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1、<p> 中文3180字,2018單詞</p><p> Source: Donald Bruce .John Deskins,2010 “Can state tax policies be used to promote entrepreneurial activity?”. Springer Science Business Media, LLC. January.pp.99-110 </
2、p><p><b> 原文:</b></p><p> Can state tax policies be used to promote entrepreneurial activity?</p><p><b> Abstract </b></p><p> Despite a recent
3、 flurry of empirical research on the effects of taxes on small business activity, state-level taxes faced by entrepreneurs have been overlooked by most of the existing literature. Using a 50-state panel of tax policy inf
4、ormation spanning the years 1989 through 2002, our analysis reveals that state tax policies generally do not appear to have quantitatively important effects on entrepreneurial activity. When we find statistically importa
5、nt effects, we find that higher individual i</p><p> 1 Introduction </p><p> The interplay between tax policy and entrepreneurial activity has enjoyed a resurgence in the empirical economics l
6、iterature. Most of the recent research has focused on federal taxes, however, leaving state tax policies relatively unexplored. As states continue to grapple with difficult issues in business taxation and development inc
7、entives, a thorough consideration of the effects of state tax policies on entrepreneurial activity becomes even more important, especially when considering the possi</p><p> This investigation is warranted
8、for a number of reasons. First, as a result of the focus on federal taxes, earlier research has only considered a subset of the taxes facing small businesses. For example, Cline et al. 2006 show that the total state and
9、local tax burden for US businesses includes much more than direct business taxes such as corporate income taxes or state franchise, excise, or gross receipts taxes. Businesses―especially small businesses―also pay signifi
10、cant amounts of property and</p><p> A second motivation for our study is the observation that state governments continue to debate and enact the bulk of pro-entrepreneurship policy in the US without the be
11、nefit of hard data on the effects of those policies on small business development and success. On one hand, higher taxes might reduce entrepreneurial activity by lowering the returns. On the other hand, higher taxes incr
12、ease the rewards from tax avoidance or evasion and thus might have the undesirable effect of increasing entrepr</p><p> As stated above, our paper is one of only a few to investigate the relationship betwee
13、n state tax policy and entrepreneurship, as the large majority of the literature has focused on federal policy. </p><p> We extend their line of analysis in the following general ways, all of which are disc
14、ussed in detail below: 1. we consider a broader array of state tax policy variables, 2. we consider an additional measure of entrepreneurial activity drawn from tax return data, 3. we consider not only the stock of entre
15、preneurship in a state, but also a state’s share of national entrepreneurship in order to address location effects, 4. we consider not only tax rates but also tax shares in state tax portfolios, </p><p> 2
16、Existing literature </p><p> Two broad areas of study in the earlier literature motivate this analysis. The first is the literature on the effects of state tax policies on business location decisions. These
17、 results are important because business location decisions can have important impacts on measured entrepreneurship or self-employment rates. In his oft-cited review of a vast array of empirical studies, Wasylenko 1997 co
18、ncludes that taxes have statistically significant but quantitatively small effects on interregional loc</p><p> The second broad area of relevant literature consists of empirical studies of taxation and ent
19、repreneurship. The number of studies in this literature has grown significantly in recent years, largely due to greater availability of useful data. Time series studies have focused on federal tax policies and have gener
20、ally concluded that higher federal income or payroll tax rates cause higher rates of entrepreneurship, specifically defined as self-employment Long1982; Blau 1987; Parker 1996; Cowling a</p><p> Several oth
21、er studies have examined cross-sectional or panel micro data to examine the influence of tax policies on individual decisions about entrepreneurship. Results from these studies have also been inconclusive Bruce and Gurle
22、y 2005; Bruce 2000, 2002; Carroll et al. 2001; Gentry and Hubbard 2000; Moore 2003; Schuetze 2000 . While some of these have indicated that higher tax rates on self-employment income have ambiguous effects on self-employ
23、ment rates, a growing consensus suggests that tax</p><p> A few studies have analyzed state-level time series or panel data to explicitly examine the effects of state tax policies on entrepreneurial activit
24、y and are therefore most relevant to the current paper. Carlton 1979 finds no strong evidence that local taxes influence the number of firm births. He uses rather rough proxies for tax variables, however, and only consid
25、ers three industries for a limited time period. Bartik 1989 uses more detailed tax information and a broader array of industries and</p><p> 3 Data and empirical methodology </p><p> A common
26、criticism of virtually all measures of entrepreneurial or small business activity is that they include part-time and so-called partial entrepreneurs. No consensus has arisen about how to address this, or even what the co
27、nsequences might be for empirical research.9 Further, for virtually any measure of entrepreneurship for which data are available, there are questions about the extent to which it actually measures what one might consider
28、 to be true entrepreneurship. Rather than focusing </p><p> In the analysis that follows, these two entrepreneurial measures are each viewed in two distinct ways. In our baseline specifications, we enter th
29、e state-specific entrepreneurship rates directly as described above. These values represent the stock of entrepreneurship in a state, as described above, and most closely relate to the self-employment rates used in much
30、of the prior literature. With this approach our focus is more heavily toward the within-state effects of tax policy instead of on the </p><p> 4 Conclusions </p><p> In this study, we present
31、an examination of state-level panel data for the period from 1989 through 2002 to better understand the relationship between state tax policies and entrepreneurial activity. Regression analyses indicate that top marginal
32、 state tax rates on corporate income and state sales tax rates do not have statistically significant effects on state entrepreneurship rates. This suggests that any disincentive effects of higher tax rates due to lower r
33、eturns from entrepreneurial activi</p><p> In contrast, higher top marginal state tax rates on personal income tend to reduce a state’s share of the national entrepreneurial stock. States with more aggressi
34、ve corporate income taxes, specifications those that include combined reporting requirements, tend to have higher entrepreneurship rates. Paradoxically, states with more progressive individual income taxes also tend to h
35、ave higher entrepreneurship rates. Higher weights on the sales factor in the corporate income tax apportionment formu</p><p> These results are important in the design of state tax policy, as they suggest t
36、hat tax policy changes will probably not have the effects on small business activity that policy makers might believe. Rather than attempt to target tax breaks to small businesses, then, states should focus on traditiona
37、l tax reforms involving lower tax rates, broader tax bases, and simpler tax systems that will create a more neutral and productive tax environment for small businesses, large businesses, and individua</p><p>
38、;<b> 譯文: </b></p><p> 能說(shuō)出用來(lái)促進(jìn)創(chuàng)業(yè)活動(dòng)的稅收政策嗎?</p><p><b> 摘要</b></p><p> 最近實(shí)證研究發(fā)現(xiàn)對(duì)小企業(yè)的稅收影響活動(dòng)中,企業(yè)家面臨的國(guó)家級(jí)稅收已經(jīng)忽視了現(xiàn)有大多數(shù)文獻(xiàn)。根據(jù)50家企業(yè)從1989年到2002年的稅收信息,我們的分析發(fā)現(xiàn),國(guó)家稅
39、收政策并未對(duì)企業(yè)納稅產(chǎn)生實(shí)質(zhì)性影響。但是其對(duì)統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)上有重要影響,我們發(fā)現(xiàn),較高的個(gè)人所得稅稅率,國(guó)有資產(chǎn)、繼承或贈(zèng)與稅的存在,以及銷售比重較大的國(guó)有企業(yè)所得稅分?jǐn)偣蕉寄苌晕⒔档推湓谌珖?guó)企業(yè)股票中的份額。結(jié)果還表明,更多的個(gè)人所得稅累進(jìn)結(jié)構(gòu)的國(guó)家和在沒(méi)有通過(guò)聯(lián)合報(bào)告要求實(shí)施更加積極的企業(yè)所得稅稅率的國(guó)家都往往有稍高的創(chuàng)業(yè)率。所以說(shuō)國(guó)家稅收組合并不是國(guó)家企業(yè)創(chuàng)業(yè)創(chuàng)收的決定性因素。</p><p><b>
40、; 1、簡(jiǎn)介</b></p><p> 稅收政策和創(chuàng)業(yè)活動(dòng)之間的相互作用在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的文獻(xiàn)中一直享有的實(shí)證復(fù)興的稱號(hào)。最近的研究主要集中在聯(lián)邦稅,但是,離開(kāi)國(guó)家稅收政策相對(duì)來(lái)說(shuō)考慮的少。隨著國(guó)家繼續(xù)在用業(yè)務(wù)發(fā)展來(lái)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)稅收和解決債券難點(diǎn)上的問(wèn)題,對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)活動(dòng)的國(guó)家稅收政策的效果徹底審議變得更加重要,尤其是當(dāng)考慮到可能帶來(lái)的循環(huán)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng),創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新的好處等等。在這份報(bào)告中,我們通過(guò)研究國(guó)家之間的稅收政策和
41、創(chuàng)業(yè)精神的關(guān)系,使用的是美國(guó)所有50個(gè)州從1989年到2002年國(guó)家稅收政策的詳細(xì)信息和縱向數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)。</p><p> 這項(xiàng)調(diào)查被一些原因證實(shí)。首先,早期的研究只考慮了小企業(yè)所面臨稅收的一部分作為對(duì)聯(lián)邦稅收集中的結(jié)果。例如,克萊因等人。更直接表明,占同期國(guó)家和地方包括美國(guó)企業(yè)的稅務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)比,如營(yíng)業(yè)稅企業(yè)所得稅或國(guó)家特許經(jīng)營(yíng),消費(fèi)稅,或稅收總收入。企業(yè),尤其是小型企業(yè),還支付財(cái)產(chǎn)和大量銷售稅,連同雜費(fèi)和費(fèi)用增長(zhǎng)清單
42、。稅收結(jié)構(gòu)的現(xiàn)有陣列狀態(tài)提供了一個(gè)變化虛擬的外生政策聚寶盆,可以用于清晰地識(shí)別企業(yè)的反應(yīng)。</p><p> 我們研究的第二個(gè)動(dòng)機(jī)是觀察美國(guó)政府繼續(xù)進(jìn)行辯論,制定對(duì)小企業(yè)成功發(fā)展和沒(méi)有利益的政策。一方面,較高的稅收可能減少企業(yè)的收益,從而降低創(chuàng)業(yè)活動(dòng)。另一方面,較高的稅收增長(zhǎng)回報(bào)從避稅或逃稅來(lái)獲得,因此可能有增加創(chuàng)業(yè)活動(dòng)的不良效果。這兩個(gè)影響可能還相互抵消,使得較高的稅收不會(huì)對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)活動(dòng)產(chǎn)生顯著的影響。在何種程度
43、上的稅收政策,特別是國(guó)家稅收政策,實(shí)際上是對(duì)企業(yè)創(chuàng)業(yè)活動(dòng)需要的實(shí)證探索。如果稅收政策不影響創(chuàng)業(yè)活動(dòng)(即,如果回報(bào)和避稅的相差較小或相互抵消),利用稅收政策來(lái)鼓勵(lì)創(chuàng)新或通過(guò)創(chuàng)業(yè)增長(zhǎng)不太可能取得成果。另外,如果一個(gè)非零效果是確定的,實(shí)際的參數(shù)估計(jì)值可以用來(lái)更有效地設(shè)計(jì)稅收政策并實(shí)現(xiàn)創(chuàng)業(yè)所需的更改。 </p><p> 正如前文所述,我們的報(bào)紙只探討少數(shù)幾個(gè)國(guó)家稅務(wù)政策和創(chuàng)業(yè)之間的關(guān)系,正如絕大多數(shù)的文獻(xiàn)中主要集中在
44、聯(lián)邦政策。 </p><p> 我們把視線分析集中在以下的一般方式,所有這一切都作詳細(xì)的討論如下:(1)我們認(rèn)為一系列國(guó)家稅務(wù)政策變量更廣闊;(2)我們考慮一個(gè)稅收回報(bào)數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)自額外的企業(yè)活動(dòng)測(cè)量;(3)我們考慮國(guó)家創(chuàng)業(yè)是不僅是股票企業(yè)家的精神,也是一種國(guó)家解決位置份額的影響;(4)我們考慮不僅是稅率而且也考慮稅務(wù)股票投資組合州稅;(5)我們考慮有效稅率作為一種魯棒性分析,看看我們的基線法定稅率;(6)我們認(rèn)為農(nóng)
45、業(yè)企業(yè)家在進(jìn)行另一個(gè)魯棒性檢;(7)我們分析更長(zhǎng)的時(shí)期。 </p><p><b> 2現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)</b></p><p> 現(xiàn)有的文獻(xiàn)中兩大領(lǐng)域研究的文獻(xiàn)更早的激勵(lì)這種分析。第一個(gè)是文獻(xiàn)對(duì)國(guó)家稅收政策對(duì)工作地點(diǎn)決定的健康影響。這些結(jié)果很重要,因?yàn)槠髽I(yè)定位決策可以測(cè)量創(chuàng)業(yè)或?qū)ψ晕夜陀寐实奶岣呔哂兄匾挠绊?。在相同的面紗中,巴體克認(rèn)為地方稅中減少更高的狀態(tài)商業(yè)活動(dòng)的地
46、區(qū)是有彈性的,然而,這種文學(xué)關(guān)系不大可能很淺的學(xué)習(xí),因?yàn)橹钡浆F(xiàn)在,位置的決定重點(diǎn)在公司。如果小企業(yè)與大企業(yè)不移動(dòng)(也可能不是), 他們也許不那么容易產(chǎn)生國(guó)家稅收的差異。此外,大多數(shù)國(guó)家激勵(lì)發(fā)展稅率針對(duì)的是更大的生產(chǎn)企業(yè),而不是小型企業(yè)。 </p><p> 第二廣泛領(lǐng)域有關(guān)文獻(xiàn)由實(shí)證研究稅收和創(chuàng)業(yè)組成,近年來(lái)文學(xué)對(duì)目前的研究的數(shù)量已經(jīng)大大提高,這在很大程度上是由于擁有了更大的可用性有用的數(shù)據(jù)。一般認(rèn)為聯(lián)邦稅收政
47、策的研究集中于時(shí)間序列,企業(yè)精神是增加聯(lián)邦所得稅或工薪稅稅率導(dǎo)致更高的利率的原因,高稅率,工人們的工作工資,或有償工作的創(chuàng)業(yè)行為,在那里他們可以更容易避免納稅或偷稅。一名企業(yè)家,除了個(gè)人收入和工資稅,還要考慮企業(yè)所得稅,資本利得稅,還有房地產(chǎn)稅。結(jié)果通常表明,稅很顯著影響小而分散多的創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)創(chuàng)業(yè)率。因此,他們很可能是需要從創(chuàng)業(yè)活動(dòng)中提取出無(wú)效的變化數(shù)量。所有這些研究都考慮到對(duì)國(guó)家稅收的影響。 </p><p>
48、 其他一些研究橫向或縱向檢查了微觀數(shù)據(jù)對(duì)個(gè)人決定稅收政策創(chuàng)業(yè)的影響。這些研究結(jié)果也不確定,當(dāng)這些自營(yíng)收入自營(yíng)率很模糊表明時(shí),稅率更高。越來(lái)越多的公眾輿論表明稅率增加將減少企業(yè)入境、生長(zhǎng)、招聘、投資和存活率。在這些研究中只有一部分被認(rèn)為是國(guó)家稅收,而且只有的一個(gè)組成的混合聯(lián)邦所得稅稅率。 </p><p> 很少有研究分析國(guó)家級(jí)時(shí)間序列或面板數(shù)據(jù)支出的影響,明確國(guó)家稅務(wù)政策,因此創(chuàng)業(yè)活動(dòng)本質(zhì)上最相關(guān)。卡爾頓(19
49、79)找不到證據(jù)表明,地方稅收影響公司的數(shù)量出生。他用很不規(guī)范的稅務(wù)代理變量,然而,只考慮三種行業(yè)有限的時(shí)間的時(shí)間周期。巴緹克將會(huì)使用更多的更廣泛的納稅資料,發(fā)現(xiàn)一系列行業(yè)的企業(yè)所得稅的財(cái)產(chǎn)稅,銷售稅對(duì)設(shè)備也有影響。他也發(fā)現(xiàn)這還會(huì)負(fù)面影響小生意,一般的銷售和個(gè)人所得稅稅收不顯著,而政府把效果取決于開(kāi)支類別。他早期的研究調(diào)查發(fā)現(xiàn)彈性通常在絕對(duì)值0.5上下。陳和威廉姆斯(1999)檢查從1984年到1993年的經(jīng)商失敗的比例,估計(jì)為每個(gè)行業(yè)
50、的一些類別的面板回歸。雖然他們的目標(biāo)并非是唯一的對(duì)小公司,他們發(fā)現(xiàn),人均提高銷售稅企業(yè)的失敗率更高的為低技術(shù)的行業(yè),人均較高企業(yè)所得稅為高科技企業(yè)降低故障率。 </p><p> 凱瑞福斯和索伯發(fā)現(xiàn)在1996年到2000年之間存在越來(lái)越多的投資人投資國(guó)家的工業(yè)由此獲得的遺產(chǎn)征稅的比率降低超過(guò)了聯(lián)邦水平。 </p><p><b> 3數(shù)據(jù)和實(shí)證方法</b><
51、/p><p> 幾乎所有的企業(yè)或小型企業(yè)活動(dòng)的方法措施被包括兼職和所謂的部分企業(yè)家普遍的指責(zé)。有關(guān)如何解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題,甚至可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生什么后果的實(shí)證研究都尚無(wú)共識(shí)。此外,對(duì)于企業(yè)家?guī)缀跛械墓_(kāi)資料,他們可能認(rèn)為是關(guān)于真正的創(chuàng)業(yè)實(shí)際措施的問(wèn)題。而不是側(cè)重于一個(gè)單一的措施,或聲稱我們的一方或雙方都可以采取的措施比其他都要好,我們現(xiàn)在只是為了衡量我們的業(yè)績(jī)敏感性和創(chuàng)業(yè)的定義并行處理兩個(gè)備選方案。 </p>&
52、lt;p> 這兩個(gè)創(chuàng)業(yè)措施都從兩個(gè)不同方法進(jìn)行分析。直接如上所述我們的基線規(guī)格、進(jìn)入特定的創(chuàng)業(yè)率陳述。這些價(jià)值觀代表國(guó)家股票企業(yè)家的精神,如前所述,用這個(gè)方法我們的目標(biāo)是向國(guó)家稅收政策上是更加嚴(yán)重的影響而不是區(qū)位越過(guò)國(guó)家稅收政策的影響勢(shì)頭。作為我們的首要目標(biāo)是開(kāi)始并維持一個(gè)小企業(yè)稅收政策的影響趨勢(shì),這個(gè)方法是非常有用的,因?yàn)樵S多企業(yè)家只有在小規(guī)模的行動(dòng)中才不涉及跨度國(guó)家邊界。 </p><p><b
53、> 4結(jié)論</b></p><p> 在這項(xiàng)研究中,我們提出以1989年到2002年為一個(gè)周期,國(guó)家級(jí)面板數(shù)據(jù)檢驗(yàn)以更好地了解國(guó)家稅收政策和創(chuàng)業(yè)活動(dòng)之間的關(guān)系。從經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退現(xiàn)象中分析表明,最高邊際狀態(tài)的企業(yè)所得稅稅率和國(guó)家銷售稅稅率對(duì)于國(guó)家創(chuàng)業(yè)率沒(méi)有顯著的影響。這表明,較高稅率(由于企業(yè)獲得較少的回報(bào))的任何不利因素的影響與避稅或逃稅產(chǎn)生較大的回報(bào)相抵消,兩種影響都很小或者沒(méi)有產(chǎn)生更大的實(shí)質(zhì)意
54、義。 </p><p> 與此相反,較高的最高邊際國(guó)家對(duì)個(gè)人所得稅率往往會(huì)降低一個(gè)國(guó)家的創(chuàng)業(yè)股。以更積極的企業(yè)所得稅,尤其是那些包括合并報(bào)告的要求的國(guó)家往往有較高的創(chuàng)業(yè)率。奇怪的是,更多的個(gè)人所得稅累進(jìn)也往往有較高的創(chuàng)業(yè)率。關(guān)于企業(yè)所得稅分?jǐn)偣?、銷售因素和國(guó)有資產(chǎn)稅,遺產(chǎn)稅,贈(zèng)與稅等超過(guò)聯(lián)邦遺產(chǎn)稅的較高權(quán)重都與國(guó)家有關(guān)企業(yè)國(guó)有股存量較低相聯(lián)系,但是這些影響都相當(dāng)規(guī)模小。我們并沒(méi)有發(fā)現(xiàn)國(guó)家稅收組合對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)活動(dòng)在經(jīng)
55、濟(jì)意義上產(chǎn)生顯著效應(yīng)的證據(jù)。 </p><p> 這些結(jié)果對(duì)國(guó)家稅收政策的設(shè)計(jì)很重要,稅收政策的制定者認(rèn)為,稅收政策的變化可能不會(huì)對(duì)小企業(yè)產(chǎn)生影響。比起試圖針對(duì)小企業(yè)減稅,各國(guó)更應(yīng)集中于傳統(tǒng)的低稅率稅制改革,涉及更廣泛的稅基,以及簡(jiǎn)單的稅收制度,它將為小型企業(yè),大型企業(yè)和個(gè)人創(chuàng)建一個(gè)更中立的和富有成效的稅收環(huán)境。 </p><p> 出處:[美] 唐納德?布魯斯約翰,《能說(shuō)出用來(lái)促進(jìn)創(chuàng)
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