外文翻譯—促進(jìn)就業(yè)的稅收政策

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯之一</b></p><p>　　Does Labor Supply Respond to a Flat Tax?</p><p>　　——Evidence from the Russian Tax Reform</p><p>　　作者：Denvil Duncan&Klara Sabirianov

2、a Peter</p><p>　　國籍：Germany</p><p>　　出處：IZA Discussion Paper No. 4257,June 2009</p><p><b>　　原文正文：</b></p><p>　　Abstract: We exploit the exogenous change in

3、marginal tax rates created by the Russian flat tax reform of 2001 to identify the effect of taxes on labor supply of males and females.We apply the weighted difference-in-difference regression approach and instrumental v

4、ariables to the labor supply function estimated on individual panel data.The mean regression results indicate that the tax reform led to a statistically significant increase in male hours of work but had no effecton that

5、 of females.How</p><p>　　we find a positive response to tax changes at both tails of the female hour distribution.We also find that the reform increased the probability of finding a job among both males and

6、females.Despite significant variation in individual responses,the aggregate labor supply elasticities are trivial and suggest that reform-induced changes in labor supply were an unlikely explanation for the amplified per

7、sonal income tax revenues that followed the reform.</p><p>　　Keywords: labor supply; personal income tax;flat tax; labor supply elasticity; weighted difference-in-difference regression approach;employment pa

8、rticipation; Russia</p><p>　　1. Introduction</p><p>　　Although the classical flat tax as described by Hall and Rabushka (2007)has not been implemented in any country to date,a number of countrie

9、s have chosen recently to tax individual income at flat rates.As of January 1, 2009,the flat personal income tax(PIT) rate schedule was implemented by 24 countries,20 of which are formerly centrally-planned economies of

10、Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Lower compliance cost and lower tax rates could potentially reduce evasion,income shifting,and other</p><p>　　The most popular of these flat tax reforms is the flat PI

11、T rate that came into effect on January 1st 2001 in Russia.Much of the attention received by the Russian reform was due to the dramatic increase in Russia’s PIT revenue following the reform.According to Ivanova,Keen,and

12、Klemm (hereafter IKK 2005),real PIT revenue increased by 26 percent in 2001 and continued to grow in subsequent years.From a theoretical perspective, reduce the tax rate means that the tax revenue to reduce,then the tax

13、ref</p><p>　　The purpose of this study is to examine,in a careful and methodological manner,the effect of the Russian tax reform on several dimensions of labor supply,including hours of work,employment parti

14、cipation,and multiple job holding.Two alternative strategies are used to deal with the endogeneity of wages.The first approach estimates a reduced form labor supply equation derived from a simultaneous system of labor su

15、pply and demand while the second relies on labor demand shifters as instruments for wa</p><p>　　Apart from allowing us to quantify the role played by the labor supply component of the tax base in explaining

16、the increase in PIT revenue,the estimated labor supply elasticities with respect to tax rates are useful for other purposes.Knowledge of the labor supply response is critical for policies such as means tested welfare ben

17、efits that depend on how much labor supply responds to incentives.Labor supply estimates also play an important role in general equilibrium macroeconomic analyses that s</p><p>　　In sum,from the theoretical

18、standpoint,the effect of the Russian flat tax reform on labor supply remains ambiguous.Determining this effect becomes an empirical question and faces serious identification problem.</p><p>　　對勞動供給產(chǎn)生影響的是單一稅嗎

19、？</p><p><b>　　——俄羅斯稅制實證</b></p><p>　　作者：Denvil Duncan和Klara Sabirianova Peter</p><p><b>　　國籍：德國</b></p><p>　　出處：國際工業(yè)協(xié)會討論文件，No. 4257( 2009.6)<

20、/p><p><b>　　中文譯文：</b></p><p>　　摘要：通過2001年俄羅斯的稅制改革，我們可以利用外援邊際稅率的改變?nèi)プR別男性和女性勞動力供應(yīng)稅的效果，并利用勞動供給函數(shù)，加權(quán)倍差回歸和工具變量方法對個體面板數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行估計。平均回歸結(jié)果表明,稅制改革導(dǎo)致了統(tǒng)計學(xué)上男性工作時間的顯著增加卻沒有導(dǎo)致失調(diào)。同時我們發(fā)現(xiàn)稅制改革在女性工作時間的分布方面也有積極的影

21、響以及改革能提高男性和女性找到工作的可能性。盡管個人反應(yīng)有顯著的差異，但是總勞動供給彈性是細(xì)微的，擴(kuò)充個人所得稅收入改革未必是誘發(fā)勞動供給制度的改變的解釋。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞：勞動力供給；個人所得稅；單一稅；勞動供給彈性；</p><p>　　加權(quán)倍差回歸方法；勞動參與；俄羅斯</p><p><b>　　引言</b></p&g

22、t;<p>　　盡管通過Hall和 Rabushka（2007）描述的傳統(tǒng)單一稅尚未在任何國家開始實行。不過一些國家最近已經(jīng)開始選擇使用單一稅率征收個人所得稅。截至2009年1月1日，該個人所得稅單一稅率表（對外貿(mào)易促進(jìn)委員會）已經(jīng)被24個國家采用，其中有20個是曾經(jīng)采用計劃經(jīng)濟(jì)的中歐和歐亞大陸國家。較低的稅率和較低的稅務(wù)執(zhí)行成本可能減少逃稅，收入轉(zhuǎn)移和其他規(guī)避活動。進(jìn)行單一稅的稅制改革可以提高工作效率和投資來刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)(H

23、all and Rabushka, 2007)。</p><p>　　最流行的單一稅稅制改革是2001年1月1日生效于俄羅斯的單一對外貿(mào)易稅率。俄羅斯稅制改革引起注意是由于此次改革促使俄羅斯對外貿(mào)易收入顯著增加。Ivanova、 Keen和 Klemm（ikk，2005以后）認(rèn)為實際的對外貿(mào)易收入在2001年上升 26%并且之后持續(xù)增長。從理論角度,降低稅率意味著稅收收入的減少，那么稅收改革能擴(kuò)大稅基,也能產(chǎn)生強(qiáng)

24、勁的財政收入的性能。綜上所述，單一稅率能有效擴(kuò)大稅基就足以解釋已經(jīng)質(zhì)疑很久的收入增長問題(Gaddy 、Gale，2005 和 IKK， 2005)。例如IKK(2005）并沒有證據(jù)證明稅制改革的目的是提高對外貿(mào)易收入。他們也在爭議是否降低對外貿(mào)易稅率或嚴(yán)格執(zhí)行手段就會導(dǎo)致稅制改革提高申報成本的結(jié)果。Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sabirianova Peter(hereafter GMP

25、2009)得出更為明確的結(jié)論：申報成本的提高絕大部分是因為對外貿(mào)易稅率的降低。除了對外貿(mào)易稅的征收和申報成本，俄羅斯稅制改革可以用總收益(IKK找到不良影響)和凈稅報告收入評估稅金變動的影響（Martinez-Va</p><p>　　本文的目的在于謹(jǐn)慎，有效地檢驗俄羅斯稅制改革對勞動力供給不同維度的影響,包括工作時間、就業(yè)參與,多工作掌握。我們需要使用從俄羅斯縱向監(jiān)測調(diào)查得到的微觀面板數(shù)據(jù)估計俄羅斯稅制改革對工

26、作時間的影響。處理外生的工資有兩種不同的策略。第一種方法是簡化利用勞動供給和需求同時制來估計的勞動供給方程，第二種則是依賴勞動需求轉(zhuǎn)變成為工資工具。我們的預(yù)測結(jié)果表明,總結(jié)論隱藏了重要的變化在個別群體中,特別是性別影響，綜合結(jié)果在個別群體，尤其是性別中隱藏了重要的變化。具體地說,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)改革有著顯著的積極影響,尤其在男性勞動供給方面。男性每個月增加大約4%-6%的實際工作時間就會隱含一個大約0.1-0.15的改革幅度彈性。盡管彈性很小，

27、但這些預(yù)測是在男性勞動供給彈性的領(lǐng)域范圍內(nèi)（Meghir 和 Phillips，2008）。同時，我們并沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)女性的平均工作時間實際回應(yīng)了稅制改革。但是零反應(yīng)并不是保持時間分布不變。事實上，有證據(jù)表明較低的稅率對最高和最低的女性工作分布時間有積極的影響。盡管個人的反應(yīng)有顯著的不同，但總反應(yīng)證實稅基的勞動供給要素不能有助于提高對外貿(mào)易收入。</p><p>　　除了對勞動供給發(fā)揮作用的稅基部分能夠量化解釋對外貿(mào)易

28、收入增加的原因，對稅率影響的勞動供給彈性估計還可用于其他用途。勞動供給反應(yīng)是政策的重要手段，而測試的福利是依賴于勞動力供給相應(yīng)程度。勞動力供給估計對平衡宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)分析發(fā)揮了重要作用，該宏觀分析試圖了解政策如何影響經(jīng)濟(jì)總量。此外，大部分勞動力供給的結(jié)果存在于勞動力市場相對發(fā)達(dá)與成熟的國家。由于轉(zhuǎn)型期國家的勞動力市場尚未完全成熟，所以這些結(jié)果可能并不適用。對經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型的勞動力供給直接估計影響最大的應(yīng)該是經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)專業(yè)的信息，對稅基的勞動力供給改革因

29、素影響更好的理解應(yīng)該是其他試圖仿效俄羅斯稅制改革的國家都能證明改革是有用的。</p><p>　　總之，從理論的角度來看，俄羅斯統(tǒng)一稅改革對勞動力供應(yīng)的影響仍然含糊。確定這種效果已成為一個需要面臨慎重鑒定的經(jīng)驗性問題。</p><p><b>　　外文翻譯之二</b></p><p>　　The employment effects of a

30、central city's source-based wage tax or hybrid wage tax</p><p>　　作者：Ralph M. Braid</p><p><b>　　國籍：USA</b></p><p>　　出處：Regional Science and Urban Economics,17 Februar

31、y,2009</p><p><b>　　原文正文： </b></p><p>　　Abstract: This paper considers the employment effects of a central city's wage tax. The tax will normally decrease employment in the centra

32、l city and increase employment in the suburbs. The magnitude of the effects depends on the exact type of wage tax that the central city imposes (the tax rates on central-city residents who work in the central city, on ce

33、ntral-city residents who work in the suburbs, and on suburbanites who work in the central city), on a production function, on a commuting cos</p><p>　　Keywords: Local wage taxes; Local income taxes; Central

34、city; Employment</p><p>　　1、Introduction</p><p>　　In this paper,I examine the effects of central city's wage tax on the distribution of a fixed amount of employment between the central city

35、and its suburbs.Local wage or income taxes are used by at least some local governments in 14 states in the United States.Some of my earlier papers (Braid, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005)can be used to examine this sort of

36、question in a variety of models,but all assume a pure source-based wage tax. This type of wage tax is used by local governments in some stat</p><p>　　First, it is worth discussing other theoretical and empir

37、ical literature.The effects of a change in a property tax or wage tax by a whole metropolitan area or a “region” are examined in theoretical models of local public finance. However, it is also important to

38、 understand the effects of tax rate differentials between different parts of a metropolitan area.First,local property tax rates typically differ between the different jurisdictions of a metropolitan area.Second, some cen

39、tra</p><p>　　Surprisingly, few theoretical papers consider the effects of such tax differentials.Many empirical papers have examined the effects of localized tax differentials within a metropolitan area on e

40、mployment or business location. Notably, Grieson (1980), Haughwout et al (2004), Inman (1987), and Luce (1994) estimate the employment effects of the Philadelphia income tax, which has a much higher tax rate on non-resid

41、ents who commute in than any other city in the United States. </p><p>　　Some of my previous papers are intended to complement these data-based analyses. Braid (1996, 2005) and Guo (2009) are theoretical pape

42、rs that include relevant equations but use them to address different questions (about tax competition). Business land is immobile, and labor is freely mobile among the local jurisdictions of the metropolitan area. These

43、papers ignore commuting costs by assuming that commuting is costless.</p><p>　　Several papers assume one-dimensional-continuous-location models in which the metropolitan area is a line segment and consumers

44、have commuting costs proportional to distance traveled. Braid (2000) and Peralta (2007) assume a single employment center in each of two local jurisdictions. Braid (2002, 2003) assumes that a central city is surrounded b

45、y suburban areas, and that employment can be anywhere.</p><p>　　The last seven papers mentioned above assume that a wage tax is a pure source-based wage tax (sometimes known as a payroll tax). That is, a cen

46、tral city's wage tax applies at the same rate to central-city and suburban residents working in the central city, but not to central-city and suburban residents working in the suburbs. Several large cities in the Uni

47、ted States have this sort of wage tax, while surrounding suburbs do not, including San Francisco, Los Angeles, Newark (New Jersey), and Birmi</p><p>　　A couple of cities in the United States have a pure resi

48、dence-based income tax . Many more have a “hybrid” income tax, with all central-city residents taxed at one rate (wherever they work), and with suburbanites who work in the central city taxed at the same or a lower rate.

49、 Large cities with this sort of tax, while surrounding suburbs do not have them (or have them at a much lower rate), include Kansas City, St. Louis, Wilmington, Detroit and other cities in Michigan, New York City, and Ph

50、ilad</p><p>　　Local governments use wage or income taxes in a number of countries besides the U.S., including (see Braid, 2005, p.1790) Sweden, Denmark, Austria, France, Germany, Japan and Spain. I am not su

51、re of the exact type of local wage or income taxes in these countries, but I believe that in some cases the taxes are purely residence-based, whereas Peralta (2007) points out that Australia, Austria, France, Greece and

52、Mexico “have payroll taxes at the state or local level”, and that in Korea, “income tax</p><p>　　This paper presents a long-run model that is a significant variation of Section 1 of Braid (1996).5 I assume t

53、hat there are several discrete zones in the metropolitan area, one of which is the central city. Each zone has a fixed amount of business land, which is a third input into production (along with labor and business capita

54、l). This is similar to Braid (1996, 2005) but contrasts with the absence of land in Braid (2000, 2002) and Peralta (2007).</p><p>　　Two assumptions are different than in any of my other papers. First, there

55、are fixed commuting costs for anyone who lives in one zone and commutes to work in another zone (in contrast to costless commuting or commuting costs proportional to distance). Second, there is a multinomial logit determ

56、ination of how many workers living in each zone will work in that zone and in each other zone, depending on the net wages a worker can earn in each zone.</p><p>　　My theoretical paper complements the empiric

57、al results of Haughwout et al. (2004), by providing an underlying theoretical model (see Section 2), and by providing intuition and insights about the effects of central-city wage taxes (see Section 3 including Propositi

58、ons 1–6). Various similarities and differences between their empirical results and my numerical results (see Table 1 and Section 4 and 5) are pointed out in Section 5. Also, they estimate the effects of the (close-to-pur

59、e) residence-bas</p><p>　　中心城市的工資稅或混合工資稅對就業(yè)的影響</p><p>　　作者：Ralph M. Braid</p><p><b>　　國籍：美國</b></p><p>　　出處：區(qū)域科學(xué)與城市經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)，2009年2月17日</p><p><b&

60、gt;　　中文譯文： </b></p><p>　　摘要：本文討論中心城市的工資稅對就業(yè)的影響。稅收一般會減少中心城市的就業(yè)率，并增加郊區(qū)就業(yè)率。影響的大小依賴于中心城市征收的確切的工資稅類型（對工作在中心城市的中心城市居民以及在中心城市工作的郊區(qū)居民征收的稅率）、生產(chǎn)函數(shù)、通勤成本參數(shù)及多項式評定選擇參數(shù)。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞：當(dāng)?shù)毓べY稅；地方所得稅；中心城市；就業(yè)&

61、lt;/p><p><b>　　引言</b></p><p>　　本文研究的是中心城市工資稅的固定額對中心城市及其郊區(qū)之間的就業(yè)分布上的影響。在美國至少有14個州的地方政府使用當(dāng)?shù)毓べY或所得稅。我一些早期的文獻(xiàn)（Braid，1996,2000，2002, 2003, 2005）用多種模型來研究這類問題，但所有的模型都基于單一來源的工資稅的假設(shè)。此種類型的工資稅也被一些國家

62、的地方政府采用。本文的模型與我早期的文獻(xiàn)有顯著的不同，美國各種不同類型的中心城市的工資稅的影響將被用以檢驗。</p><p>　　首先，其他理論和實證文獻(xiàn)是值得討論的。通過地方公共財政的理論模型對整個大都市區(qū)或“地區(qū)”的物業(yè)稅或工資稅變化的影響進(jìn)行研究。然而了解大城市區(qū)域的不同地區(qū)之間的稅率差異影響也是很重要的。首先，當(dāng)?shù)赜写硇缘呢敭a(chǎn)稅稅率在大城市區(qū)域不同的司法管轄區(qū)之間通常會有差異。其次，一些中心城市有工資稅

63、或所得稅，然而周圍的郊區(qū)沒有。</p><p>　　令人驚訝的是，很少有理論文章考慮到這種稅差的影響。許多實證論文驗證了大城市區(qū)域的當(dāng)?shù)囟愂詹町愒诰蜆I(yè)或企業(yè)場所方面的影響。值得注意的是Grieson（1980），Haughwout等人（2004），Inman（1987）和Luce（1994）估計了費城所得稅對就業(yè)的影響，其中非居民通勤的所得稅率比美國任何一個其他城市的居民都要高。</p><p

64、>　　我以前的一些論文，旨在補(bǔ)充這些基礎(chǔ)數(shù)據(jù)的分析。包括Braid (1996, 2005)和Guo(2009)的理論文獻(xiàn)，可用相關(guān)的方程來解決不同的（關(guān)于稅收競爭）問題。商業(yè)用地是固定的，勞動力在大都市區(qū)的當(dāng)?shù)厮痉ü茌爡^(qū)之間是自由移動的。這些論文，都假設(shè)通勤是不花錢，從而忽略了通勤成本。</p><p>　　一些論文假設(shè)了一維連續(xù)位置模型，即假設(shè)大城市區(qū)域是一個線段和消費者的通勤成本的比例距離。Braid

65、 (2000)和Peralta (2007)假設(shè)在每兩個地方管轄就有一個單一的就業(yè)中心。Braid (2002, 2003)假設(shè)中心城市是被郊區(qū)所包圍，并且可以在任何地方就業(yè)。</p><p>　　上文提到在過去的七篇文獻(xiàn)中，工資稅是一種純粹的基于來源的工資稅（有時也稱為工資單稅）。也就是說，中心城市的工資稅稅率同樣適用于在中心城市工作的城市居民和郊區(qū)居民，但不適用于在郊區(qū)工作的城市和郊區(qū)的居民。美國的幾個大城市

66、包括舊金山，洛杉磯，紐瓦克（新澤西州），伯明翰（阿拉巴馬州）有這種工資稅，而他們周圍的郊區(qū)卻沒有。</p><p>　　在美國的幾個城市有一種以純居民為主的所得稅，此外還有更多的“混合型”的所得稅，所有中心城市的居民以同一稅率征稅（無論他們在哪里工作），而在中心城市工作的郊區(qū)居民以同一稅率或較低稅率征稅。一些大都市包括威爾明頓，堪薩斯城，圣路易斯，底特律和密歇根州，紐約市和費城等城市有此種稅，而周圍的郊區(qū)卻沒有（

67、或擁有較低的稅率）。</p><p>　　許多除美國之外的國家的地方政府也采用工資稅或所得稅，這些國家包括瑞典，丹麥，奧地利，法國，德國，日本和西班牙（見 Braid, 2005, 第1790頁）。我不能肯定的是，這些國家的當(dāng)?shù)毓べY稅或所得稅確切類型，但我相信在某些情況下，稅收是純粹以居民為主的，而Peralta（2007）指出，澳大利亞，奧地利，法國，希臘和墨西哥“在州或地方一級有工資稅”，并在韓國，“所得稅稅

68、收收入是地方一級的經(jīng)濟(jì)來源”。</p><p>　　在我的文獻(xiàn)中這兩種假設(shè)是不同的。首先，居住在一個區(qū)域但去另一個區(qū)域工作的任何人都會產(chǎn)生固定通勤成本（無成本的通勤或與與距離成正比的通勤費用對比）。其次，在某個區(qū)域會有多少居民將在此地工作可用多種回歸方式進(jìn)行檢測，該方法依賴于一個地區(qū)每個工人能賺取的凈收入。</p><p>　　我的理論文章補(bǔ)充了haughwout等人（2004年）的實證結(jié)