會(huì)計(jì)專業(yè)外文翻譯 ---股權(quán)集中度在私營(yíng)企業(yè)的職責(zé)

1、<p>　　畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文）外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯</p><p>　　股權(quán)集中度在私營(yíng)企業(yè)的職責(zé)： </p><p>　　披露標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，審計(jì)員選擇，審計(jì)等基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施</p><p><b>　　摘要</b></p><p>　　我們依靠一個(gè)獨(dú)特的數(shù)據(jù)集來(lái)估計(jì)對(duì)來(lái)自31個(gè)國(guó)家的股權(quán)集中度在190的私有化公司的披露標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和審計(jì)相關(guān)

2、特性的影響。會(huì)計(jì)透明度，有助紓緩該機(jī)構(gòu)之間少數(shù)投資者和有控制權(quán)的股東的沖突。在一定程度上的股權(quán)集中度，是顯而易見的，因?yàn)檎饔霉镜馁Y源，取決于這些私人利益被隱藏起來(lái)。 在控制了其他國(guó)家一級(jí)和公司一級(jí)的影響因素，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)弱的證據(jù)表明，廣泛披露標(biāo)準(zhǔn)（審計(jì)員選擇）減少股權(quán)集中度。相比之下，我們報(bào)告得強(qiáng)勁，穩(wěn)健的證據(jù)表明，在國(guó)家證券法律指定一個(gè)較低的舉證責(zé)任中，股權(quán)集中度低，在民事和刑事訴訟中反對(duì)審計(jì)員關(guān)于Ball[ 2001 ]預(yù)言。同樣地，

3、我們的研究暗示少數(shù)的投資者在全世界合法的機(jī)構(gòu)審計(jì)結(jié)果中財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告沒(méi)有更好的揭發(fā)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。</p><p><b>　　導(dǎo)言</b></p><p>　　在這篇文章里，我們提供來(lái)自31個(gè)國(guó)家的190個(gè)公司的披露標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和審計(jì)員等相關(guān)特性的新證據(jù)，來(lái)減少控制及少數(shù)股東之間的信息不對(duì)稱。我們主要是有助于現(xiàn)存研究通過(guò)檢查審計(jì)紀(jì)律對(duì)股權(quán)集中度對(duì)于法定機(jī)構(gòu)的重要性。Ball[ 2001年P(guān)

4、128 ]辯稱孤立的改革，旨在改善財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告質(zhì)量等，需要一個(gè)國(guó)家的企業(yè)是跟隨國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)而不改變其證券法律，卻持有審計(jì)更負(fù)責(zé)重大的誤導(dǎo)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表這將是徒勞無(wú)益的行為：</p><p>　　如果被迫提名單一位置由此而開始改變一個(gè)國(guó)家的系統(tǒng)中的公共財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告和披露，我會(huì)堅(jiān)持開放細(xì)則股東和貸款人的訴訟。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)訴訟激勵(lì)經(jīng)理和審計(jì)師增加透明度，尤其是披露壞的決定和報(bào)告損失。 許多其他體制的特征-包括會(huì)計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)確實(shí)落實(shí)管理人員和財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)

5、告的質(zhì)量和披露實(shí)際取決于內(nèi)在刺激經(jīng)理和審計(jì)師的遭遇。一個(gè)有效的對(duì)私營(yíng)訴訟制度比外源性強(qiáng)加給各國(guó)政府的命令有更多的做更多改進(jìn)實(shí)際實(shí)踐。</p><p>　　最近的研究表明，雖然所有權(quán)集中減輕管理征用，但由此產(chǎn)生了另一個(gè)代理問(wèn)題，即小股東和其他利益相關(guān)者被有控制權(quán)的股東的潛在征用。這些顯性股東通常充分發(fā)揮對(duì)經(jīng)理的控制和經(jīng)常持有控制權(quán)超出其現(xiàn)金流動(dòng)的權(quán)利，為他們提供了強(qiáng)大的動(dòng)力，以提取私人利益而不惜犧牲小股東（La P

6、orta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, hereafter, LLS [1999] ）。根據(jù)Shleifer和Vishny [1997年P(guān)758] ：大的投資者，代表他們自己的利益，不需要配合其他投資者或雇員和經(jīng)理人的利益。在這一過(guò)程中使用他的控制權(quán)使自己的福利最大化，大投資者以高效率和無(wú)結(jié)果的方式可以從其他投資者那里重新分配財(cái)富。與這種觀點(diǎn)相一致的，國(guó)際問(wèn)題研究關(guān)于大區(qū)段貿(mào)易選舉權(quán)（Dyck and

7、 Zingales [2004]）和雙重企業(yè)（Nenova [2003]）的報(bào)告顯示控制保費(fèi)，顯示私營(yíng)企業(yè)福利的管制措施。其他的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，提取的私人好處，主要是用來(lái)塑造法律環(huán)境，這將會(huì)付出很高的代價(jià)，而對(duì)于控制股東和公司而言，可以提高股票融資和堅(jiān)定價(jià)值（La Porta et al., herea</p><p>　　我們對(duì)在特定背景下的國(guó)際抽樣的31個(gè)國(guó)家的私有化進(jìn)行分析。公司經(jīng)歷一個(gè)離散性和戲劇性所有權(quán)變更私

8、營(yíng)化后，該模式將創(chuàng)造了一機(jī)會(huì)來(lái)對(duì)企業(yè)管治的測(cè)試。從LLSV[1998]開始最近有相當(dāng)多的研究建議結(jié)構(gòu)和執(zhí)法法律保護(hù)投資者在，這在一個(gè)國(guó)家中對(duì)企業(yè)統(tǒng)治的質(zhì)量起著決定性的因素。集中的所有權(quán)脫穎而出成為一位理性的替代時(shí)，那么對(duì)少數(shù)股東的保護(hù)是微弱的,如Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami [2005]所證明的私營(yíng)化企業(yè)的情況。因此，成功的私有化進(jìn)程中提高公司業(yè)績(jī)?cè)诤艽蟪潭壬先Q于法律制度，避免土地被新的控制權(quán)的股東征用

9、。</p><p>　　此外，對(duì)于一個(gè)國(guó)家法律體系的重大改革往往伴隨著從國(guó)有到私有制的改變，這是一個(gè)自然的轉(zhuǎn)變，以促進(jìn)國(guó)際企業(yè)管治研究(Djankovand Murrell [2002], Denis and McConnell [2003])。事實(shí)上，國(guó)家實(shí)行大規(guī)模私有化的項(xiàng)目通常是急于實(shí)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)代化的公司治理機(jī)制。舉例來(lái)說(shuō)，私有化的政府經(jīng)常成立（或加強(qiáng)）一個(gè)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)類似于美國(guó)證券交易commission.3 bu

10、shman和史密斯[ 2003 ]辯稱的一個(gè)國(guó)家內(nèi)實(shí)行的輪班制度，其中包括私有化對(duì)國(guó)有獨(dú)資企業(yè)，探索適應(yīng)金融會(huì)計(jì)質(zhì)量和經(jīng)濟(jì)成果。Megginson等人[ 2004 ]依賴類似的論據(jù)來(lái)說(shuō)明審查體制因素為何選擇私人和公共資本市場(chǎng)的背景私有化。</p><p>　　我們定量小股東不愿投資在公司，隨著控制手段的較大，在私有化企業(yè)中，股權(quán)集中度的控制程度越大。在控制了國(guó)家一級(jí)及其他企業(yè)級(jí)的決定性因素后，我們不認(rèn)為存在一個(gè)審

11、計(jì)員可以影響股權(quán)集中度。雖然這一結(jié)果是為了模型規(guī)格的敏感度，我們所提供的證據(jù)較薄弱可以加強(qiáng)披露標(biāo)準(zhǔn)降低股權(quán)集中度。相較之下，我們將報(bào)告得越強(qiáng)勁，穩(wěn)健的證據(jù)表明，國(guó)家審計(jì)等基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，外來(lái)投資者及控股股東之間的沖突與Ball[2001]的預(yù)言一致。具體來(lái)說(shuō)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)在司法管轄區(qū)的證券法規(guī)中股權(quán)集中度低，在民事和刑事案件，對(duì)審計(jì)就會(huì)訂立較低的舉證責(zé)任。經(jīng)濟(jì)上,我們的結(jié)果暗示所有權(quán)集中將經(jīng)過(guò)35%和31%一均方差的變數(shù),代表在我們退回中文明和犯

12、罪訴訟中證明的負(fù)擔(dān)的分別減退。此外,我們?cè)诙嘧兞康脑囼?yàn)中發(fā)現(xiàn),這些使審計(jì)員受到更嚴(yán)重私有和公共實(shí)施的條款主導(dǎo)的中找出在解釋所有權(quán)集中方面其它法律上和額外-法律上具有公共機(jī)構(gòu)特征的因素。最后,重新估計(jì)我們?cè)谖鞣綒W洲公共公司的寬廣樣品上退回提供相似在全部的我們預(yù)言上證據(jù)。</p><p>　　我們解釋我們的研究,是暗示其投資者估價(jià)法律上機(jī)構(gòu)在重視法律在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表情形下，如果發(fā)生財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告關(guān)于審計(jì)員選擇和較好揭發(fā)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)失敗審

13、計(jì)員的。在用文件證明文明和犯罪訴訟的醒酒對(duì)關(guān)于財(cái)政報(bào)道過(guò)程強(qiáng)迫作者的刺激的沖擊方面，我們的證據(jù)補(bǔ)充最近國(guó)際研究,其發(fā)現(xiàn)影響主管刺激的機(jī)構(gòu)比正式揭發(fā)標(biāo)對(duì)品質(zhì)的要求更高,例如Ball, Robin, andWu[2003], Francis, Khurana, and Pereira [2003], and Haw 等等 [2004]。我們結(jié)果也加強(qiáng)證實(shí)在LLSV[[1997]和DeFond和Hung[[2004]中一強(qiáng)烈圍繞物實(shí)施基礎(chǔ)是與

14、其說(shuō)是廣闊不如說(shuō)是投資者保護(hù)法律對(duì)好社團(tuán)的統(tǒng)治重要的證據(jù)。</p><p>　　與Dyck 和 Zingales [2004] 和Haw et al. [2004]對(duì)比，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)稅執(zhí)行的嚴(yán)肅不影響歸屬集中，相當(dāng)數(shù)量的代理人私有控制是有益的。反而，我們的研究建議統(tǒng)治改革意味緩和在控股股東和外部投資者之間的代辦處沖突在降低提供證據(jù)的責(zé)任應(yīng)該焦點(diǎn)在民用和犯罪的反對(duì)f公司的審計(jì)員，并且，較小程度，要求更多透露的案件。幸好

15、,為了改進(jìn)他們的債券市場(chǎng),這些政策規(guī)定是有政府直接執(zhí)行的。實(shí)際上，這樣可行的改革應(yīng)該提高財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的質(zhì)量，對(duì)從那以后更高的稅金服從的正面客觀性的引導(dǎo)共有資源的保護(hù)轉(zhuǎn)換有益于稅務(wù)局在投資者之外。</p><p>　　本文剩下的部分如下繼續(xù)。第2部分開發(fā)我們實(shí)驗(yàn)假說(shuō)。第3段描繪樣品和報(bào)告概要有關(guān)退回變數(shù)描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)。第4段討論以經(jīng)驗(yàn)為依據(jù)的發(fā)現(xiàn).第5段結(jié)束。</p><p>　　但是,我們通過(guò)向B

16、all’s[2001]和Leuz’s[2001]召喚研究無(wú)意中發(fā)現(xiàn)是否訓(xùn)練審計(jì)員的法律上機(jī)構(gòu)通向變得更好些在資本市場(chǎng)市場(chǎng)中知道公司主要向我們對(duì)國(guó)際社團(tuán)的統(tǒng)治的理解捐贈(zèng)。特別是,我們估計(jì)跨過(guò)國(guó)家在證明的負(fù)擔(dān)中差異的影響需要進(jìn)入文明和對(duì)著有關(guān)所有權(quán)集中審計(jì)員刑事案件。這證據(jù)暗示真正使審計(jì)員接觸文明和犯罪處罰的政府從公司,已經(jīng)更多驅(qū)散所有權(quán)建議少數(shù)民族投資者察覺(jué)到公司的財(cái)政聲明在這些司法中是更可信受益。此外,在多變量的試驗(yàn)中,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)方便對(duì)著

17、審計(jì)員文明和犯罪訴訟的債券法律包含其它法律上,包含揭發(fā)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和額外-法律上因素的影響. 重新估計(jì)我們?cè)谝晃鞣綒W洲公共公司的寬廣樣品上退回提供相似在全部的我們預(yù)言上證據(jù).</p><p>　　與Dyck 和 Zingales [2004] 和Haw et al. [2004]對(duì)比，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)把更嚴(yán)重私有和公共實(shí)施強(qiáng)加給審計(jì)員主導(dǎo)在用我們數(shù)據(jù)解釋所有權(quán)集中方面稅順從。和Ball’s[2001]的預(yù)言完全一致,我們強(qiáng)烈,強(qiáng)

18、健證據(jù)建議使管理審計(jì)員的法律上基礎(chǔ)自由主義化有改進(jìn)通過(guò)支持高質(zhì)量的-財(cái)政報(bào)道訂合同。相應(yīng)地，在套可行的公眾政策改革之中，我們的國(guó)家研究應(yīng)該追求制定證券法的磨練。實(shí)際上，國(guó)家能剪裁這些改革適合他們的法律傳統(tǒng)降低提供證據(jù)的責(zé)任和共同的(民用)法律國(guó)家反對(duì)審計(jì)員的civil (犯罪)案件。</p><p>　　Ownership Concentration in</p><p>　　Disclo

19、sure Standards,Auditor</p><p>　　Choice,and Auditing Infrastructure</p><p><b>　　ABSTRACT</b></p><p>　　We rely on a unique data set to estimate the impact of disclosure s

20、tandards and auditor-related characteristics on ownership concentration in 190 privatized firms from 31 countries.Accounting transparency can help alleviatethe agency conflict between minority investors and controlling s

21、hareholders,which is evident in the extent of ownership concentration,since the expropria-tion of corporate resources hinges on these private benefits remaining hidden.After controlling for other country-level </p&g

22、t;<p>　　1.Introduction</p><p>　　In this paper,we provide new evidence from 190 firms in 31 countries on the role of disclosure standards and auditor-related characteristics in reducing information asy

23、mmetry between controlling and minority shareholders.</p><p>　　We mainly contribute to extant research by examining the importance of legal institutions that discipline auditors to ownership concentration.Ba

24、ll [2001,p.128]argues that isolated reforms intended to improve financial reporting quality such as requiring a country’s firms to follow international accounting standards will be futile without concurrent changes to it

25、s securities laws that hold auditors more responsible for materially misleading financial statements(his italics):</p><p>　　If forced to nominate a single place from which to start changing a country’s syste

26、m of public financial reporting and disclosure,I would advocate liberalizing the rules governing stockholder and lender litigation.The risk of litigation motivates managers and auditors alike to increase transparency and

27、,in particular,to disclose bad decisions and report losses in a timely fashion. Many other institutional features—including the accounting standards actually implemented by managers and the quality</p><p>　　

28、Recent research suggests that,although concentrated ownership mitigates managerial expropriation,it engenders another agency problem,the potential expropriation of minority shareholders and other stakeholders by controll

29、ing shareholders.1 These dominant shareholders usually exert full control over managers and frequently hold control power in excess of their cash flow rights,providing them with strong incentives to extract private benef

30、its at the expense of minority shareholders(La Porta,Lopez-d</p><p>　　We conduct our analysis in the specific context of privatization in an international sample of 31 countries.Firms undergo a discrete and

31、dramatic change in ownership upon privatization,which creates an opportune testing ground in which to understand corporate governance.2 Considerable recent research starting with LLSV[1998]suggests that the structure and

32、 enforcement of laws protecting investors in a country are among the most salient determinants of the quality of its corporate governance.Conce</p><p>　　Moreover,major reforms to a country’s legal system oft

33、en accompany the transition from state to private ownership,reinforcing that this is a natural setting for international corporate governance researc Murrell[2002],Denis and McConnell[2003]).Indeed,countries that impleme

34、nt large-scale privatization programs are typically eager to modernize their corporate governance mechanisms as well.For example, privatizing governments frequently set up(or strengthen)a regulatory body resembling the U

35、.S.Sec</p><p>　　Our study builds on Boubakri,Cosset,and Guedhami[2005],who analyze the relationships among ownership concentration,legal protection, and firm performance after privatization.The authors repor

36、t high levels of private ownership concentration for a sample of 209 firms from 39 countries.Consistent with Shleifer and Vishny’s[1997]conjecture,they provide evidence that strong investor protection is associated with

37、lower ownership concentration.4 In contemporaneous research,Atanasov[2005]finds that,in t</p><p>　　We quantify minority shareholders’reluctance to invest in companies with greater private benefits of control

38、 with the extent of ownership concentration in privatized firms.After controlling for country-level and other firm-level determinants,we fail to find that the presence of a Big 5 auditor affects ownership concentration.5

39、 Although this result is sensitive to model specification,we provide weak evidence that enhancing disclosure standards reduces ownership concentration.In comparison,we epor</p><p>　　Collectively, we interpre

40、t our research as implying that investors value legal institutions that discipline auditors in the event of financial reporting failure over both auditor choice and better disclosure standards.7 In documenting the soberi

41、ng impact of civil and criminal litigation on auditors’ incentives to constrain insiders’discretion over the financial reporting process,our evidence complements recent international research that finds that institutions

42、 that affect managers’incentives ma</p><p>　　In contrast to Dyck and Zingales[2004]and Haw et al.[2004],we find that the severity of tax enforcement does not influence ownership concentration,our proxy for t

43、he amount of insiders’private control benefits.Instead,our research suggests that governance reforms meant to alleviate the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and outside investors should focus on lowering

44、the burden of proof in both civil and criminal cases against firms’auditors and,to a lesser extent,requiring more disc</p><p>　　The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.Section 2 develops our testable

45、hypotheses.Section 3 describes the sample and reports summary descriptive statistics on the regression variables.Section 4 discusses the empirical findings.Section 5 concludes.</p><p>　　However,we mainly con

46、tribute to our understanding of international corporate governance by responding to Ball’s[2001]and Leuz’s[2001]calls for research that sheds light on whether legal institutions that discipline auditors lead to firms bec

47、oming better known in the capital markets.In particular,we estimate the influence of differences across countries in the burden of proof required in civil and criminal cases against auditors on ownership concentration.Th

48、is evidence implies that governments th</p><p>　　In contrast to Dyck and Zingales[2004]and Haw et al.[2004],we find that imposing more severe private and public enforcement on auditors dominates tax complian

49、ce in explaining ownership concentration in our data.Altogether,consistent with Ball’s[2001]predictions,our strong,robust evidence suggests that liberalizing the legal infrastructure that governs auditors improves contra