會(huì)計(jì)專業(yè)外文資料及翻譯

1、<p><b>　　外文資料</b></p><p>　　Why credit risk occur? And how to deal with it? Adverse selection in loan markets occurs because bad credit risks(those most likely to default on their loans) are

2、the ones who usually line up for loans ; in other words, those who are most likely to produce an adverse outcome are the most likely to be selected. Borrowers with very risky investment projects have much to gain if thei

3、r projects are successful; and so they are the most eager to obtain loans. Clearly ，however, they are the least desir</p><p>　　Moral hazard exists in loan markers because borrowers may have incentives to eng

4、age in activities that are undesirable from the lender’s point of view. In such situations, it is more likely that the lender will be subjected to the hazard of default. Once borrowers have obtained a loan, they are more

5、 likely to invest in high-risk investment projects-projects that pay high returns to the borrowers if successful. The high risk, however, makes it less likely that they will be able to pay the loan ba</p><p>

6、;　　To be profitable, financial institutions must overcome the adverse selection and moral hazard problems that make loan defaults more likely. The attempts of financial institutions to solve these problems help explain a

7、 number of principles for managing credit risk: screening and monitoring, establishment of long-term customer relationships, loan commitments, collateral, compensating balance requirement, and credit rationing.</p>

8、<p>　　Screening and monitoring</p><p>　　Asymmetric information is present in loan markets because lenders have less information about the investment opportunities and activities of borrowers than borr

9、owers do. This situation leads to two information-producing activities by banks and other financial institutions, screening and monitoring. Indeed , Walter Wriston, a former head of Citicorp, the largest bank corporation

10、 in the United States, was often quoted as stating that the business of banking is the production of information.</p><p>　　Screening . Adverse selection in loan markets requires that lenders screen out the b

11、ad credit risks from the good ones so that loans are profitable to them. To accomplish effective screening, lenders must collect reliable information from prospective borrowers. Effective screening and information collec

12、tion together form an important principle of credit risk management.</p><p>　　Specialization in lending. One puzzling feature of bank lending is that a bank often specializes in lending to local firms or to

13、firms in particular industries, such as energy. In one sense, this behavior seems surprising because it means that the bank is not diversifying its portfolio of loans and thus is exposing itself to more risk. But from an

14、other perspective such specialization makes perfect sense. The adverse selection problem requires that the bank screen out bad credit risks. It is easi</p><p>　　Monitoring and Enforcement of Restrictive Cove

15、nants. Once a loan has been made, the borrower has an incentive to engage in risky activities that make it less likely that the loan will be paid off. To reduce this moral hazard, financial institutions must adhere to th

16、e principle for managing credit risk that a lender should write provisions (restrictive covenants) into loan contracts that restrict borrowers from engaging in risky activities. By monitoring borrowers’ activities to see

17、 whether they </p><p>　　Long-term customer relationships</p><p>　　An additional way for banks and other financial institutions to obtain information about their borrowers is through long-term cu

18、stomer relationships, another important principle of credit risk management.</p><p>　　If a prospective borrower has had a checking or savings account or other loans with a band over a long period of time, a

19、loan officer can look at past activity on the accounts and learn quite a bit about the borrower. The balances in the checking and savings accounts tell the banker how liquid the potential borrower is and at what time of

20、year the borrower has a strong need for cash. A review of the checks the borrower has written reveals the borrower’s suppliers. If the borrower has borrowed pr</p><p>　　The need for monitoring by lenders add

21、s to the importance of long-term customer relationships. If the borrower has borrowed from the bank before, the bank has already established procedures for monitoring that customer. Therefore, the costs of monitoring lon

22、g-term customers are lower than those for new customers.</p><p>　　Long-term relationships benefit the customers as well as the bank. A firm with a previous relationship will find it easier to obtain a loan a

23、t a low interest rte because the bank has an easier time determining if the prospective borrower is good credit risk and incurs fewer costs in monitoring the borrower.</p><p>　　A long-term customer relations

24、hip has another advantage for the bank. No bank can think of every contingency when it writes a restrictive covenant into a loan contract; there will always be risky borrower activities that are not ruled out. However, w

25、hat if a borrower wants to preserve a ling-term relationship with a bank because it will be easier to get future loans at low interest rates? The borrower then has the incentive to avoid risky activities that would upset

26、 the bank, even if restriction</p><p>　　The advantages of establishing long-term customer relationships suggest that closer ties between corporations and banks might be beneficial to both. One way to create

27、these ties is for banks to hold equity stakes in companies they lend to and for banks to have embers on the boards of directors of these companies.</p><p>　　Loan commitments</p><p>　　Banks also

28、create long-term relationships and gather information by issuing loan commitment to commercial customers. A loan commitments a bank’s commitment (for a specified future period of time) to provide a firm with loans up to

29、a given a mount at an interest rate that is tied to some market interest rate. The majority of commercial and industrial loans are made under the loan commitment arrangement. The advantage for the firm is that it has a s

30、ource of credit when it needs it. The advantage f</p><p>　　<<China City Commercial Bank Report,2008>>tells us: China’s city commercial banks, as the last institutions emerging in China’s commerci

31、al banking system, were founded in 1995 through shareholding reform of the former urban credit cooperatives. They are regarded as “the third echelon” in China’s banking system.</p><p>　　In 2007, China accele

32、rated the pace of initial public offerings of its city commercial banks. On July 19th 2007, Bank of Nanjing went public in Shanghai Stock Exchange, becoming the first urban commercial bank stock in Shanghai Stock Exchang

33、e. Bank of Nanjing with a registered capital of CNY1.207 billion is the third urban commercial bank that has set up branches in other cities, after the Bank of Beijing and Bank of Shanghai. Besides Bank of Nanjing, Bank

34、of Ningbo also had its IPO on the same </p><p>　　Bank of Beijing (601169) had its IPO in the Shanghai Stock Exchange on Sep. 19th 2007. The Bank of Beijing opened at 23 yuan per share in its market debut, up

35、 84% from its IPO prices of 12.5 yuan. The bank issued 1.2 billion A shares in all, among which, 900 million shares were issued on-line. The bank’s shares were chased by the market and a total of CNY1.9 trillion was froz

36、en for subscription.</p><p>　　Furthermore, Bank of Hangzhou, Bank of Chongqing, and Bank of Tianjin have all expressed their intention to go public clearly. It is inevitable that more China’s urban commercia

37、l banks will be listed on the stock market in 2008.</p><p>　　China Banking Regulatory Commission requires that domestic city commercial banks should be of a basic rudiment of a modern financial company in 20

38、08. The basic rudiment should cover the following seven aspects: firstly, non-performing loan should remain at about 5%; secondly, capital adequacy ratio should be above 8%; thirdly, NPL provision coverage rate should re

39、ach 100%; fourthly, profit  should continue to grow; fifthly, all information should be fully disclosed; sixthly, the ability to preve</p><p><b>　　中文譯文</b></p><p>　　信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的成因及該如何應(yīng)

40、對(duì)？在信貸市場(chǎng)上所以發(fā)生逆向選擇問題，是因?yàn)楦咝刨J風(fēng)險(xiǎn)者（那些最有可能在貸款上違約的人們）常常就是那些排著隊(duì)申請(qǐng)貸款的人。換言之，那些最有可能造成“逆向”結(jié)果的人，常常就是那些被“選中”得到貸款的人。如果項(xiàng)目成功，那些有著巨大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資項(xiàng)目的借款人將大有好處，因而這些人最急于得到貸款。然而，由于他們極有可能難以償還貸款，他們顯然是最不合意的借款人。</p><p>　　貸款市場(chǎng)上所以存在道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，是因?yàn)榻杩钊丝赡苡?/p>

41、積極性去從事那些被貸款人認(rèn)為不合意的活動(dòng)。在這種情況下，貸款人將可能遇到違約的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。一旦借款人的到貸款，他們可能進(jìn)行高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)項(xiàng)目的投資，即一旦成功將給借款人帶來很高收益的投資項(xiàng)目。然而，高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)使得他們更有可能難以償還貸款。</p><p>　　為了能賺取利潤(rùn)，銀行必須解決那些可能導(dǎo)致貸款違約的逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題。銀行解決這些問題的嘗試，有助于解釋它們管理信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的一系列原則，如：篩選和監(jiān)控、與客戶建立長(zhǎng)期聯(lián)系、

42、貸款承諾、抵押物、補(bǔ)償余額要求和信用配給等。</p><p><b>　　篩選和監(jiān)控</b></p><p>　　信息不對(duì)稱問題所以在貸款市場(chǎng)上出現(xiàn)，是因?yàn)榕c借款者相比，貸款人對(duì)于投資機(jī)會(huì)和借款人的活動(dòng)所知較少。這種狀況導(dǎo)致銀行和其他金融機(jī)構(gòu)發(fā)展出兩種生產(chǎn)信息的活動(dòng)：篩選和監(jiān)控。的確，美國花旗銀行的前負(fù)責(zé)人沃爾特·李斯頓的這段話是經(jīng)常被引用的：銀行業(yè)的工作就

43、是生產(chǎn)信息。</p><p>　　篩選。貸款市場(chǎng)上存在著逆向選擇問題，要求銀行將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)小的人們從風(fēng)險(xiǎn)大的人們中篩選出來，從而使銀行放款有利可圖。為了進(jìn)行有效的篩選，銀行必須從每一位借款人那里收集到可靠的信息。有效的篩選和收集信息，構(gòu)成信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理的一項(xiàng)重要原則。</p><p>　　貸款專業(yè)化。銀行貸款令人迷惑的特征之一就是，一些銀行常常專事對(duì)當(dāng)?shù)仄髽I(yè)或諸如能源之類的特定行業(yè)發(fā)放貸款。從某種

44、角度來說，這種行為看起來是令人意外的，因?yàn)檫@意味著銀行沒有把它們的貸款組合分散化，因而使自己面臨更多的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。然而，從另一角度來看，這樣專業(yè)化又是非常有道理的。由于存在著逆向選擇問題，銀行分辨風(fēng)險(xiǎn)高低就是必要的。對(duì)于銀行來說，收集當(dāng)?shù)仄髽I(yè)的信息并確定它們的信用度，較之對(duì)一家遙遠(yuǎn)的企業(yè)做同樣的事要容易得多。同樣，將自己的貸款集中于特定的行業(yè)，銀行對(duì)這些企業(yè)會(huì)擁有更多的了解，從而更容易判斷哪些企業(yè)具有按時(shí)償還貸款能力。</p>

45、<p>　　監(jiān)控和限制性契約。一旦貸款發(fā)出，借款者就有從事那些可能會(huì)使貸款難以償還的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)活動(dòng)的動(dòng)力。為了減少這種道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，銀行必須堅(jiān)持風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理的原則，在貸款合約中寫入限制借款者從事風(fēng)險(xiǎn)活動(dòng)的條款（限制性契約）。通過對(duì)借款人從事的活動(dòng)進(jìn)行監(jiān)控來審視借款者是否遵守限制性契約，一旦它們不遵守則強(qiáng)制他們執(zhí)行，這樣，銀行能保證借款者不從事那些從銀行角度來看有損于銀行利益的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)活動(dòng)。一家成功的銀行之所以要在審計(jì)和收集信息活動(dòng)上花那么多錢，

46、其原因就在于它們需要對(duì)貸款實(shí)行篩選和監(jiān)控。</p><p><b>　　與客戶的長(zhǎng)期聯(lián)系</b></p><p>　　銀行得到有關(guān)借款人信息的另一條途徑就是同客戶們建立長(zhǎng)期聯(lián)系，這是信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理的另一重要原則。</p><p>　　如果一位可能的借款人在一家銀行長(zhǎng)期保有支票賬戶或儲(chǔ)蓄賬戶，或者曾借過其他貸款，信貸員就能從賬戶上觀察客戶的活動(dòng)，并

47、對(duì)借款者有所了解。在支票賬戶和儲(chǔ)蓄賬戶的余額上可以告訴銀行家，這位可能的借款者掌握的資金流動(dòng)狀況以及在一年中的什么時(shí)候?qū)ΜF(xiàn)金有著最強(qiáng)烈的需求。復(fù)審這位借款者過去簽發(fā)的支票，能了解他的供應(yīng)者是誰。如果借款者過去在銀行借過款，銀行就有其償還貸款的紀(jì)錄?？梢?，與客戶的長(zhǎng)期聯(lián)系減少了收集信息的成本，并使甄別信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更容易。</p><p>　　銀行監(jiān)控的需要，使得與客戶的長(zhǎng)期聯(lián)系多了一層重要性。如果借款者過去在銀行借過錢

48、，銀行就已經(jīng)建立過對(duì)他的監(jiān)控程序。因此，監(jiān)控長(zhǎng)期客戶的成本就比監(jiān)控新客戶的成本低得多。</p><p>　　長(zhǎng)期聯(lián)系即使客戶受惠，也使銀行受惠。一家過去與銀行有聯(lián)系的企業(yè)將發(fā)現(xiàn)，它們能以低利率取得貸款，因?yàn)殂y行能很容易地確定借款者的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)狀況，而且在監(jiān)控上也將少花很多錢。</p><p>　　對(duì)于銀行來說，與長(zhǎng)期客戶的聯(lián)系還有另一項(xiàng)好處。當(dāng)銀行將限制性契約寫進(jìn)貸款合約時(shí)，它們不可能設(shè)想到所有

49、的可能，依然會(huì)有借款者的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)活動(dòng)未被排除在外。然而，如果一名借款者想同一家銀行保持長(zhǎng)期聯(lián)系，以便其在未來較容易地以低利率取得借款，他將怎樣行事？這位借款者就會(huì)有積極性去規(guī)避那些會(huì)惹惱銀行的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)活動(dòng)，即便在貸款合約中并未對(duì)這些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)活動(dòng)有所約束。的確，如果銀行不喜歡借款者的所作所為，即便借款者沒有違反任何限制性契約，它也有能力阻止借款者去從事這些活動(dòng)，如銀行可以用未來不再提供新貸款來威脅借款者。這樣，與客戶的長(zhǎng)期聯(lián)系甚至可以使銀行防范那些未

50、預(yù)見到的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。</p><p>　　與客戶建立長(zhǎng)期聯(lián)系的好處告訴我們，公司和銀行之間的密切聯(lián)系可能使雙方受益。建立這種聯(lián)系的途徑之一，就是由銀行持有其貸款企業(yè)的股份，并派員參加這些企業(yè)的董事會(huì)。</p><p><b>　　貸款承諾</b></p><p>　　銀行還通過向商業(yè)客戶提供貸款承諾來創(chuàng)造長(zhǎng)期聯(lián)系和收集信息。所謂貸款承諾，就是銀行

51、同意在未來某一時(shí)期中以某種與市場(chǎng)利率相關(guān)聯(lián)的利率向企業(yè)提供某一限額之內(nèi)貸款的承諾。大部分工商業(yè)貸款都是在貸款承諾安排下發(fā)放的。這樣做對(duì)企業(yè)的好處是當(dāng)它需要貸款時(shí)便能得到。對(duì)銀行的好處則在于貸款承諾促進(jìn)了長(zhǎng)期聯(lián)系，反過來便利了企業(yè)連續(xù)不斷地提供其收入、資產(chǎn)和負(fù)債狀況、經(jīng)營活動(dòng)等等的信息，因此，貸款承諾安排是一種減少銀行篩選和收集信息成本的有力手段。</p><p>　　<<2008中國城市商業(yè)銀行研究報(bào)

52、告>>告訴我們：China's city commercial banks, as the last institutions emerging中國城市商業(yè)銀行，作為中國商業(yè)銀行體系中出現(xiàn)的最后機(jī)構(gòu)in China's commercial banking system, were founded in 1995 through a，于1995年在城市信用社股份制改革的過程中成立。 They are他們?cè)谥袊?/p>

53、銀行體系中regarded as "the third echelon" in China's banking system.被視為“第三梯隊(duì)”。 </p><p>　　In 2007, China accelerated the pace of initial public offerings of2007年，中國加快了城市商業(yè)銀行首次公開募股its city commercia

54、l banks.的步伐。 On July 19th 2007, the Bank of Nanjing went在07年7月19日，南京銀行public on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, becoming the first urban在上海證券交易所上市，成為第一家在上海證券交易所上市的城市 </p><p>　　commercial bank stock in the Shang

55、hai Stock Exchange.商業(yè)銀行股票。Bank of Nanjing南京銀行with a registered capital of CNY1.207 billion is the third urban注冊(cè)資本CNY1.207億，是繼北京銀行和上海銀行之后第三個(gè)在其他城市設(shè)立了分行的城市商業(yè)銀行。 Besides Bank of Nanjing, Bank of此外，寧波銀行也在同一天于深圳證券交易所Exchange.首

56、次公開上市。（中國城市商業(yè)銀行存款總額的變化，2002—2007見下圖）</p><p>　　Bank of Beijing (601169) had its IPO in the Shanghai Stock北京銀行（ 601169 ） 于2007年9月19日在上海證券交易所上市并以 23元每股的價(jià)格share in its market debut, up 84% from its IPO prices of

57、 12.5 yuan在市場(chǎng)上公開亮相，已由其首次發(fā)行價(jià)格上升了84 ％即12.5元。The bank issued 1.2 billion A shares in all, among which, 900 million銀行總共發(fā)行了12億股A股股票，其中9億shares were issued on-line.股于網(wǎng)上發(fā)行。北京The bank's shares were chased by the銀行的股票受到市場(chǎng)的熱捧，

58、market and a total of CNY1.9 trillion was frozen for subscription.并有CNY1.9萬億被凍結(jié)認(rèn)購。 </p><p>　　Furthermore, Bank of Hangzhou, Bank of Chongqing, and Bank of此外，杭州銀行，重慶銀行， 天津銀行都明確地表示了上市的打算。毋庸置疑，將It is毋庸置有更多的中國城市

59、商業(yè)銀行在2008年上市。 </p><p>　　China's Banking Regulatory Commission stated that domestic city我國銀行業(yè)監(jiān)督管理委員會(huì)要求國內(nèi)各城市commercial banks should adhere to seven basic requirements: firstly,商業(yè)銀行在2008年應(yīng)當(dāng)滿足作為現(xiàn)代金融公司的基本要求?；?/p>

60、本要求包括以下七個(gè)方面：首先，non-performing loans should remain at about 5%; the capital adequacy不良貸款比率應(yīng)保持在5 ％左右；第二，資本充足率ratio should be above 8%; NPL provision coverage rate should reach比例應(yīng)高于8 ％ ;第三，不良貸款提供覆蓋率應(yīng)達(dá)到100%; profit should co