石油專業(yè)相關(guān)外文翻譯

1、<p>　　本 科 畢 業(yè) 設(shè) 計(jì)（論文）</p><p><b>　　( 2012屆)</b></p><p><b>　?。ㄍ?文 翻 譯）</b></p><p>　　題 目: 我國石油進(jìn)出口現(xiàn)狀與問題分析</p><p>　　學(xué) 院:__商學(xué)院_______________

2、________</p><p>　　專　　業(yè):__國際經(jīng)濟(jì)與貿(mào)易_______________</p><p>　　原文題目：《中國的石油出口和價格》</p><p>　　作者：若昂里卡多·法利亞</p><p>　　原文出處: 學(xué)院經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的討論文件，第08,12，提供合作：肯特大學(xué)</p><p><

3、;b>　　中國出口和石油價格</b></p><p>　　在新世界發(fā)展的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境下，石油價格的上漲是最實(shí)質(zhì)性，而不是一個臨時加息的情況。評論家認(rèn)為高油價是停留在一個位置。這個說法的一個主要的原因是，中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)高速增長是推動增加對石油的需求和價格上漲的罪魁禍?zhǔn)?。然而，鑒于中國是一個石油進(jìn)口國，這就增加了石油價格，對于中國石油的出口擴(kuò)張?jiān)黾由a(chǎn)成本產(chǎn)生了負(fù)面的影響。但根據(jù)數(shù)據(jù)檢測現(xiàn)實(shí)，這樣的結(jié)果

4、似乎并沒有發(fā)生。相反，中國的石油出口沒有受到石油價格提高的影響。 </p><p>　　另一個程式化的事實(shí)是，在洛迪克（2006）中國的石油出口占世界的比例也越來越多的被討論。肖特（2005）為一種相關(guān)的方法。根據(jù)賴（2004）中國對外貿(mào)易成功在經(jīng)濟(jì)方面的市場化改革，恰當(dāng)?shù)膮R率和貿(mào)易政策，并積極參與外商企業(yè)投資。2張和張（2005）表明，隨著中國制造業(yè)在國際上的競爭力增強(qiáng)，全要素生產(chǎn)率和勞動生產(chǎn)率的提高，中國已經(jīng)

5、成為世界上最大的貿(mào)易集團(tuán)，占有著6%的全球貿(mào)易，在2002年成為世界第四大石油出口國。這是一個驚人的有關(guān)成功方面的產(chǎn)出增長率的數(shù)據(jù)。1980以來中國平均增長率每年約10%。中國的增長遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于其他地區(qū)，平均11.45%在1991年至2003年期間。</p><p>　　在本文中我們提出一個合理的解釋，這個事實(shí)有關(guān)中國在出口方面的擴(kuò)張，產(chǎn)量和石油價格的價格都得到增長。我們的假設(shè)是，中國經(jīng)濟(jì)的飛速發(fā)展是石油價格上漲背后

6、的強(qiáng)大驅(qū)動力。然而，由于彈性的勞動力供給，由于中國經(jīng)濟(jì)市場上大量儲備的勞動力，石油價格的上漲損害中國出口能力的程度低于對它的競爭對手所造成的損害。中國石油出口的快速擴(kuò)張?jiān)诹硪环矫嬗直仨毰c當(dāng)前的現(xiàn)象結(jié)合到一起。</p><p>　　競爭力作為洛迪克（2006）措施進(jìn)步完善有很大關(guān)系。因此，我們可以看出，石油價格和中國的出口增加時間也有關(guān)。當(dāng)然，也有其他可能原因來解釋這個問題，比如同時增加中國出口和石油的價格。例如，

7、另一個假設(shè)，與假設(shè)正好對應(yīng)的是中國出口并不是能源密集型，石油也不會是一個重要的投入和生產(chǎn)對象。因此，在石油生產(chǎn)成本和出口價格方面，石油價格上漲帶來的因素對我國的影響并不大。這一假設(shè)石油有意義不是本文討論的對象。我們的目的是測試這個想法，中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長對油價的影響，同時影響其出口的競爭對手，因?yàn)槲覀冇写罅康氖Ｓ鄤趧恿Α?lt;/p><p>　　艾肯格林等證據(jù)支持這一假說。（2004年），這表明中國出口的東西主要集中在消

8、費(fèi)品市場，跟其他亞洲國家的出口是一樣的。羅蘭 - 霍爾斯特和Weiss（2005）發(fā)現(xiàn)，中國出口的產(chǎn)品削弱了亞洲其他國家在美國和日本區(qū)域的市場份額，這從拉爾和Albaladejo（2004）]也可以看出來。菲爾普斯（2004）認(rèn)為，中國的出口增長是因?yàn)榻?jīng)濟(jì)欠發(fā)達(dá)，尤其是像拉丁美洲，這種情況實(shí)際上是有害的，因?yàn)橹袊母偁帉?dǎo)致貿(mào)易條件急劇惡化，減少拉丁美洲的比較優(yōu)勢。</p><p>　　中國出口優(yōu)勢的另一個因素是在

9、于生產(chǎn)力資源蟲族。小弟，小鐘（2004）顯示，勞動密集型產(chǎn)品的形式在出口商品中占了最大的比例，在中國的出口中，勞動密集型產(chǎn)品幾乎都可以無限制的供應(yīng)。</p><p>　　labor.5一個勞動力供給過剩的含義是，中國可以大幅提高其在出口部門的勞動人口的就業(yè)率，工資并不會提高。因?yàn)?，在出口部門提高生產(chǎn)率的結(jié)果是不太可能提高工資的，大幅度增加出口和競爭力的供應(yīng)。因此，生產(chǎn)率的外生因素，比如采用國外技術(shù)或外國直接投資，

10、對產(chǎn)出的增長和出口競爭力產(chǎn)生積極的影響。這反過來又導(dǎo)致石油價格上漲，這樣有助于解釋油價和中國的出口。</p><p>　　我們提出了一個程式化的理論模型，考慮到所有的這些因素。該模型能夠解釋如何在外生增長全要素生產(chǎn)率（TFP），可以生成一個中國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長和石油價格之間的正相關(guān)。然后，我們估計(jì)中國出口的理論模型減少的形式方程模型研究經(jīng)驗(yàn)的影響。這個公式考慮到羅德瑞克（2006）（expy）開發(fā)競爭力的措施，與石油價格

11、，生產(chǎn)率，實(shí)時匯率，和國外的工業(yè)生產(chǎn)。我們利用自回歸分布滯后（ARDL）方法提供的靈活性，解釋1992-2005年期間每月中國的制成品出口。估計(jì)油價系數(shù)和expy產(chǎn)生非常大的正面價值觀。根據(jù)模型的數(shù)據(jù)，從而為我們的猜想提供了強(qiáng)有力的支持，對于勞動生產(chǎn)率也有積極作用，與理論保持了一致。為負(fù)值的實(shí)際匯率也與理論的驗(yàn)證也一致，而國外工業(yè)收入的影響雖然是積極的，但卻影響力卻比較弱。</p><p>　　China’s E

12、xports and the Oil Price</p><p>　　By João Ricardo Faria</p><p>　　School of Economics discussion papers, No. 08,12</p><p>　　Provided in cooperation with: University of Kent</

13、p><p>　　The increase in oil prices is one of the most substantive recent developments in the world macroeconomic environment. Rather than being a temporary hike, commentators have argued that higher oil prices

14、are here to stay. One of the main reasons behind this hypothesis is that China’s economic growth is driving the increase in the demand for oil and its price hike. However, given that China is an oil importing country, th

15、is increase in the price of oil should have a negative impact on China’s expor</p><p>　　Another stylized fact is that China’s share in the world’s exports is also increasing as discussed in Rodrik (2006). Se

16、e also Schott (2005) for a related approach. According to Lai (2004) Chinese foreign trade success lies in the market-oriented reforms of the economy, appropriate exchange rate and trade policies and the active participa

17、tion of foreign invested enterprises.2 Zhang and Zhang (2005) show that the significant improvement of international competitiveness in China’s manufacturing sec</p><p>　　In this paper we advance a plausible

18、 explanation for this set of facts relating Chinese export expansion, output growth, and the oil price. Our hypothesis is that China’s growth has been a driving force behind the oil price increase. However, given the ela

19、stic labor supply due to the large reserves of workforce of the Chinese economy, the oil price increase harms China’s export capacity less than that of its competitors. The rapid expansion of Chinese exports, on the othe

20、r hand, has to do with i</p><p>　　Competitiveness as advanced by Rodrik’s (2006) measure of relative competitiveness. As a consequence, we observe that both oil prices and China’s exports increase over time.

21、 Of course, there are other possible explanations for the simultaneous increase in China’s exports and oil prices. For instance, another hypothesis, not necessarily opposed to ours, is that Chinese exports are not energy

22、 intensive, that is, oil is not a significant input in its production and, therefore, increases in oil pric</p><p>　　This hypothesis is backed by evidence in Eichengreen et al. (2004), which shows that Chine

23、se exports crowd out the exports of other Asian countries mainly in markets for consumer goods. Roland-Holst and Weiss (2005) find that China’s exports are eroding the market share of its regional neighbors in the U.S. a

24、nd Japan [see also Lall and Albaladejo (2004)]. Phelps (2004) argues that China’s exports growth is detrimental for less advanced economies, especially Latin America, since Chinese competiti</p><p>　　Another

25、 factor behind Chinese exports’ strength lies in the productivity gains of its work force. Xiaodi and Xiaozhong (2004) show that labor-intensive products form the largest ratio of Chinese exports, which is due to China’s

26、 almost unlimited supply of</p><p>　　labor.5 One implication of the excess of supply of labor is that China can increase substantially the employment of its work force in the exports sector without inflating

27、 wages. Also, the productivity gains in the export sector are less likely to raise wages, which increases substantially the supply of exports and its competitiveness. Hence, exogenous increases in productivity brought ab

28、out by factors such as foreign technology adoption or FDI have a positive impact on output growth and export c</p><p>　　We present a stylized theoretical model that takes into account all these factors. The

29、model is able to explain how an exogenous increase in total factor productivity (TFP) can generate a positive correlation between Chinese growth and the oil price. We then examine empirically the implications of the mode

30、l by estimating a reduced form equation for Chinese exports derived from the theoretical model. This equation takes into account the measure of competitiveness developed by Rodrik (2006) (expy)</p><p>　　原文題目

31、：《中華人民共和國石油儲備的發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略》</p><p><b>　　作者：丹尼爾</b></p><p>　　原文出處: 賓夕法尼亞大學(xué)</p><p>　　中華人民共和國石油儲備的發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略</p><p>　　今天，籠罩在國際關(guān)系領(lǐng)域中的幾個問題比世界日益減少石油供應(yīng)的競爭顯得更為突出。同時，中國人民共和國經(jīng)濟(jì)從第三世

32、界過渡到全球超級大國構(gòu)成了冷戰(zhàn)后的世界秩序的最大挑戰(zhàn)。如果美國全球霸權(quán)的崛起的故事是20世紀(jì)的故事，類似中國的崛起可能是21世紀(jì)的故事。所以這并不奇怪，中國的能源安全，這兩個具有不可估量的全球合流進(jìn)口的問題將獲得越來越多國際的關(guān)注。</p><p>　　中國在全球石油市場的作用只是在最近成為國際社會的主題關(guān)注。中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)改革始于1978年，但西方對中國崛起的顧慮是直到中國于2001年加入世界貿(mào)易組織時，開始達(dá)到一

33、個火熱的高音點(diǎn)上。2002年中國的石油消費(fèi)超過日本，今天，只有美國的消費(fèi)超過中國石油的消費(fèi)。隨后，在2004年，中國石油進(jìn)口增加了前所未有的49％，在全球石油價格上貢獻(xiàn)了33％的跳躍。通過一些計(jì)算，在過去的5 年里中國已占到世界石油需求增量的約40％。</p><p>　　中國石油爭論的中心內(nèi)容是一場關(guān)于兩個不同的世界觀的國際政治經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域的拔河戰(zhàn)爭：經(jīng)濟(jì)自由主義和經(jīng)濟(jì)民族主義。 “前者強(qiáng)調(diào)通過比較優(yōu)勢的開發(fā)提高一

34、般福利在國際貿(mào)易中的效用。這是自由市場資本主義的世界觀。后者假定貿(mào)易在國家權(quán)力的最大化的背景下，強(qiáng)調(diào)自給自足的相對而不是絕對的福利。</p><p>　　中國的石油工業(yè)仍然是經(jīng)濟(jì)民族主義占主導(dǎo)地位。如上所述，中國的各大石油公司是國有企業(yè)，政府繼續(xù)調(diào)節(jié)石油產(chǎn)品價格。最重要的是，經(jīng)濟(jì)民族主義繼續(xù)影響著中國石油供應(yīng)穩(wěn)定的探索。</p><p>　　在過去的十年里，中國一直奉行新重商主義的石油安全

35、政策通常被稱為“權(quán)益油”。</p><p>　　寧可通過國際交流的傳統(tǒng)渠道買石油，而不是引導(dǎo)其國有石油公司通常是以共同勘探和生產(chǎn)權(quán)的形式海外購買石油資產(chǎn)。業(yè)內(nèi)專家之間的共識是，中國以收購出高價換取更大的石油供應(yīng)安全。 </p><p>　　事實(shí)上，權(quán)益油的方法在很大程度上依賴于這一概念，由于全球石油供應(yīng)緊張，中國在國外的石油項(xiàng)目的股份，將確保穩(wěn)定的供應(yīng)。這表明中國在石油市場的經(jīng)濟(jì)自由主義的

36、觀點(diǎn)，其中石油訪問的唯一標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是買它的能力的信心不足。在許多方面，這些方法作為自我實(shí)現(xiàn)的預(yù)言，如果中國政府要求中國的石油進(jìn)口，使中國市場財政不合理的收購和出售虧損，全球石油市場的流動性會相應(yīng)減少。</p><p>　　權(quán)益油的方法玷污了中國在海外的形象，損害任何分離中國的主要石油企業(yè)與政府的幻想。例如，美國國會對中國海洋石油公司收購優(yōu)尼科的一片嘩然出現(xiàn)主要是由于中國政府對中海油的控制。中國還從事戰(zhàn)略雙邊消費(fèi)者和生產(chǎn)

37、者的關(guān)系，提供政治住宿，希望確保獲得石油。在西方與伊朗和蘇丹，特別是中國的伙伴關(guān)系提出了梳理，和一些鷹派評論員甚至警告中國和中東無賴國家之間的關(guān)系以及潛在的有關(guān)武器的石油。</p><p>　　隨著名義上創(chuàng)新高的石油價格與全球性的焦點(diǎn)都對準(zhǔn)了中國的石油需求，中國石油儲存量的發(fā)展是不能犯一點(diǎn)錯誤的。目前，在中國的狀態(tài)是支持日本的模式，盡管日本計(jì)劃改革其系統(tǒng)，但是模仿日本的系統(tǒng)將是一個錯誤。中國將會發(fā)展得更好如果能發(fā)

38、展一個適合中國獨(dú)特的經(jīng)濟(jì)，政治和戰(zhàn)略條件的靈活的系統(tǒng)。</p><p>　　本文沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)中國的儲備計(jì)劃的第一階段的任何問題。 進(jìn)口碼頭和煉油廠附近存放百萬桶，將成為中國的戰(zhàn)略儲備的基礎(chǔ)。然而，用國內(nèi)成品油填補(bǔ)這些坦克沒有意義。除非國內(nèi)嚴(yán)峻的石油配給，任何國內(nèi)成品油用于填補(bǔ)萬桶將需要通過進(jìn)口替代，最終全球石油市場上有相同的效果。此外，中國儲存石油以取代進(jìn)口以防供應(yīng)中斷的情況。石油儲備應(yīng)與進(jìn)口石油相同，這是為了備份。

39、</p><p>　　中國政府和各大石油公司之間非同一般的關(guān)系可以在發(fā)展中國的石油庫存發(fā)揮優(yōu)勢。美國和國際能源機(jī)構(gòu)的反對是因?yàn)樗麄儞?dān)心，在緊急情況下，利潤最大化的企業(yè)為保護(hù)國內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)利益的私人戰(zhàn)略儲備可能無法分享他們政府的利益。</p><p>　　創(chuàng)新，合作的措施比比皆是，可以為中國節(jié)省成本，但最終，中國的戰(zhàn)略儲備制度的未來取決于有關(guān)中國決策者的心態(tài)。保守，安全為基礎(chǔ)的思想，對于政府來說將

40、導(dǎo)致更大的成本，更對世界石油市場的壓力以及中國在海外的形象有消極后果。一個更加開放的態(tài)度，將有利于高效的儲備和相對低廉的完成。</p><p>　　The People’s Republic of China’s Development of Strategic Petroleum Stockpiles</p><p>　　By Daniel Nieh</p><p&g

41、t;　　University of Pennsylvania</p><p>　　Today, few issues loom larger in the realm of international relations than the competition for the world’s dwindling supply of oil. At the same time, the People’s Repu

42、blic of China’s transition from third world economy to global superpower constitutes the greatest challenge to the post-Cold War world order. If America’s rise to global hegemonic power was the story of the 20th century,

43、 China’s similar emergence may be the story of the 21st. So it is not surprising that China’s energy security—the</p><p>　　China’s role in the global oil market has only recently become a subject of internat

44、ional concern. China’s economic reform began in 1978, but not until the PRC’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 did Western apprehension of China’s rise begin to approach today’s fervent pitch. China’s oi

45、l consumption passed Japan’s in2002; today, only the United States consumes more oil than the PRC. Then, in 2004, China’s oil imports increased by an unprecedented 49 percent, contributing to a 33</p><p>　　T

46、he Chinese oil debate centers on a tug of war between two different outlooks within the realm of international political economy: economic liberalism and economic nationalism. The former emphasizes the utility of interna

47、tional trade in increasing general welfare through the exploitation of comparative advantages. It is the worldview of free market capitalism. The latter posits trade in the context of the maximization of national power,

48、emphasizing self-sufficiency and relative rather than absol</p><p>　　In the past decade, China has pursued a neo-mercantilist oil security policy often called “equity oil.” Rather than purchase oil through t

49、he conventional avenues of international exchange, the PRC has instead guided its state-owned oil companies to purchase oil equity abroad, generally in the form of shared exploration and production rights. The consensus

50、among industry experts is that China overpays for these acquisitions in exchange for a perceived greater oil supply security. </p><p>　　Indeed, the equity oil approach relies heavily on the notion that as gl

51、obal oil supplies</p><p>　　tighten, Chinese stakes in oil projects abroad will ensure a steady supply. This demonstrates a Chinese lack of faith in the economic liberalist view of the oil market, in which th

52、e sole criterion of oil access is the capacity to buy it. In many ways, these approaches act as self-fulfilling prophecies; if the Chinese government requires Chinese oil importers to make financially unjustifiable acqui

53、sitions and sell to the Chinese market at a loss, the liquidity of the global oil market will corres</p><p>　　The equity oil approach has tarnished China’s image abroad, damaging any illusion of separation b

54、etween the government and China’s major oil companies. For example, the US Congress’s uproar over the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company’s bid for Unocal arose mainly due to the Chinese government’s control over CNOOC

55、. China has also engaged in strategic bilateral consumer-producer relationships, offering political accommodations in hopes of securing access to oil. China’s partnerships with Iran a</p><p>　　With nominal o

56、il prices at unprecedented highs, and with a global spotlight trained on China’s oil demand, there is little room for error in the PRC’s development of oil stockpiles. At the moment, sentiment in China favors the Japanes

57、e model, even as Japan plans to reform its system.26 Imitating the Japanese system would be a mistake. China would be better off developing a flexible system suited to the unique economic, political and strategic conditi

58、ons in the PRC.</p><p>　　This paper finds no problem with the first phase of China’s stockpiling plan. The 100million barrels stowed near import terminals and refineries will form the foundation of China’s s

59、trategic reserve. However, filling these tanks with domestic oil does not make sense. Barring draconian domestic oil rationing, any domestic oil used to fill the barrels would require replacement by import, ultimately ha

60、ving the same effect on the global oil market. Furthermore,China is stockpiling oil to replace imp</p><p>　　The unusual relationship between China’s government and its major oil companies could play to China

61、’s advantage in developing oil stockpiles. The US and IEA oppose private strategic reserves because they fear that, in an emergency scenario, profit-maximizing companies may not share their government’s interest in prote