外文翻譯--治理機(jī)制與企業(yè)價(jià)值股權(quán)集中度和紅利的影響

1、<p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Governance Mechanisms and Firm Value: The Impact of Ownership Concentration and Dividends</p><p>　　Over the last three

2、 decades, the idea of independent directors has become important, particularly with stock market regulators and many corporate governance advocates (Farrar, 2001). Indeed, financial economists generally suggest that the

3、representation of independent directors on boards increases the effectiveness of boards in monitoring managers and exercising control on behalf of shareholders (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983;Weisbach, 1988). The most wid

4、ely discussed question regarding board compos</p><p>　　Conflicting evidence on a direct relationship between board composition and firm performance has also been reported from Australia. Lawrence and Stapled

5、on(1999) found that independent directors do not appear to have added value to firms in the period 1985-1995. A similar result is reported by Cotter and Silvester(2003), who examine the largest 200 companies in 1997. In

6、contrast, Bonn, Yoshikawa, and Phan(2004) reported that a higher proportion of independent directors on the board leads to stron</p><p>　　Why are the findings on the relationship between board composition an

7、d firm performance inconclusive? One possible explanation is that most of the corporate governance is both a result of the decisions made by previous directors and, itself a factor that potentially affects the choice of

8、subsequent directors. Studies of boards often neglect this issue and therefore produce confusing results (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003).</p><p>　　An important role of boards is to establish sub-committees t

9、o deal with specific matters. One such committee is the audit committee. The audit process, and internal accounting controls. This helps mitigate the agency problem by providing unbiased accounting information, thus redu

10、cing the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Principle 4 of the 2003 ASX Best Practices Recommendations includes a recommendation that all members of the audit committee should be non-executive director

11、</p><p>　　The empirical evidence on the relationship between audit committee composition and firm value, however, is also inconclusive. A number of studies (e.g., Hsu, 2008; Klein, 1998; Reddy, Locke, Scrimg

12、eour, & Gunasekarage, 2008) find that audit committee independence has insignificant impact on firm value. In contrast, DeFond, Hann, and Hu(2005) find significant positive abnormal returns around the appointment of

13、“accounting” financial expert-independent directors to the audit committee. More recent</p><p>　　Several studies have also provided evidence on the governance role of an audit committee in Australia. For exa

14、mple, Koh, Laphante, and Tong(2007) examine the twin roles of accountability and value enhancement of corporate governance in the context of financial reporting. The authors find that independent active audit committees

15、and independent boards are important governance mechanisms and value enhancing. Cotter and Silvester(2003), however, find no support for a positive relationship between a</p><p>　　The positive impact of an a

16、udit committee on firm value may come from the role of the audit committee in constraining earnings management. A number of studies provide support for this notion. For example, Davidson, Goodwin Stewart, and Kent(2005)

17、show that a majority of nonexecutive directors on the audit committee is associated with a lower likelihood of earnings management. Hsu and Koh(2005) find that a long-term oriented institution can act as a corporate gove

18、rnance mechanism to mitigate aggr</p><p>　　Independent Directors, Audit Committee and Ownership Concentration</p><p>　　The relation between ownership concentration and boards of directors can be

19、 explained by agency theory. Jensen and Meckling(1976) suggest that agency problems will be lower when the interests of agents(i.e., managers) and principals(i.e., shareholders) are more aligned through higher managerial

20、 share ownership. Agency problems between owners and managers relate to managerial consumption of perquisites, shirking, misallocation of company funds, and entrenchment(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The prese</p>

21、<p>　　The literature, however, suggests that combining ownership and control allows concentrated shareholders to exchange profits for private rents (e.g., Bebchuk, 1999; Bebchuk & Kahan, 1990:1090; Faccio, Lang

22、, & Young, 2001; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) define private benefits as “any value captured by those controlling the company after the control contest and not shared among shareholders at la

23、rge.” For example, the opportunity to engage in self-dealing and in taking corporate opp</p><p>　　As such, ownership concentration can either mitigate or exacerbate agency problems and consequently may affec

24、t the composition and effectiveness of the internal governance mechanisms. For example, to facilitate their opportunistic behavior large controlling shareholders may prefer boards and audit committees that have fewer ind

25、ependent directors.</p><p>　　Agency theorists also suggest independent directors can serve to protect minority shareholders against expropriation by large shareholders. Raheja(2005) hypothesizes that the opt

26、imal number of independent directors on the board increases as the private benefits to insiders increase. Indeed, Westphal(1998) suggests that since governance mechanisms in closely-held firms are limited, minority share

27、holders potentially rely on their boards and their committees to limit the controlling shareholder’s o</p><p>　　Empirical studies show that ownership concentration has a significant impact on board and audit

28、 committee independence. For example, Anderson and Reeb(2004) report that family blockholders in large US firms prefer to limit independent director presence on the board. Kim, Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard, and Nofsinger(

29、2007) find that ownership concentration and board independence are negatively related in 14 European countries. Cotter and Silvester(2003) report that board independence of Australian f</p><p>　　Based on thi

30、s empirical evidence, the following hypotheses to answer whether ownership concentration affects board and audit committee independence (Research Question 1) is developed:</p><p>　　Hypothesis 1a. Board indep

31、endence is significantly lower among closely-held than widely-held firms in Australia.</p><p>　　Hypothesis 1b. Audit committee independence is significantly lower among closely-held than widely-held firms in

32、 Australia.</p><p>　　Since ownership concentration can influence board and audit committee independence, it can be argued that ownership concentration may moderate the role of board and audit committee indep

33、endence in corporate governance. Studies that examine the monitoring role of independent directors in firms with different ownership provide inconclusive evidence. For instance, Anderson and Reeb(2004) find that among la

34、rge US corporations, family firms outperformed non-family firms only when family firms have a </p><p>　　How can independent directors be an effective governance device in the presence of a dominant sharehold

35、er such as families? Dahya et al.(2008) argue that although the dominant shareholders can remove independent directors just as easily they appoint them, they should consider the costs of replacement of independent direct

36、ors. The authors also suggest that independent directors have an incentive to monitor a dominant shareholder as long as a market for independent directors occurs (Fama & Jensen,</p><p>　　Erickson, Park,

37、Reising, and Shin(2005), however, examine the relation between board composition and firm value in the presence of significant ownership concentration using publicly traded Canadian firms. They find that greater board in

38、dependence does not have a positive influence on firm value and that poorly performing firms increase the proportion of outside directors in subsequent periods.</p><p>　　Based on Anderson and Reeb(2004) and

39、Dahya et al.(2008) , this study develops the following hypotheses to examine whether closely-held firms with a less independent board or audit committee underperform closely held firms with more independent board or audi

40、t committee (Research Question2):</p><p>　　Hypothesis 2a. Among Australian closely-held firms, board independence is positively related to firm performance. </p><p>　　Hypothesis 2b. Among Austra

41、lian closely-held firms, audit committee independence is positively related to firm performance.</p><p>　　In addition, to test whether the impact of board or audit committee independence on firm performance

42、differs between closely-held and widely-held firms (Research Question 3), this study develops the-following hypotheses:</p><p>　　Hypothesis 3a. The impact of board independence on firm performance is stronge

43、r in closely-held than widely-held firms.</p><p>　　Hypothesis 3b. The impact of audit committee independence on firm performance is stronger in closely-held than widely-held firms.</p><p>　　Sour

44、ce: Lukas Y. Setia Atmaja. 2009, “Governance Mechanisms and Firm Value: The Impact of Ownership Concentration and Dividends”. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol.17,No.6,pp.694-709.</p><p><

45、;b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　治理機(jī)制與企業(yè)價(jià)值：股權(quán)集中度和紅利的影響</p><p>　　在過去的三十年中，獨(dú)立董事的概念已成為重要的，特別是與股市監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和許多公司治理倡導(dǎo)者（Farrar，2001）。事實(shí)上，金融經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家普遍認(rèn)為，對獨(dú)立董事在董事會(huì)中增加監(jiān)督管理人員的代表，行使代表股東控制董事會(huì)的效力（例如，F(xiàn)ama和Jensen，1983;Wei

46、sbach，1988）。最廣泛討論的問題，因此關(guān)于董事會(huì)組成的董事會(huì)是否有更多的獨(dú)立董事提高公司績效。許多研究已在美國進(jìn)行這一問題。例如，由Baysinger和Butler的研究報(bào)告（1985）發(fā)現(xiàn)，獨(dú)立董事比例呈正相關(guān)會(huì)計(jì)績效指標(biāo)。與此相反，Bhagat和Black（2001），Hermalin和Weisbach（1991）和Klein（1998）發(fā)現(xiàn)，對董事會(huì)獨(dú)立董事的比例更高并沒有對公司業(yè)績產(chǎn)生重大影響的會(huì)計(jì)措施。一個(gè)由Agraw

47、al和Knoeber（1996）表明，獨(dú)立董事比例有負(fù)面關(guān)系的演出市場措施的研究。</p><p>　　有報(bào)道來自澳大利亞，矛盾證據(jù)對于董事會(huì)構(gòu)成與公司績效有直接關(guān)系。Lawrence和Stapledon（1999）發(fā)現(xiàn)，在1985至1995年期間，獨(dú)立董事沒有使公司的價(jià)值有所增加。Cotter和Silvester（2003）也有相近的結(jié)果報(bào)告，他們審查了1997年年度最大的200家公司。與此相反，Bonn，Yo

48、shikawa和Phan（2004）指出，獨(dú)立董事在董事會(huì)的比例較高公司業(yè)績更佳。</p><p>　　為什么在董事會(huì)構(gòu)成與公司績效關(guān)系的調(diào)查結(jié)果沒有結(jié)論？一個(gè)可能的解釋是，公司治理最既是結(jié)果由以前的董事作出的決定，這本身就是一個(gè)因素可能會(huì)影響以后的董事的選擇。董事會(huì)的研究往往忽視這個(gè)問題，因此產(chǎn)生混亂的結(jié)果（Hermalin＆Weisbach，2003）。</p><p>　　議會(huì)的一個(gè)

49、重要作用是建立小組委員會(huì)來處理具體事項(xiàng)。一個(gè)這樣的委員會(huì)是審計(jì)委員會(huì)。審計(jì)過程中，與內(nèi)部會(huì)計(jì)控制。這有助于減輕提供不偏不倚的會(huì)計(jì)信息，從而減少了內(nèi)部和外部之間的信息不對稱，代理問題。 2003年澳大利亞證券交易所原則最佳做法的建議4包括了一個(gè)建議，即審計(jì)委員會(huì)所有成員應(yīng)為非執(zhí)行董事，該委員會(huì)應(yīng)包括多數(shù)獨(dú)立董事以及由獨(dú)立董事誰不是主席主持董事會(huì)。在標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾/澳洲證交所所有普通股指數(shù)的公司必須遵守這一建議。</p><p

50、>　　關(guān)于審計(jì)委員會(huì)的組成和之間的公司價(jià)值關(guān)系的實(shí)證研究，然而，也沒有定論。許多研究（e.g., Hsu, 2008; Klein, 1998; Reddy, Locke, Scrimgeour, & Gunasekarage, 2008）發(fā)現(xiàn)，審計(jì)委員會(huì)的獨(dú)立性對公司價(jià)值影響不大。與此相反，DeFond, Hann, and Hu(2005)發(fā)現(xiàn)重大的積極圍繞“會(huì)計(jì)“財(cái)務(wù)專家，獨(dú)立董事委任審計(jì)委員會(huì)異常報(bào)酬。最近，Hsu

51、(2008) 和 Chan 和 Li(2008)報(bào)告說，與公司業(yè)績呈正相關(guān)審計(jì)委員會(huì)財(cái)務(wù)專家。</p><p>　　一些研究也提供了關(guān)于在澳大利亞的審計(jì)委員會(huì)治理作用的證據(jù)。例如，Koh, Laphante, 和Tong(2007)研究問責(zé)制和加強(qiáng)公司治理的價(jià)值在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告方面的雙重作用。作者發(fā)現(xiàn)，獨(dú)立的審計(jì)委員會(huì)和獨(dú)立的活動(dòng)板重要的管理機(jī)制和價(jià)值的提高。Cotter 和 Silvester(2003),但沒有找到

52、一間審計(jì)委員會(huì)的獨(dú)立性與公司價(jià)值正相關(guān)支持。與此同時(shí)，Psaros和Seamer（2004）的報(bào)告，從1998年至2001年澳大利亞最大的250家公司的審計(jì)委員會(huì)的獨(dú)立性似乎已經(jīng)惡化。</p><p>　　一個(gè)審計(jì)委員會(huì)對公司價(jià)值產(chǎn)生積極的影響可能會(huì)從盈余管理的制約審計(jì)委員會(huì)的作用。許多研究這一觀點(diǎn)提供了支持。例如，Davidson, Goodwin Stewart, 和Kent(2005)表明，非執(zhí)行董事一對審

53、計(jì)委員會(huì)的大多數(shù)是與盈余管理的可能性較低有關(guān)。Hsu和Koh（2005）發(fā)現(xiàn)，長期面向機(jī)構(gòu)可以作為公司治理機(jī)制，以減輕管理的積極收益，而Chen,Faff，Mather, 和 Ramsay(2007)記載了與企業(yè)的可能性和頻率正相關(guān)關(guān)系盈利預(yù)測發(fā)行管理和審計(jì)委員會(huì)的獨(dú)立性。Stewart 和Munro(2007)表明，一個(gè)審計(jì)委員會(huì)的存在是在自覺與審計(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)減少有關(guān)。最后，Krishnamoorthy,Wright和Cohen（2002）

54、和Chen，Carson和Simnett（2007）建議，審計(jì)委員會(huì)發(fā)揮在提高財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告質(zhì)量的重要作用。</p><p>　　獨(dú)立董事，審計(jì)委員會(huì)與股權(quán)集中度</p><p>　　股權(quán)集中度之間和董事會(huì)的關(guān)系可以通過代理理論來解釋。 Jensen和Meckling（1976）認(rèn)為將降低代理問題時(shí)，代理商的利益（即經(jīng)理）和主體（即股東）通過更高的管理更加股權(quán)對齊。所有者和經(jīng)營者之間的代理問題涉

55、及到管理消耗額外補(bǔ)貼，推卸，公司資金分配不當(dāng)，與塹壕（Shleifer & Vishny, 1997）。對大股東的存在也可增強(qiáng)企業(yè)管治。由于大股東持有公司股票占很大比例，他們有動(dòng)力去收集信息和監(jiān)督管理（Shleifer & Vishny, 1986），以及有足夠的投票權(quán)的行為，迫使管理層在股東權(quán)益（La Porta等人，1999）。因此，經(jīng)典的所有者經(jīng)理沖突描述Berle 和 Means（1932）應(yīng)緊密合作，舉辦企業(yè)低

56、于普遍持有的公司。</p><p>　　文學(xué)，不過，暗示允許所有權(quán)和管理權(quán)相結(jié)合的集中（例如，Bebchuk, 1999; Bebchuk & Kahan, 1990:1090; Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997）定義為私人利益“的任何控股公司的捕捉值后，控制比賽，而不

57、是在大股東之間的共享?！袄纾袡C(jī)會(huì)進(jìn)行自我交易，并采取企業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)被視為作為控制私人利益。此外，Shleifer和Vishny（1997）和La Porta等人（2000）認(rèn)為，少數(shù)股東征用涉及到內(nèi)部使用該公司的利潤，他們的利益，而不是把他們送回其他股東。例如，有業(yè)內(nèi)人士可以簡單地竊取或出售在他們控制的公司，他們自己的另一家公司以低于市場價(jià)格的資產(chǎn)。他們還可以從公司企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移的機(jī)會(huì)，擔(dān)任管理職務(wù)的任命不合格的家庭成員，或支付過多的行政人員。

58、</p><p>　　文學(xué)，不過，暗示允許所有權(quán)和管理權(quán)相結(jié)合的集中（例如，Bebchuk, 1999; Bebchuk & Kahan, 1990:1090; Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997）定義為私人利益“的任何控股公司的捕捉值后，控制比賽，而不是在大股東之間的共

59、享?！袄?，有機(jī)會(huì)進(jìn)行自我交易，并采取企業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)被視為作為控制私人利益。此外，Shleifer和Vishny（1997）和La Porta等人（2000）認(rèn)為，少數(shù)股東征用涉及到內(nèi)部使用該公司的利潤，他們的利益，而不是把他們送回其他股東。例如，有業(yè)內(nèi)人士可以簡單地竊取或出售在他們控制的公司，他們自己的另一家公司以低于市場價(jià)格的資產(chǎn)。他們還可以從公司企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移的機(jī)會(huì)，擔(dān)任管理職務(wù)的任命不合格的家庭成員，或支付過多的行政人員。</p>

60、;<p>　　因此，股權(quán)集中度可以減輕或加劇代理問題，從而可能影響的組成和內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制的有效性。例如，為了方便他們的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為大控股股東可能更喜歡董事會(huì)和審計(jì)委員會(huì)，獨(dú)立董事較少。</p><p>　　原子能機(jī)構(gòu)理論家還建議獨(dú)立董事可以起到防止大股東侵占小股東。 Raheja（2005）推測認(rèn)為，獨(dú)立董事，以提高內(nèi)部審計(jì)委員會(huì)增加私人利益的最佳數(shù)目。事實(shí)上，Westphal（1998）提出，由于在

61、緊密合作，舉辦公司治理機(jī)制是有限的，少數(shù)股東可能在他們的議會(huì)及其委員會(huì)的依賴，以限制控股股東的機(jī)會(huì)主義。與此同時(shí)，Anderson 和 Reeb（2004）認(rèn)為，小股東利益的最佳保障獨(dú)立董事時(shí)擁有更大的權(quán)力相對于提取他們的私人利益租金不大可能組裝板或?qū)徲?jì)委員會(huì)，可以限制其企業(yè)控制，這意味著一之間存在著負(fù)相關(guān)，股權(quán)集中與董事會(huì)及審計(jì)委員會(huì)的獨(dú)立性。</p><p>　　實(shí)證研究表明，股權(quán)集中有一對董事會(huì)和審計(jì)委員會(huì)

62、的獨(dú)立性產(chǎn)生重大影響。舉例來說，安德森和里布（2004）的報(bào)告，在美國大公司的大股東希望限制家庭對董事會(huì)獨(dú)立董事的存在。金Kitsabunnarat- Chatjuthamard和諾夫辛格（2007年）發(fā)現(xiàn)，股權(quán)集中度與董事會(huì)的獨(dú)立性是負(fù)14個(gè)歐洲國家的關(guān)系。Cotter 和Silvester（2003）報(bào)告說，澳大利亞公司董事會(huì)的獨(dú)立性是低所有權(quán)和管理缺乏相關(guān)的大股東。Setia-Atmaja，Tanewski和Skully（2009

63、）表明，有家族控制的企業(yè)比澳大利亞非家族企業(yè)下的獨(dú)立板。Mendez 和 Garcia（2007）研究顯示當(dāng)股權(quán)掌握在大股東手中時(shí)，審計(jì)委員會(huì)活動(dòng)處于較弱的水平。</p><p>　　在此經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)的基礎(chǔ)上，產(chǎn)生了以下假設(shè)，所有權(quán)集中是否會(huì)影響董事會(huì)和審計(jì)委員會(huì)的獨(dú)立性（研究問題1）：</p><p>　　假說1a。在澳大利亞，集中持股的公司的董事會(huì)的獨(dú)立性明顯比分散持股的公司低。</

64、p><p>　　假設(shè)1b。在澳大利亞，集中持股的公司的審計(jì)委員會(huì)的獨(dú)立性明顯比分散持股的公司低。</p><p>　　由于股權(quán)集中度可以影響董事會(huì)和審計(jì)委員會(huì)的獨(dú)立性，它可以說，股權(quán)集中可能放緩的董事會(huì)和審計(jì)委員會(huì)的獨(dú)立性，公司治理的作用。研究，探討在企業(yè)獨(dú)立董事的作用不同所有制監(jiān)測提供決定性的證據(jù)。舉例來說，Anderson 和 Reeb（2004）發(fā)現(xiàn)，美國大公司中，家族企業(yè)優(yōu)于非家族企業(yè)

65、只有在家族企業(yè)有一個(gè)相對強(qiáng)勢的董事會(huì)（即對董事會(huì)更加獨(dú)立董事）。最近，Dahya等（2008）的研究與公司價(jià)值和公司的獨(dú)立董事比例與22個(gè)國家的主要股東的關(guān)系。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)一種積極的關(guān)系，特別是在對股東保護(hù)薄弱的法律，這表明塔爾主導(dǎo)股東可以抵消委任一個(gè)獨(dú)立委員會(huì)的價(jià)值折讓薄弱的法律保護(hù)股東聯(lián)系國。</p><p>　　獨(dú)立董事如何才能成為一個(gè)有效的治理設(shè)備在一個(gè)家庭等為主要股東的存在？Dahya等（2008）認(rèn)為，雖

66、然占主導(dǎo)地位的獨(dú)立董事，股東可以消除他們一樣容易委任他們，他們應(yīng)該考慮更換獨(dú)立董事的費(fèi)用。作者還認(rèn)為，獨(dú)立董事有動(dòng)力，以監(jiān)察作為獨(dú)立董事市場的優(yōu)勢，只要股東發(fā)生（Fama & Jensen,1983）和獨(dú)立董事可以行使他們的權(quán)力，以合法、合規(guī)或者含蓄的方式監(jiān)督主要股東。</p><p>　　Erickson，Park，Reising，和Shin(2005)，然而，檢查中存在重大的所有權(quán)集中董事會(huì)構(gòu)成與公司

67、價(jià)值關(guān)系的加拿大公司利用上市。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，更大的獨(dú)立董事沒有對公司價(jià)值的積極影響力，業(yè)績不佳的公司增加在隨后時(shí)期的外部董事比例。</p><p>　　基于Anderson和Reeb（2004）和Dahya等（2008），本報(bào)告研究了以下假設(shè)，檢驗(yàn)一個(gè)獨(dú)立董事會(huì)或?qū)徲?jì)委員會(huì)獨(dú)立性較低集中持股的企業(yè)與一個(gè)集中持股的企業(yè)但是董事會(huì)和審計(jì)委員會(huì)獨(dú)立性較高相比是否會(huì)表現(xiàn)不佳（研究問題2）：</p><p&

68、gt;　　假設(shè)2a。在澳大利亞集中持股的公司，董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性與公司績效呈正相關(guān)</p><p>　　假設(shè)2b。在澳大利亞集中持股的的公司，審計(jì)委員會(huì)的獨(dú)立性與公司績效呈正相關(guān)。</p><p>　　此外，為了測試是否對公司的董事會(huì)或?qū)徲?jì)委員會(huì)獨(dú)立性的影響表現(xiàn)之間的緊密合作，舉辦和廣泛持有的公司不同（研究問題3），本研究發(fā)展了，下面的假設(shè)：</p><p>　　假說3a