和Fan，2002）的主要沖突。</p><p>　　在這種集中的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)下，金融機(jī)構(gòu)可以發(fā)揮有效的作用？

8、現(xiàn)存文獻(xiàn)的結(jié)論是，中國金融機(jī)構(gòu)是被動的，短暫的投資者。 Tenev，zhang和Brevort（2002）認(rèn)為，在中國，金融機(jī)構(gòu)有一個小市場的存在并不能起到穩(wěn)定作用。因此，企業(yè)的控制機(jī)制和股東行動根據(jù)現(xiàn)行的高度集中和分段所有制結(jié)構(gòu)無助于緩解代理問題。Zhang（2002）持有相同的看法,有關(guān)金融機(jī)構(gòu)當(dāng)前的作用有限主要原因有兩個 –機(jī)構(gòu)數(shù)量少和金融機(jī)構(gòu)的資本，還有不成熟的法律制度。據(jù)根Gen（2002），金融機(jī)構(gòu)在上市公司的公司治理中不會

9、起到任何作用，因為波動的證券市場。具體來說，Tan（2002）指出，管理的基金一直無法發(fā)揮提升企業(yè)業(yè)績的預(yù)期作用，也不能灌輸一個穩(wěn)定因素在經(jīng)常動蕩中的金融機(jī)構(gòu)的作用治理上市公司股票的市場中。但是，沒有任何經(jīng)驗的研究提供了證據(jù)支持這些說法。</p><p>　　這項研究調(diào)查了金融機(jī)構(gòu)在公司治理預(yù)期的和實際的作用和影響因素的作用。我們的大多數(shù)受訪者預(yù)期金融機(jī)構(gòu)在公司治理中發(fā)揮了積極的監(jiān)督或干預(yù)的作用，少數(shù)受訪者認(rèn)為，

10、他們應(yīng)該保持被動的投資者。</p><p>　　我們的訪談節(jié)目分為兩個階段關(guān)于影響金融機(jī)構(gòu)是否會影響公司的治理。在此之前做出的投資，金融機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行質(zhì)量研究，以找出有效率的企業(yè)，以此將有限的資金引導(dǎo)到最有效的利用，從而提高企業(yè)效益。事實上，大多數(shù)基金經(jīng)理認(rèn)為企業(yè)績效，股權(quán)交易，財務(wù)報表和年度報告，管理質(zhì)量，還有機(jī)構(gòu)投資者溝通是影響投資決策的重要因素。</p><p>　　訪談數(shù)據(jù)還表明，五個共

11、同基金似乎是積極的監(jiān)測和行使其對企業(yè)管理的影響，一些董事確認(rèn)了對金融機(jī)構(gòu)參與公司治理的積極作用。相比之下，其他共同基金和在我們的樣本中各證券公司一樣似乎是被動的股東，并沒有??發(fā)揮上市公司治理的作用?？傮w而言，似乎是一個與實際的作用和預(yù)期的作用期望的差距。</p><p>　　訪談數(shù)據(jù)還表明，一些因素可能會被視為金融機(jī)構(gòu)發(fā)揮這有限的作用的原因。這是國家所有權(quán)，不成熟的監(jiān)管環(huán)境，財務(wù)信息披露不充分，金融機(jī)構(gòu)自身薄弱

12、的公司治理，與投資公司的興趣沖突，監(jiān)督成本高，缺乏專門知識和利益沖突。最重要的決定因素，也許是國家所有權(quán)高度集中。這可能導(dǎo)致嚴(yán)重的內(nèi)部人控制，這限制了金融機(jī)構(gòu)在公司治理中的作用（Zhou，2004年）。</p><p>　　這項研究提出了一些貢獻(xiàn)。這是首次研究提供采訪為基礎(chǔ)的金融機(jī)構(gòu)在上市公司治理中作用的實證證據(jù)。這一證據(jù)表明，事先認(rèn)為他們沒有發(fā)揮任何作用，應(yīng)當(dāng)修改。第二，訪問表明，證券公司和共同基金不同的特點可

13、能會影響他們在中國的公司治理的作用。第三，成果突出了中國特有的因素，初步設(shè)定可能影響金融機(jī)構(gòu)在公司治理中的作用。</p><p>　　此外，調(diào)查結(jié)果的政策含義。首先，他們建議，在促進(jìn)監(jiān)管工作中，共同基金的發(fā)展已經(jīng)對公司治理產(chǎn)生積極的，盡管是有限的影響。其次，治理，監(jiān)測和金融機(jī)構(gòu)本身需要的激勵機(jī)制有待完善。第三，有必要提高中小投資者的法律保護(hù)，包括金融機(jī)構(gòu)。此外，有必要在金融機(jī)構(gòu)及其投資組合公司中培養(yǎng)一種信任和道德

14、文化，以防止內(nèi)幕交易，官商勾結(jié)和虛假報道。最后，改善投資者關(guān)系可能有助于提高金融機(jī)構(gòu)在公司治理中的作用。</p><p>　　The Role of Financial Institutions in the Corporate Governance of Listed Chinese Companies</p><p>　　Rongli Yuan, Jason Zezhong Xiao,

15、 Nikolaos Milonas, Joe Hong Zou</p><p>　　British Journal of Management, Dec2009,Vol.20: p562-580</p><p>　　A substantial regulatory effort has recently been made in China to accord financial inst

16、itutions an important role in improving corporate governance and stabilizing the stock market. For example, in 2000 the government made a strategic decision to devote major efforts to developing financial institutions (C

17、hina Securities Regulatory Commission, 2000). It encouraged financial institutions, especially mutual funds and securities companies, to invest in listed companies so that they can monitor cor</p><p>　　Unfor

18、tunately, the role of financial institutions in China so far has attracted little academic attention, partly because financial institutions are not perceived to play any significant role in corporate governance (Gen, 200

19、2). However, the literature offers no empirical evidence to support such a perception. Indeed, financial institutions’ recent attempts to intervene in corporate governance issues suggest that some of them are exercising

20、an important role in protecting the rights of minority </p><p>　　To explore the role of financial institutions in the governance of listed Chinese companies, we interviewed both senior managers of financial

21、institutions and directors of listed companies. From their perspectives, we are able to provide balanced and comprehensive evidence on the participation and role of financial institutions in corporate governance. The int

22、erview evidence indicates that most securities companies are passive investors, while some active mutual funds attempt to get involved in </p><p>　　Since most listed Chinese companies have been transformed f

23、rom former state-owned enterprises, there is a high proportion of state ownership and legal person ownership (i.e. shares held by institutional promoters and other legal persons, most of which are also state-owned or con

24、trolled through state-owned enterprises or other state-owned institutions) and a great degree of ownership concentration (Xiao, Dahya and Lin, 2004). Data from 2003 (according to the Sinofin database compiled by Peking U

25、n</p><p>　　Can financial institutions play an effective role given this concentrated ownership structure? The extant literature concludes that Chinese financial institutions are passive and transient investo

26、rs. Tenev, Zhang and Brevort (2002) argue that financial institutions in China have a small market presence and cannot play a stabilizing role. As a result, corporate control mechanisms and shareholder activism can do li

27、ttle to mitigate agency problems under the existing highly concentrated and segmente</p><p>　　This study has investigated the expected and actual roles of financial institutions in corporate governance and t

28、he factors that affect their role. The majority of our interviewees expected financial institutions to play an active monitoring or interventionist role in corporate governance while a minority of our interviewees argued

29、 that they should remain passive investors.</p><p>　　Our interviews show two phases at which financial institutions could affect corporate governance. Prior to making an investment, financial institutions pe

30、rformed quality research in order to identify efficient firms, thus directing scarce capital to its most efficient use and consequently enhancing corporate efficiency. Indeed, most fund managers considered firm performan

31、ce, tradable shareholdings, financial statements and annual report, quality of management, and investor communications as impo</p><p>　　The interview data also indicate that five mutual funds seemed to be ac

32、tive monitors and exercised their influence on corporate management and that some directors confirmed the positive effect of financial institutions’ participation in corporate governance. By contrast, the other mutual fu

33、nds and all securities companies in our sample appeared to be passive shareholders and did not play any role in the governance of listed companies. Overall, there appeared to be an expectations gap between the</p>

34、<p>　　The interview data also suggest that a number of factors might be seen to account for this limited role played by financial institutions. These were the high concentration of state ownership, the immature reg

35、ulatory environment, the inadequate disclosure of financial information, the weak corporate governance within financial institutions themselves, conflicts of interest with investee companies, high monitoring costs, and l

36、ack of expertise. The most important determinant was perhaps the high de</p><p>　　This study makes several contributions. It is the first study to provide interview-based empirical evidence on the role of fi

37、nancial institutions in the governance of listed Chinese firms. This evidence suggests that the prior perception that they do not play any role should be modified. Second, the interviews suggest that different characteri

38、stics of securities companies and mutual funds could affect their corporate governance roles in China. Third, the results highlight a tentative set of Chin</p><p>　　In addition, the findings have a number of

39、 policy implications. First, they suggest that the regulatory efforts in promoting the development of mutual funds seem to have generated positive, albeit limited, impacts on corporate governance. Second, the governance,

40、 monitoring and incentive mechanisms for financial institutions themselves need to be perfected. Third, there is a need to improve legal protection of minority investors including financial institutions. Moreover, there