外文翻譯--跨境合并和收購(gòu)歐洲、美國(guó)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)

1、<p><b>　?、?外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　外文原稿之一</b></p><p>　　Cross-border merges and acquisitions:</p><p>　　The European—US experience</p><p>　　Auth

2、or: R.J.Kish.</p><p>　　Nationality: America</p><p>　　Source: Journal of Multinational Financial Management 1998(8)</p><p><b>　　434-43</b></p><p>　　Original

3、text：</p><p>　　Factors motivating cross-border acquisition </p><p>　　In her extensive discussion of the merge and acquisition process McDonough Bergson (1990) proposes that the following factors

4、 motivate many companies to acquire firms: the desire to spread products and diversify risks geographically; to gain back-up products; to exploit synergies; and to attain economies of scale. However, she cautions that wo

5、rkforce problem, poor facilities, as well as social and technological difference may expose the acquiring company new risks. Other studies in the area of c</p><p>　　Favorable acquisition factors </p>

6、<p>　　Although there are a number of factors that favor acquisition activity, we focus on those that seem to affect cross-border acquisitions between the US and EU. These factors include exchange rates diversificati

7、ons, and economic conditions in the home country, as well as technology and human resource.</p><p>　　Exchange rates</p><p>　　Currents and foretasted future exchange rates affect the home currenc

8、y equivalent of acquisition prices, as well as the present value of future cash flows accruing to the acquired firm; </p><p>　　Therefore, the dominant effect in any particular case is ultimately an empirical

9、 question. Existing studies, predictably, arrive at different conclusions concerning the role of exchange rates. For example, foot and Stein (1991) propose that, while there is a relationship between the exchange-rates a

10、nd acquisition activity, there is no evidence that a change in the exchange rate improve the position of foreign acquirers relative to their US counterparts. They contend that when the dollar deprecia</p><p>

11、;　　Diversification</p><p>　　This argument is based on the empirical observation that covariance of returns across different economy. It follows that the prospective acquiring company must first decide on its

12、 desired levels of risk and return. Only then should it attempt to acquire ongoing foreign concerns, companies may be able to circumvent tariff and non-tariff barriers, thereby improving their risk-return trade-off by lo

13、wering the level of unsystematic risk.</p><p>　　Economic conditions in the acquiring firm’s home country should facilitate cross-border acquisitions as a means for increasing demand and levels of diversifica

14、tion. On the other hand, adverse economic conditions, such as a slump, recession, or capital market constraints, may cause prospective acquiring firms to concentrate on their domestic business while postponing any intern

15、ational strategic moves. </p><p>　　Acquisition of technological and human resources</p><p>　　If a firm falls behind in the level of technological knowledge necessary to efficiently in its indust

16、ry, and it is unable or unwilling to obtain the required technology through research and development, then it may attempt to acquire a foreign firm which is technologically more advanced. In their study, Cebenoyan et al.

17、(1992) support this point, showing that the expansion into new market through acquisitions allows firms to gain competitive advantage from the possession of special resources.</p><p>　　Unfavorable acquisitio

18、n factors</p><p>　　The factors discussed thus far generally tend to encourage firms to make cross-border acquisitions. In contrast there are other variables that often appear to restrain cross-border combina

19、tion. These include information asymmetry, monopolistic power, as well as government restrictions and regulations.</p><p>　　Information asymmetry</p><p>　　Roll (1986) contends that information a

20、bout a prospective target firm (e.g. market share, sales, and cash flow forecasts) is crucial in the decision-making process of acquiring firm. If the necessary information is not available, Roll (1986) argues that the p

21、rospective acquiring firm may be forced to delay or discontinue its plants, even though the foreign firm appears to be an attractive target. In contrast, Stoughton (1988) argues that information effects are not always ha

22、rmful. He points out </p><p>　　Monopolistic power</p><p>　　If a firm enjoys monopolistic power (a difficult prospect in the US, due to antitrust laws), then entry into the industry become more d

23、ifficult for potential competitors, domestic or foreign. Moreover, a monopolist is much more likely to resist a takeover attempt. Other barriers to entry that make cross-border acquisition especially difficult within a m

24、onopolistic environment include extensive outlays for research and development, capital expenditures necessary to establish greenfield productio</p><p>　　Government reconstructions and regulations </p>

25、;<p>　　Most governments have some form of takeover regulations in place. In many instances, government approval is mandatory before an acquisition by a foreign firm can occur. In addition, there may exist governme

26、nt restrictions on capital repatriations, dividend payouts, intercompany interest payments, and other remittances. Scholes and Wolfsan (1990) for example, discuss periods in the US where regulatory events discouraged acq

27、uisition activity; they cite the William’s Amendments</p><p>　　And the Tax Reform Act of 1969 as significant legal and regulatory changes that contributed to a significant showdown in merger activity in the

28、1960s. In addition, Scholes and Wolf son (1990) argue that there was a similar impact resulting from changes in US tax laws in the 1980s, because those changes increased transaction costs in acquisitions involving US sel

29、lers and foreign buyers. On the other hand, Dewenter (1995) contends that her empirical findings in the chemical and retail industry con</p><p><b>　　中文譯文之一</b></p><p><b>　　跨境合并

30、和收購(gòu)：</b></p><p><b>　　歐洲、美國(guó)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)</b></p><p>　　作者：R.J.Kish。</p><p><b>　　國(guó)籍：美國(guó)</b></p><p>　　出處：《跨國(guó)公司財(cái)務(wù)管理》，第八卷，第四期，1998年11月，434-437</p>&

31、lt;p><b>　　1.跨境收購(gòu)的因素</b></p><p>　　McDonough Bergson(1990)，在關(guān)于合并和收購(gòu)的廣泛討論中提出以下因素促使許多公司去收購(gòu)國(guó)外公司：一是不同的領(lǐng)域傳播產(chǎn)品和分散風(fēng)險(xiǎn)；二是獲得備用產(chǎn)品；三是充分發(fā)揮并購(gòu)的協(xié)同作用；四是達(dá)到規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)。然而，她注意到，勞動(dòng)力問(wèn)題、落后的生產(chǎn)設(shè)施，以及社會(huì)形式和技術(shù)水平上的差異可能導(dǎo)致并購(gòu)企業(yè)遭遇新的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

32、其他關(guān)于企業(yè)跨國(guó)并購(gòu)的研究中把跨境并購(gòu)形式產(chǎn)生的原因歸因于以下幾個(gè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)因素，包括有利的和不利的。我們的討論是建立在對(duì)這些因素的抽樣調(diào)查的基礎(chǔ)上的。在研究中，我們首先對(duì)收購(gòu)的有利變量進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn)。(即變量出現(xiàn)會(huì)影響公司的關(guān)注跨境交易)，然后再對(duì)不力變量進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn)。同時(shí)，我們也會(huì)特別關(guān)注那些對(duì)研究范圍中的國(guó)家有直接聯(lián)系的因素。</p><p>　　1.1有利的收購(gòu)因素</p><p>　　雖然很多因

33、素都有利于收購(gòu)活動(dòng)，但是目前我們更專注于那些影響歐美大陸之間并購(gòu)活動(dòng)的因素。這些因素包括各國(guó)之間的匯率、多元化發(fā)展的趨勢(shì)、本國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況發(fā)展?fàn)顩r，以及科技發(fā)展水平和人力資源。</p><p><b>　　1.1.1匯率</b></p><p>　　現(xiàn)在和可以預(yù)見(jiàn)的未來(lái)匯率影響著以本國(guó)貨幣計(jì)算的收購(gòu)價(jià)格，被收購(gòu)公司未來(lái)現(xiàn)金流量的現(xiàn)值； </p><p

34、>　　因此，在任何情況下最重要的影響最終都將是是一個(gè)實(shí)證問(wèn)題。從現(xiàn)有的研究中可以看出，研究者們對(duì)于匯率的作用各執(zhí)己見(jiàn)，尚未達(dá)成共識(shí)。例如，foot and Stein (1991)提出,雖然匯率變動(dòng)與收購(gòu)活動(dòng)之間存在著一定的關(guān)系，但到目前為止還沒(méi)有任何確切的證據(jù)表明，匯率變動(dòng)使外國(guó)收購(gòu)者獲得比他們的美國(guó)同行更多的收益。他們認(rèn)為，當(dāng)美元貶值美時(shí)，任何一家公司無(wú)論展開(kāi)何種業(yè)務(wù)，包括外國(guó)或國(guó)內(nèi)，美國(guó)都將是一個(gè)有利可圖的地方。此外，他們低

35、估了匯率變動(dòng)對(duì)跨國(guó)并購(gòu)活動(dòng)的影響。相反，他們認(rèn)為這對(duì)國(guó)際投資環(huán)境是十分有利的，在提高資本流動(dòng)性和均衡性的同時(shí)也降低了投資的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。Goldberg (1993)卻持截然相反的觀點(diǎn)。她發(fā)現(xiàn)美元的貶值會(huì)直接導(dǎo)致外商在美國(guó)投資業(yè)務(wù)的收縮。根據(jù)她的觀點(diǎn)，如果美元持續(xù)走強(qiáng)，那么我們會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)被收購(gòu)的美國(guó)公司會(huì)增多而美國(guó)對(duì)外的收購(gòu)活動(dòng)會(huì)減少。然而，Harris and Ravens craft(1991)所得出的實(shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)論與戈德堡的觀點(diǎn)又是相悖的。特別是，

36、他們認(rèn)為美元貶值增加一些外國(guó)收購(gòu)美國(guó)公司。</p><p><b>　　1.1.2多元化</b></p><p>　　這個(gè)論點(diǎn)是基于對(duì)不同經(jīng)濟(jì)的協(xié)方差的回歸直線的觀測(cè)中得出的。由此可見(jiàn)，當(dāng)將來(lái)要收購(gòu)某家公司時(shí)，首先需要考慮的因素是自身所期望報(bào)酬率和所能承受的與之相對(duì)應(yīng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平。與收購(gòu)相關(guān)的其他需要考慮的問(wèn)題都被放在這之后。通過(guò)權(quán)衡風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與報(bào)酬水平可以降低非系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，從

37、而企業(yè)也能規(guī)避關(guān)稅壁壘和非關(guān)稅壁壘的問(wèn)題。</p><p>　　1.1.3本國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)條件</p><p>　　一方面，收購(gòu)企業(yè)本國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)條件應(yīng)當(dāng)能夠促進(jìn)跨國(guó)并購(gòu)交易，并且能滿足日益增長(zhǎng)的對(duì)多元化的需求。另一方面。例如經(jīng)濟(jì)下滑、衰退、尚未完全開(kāi)放的資本市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)很可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致將來(lái)企業(yè)在收購(gòu)時(shí)只關(guān)注國(guó)內(nèi)的業(yè)務(wù)而忽視了國(guó)際戰(zhàn)略措施。</p><p>　　1.1.4技術(shù)與人才的培

38、養(yǎng)</p><p>　　如果一家公司對(duì)于其所處的產(chǎn)業(yè)所必需的技術(shù)水平相當(dāng)匱乏，并且又不能或者不愿意通過(guò)技術(shù)開(kāi)發(fā)和研究獲取這些必備的技術(shù)，那么它可以通過(guò)收購(gòu)在這方面擁有先進(jìn)技術(shù)的公司來(lái)彌補(bǔ)自身的缺陷以獲得發(fā)展。一個(gè)公司落后的技術(shù)知識(shí)水平必須有效地在它的產(chǎn)業(yè),它是不能或不愿意獲取所需的技術(shù)研究和開(kāi)發(fā),然后通過(guò)它可能試圖收購(gòu)?fù)鈬?guó)公司在技術(shù)上更先進(jìn)。Cebenoyan (1992)，支持上述觀點(diǎn)，他的研究表明通過(guò)企業(yè)并購(gòu)

39、獲得的擴(kuò)張使得企業(yè)具有了特殊資源，并獲得了競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)。</p><p>　　1.2不利的收購(gòu)因素</p><p>　　到目前為止我們所討論的因都是鼓勵(lì)企業(yè)間進(jìn)行跨國(guó)并購(gòu)活動(dòng)的。然而，其他的可變因素也會(huì)抵制跨境并購(gòu)活動(dòng)的展開(kāi)。這些不利因素包括信息的不對(duì)稱性，壟斷權(quán)力，以及政府出臺(tái)的抵制并購(gòu)的法律法規(guī)。</p><p>　　1.2.1信息不對(duì)稱性</p>&

40、lt;p>　　Roll(1986)認(rèn)為在制定并購(gòu)決策的過(guò)程中，潛在的目標(biāo)公司的信息是十分關(guān)鍵的(例如市場(chǎng)份額、銷量、現(xiàn)金流)。如果這些必要的信息無(wú)從獲得的話，Roll (1986)認(rèn)為盡管這家外國(guó)公司看起來(lái)十分具有誘惑力，潛在收購(gòu)方可能還是會(huì)被迫推遲或終止這項(xiàng)收購(gòu)計(jì)劃。相反，Stoughton (1988)認(rèn)為，信息的不對(duì)稱性帶來(lái)的影響并不總是有害的。他指出潛在收購(gòu)者可以獲得與其他市場(chǎng)參與者相同的關(guān)于目標(biāo)公司的信息。</p&

41、gt;<p><b>　　1.2.2壟斷力量</b></p><p>　　如果一個(gè)公司在市場(chǎng)上擁有壟斷權(quán)力(由于反托拉斯法存在，這種情況在美國(guó)的存在性是很小的)，那么無(wú)論是國(guó)內(nèi)還是國(guó)外的潛在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手都很難進(jìn)入這個(gè)行業(yè)對(duì)其造成威脅。并且，壟斷者會(huì)更容抵制這類收購(gòu)的企圖。壟斷環(huán)境中其他成為跨國(guó)并購(gòu)進(jìn)入的主要障礙包括廣泛研究和開(kāi)發(fā)支出，建立綠地生產(chǎn)設(shè)施，過(guò)大規(guī)模的廣告宣傳活動(dòng)達(dá)到產(chǎn)品

42、差異化等必要的資本性支出。</p><p>　　1.2.3政府的約束</p><p>　　大多數(shù)政府都會(huì)執(zhí)行某種形式的收購(gòu)法規(guī)。在許多情況下，在展開(kāi)一個(gè)收購(gòu)活動(dòng)之前必須得到當(dāng)?shù)卣恼J(rèn)可和批準(zhǔn)。此外，也可能存在政府限制資本返還，派發(fā)福利，公司內(nèi)部的利息支付和其他匯款的情況。以Scholes and Wolfsan (1990)為例，他們認(rèn)為在美國(guó)監(jiān)管活動(dòng)期間阻礙了收購(gòu)活動(dòng)的展開(kāi)；為此他們列

43、舉了威廉的修正案。</p><p>　　1969年的稅收改革法案作為最重要的法律和法規(guī)的變化，促成了20世紀(jì)60年代企業(yè)并購(gòu)活動(dòng)的形成。此外，Scholes and Wolfsan (1990)認(rèn)為，20世紀(jì)80年代稅收法案的變革也產(chǎn)生了一些類似的影響。這些改變?cè)黾恿嗣绹?guó)內(nèi)外企業(yè)并購(gòu)交易者的成本。另一方面，Dewenter(1995)聲稱，她在化學(xué)和零售行業(yè)的實(shí)證結(jié)果卻恰恰與Scholes and Wolfsan

44、 (1990)相反。她總結(jié)了她的發(fā)現(xiàn)，20世紀(jì)80年代美國(guó)稅收制度的變化并不能為跨國(guó)并購(gòu)活動(dòng)水平提高任何解釋說(shuō)明。然而，值得注意的是Dewenter(1995)只對(duì)1978年至1989年約占據(jù)了海外收購(gòu)活動(dòng)16%的兩個(gè)行業(yè)做了調(diào)查。Scholes and Wolfsan (1990)的研究卻包括了1968年到1987年大部分的行業(yè)。對(duì)從積極和消極兩個(gè)方面影響跨國(guó)并購(gòu)的變量討論顯示，在涉及不同國(guó)家間的并購(gòu)活動(dòng)存在著一個(gè)附加的復(fù)雜性，而最基

45、本的合并分析方面保持不變。也就是說(shuō)，合并或收購(gòu)、國(guó)內(nèi)或國(guó)外，如果要估計(jì)的主要因素是未來(lái)現(xiàn)金流量，收購(gòu)價(jià)格，融資成本，那么這些都可以在一個(gè)資本預(yù)算框架內(nèi)處理。因此，按理說(shuō)，在宏觀層面上，</p><p><b>　　外文原稿之二</b></p><p>　　Acquirer Systematic Risk：</p><p>　　Evidence

46、on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions</p><p>　　Author： Sidney W. Yeomans</p><p>　　Nationality：America</p><p>　　Source： The degree of business administration with finance concentra

47、tion, Nova Southeastern University ,2004</p><p>　　Original text：</p><p>　　Managerial Risk Taking Following Acquisition </p><p>　　Researchers can think of the required performance im

48、provements as target reference points for managers with respect to preserving the value of the firm. Simulations clearly illustrated as the premium increases beyond certain levels, the likelihood of realizing the require

49、d improvements declines dramatically .It is the knowledge of the synergy trap and the results of the simulation analysis that allows upfront predictions about when managers are likely to miss their performance requiremen

50、ts and b</p><p>　　This discussion has largely focused on generating predictions about the systematic risk of targets and acquirers based on the value consequences and the interaction of those consequences in

51、 paying an acquisition premium. Future changes in the nature of resource commitments might take the form of changed in risk taking. </p><p>　　In the post-acquisition phase, the changes in managerial risk tak

52、ing could take two forms:(1)increasing the size of the bet on the current competitive game (such as a major advertising campaign),or(2) committing resources to new, higher-risk competitive games(such as a major distribut

53、ion system change or R&D venture),or both.</p><p>　　Why would the level of risk taking increase following an acquisition? Initially managers may have built increased risk into post-merger integration pla

54、ns to obtain a greater chance of positive returns from their resource allocation decision. But given the likelihood that as the acquisition premium increase, managers will predictably miss their performance targets the i

55、ssue is whether the level of risk taking will change over time.</p><p>　　A manager acting in an economically rational manner should, at any given point in time, evaluate the net present value of future decis

56、ions and not be affected by past decision. Simply put, is it better to divest or to continue ownership?</p><p>　　A substantial amount of evidence has shown that the assumption of economic rationality is rout

57、inely violated by managers. It is well documented managers may exhibit an escalation of commitment to a failing course of action. There are at least two approaches to risk taking that would motivate predications within t

58、his context.</p><p>　　One approach to the escalation of commitment phenomenon has been the self-justification hypothesis. Brockner, et.al(1986) has written escalation is determined, at least in part, “by dec

59、ision makers’ unwillingness to admit that their prior allocation of resources to the chosen course of action was in vain (the self-justification hypothesis).”O(jiān)ften managers do not want to admit defeat and will go to grea

60、t lengths to show their decisions were ultimately justified. This explanation is comparable to </p><p>　　The concept of escalating commitment has also been approached from the prospect theory perspective. Pr

61、ospect theory predicts that individuals will generally be risk seeking when they are losing but risk averse when they are winning-classic gambling behavior. Winning or losing is in relation to an arbitrary reference poin

62、t. The acquisition premium provides a clear target reference point for managers to use.</p><p>　　Then, as managers miss what may actually be unachievable performance targets and fall below their target refer

63、ence point into the domain of losses, they may increase their level of risk taking to attempt to upset these targets in the future. The analogy to this is a gambler sitting at a blackjack table who increases his bets as

64、he loses. These higher-risk strategies may simply be perceived as necessary by managers given the distance they must cover to preserve value. For example, recall when syn</p><p>　　Since higher levels of the

65、acquisition systematic risk will be associated with a greater likelihood of not achieving performance targets, it follows high levels of the premium will also be associated with increases in risk taking.</p><p

66、>　　Very little research has been done in the area of the effect of acquisitions on risk taking. Lubatkin and O’Nelii (1987) and Chatterjee and Lubatkin (1990) find larger decreases in systematic risk “than an investor

67、 can do his own” for relate mergers than unrelated merges. Unrelated mergers, however, are found to have larger absolute levels of systematic risk according to Chatterjee and Lubatkin (1990).As with the majority of the m

68、anagement literature on acquisitions; these results are not withou</p><p>　　The concept of changes in risk-taking behavior has not been considered in the post-acquisition environment. In other words, now mig

69、ht a given manager in two different post-acquisition performance environments react differently to a similar post-acquisition problem? Managerial actions do not lie in isolation of the performance environment, and so it

70、is important to consider how the risk-taking posture of executive teams may emerge post-acquisition.</p><p><b>　　中文譯文之二</b></p><p><b>　　收購(gòu)后的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)</b></p><p>　　作

71、者：Sidney W. Yeomans </p><p><b>　　國(guó)籍：美國(guó)</b></p><p>　　出處：諾瓦東南大學(xué)博士論文，2004</p><p><b>　　中文譯文：</b></p><p>　　研究人員為管理者希望公司保值的愿望提供依稀必要措施作為目標(biāo)參考值。模型清楚地說(shuō)明，當(dāng)

72、溢價(jià)超過(guò)某種程度時(shí)，意識(shí)到采取有效防范措施的可能性也就越小。這是協(xié)同效應(yīng)的陷阱，模型的分析結(jié)果，可以事前預(yù)測(cè)管理者在什么時(shí)候以及多達(dá)程度上達(dá)不到他們要求的目標(biāo)。</p><p>　　本次討論主要關(guān)注對(duì)收購(gòu)產(chǎn)生的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的預(yù)測(cè)，以及溢價(jià)收購(gòu)所產(chǎn)生的后果。未來(lái)資源承諾的性質(zhì)的變化可能會(huì)采取不同的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)表現(xiàn)形式。</p><p>　　從并購(gòu)之后的角度來(lái)看，管理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的變化來(lái)自于兩個(gè)方面：(1) 在

73、當(dāng)前激烈的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)游戲中，所下的賭注的范圍越來(lái)越大(如一個(gè)重大的廣告活動(dòng))；(2)資源投入到風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更高新的競(jìng)技游戲或兩者兼而有之。</p><p>　　為什么收購(gòu)后的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)會(huì)增加？最初管理者為了增加從資源分配的決策中獲取高回報(bào)的機(jī)會(huì)采取高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的并購(gòu)整合計(jì)劃。但是要考慮到隨著收購(gòu)溢價(jià)的增加，管理者很可能會(huì)忽視他們的業(yè)績(jī)，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平是否隨時(shí)間而改變。</p><p>　　在任何情況下，一個(gè)理性的管理

74、者應(yīng)該評(píng)估一項(xiàng)決定未來(lái)現(xiàn)金流量的凈現(xiàn)值，而不是過(guò)去決策的影響。僅僅需要考慮是需要?jiǎng)冸x資產(chǎn)呢還是繼續(xù)持有。</p><p>　　大量的證據(jù)表明，管理者經(jīng)常會(huì)違反經(jīng)濟(jì)合理性假說(shuō)。這是有據(jù)可查的，在失敗的行動(dòng)中，管理者可能會(huì)給出一個(gè)升級(jí)的承諾。在此情況下，至少有兩種承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的突進(jìn)可以起到激勵(lì)作用。</p><p>　　自我辯解假說(shuō)是實(shí)現(xiàn)承諾升級(jí)現(xiàn)象的途徑之一。Brockner(1986)等人認(rèn)為

75、承諾現(xiàn)象至少在一定程度上是肯定的，“決策者通常不愿意承認(rèn)他們?yōu)榱诉x擇行動(dòng)策略而進(jìn)行事先分配資源的舉動(dòng)是徒勞的(自我辯解假說(shuō))” 管理者通常是不愿承認(rèn)失敗的，并會(huì)通過(guò)延長(zhǎng)時(shí)間來(lái)證明他們的決定最終是合理的。這個(gè)解釋與金融界上的管理傲慢理論很相似。該理論認(rèn)為管理者認(rèn)為他們是一定可以達(dá)到所要的報(bào)酬。還有一些研究認(rèn)為管理者在失敗的收購(gòu)中提升承諾會(huì)使得撤資的決定被嚴(yán)重推遲。</p><p>　　承諾升級(jí)理論也是從前景理論的觀

76、點(diǎn)演變而來(lái)前景理論認(rèn)為當(dāng)人們失敗時(shí)會(huì)采取帶有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的行動(dòng)，反而在成功時(shí)采取風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的態(tài)度，這就是經(jīng)典的賭徒心理。</p><p>　　收購(gòu)溢價(jià)為管理者提供了一個(gè)明確的目標(biāo)參考點(diǎn)。那么，當(dāng)管理者誤解了可能那些實(shí)際上不可能實(shí)現(xiàn)的戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)，并低于之前設(shè)定的目標(biāo)參考點(diǎn)產(chǎn)生損失時(shí)，他們可能采取更高的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)企圖破壞未來(lái)的這些目標(biāo)。就好像一個(gè)在賭場(chǎng)上賭輸?shù)馁€徒坐在酒桌旁，這無(wú)疑是會(huì)增加他的堵住的。考慮到保值的因素，管理者僅僅會(huì)認(rèn)為

77、采取高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的戰(zhàn)略是必需的。例如，在AT&T收購(gòu)NCR的案例中，并未實(shí)現(xiàn)并購(gòu)效應(yīng)，損失卻因此產(chǎn)生AT＆T在從未涉及的且沒(méi)有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的全新市場(chǎng)和領(lǐng)域中在銷售團(tuán)隊(duì)上花費(fèi)了數(shù)百萬(wàn)。</p><p>　　由于收購(gòu)的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)越高，無(wú)法事項(xiàng)戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)的可能性也就越大，同時(shí)，高溢價(jià)也會(huì)使承擔(dān)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)增加。</p><p>　　至今為止，關(guān)于并購(gòu)對(duì)于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響的研究相當(dāng)匱乏。Lubatkin、O’Neli

78、i (1987)，Chatterjee、Lubatkin (1990)發(fā)現(xiàn)，亦非相關(guān)合并相比，相關(guān)合并在降低單個(gè)投資者無(wú)法通過(guò)投資組合降低的系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)上更有用。然而，Chatterjee和Lubatkin認(rèn)為非相關(guān)合并有更高的絕對(duì)性水平的系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。和大多數(shù)有關(guān)并購(gòu)管理的文獻(xiàn)的觀點(diǎn)一樣，這一結(jié)果是不容置疑的。Seth (1990)發(fā)現(xiàn)任何一種類型的并購(gòu)都沒(méi)有顯著地降低系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，并得出結(jié)論減少測(cè)試并不是價(jià)值創(chuàng)造的來(lái)源。</p>