法國(guó)股市流動(dòng)性外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　1600單詞，10000英文字符，中文3000字</p><p>　　文獻(xiàn)出處：Ajina A, Lakhal F, Sougné D. Institutional investors, information asymmetry and stock market liquidity in France[J]. International Journal of Managerial

2、 Finance, 2015, 11(1):44-59.</p><p>　　http://www.wenku1.com/news/A69A8AD2CB1FAFE3.html</p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Institutional investors, information asymmetry and sto

3、ck market liquidity in France</p><p>　　Ajina, Aymen, faten lakhal, and Danielle Sougné.</p><p>　　1. Introduction</p><p>　　Institutional investors are considered as a common fea

4、ture of modern capital markets. They play a major role in internationalizing financial markets because they manage huge volume of assets: nearly 62,000 billion dollars at the end of 2006, more than the total GDP of major

5、 industrialized countries. In 2005, institutional investors held 65% of equity in firms listed on the NYSE/AMEX, indicating a compound annual growth rate of 6.3% over the past 25 years (Agarwal, 2009).</p><p&g

6、t;　　Institutional investors have constantly monitored companies for the past few years. Within this context, many studies have focused on the role of institutional investors as main actors on corporate governance structu

7、res (Bozec and Bozec, 2007; Chung and Zhang, 2011). However, few researchers studied institutional investors’ impact on the financial market and, particularly, on liquidity.</p><p>　　The purpose of this pape

8、r is to examine whether institutional investors affect information asymmetry and stock market liquidity in France. On the one hand, institutional investors are often considered as informed agents. Due to their huge volum

9、es of assets, they are able to get private information (Fehle, 2004). The information asymmetry between those who possess private information (institutional investors) and uninformed agents (minority shareholders) can ha

10、ve a negative impact on market liqui</p><p>　　The paper contribution is twofold. Firstly, most previous studies examining the relationship between institutional investors and market liquidity consider instit

11、utional investors as a homogenous group. This hypothesis is restrictive and leads to ambiguous findings. Actually, these actors are various and have different characteristics and behaviour among corporate governance stru

12、ctures. Hence, our paper examines these actors as a heterogenous group, and distinguishes between active and passive in</p><p>　　We identify three major factors likely to influence their behaviors: participa

13、tion level, investment horizons and the nature of the relationship. This study provides insight into the existence of an influence of institutional investors on information asymmetry and on liquidity of the French market

14、.</p><p>　　The findings show that institutional share-ownership seems to reduce bid-ask spreads and improve stock liquidity. Because institutional investors have diversified portfolios, they trade on a frequ

15、ent basis. This should reduce trading costs and therefore improve stock liquidity. Institutional investor ownership is considered as a favorable signal by the market, which increases investors’ mutual trust and improves

16、liquidity. The results also show that there is no significant effect of bank and ins</p><p>　　The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework of the relation between in

17、stitutional investors and stock market liquidity. Section 3 describes our sample, variables and methodology. Results, discussion and a conclusion follow these sections.</p><p>　　2. Institutional investors an

18、d stock market liquidity: Literature review and development of hypotheses</p><p>　　2.1. Institutional investor ownership and market liquidity</p><p>　　The relationship between market liquidity a

19、nd institutional investors' ownership is ambiguous. Theoretically, this relationship stems from the information asymmetry between various stakeholders in the company. This is based on the theoretical adverse selectio

20、n, trading and signaling hypotheses.</p><p>　　2.1.1. The adverse selection hypothesis</p><p>　　This hypothesis assumes that institutional investors are considered as informed investors. As block

21、holders, they have access to private information and are able to collect information about firm value (Bae et al. 2002). Bushee and Goodman (2007) find that changes in institutional investors' ownership are consisten

22、t with trading on private information. This should exacerbate information asymmetry, increase the adverse selection costs and decrease stock market liquidity (Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengu</p><p>　　The adverse

23、selection hypothesis is confirmed by several empirical studies. Sharma (2005) studies the issue of institutional investors on a sample of 150 Indian companies. He shows that institutional investors’ capital share is not

24、significantly related to stock liquidity. Aslan et al. (2007) find strong evidence that firms with higher institutional ownership have a higher probability of informed trading. Boehmer and Kelley (2009) obtain empirical

25、evidence that institutional investors improve th</p><p>　　In the Australian market, Carole and James (2006) examine the relationship between institutional ownership and liquidity and find a negative impact o

26、f institutional ownership on turnover. In the same vein, based on a sample of 16,911 firm-years over 1995-2006, Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012) find that higher institutional ownership is associated with greater conservatis

27、m in firms' financial reporting and that this positive association is more pronounced among firms with higher information asymmetry</p><p>　　2.1.2. The trading and signal hypotheses</p><p>　

28、　According to the trading hypothesis, institutional investors’ portfolios are likely to enhance market liquidity. Institutional investors trade aggressively on their portfolios which positively affect market liquidity. T

29、his hypothesis has been supported by several empirical studies. Rhee and Wang (2009) find that the liquidity on the Jakarta Stock Exchange has improved substantially with the average bid–ask spread more than half and the

30、 average depth more than doubled. Kothare and Laux (1995) con</p><p>　　The relationship between institutional investors and liquidity could also rely on developments from the signal theory. Within the scope

31、of this study, institutional shareholders are able to perform monitoring activities on management, and this is considered as a positive signal to market participants. Institutional investors are able to pay higher monito

32、ring costs to protect their assets (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). As a result, they may encourage managers to take better accounting and financial</p><p>　　H1: There is a positive relationship between institut

33、ional investors' ownership and market liquidity in France.</p><p>　　2.2. Institutional investor ownership and market liquidity: A simultaneous relationship</p><p>　　Institutions are likely t

34、o trade in companies with better visibility and transparency and the most liquid ones. Eakins and al. (1998) highlight that institutions are likely to avoid external risks and select companies with positive expected retu

35、rns. Falkenstein (1996), Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) use cross-sectional analysis to show institutional preference for large liquid stocks.</p><p>　　Based on a sample of 9

36、7 companies studied from 1978 to 1991, Healey and al. (1999) show that good disclosure quality is linked with increasing institutional ownership. Bushee and Noe (2000) document that an increase in a company’s disclosure

37、level attracts institutional investors. Al-Najjar (2010) finds that stock liquidity influences the percentage of shares held by institutional investors in the Jordanian market. Dennis and Weston (2001) use a simultaneous

38、 equation system to examine the relati</p><p>　　Accordingly, we expect the following hypothesis:</p><p>　　H2: Market liquidity in France positively affects institutional investor’s ownership.<

39、;/p><p>　　2.3. Institutional investor type and market liquidity</p><p>　　Institutional investors’ type includes pension funds, collective investment institutions, investment advisers, banks and ins

40、urances (OECD, 2000). The way institutional investors influence managers’ behavior is empirically proved because cases of passive policy (Porter, 1992) or active behavior are found (Bushee and Noe, 2000).</p><

41、p>　　Within the governance theoretical framework, shareholding activism is considered an alternative monitoring mechanism likely to reduce agency costs and conflicts of interests between majority and minority sharehold

42、ers. Institutional investors’ behavior (passive or active) and the incentive to control a company’s governance policy depends on the size of their portfolios, on their investment horizon, which might go from short to lon

43、g term, and the nature of their relationships with a company (Bushe</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　機(jī)構(gòu)投資者，信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)和法國(guó)股市流動(dòng)性</p><p><b>　　1.引言</b></p><p>

44、　　機(jī)構(gòu)投資者被認(rèn)為是現(xiàn)代資本市場(chǎng)的一個(gè)共同特征。他們?cè)趪?guó)際化金融市場(chǎng)上扮演了重要的角色,因?yàn)樗麄児芾頂?shù)量龐大的資產(chǎn):2006年底將近62萬(wàn)億美元,超過(guò)主要工業(yè)化國(guó)家國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值。2005年,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持有65%的股權(quán)在紐交所/美國(guó)證券交易所上市,表明在過(guò)去的25年里復(fù)合年增長(zhǎng)率為6.3% (阿格沃爾,2009)。</p><p>　　機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在過(guò)去的幾年里不斷監(jiān)控公司。在這種背景下,許多研究把重點(diǎn)放在機(jī)構(gòu)投資

45、者在公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中的作用上 (博則克，2007;鐘和張,2011年)。然而,很少有研究人員研究機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)金融市場(chǎng)的影響,特別是對(duì)流動(dòng)性的影響。</p><p>　　本文的目的是調(diào)查機(jī)構(gòu)投資者是否影響法國(guó)股票市場(chǎng)信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)和流動(dòng)性。一方面,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者往往被認(rèn)為是知情代理。由于他們有大量的資產(chǎn),他們通常能夠得到私人信息(費(fèi)赫爾,2004)。那些擁有私人信息(機(jī)構(gòu)投資者)和無(wú)知代理(少數(shù)股東)之間的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)會(huì)對(duì)市場(chǎng)

46、流動(dòng)性產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響,這證實(shí)了逆向選擇的假設(shè)。另一方面,股利政策的發(fā)展聲稱(chēng)這種持股是一種治理機(jī)制。它本質(zhì)上應(yīng)該鼓勵(lì)投資者投資于這些公司,從而增加交易量和市場(chǎng)流動(dòng)性。</p><p>　　本文所做出的貢獻(xiàn)是雙重的。首先,大多數(shù)以前的研究考察機(jī)構(gòu)投資者和市場(chǎng)流動(dòng)性之間的關(guān)系認(rèn)為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者是一個(gè)同質(zhì)的群體。這一假設(shè)是具有限制性的,可能導(dǎo)致模棱兩可的結(jié)果。實(shí)際上,這些活動(dòng)者不同,他們?cè)诠局卫斫Y(jié)構(gòu)中有不同的特性和行為。因此

47、,我們考察作為異質(zhì)的群體的活動(dòng)者,并區(qū)分主動(dòng)和被動(dòng)投資者。其次,本文考察了法國(guó)市場(chǎng)不同機(jī)構(gòu)設(shè)置的關(guān)系。這個(gè)選擇是出于不同法律體系和法國(guó)和盎格魯-撒克遜環(huán)境金融市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展。大多數(shù)法國(guó)公司的所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)比美國(guó)公司更集中。在這種環(huán)境下,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中可以作為主要活動(dòng)者。除此之外,法國(guó)是一個(gè)民用低的國(guó)家,那里的投資者利益保護(hù)不如其他低于通常水平的國(guó)家。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者被視為擔(dān)保人保護(hù)少數(shù)股權(quán)和積極影響公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)。因此，這些投資者并被不認(rèn)為

48、是知情投資者(逆向選擇假說(shuō))作為他們控制經(jīng)理的主要作用。他們作為公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)市場(chǎng)的媒介,可能會(huì)對(duì)法國(guó)股票市場(chǎng)的流動(dòng)性產(chǎn)生積極影響 (交易和信號(hào)假說(shuō))。</p><p>　　我們發(fā)現(xiàn)三個(gè)主要因素可能影響他們的行為:參與水平,投資的注資期和自然關(guān)系。這項(xiàng)研究提供了洞察機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)和流動(dòng)性的法國(guó)市場(chǎng)的依據(jù)。</p><p>　　研究結(jié)果表明,機(jī)構(gòu)持股似乎減少買(mǎi)賣(mài)價(jià)差和提高股票

49、的流動(dòng)性。因?yàn)闄C(jī)構(gòu)投資者有多元化的投資組合,他們之間交易頻繁。這將減少交易成本,因此提高股票的流動(dòng)性。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者所有權(quán)被市場(chǎng)視為一個(gè)良好的信號(hào),從而增加投資者的相互信任,提高流動(dòng)性。結(jié)果還表明,銀行和保險(xiǎn)所有權(quán)對(duì)股票的流動(dòng)性沒(méi)有顯著影響。作為被動(dòng)投資者,后者發(fā)現(xiàn)高循環(huán)的投資組合沒(méi)有優(yōu)勢(shì)。然而, 養(yǎng)老基金的所有權(quán)和股市流動(dòng)性之間有一個(gè)積極的顯著關(guān)系。這些結(jié)果強(qiáng)調(diào)了法國(guó)市場(chǎng)上機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的作用。</p><p>　　本

50、文的其余部分如下:第二部分介紹了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者和股票市場(chǎng)流動(dòng)性之間關(guān)系的理論框架。第三部分描述了我們選取的樣本,變量和方法論。最后一部分是討論和結(jié)論。</p><p>　　2．機(jī)構(gòu)投資者和股市流動(dòng)性:文獻(xiàn)綜述和發(fā)展假設(shè)</p><p>　　2.1 機(jī)構(gòu)投資者所有權(quán)和市場(chǎng)流動(dòng)性</p><p>　　市場(chǎng)流動(dòng)性和機(jī)構(gòu)投資者所有權(quán)之間的關(guān)系是模糊的。從理論上講,這種關(guān)系源于公

51、司各利益相關(guān)者之間的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)。這是基于理論的逆向選擇,交易和信號(hào)假說(shuō)。</p><p>　　2.1.1 逆向選擇假說(shuō)</p><p>　　這一假設(shè)認(rèn)為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者應(yīng)被視為精明的投資者。作為股東,他們可以獲得和利用私人信息,并能收集與公司價(jià)值相關(guān)的信息(貝.2002年)。布希和古德曼(2007)發(fā)現(xiàn),機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的變化對(duì)私人信息的私人信息交易一致。這將加劇信息的不對(duì)稱(chēng)性, 增加逆向選擇成本和減

52、少股票市場(chǎng)流動(dòng)性(安尼克， 博瑞杰和森古普塔,2003)。在這種背景下,格羅斯頓和米格羅姆(1985)認(rèn)為, 由于機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的存在，做市商面臨逆向選擇成本。此外,由于這些投資者的交易比例高,直接供應(yīng)服務(wù)迫使做市商來(lái)以一個(gè)較高的價(jià)格管理自己的資產(chǎn)。</p><p>　　逆向選擇假說(shuō)由一些實(shí)證研究證實(shí)。沙瑪(2005)以150個(gè)印度公司為案例研究機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的問(wèn)題。他表明,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的資本份額與股票的流動(dòng)性不顯著相關(guān)。

53、阿斯蘭 (2007)發(fā)現(xiàn)強(qiáng)有力的證據(jù)表明，企業(yè)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持有更高的股票與知情交易概率更高。博和凱利(2009)獲得的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)表明,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者提高價(jià)格的信息效率。</p><p>　　在澳大利亞市場(chǎng),卡羅爾和詹姆斯(2006)考察機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股和流動(dòng)性之間的關(guān)系,發(fā)現(xiàn)與機(jī)構(gòu)所有權(quán)的營(yíng)業(yè)額成負(fù)相關(guān)。同樣,基于對(duì)1995 - 2006年16911個(gè)公司樣本的調(diào)查,高達(dá)和余（2012)發(fā)現(xiàn)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股較高與更具保守主義

54、的企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告相關(guān),這種相關(guān)性在高度信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)的公司中更為明顯。拉馮德和瓦茨(2008)也發(fā)現(xiàn)了類(lèi)似的結(jié)果。布盧姆和凱姆(2012)考察了非流動(dòng)性和股權(quán)制度之間的關(guān)系。作者表明,機(jī)構(gòu)的數(shù)量能提高股市的流動(dòng)性。</p><p>　　2.1.2 交易和信號(hào)假說(shuō)</p><p>　　根據(jù)交易假說(shuō),機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的證券投資組合可能會(huì)提高市場(chǎng)流動(dòng)性。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者交易的積極投資組合,會(huì)對(duì)市場(chǎng)流動(dòng)性產(chǎn)生積極影

55、響。這個(gè)假設(shè)已經(jīng)得到一些實(shí)證研究的支持。芮依和王(2009)發(fā)現(xiàn),雅加達(dá)證券交易所流動(dòng)性大大提高本質(zhì)上與與超過(guò)一半的買(mǎi)賣(mài)價(jià)差、比一倍還多的深度相關(guān)?？ㄋ?fàn)柡屠卓怂?1995)證實(shí)了納斯達(dá)克的上市公司樣本的正相關(guān)。丹尼斯和韋斯頓(2001)考察了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)股票市場(chǎng)流動(dòng)性的影響, 他們研究美國(guó)上市的5500家公司表明，流動(dòng)性正受到機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例的影響。</p><p>　　機(jī)構(gòu)投資者和流動(dòng)性之間的關(guān)系也可能依賴

56、于信號(hào)理論的發(fā)展。在本研究的范圍內(nèi),法人股東能夠執(zhí)行監(jiān)視活動(dòng)管理,而這被認(rèn)為是市場(chǎng)參與者的一個(gè)積極的信號(hào)。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者可以支付更高的監(jiān)控成本來(lái)保護(hù)他們的資產(chǎn)(施萊費(fèi)爾和維什尼，1988)。因此,他們鼓勵(lì)經(jīng)理們采取更好的會(huì)計(jì)和財(cái)務(wù)決策(貝克和瓦拉,2000)。他們被視為治理機(jī)制,能夠減少股東之間的代理沖突,重建信任,保證信息透明和良好的公司治理,特別是在投資者利益不受保護(hù)的民事低的國(guó)家, 在法國(guó)就是這樣。這可能鼓勵(lì)其他投資者投資于這些公司,

57、增加交易量。上述討論導(dǎo)致以下假設(shè):</p><p>　　H1:在法國(guó)，機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的所有權(quán)和市場(chǎng)流動(dòng)性之間呈正相關(guān)。</p><p>　　2.2 機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的所有權(quán)和市場(chǎng)流動(dòng)性:同步關(guān)系</p><p>　　機(jī)構(gòu)投資者有可能在好的可見(jiàn)性與透明度，流動(dòng)性最強(qiáng)的貿(mào)易公司進(jìn)行交易。埃金斯和艾爾(1998)強(qiáng)調(diào)機(jī)構(gòu)可能避免外部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和選擇公司積極的預(yù)期收益。法爾肯斯泰因(199

58、6)、岡波斯和梅特里(2001)，班尼特和斯塔克斯(2003)使用代表性法分析表明機(jī)構(gòu)傾向于流動(dòng)性股票。</p><p>　　基于對(duì)1978年到1991年的97家公司進(jìn)行的研究,希利和艾爾(1999)研究表明,良好的信息披露質(zhì)量與增加機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股息息相關(guān)。布什里和挪亞(2000)證明,提高公司的信息披露水平能吸引機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股。阿納金(2010)發(fā)現(xiàn),股票流動(dòng)性影響約旦市場(chǎng)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持有股份的百分比。丹尼斯和韋

59、斯頓(2001)使用聯(lián)立方程系統(tǒng)考察機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股和價(jià)格利差之間的關(guān)系。作者發(fā)現(xiàn)傳播的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)成分與機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的股本成正比例關(guān)系。</p><p>　　因此,我們預(yù)期以下假設(shè):</p><p>　　H2:市場(chǎng)流動(dòng)性在法國(guó)對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的所有權(quán)有積極影響。</p><p>　　2.3機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的類(lèi)型和市場(chǎng)流動(dòng)性</p><p>　　機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的

60、類(lèi)型包括養(yǎng)老基金、集合投資機(jī)構(gòu)、投資顧問(wèn),銀行和保險(xiǎn)公司(經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織,2000年)。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者影響經(jīng)理人行為的方式在被動(dòng)的政策下已得到經(jīng)驗(yàn)證明 (波特,1992)或主動(dòng)行為被發(fā)現(xiàn)(布什利和挪亞,2000)。</p><p>　　治理理論框架內(nèi),股權(quán)運(yùn)動(dòng)被認(rèn)為是一種監(jiān)督機(jī)制，可能減少代理成本和多數(shù)與少數(shù)股東之間的利益沖突。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的行為(被動(dòng)或主動(dòng))和控制一個(gè)公司的治理策略取決于投資組合的規(guī)模, 從短期到