外文翻譯---歐洲、美國(guó)的跨國(guó)并購(gòu)經(jīng)驗(yàn)

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文1</b></p><p>　　Cross-border mergers and acquisitions:</p><p>　　the European–US experience</p><p>　　1. Facto

2、rs motivating cross-border acquisitions</p><p>　　In her extensive discussion of the merger and acquisition process McDonagh Bengtsson (1990) proposes that the following factors motivate many companies to acq

3、uire foreign firms: the desire to spread products and diversify risks geographically; to gain back-up products; to exploit synergies; and to attain economies of scale. However, she cautions that workforce problems, poor

4、facilities, as well as social and technological differences may expose the acquiring company to new risks. Other studies i</p><p>　　1.1. Favorable acquisition factors</p><p>　　Although there are

5、 a number of factors that favor acquisition activity, we focus on those that seem to affect cross-border acquisitions between the US and the EU. These factors include exchange rates, diversification, and economic conditi

6、ons in the home country, as well as technology and human resources.</p><p>　　1.1.1. Exchange rates</p><p>　　Current and forecasted future exchange rates affect the home currency equivalent of ac

7、quisition prices, as well as the present value of future cash flows accruing to the acquired firm; therefore, the dominant effect in any particular case is ultimately an empirical question. Existing studies, predictably,

8、 arrive at different conclusions concerning the role of exchange rates. For example, Froot and Stein (1991) propose that, while there is a relationship between the exchange rates and acquisition</p><p>　　1.1

9、.2. Diversification</p><p>　　This argument is based on the empirical observation that the covariance of returns across different economies, even within the same industries, is likely to be smaller than withi

10、n a single economy. It follows that the prospective acquiring company must first decide on its desired levels of risk and return. Only then should it attempt to identify countries, industries, and specific firms that fal

11、l within its risk class. In addition, by acquiring ongoing foreign concerns, companies may be able to </p><p>　　1.1.3. Economic conditions in the home country</p><p>　　Favorable cyclical conditi

12、ons in the acquiring firm’s home country should facilitate cross-border acquisitions as a means for increasing demand and levels of diversification. On the other hand, adverse economic conditions, such as a slump, recess

13、ion, or capital market constraints, may cause prospective acquiring firms to concentrate on their domestic business while postponing any international strategic moves.</p><p>　　1.1.4. Acquisition of technolo

14、gical and human resources</p><p>　　If a firm falls behind in the level of technological knowledge necessary to compete efficiently in its industry, and it is unable or unwilling to obtain the required techno

15、logy through research and development, then it may attempt to acquire a foreign firm which is technologically more advanced. In their study, Cebenoyan et al. (1992) support this point, showing that the expansion into new

16、 markets through acquisitions allows firms to gain competitive advantage from the possession of specialized </p><p>　　1.2. Unfavorable acquisition factors</p><p>　　The factors discussed thus far

17、 generally tend to encourage firms to make crossborder acquisitions. In contrast, there are other variables that often appear to restrain cross-border combinations. These include information asymmetry, monopolistic power

18、, as well as government restrictions and regulations.</p><p>　　1.2.1. Information asymmetry.</p><p>　　Roll (1986) contends that information about a prospective target firm (e.g. marketshare, sal

19、es, cash flow forecasts) is crucial in the decision-making process of an acquiring firm. If the necessary information is not available, Roll (1986) argues that the prospective acquiring firm may be forced to delay or dis

20、continue its plans, eventhough the foreign firm appears to be an attractive target. In contrast, Stoughton (1988) argues that information effects are not always harmful. He points out that</p><p>　　1.2.2. Mo

21、nopolistic power</p><p>　　If a firm enjoys monopolistic power (a difficult prospect in the US, due to antitrust laws), then entry into the industry becomes more difficult for potential competitors, domestic

22、or foreign. Moreover, a monopolist is much more likely to resist a takeover attempt. Other barriers to entry that make cross-border acquisitions especially difficult within a monopolistic environment include extensive ou

23、tlays for research and development, capital expenditures necessary to establish greenfield producti</p><p>　　1.2.3. Government restrictions and regulations</p><p>　　Most governments have some fo

24、rm of takeover regulations in place. In many instances, government approval is mandatory before an acquisition by a foreign firm can occur. In addition, there may exist government restrictions on capital repatriations, d

25、ividend payouts, intracompany interest payments, and other remittances. Scholes and Wolfson (1990) for example, discuss periods in the US where regulatory events discouraged acquisition activity; they cite the William’s

26、Amendments and the Tax Reform A</p><p>　　Author: R.J. Kish.</p><p>　　Nationality: Amarica</p><p>　　Originate form: Journal of Multinational Financial Management 1998(8) 434–43</p

27、><p><b>　　譯文1</b></p><p>　　歐洲、美國(guó)的跨國(guó)并購(gòu)經(jīng)驗(yàn)</p><p>　　1. 激勵(lì)跨國(guó)并購(gòu)的因素</p><p>　　McDonagh Bengtsson(1990)在關(guān)于合并和收購(gòu)過(guò)程的廣泛討論中，提出下列激勵(lì)很多公司收購(gòu)?fù)鈬?guó)公司的因素: 第一，傳播產(chǎn)品和地理上分散風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的愿望;第二，獲得支撐

28、的產(chǎn)品;第三，充分發(fā)揮協(xié)同作用,最后達(dá)到經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模。然而,她警告說(shuō),勞動(dòng)力問(wèn)題,設(shè)施問(wèn)題,還有社會(huì)和技術(shù)差異等等都可能暴露公司新的危機(jī)。在跨國(guó)并購(gòu)地區(qū)的其他的研究有助于形成收購(gòu)模式的幾個(gè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)因素,包括有利的與不利的。下面的討論調(diào)查的第一次檢查有利獲取變量（即變量出現(xiàn)影響該公司的有關(guān)跨境交易）的這些因素的取樣，然后是不利的因素取樣。我們要特別注意這些因素更直接關(guān)系到國(guó)家的。</p><p>　　1.1有利的并購(gòu)因素&

29、lt;/p><p>　　雖然有很多有利于并購(gòu)活動(dòng)的因素,我們把關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)放在那些可能影響美國(guó)和歐盟之間跨國(guó)并購(gòu)的那些因素。這些因素包括匯率、多元化、在自己國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展?fàn)顩r以及技術(shù)和人力資源等。</p><p><b>　　1.1.1匯率</b></p><p>　　目前和預(yù)測(cè)未來(lái)外匯匯率的影響本國(guó)貨幣相當(dāng)于收購(gòu)價(jià)格, 收購(gòu)公司應(yīng)累算的未來(lái)現(xiàn)金流量

30、的現(xiàn)值,因此,在任何一個(gè)特定情況的主導(dǎo)作用是實(shí)證研究的問(wèn)題。在現(xiàn)有研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,可以預(yù)料到關(guān)于匯率作用不同的結(jié)論。例如,Froot和Stein (1991)指出,盡管并購(gòu)活動(dòng)與匯率有一定的關(guān)系,但是根據(jù)他們?cè)诿绹?guó)的同行顯示，沒(méi)有證據(jù)能證明人民幣匯率的變動(dòng)能提高跨國(guó)收購(gòu)地位。他們聲稱,當(dāng)美元的貶值,我們變成任何一個(gè)國(guó)內(nèi)或是國(guó)外公司做生意更便宜的地方,。除此之外,他們淡化了跨國(guó)收購(gòu)和匯率制度之間的關(guān)系,認(rèn)為資本流動(dòng)的提高導(dǎo)致平等和貼現(xiàn)率

31、的國(guó)際投資回報(bào)。歌德堡(1993)卻有不同的結(jié)論。她發(fā)現(xiàn)美元的貶值降低了在美國(guó)的外商直接投資。她還認(rèn)為,相反的才是真理，那就是,如果美元強(qiáng)會(huì)增加外國(guó)公司收購(gòu)美國(guó)公司的活動(dòng)，美國(guó)公司收購(gòu)?fù)鈬?guó)公司則會(huì)呈現(xiàn)下降趨勢(shì)。然而, Harris和Ravenscraft(1991)提出了與Goldberg相反的實(shí)證證據(jù)。特別是,他們認(rèn)為美元貶值會(huì)增加外方收購(gòu)美國(guó)公司的數(shù)量。</p><p><b>　　1.1.2 多樣

32、化</b></p><p>　　這個(gè)爭(zhēng)論是基于實(shí)證的觀察, 在不同的經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境的哪怕同一個(gè)行業(yè)里，協(xié)方差的回報(bào)也可能是比在一個(gè)單一的經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境下小。它的意思是,潛在收購(gòu)的公司必須首先要確定其預(yù)期的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和回報(bào)。只有這樣它才能嘗試確定國(guó)家、行業(yè)、企業(yè)內(nèi)的特定風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。在通過(guò)獲取持續(xù)的外交關(guān)系,公司可以躲避關(guān)稅壁壘和非關(guān)稅壁壘,從而通過(guò)降低非系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的水平來(lái)提高他們的交易風(fēng)險(xiǎn)回報(bào)。</p><p

33、>　　1.1.3 本國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)條件</p><p>　　收購(gòu)公司在祖國(guó)擁有的良好的周期性條件應(yīng)該作為一種減少需求和降低多樣化水平的手段來(lái)促進(jìn)跨國(guó)并購(gòu)。另一方面,不良的經(jīng)濟(jì)條件,如在暴跌、經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退或資本市場(chǎng)約束的條件下,可能導(dǎo)致潛在收購(gòu)公司集中精力在他們國(guó)內(nèi)的業(yè)務(wù)而推遲任何國(guó)際戰(zhàn)略遷移。</p><p>　　1.1.4 并購(gòu)技術(shù)和人力資源的培養(yǎng)</p><p>　

34、　如果一個(gè)公司的有效競(jìng)爭(zhēng)所必要科技水平落后于其行業(yè)水平,而且它不能或不愿去獲取并發(fā)展它需要的技術(shù)和研究,那么它可能試圖并購(gòu)那些技術(shù)更加先進(jìn)的外國(guó)公司。在他們的研究中, Cebenoyan et al (1992)支持這個(gè)觀點(diǎn),即通過(guò)并購(gòu)?fù)卣剐率袌?chǎng)使公司能從獲得被并購(gòu)公司擁有的專門(mén)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)。</p><p>　　1．2 不利的并購(gòu)因素</p><p>　　到目前為止討論的因素，一般傾向于鼓

35、勵(lì)企業(yè)進(jìn)行跨境并購(gòu)。。相反,還有其他的變數(shù),經(jīng)常出現(xiàn)抑制跨境合并。這些包括信息不對(duì)稱、壟斷權(quán)力,以及政府約束和規(guī)則。</p><p>　　1.2.1 信息不對(duì)稱。</p><p>　　Roll (1986)認(rèn)為, 有關(guān)一個(gè)潛在目標(biāo)公司（如市場(chǎng)份額，銷售，現(xiàn)金流預(yù)測(cè)）的信息是并購(gòu)公司過(guò)程中至關(guān)重要的決策過(guò)程。如果必要的信息不可用,Rool(1986)認(rèn)為潛在的收購(gòu)公司可能會(huì)被迫延遲或中斷它的

36、計(jì)劃,盡管外國(guó)公司似乎是一個(gè)非常不錯(cuò)的目標(biāo)。相反, Stoughton (1988)則認(rèn)為信息效果不一定是有害的。他指出,潛在的收購(gòu)方可能可以獲取到目標(biāo)公司其它市場(chǎng)參與者不能獲取的信息。</p><p>　　1.2.2 壟斷力量</p><p>　　如果一個(gè)公司享有壟斷力量(一個(gè)困難的前景,因?yàn)榉赐欣狗ǚ?,那么潛在無(wú)論是國(guó)內(nèi)或國(guó)外的的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者要加入這個(gè)行業(yè)變得更難了。此外,壟斷者更抵制

37、收購(gòu)的企圖。在壟斷環(huán)境中的其他成為跨國(guó)并購(gòu)進(jìn)入的主要障礙包括廣泛研究與發(fā)展支出,建立綠地的生產(chǎn)設(shè)施、產(chǎn)品差異化通過(guò)大規(guī)模的廣告宣傳活動(dòng)等的資本必要支出。</p><p>　　1.2.3 政府約束和規(guī)則</p><p>　　大多數(shù)政府在地方有某種形式的收購(gòu)規(guī)則。在許多情況下，政府批準(zhǔn)之前，強(qiáng)制收購(gòu)?fù)鈬?guó)公司也可能發(fā)生。此外, 可能存在政府限制資本遣返，股息支出，公司內(nèi)部利息支付和其他匯款。以S

38、choles和Wolfson (1990)為例, 討論了在美國(guó)監(jiān)管活動(dòng)阻礙了并購(gòu)活動(dòng)期間，他們列舉了威廉的修正案，1969年稅收改革法案作為重要的法律和法規(guī)的變化，促成了在20世紀(jì)60年代并購(gòu)活動(dòng)明顯攤牌。此外, Scholes和Wolfson (1990)認(rèn)為在20世紀(jì)80年代美國(guó)稅法的改革有一個(gè)同樣的影響,因?yàn)檫@些變化增加了我們?cè)谑召?gòu)交易中成本包括賣方和國(guó)外買家。另一方面,Dewenter(1995)認(rèn)為她在化學(xué)和零售行業(yè)中的發(fā)現(xiàn)的

39、實(shí)證結(jié)果與Scholes和Wolfson的觀點(diǎn)相矛盾(1990)。她總結(jié)了她的發(fā)現(xiàn),美國(guó)在80年代的稅收政策的變化沒(méi)有對(duì)外國(guó)投資者并購(gòu)活動(dòng)的水平提供任何解釋說(shuō)明。然而,必須注意的是, 必須注意的是， Dewenter（1995年）只審查了在1978至1989年間約占16％的海外收購(gòu)活動(dòng)的兩個(gè)行業(yè)，而在從1968年到1987年的考察活動(dòng)中，Scholes和Wolfson（1990）在他們的</p><p><

40、b>　　作者：基什</b></p><p><b>　　國(guó)籍：美國(guó)</b></p><p>　　出處：《跨國(guó)公司財(cái)務(wù)管理》，第8卷，第四期，1998年11月，434-437</p><p><b>　　原文2</b></p><p>　　Mitigating risks in cr

41、oss-border acquisitions</p><p>　　In the past 20 years, the volume of cross-border acquisitions for corporate assets has increased nearly three times faster than the volume of domestic acquisitions. Compared

42、to domestic acquisitions, cross-border acquisitions present greater challenges for a buyer because of institutions and cultural values that are unfamiliar to a foreign corporation. Firms acquiring assets in a foreign cou

43、ntry may face different accounting practices and disclosure requirements, which hamper the due diligence p</p><p>　　Acquiring firms can reduce investment uncertainty by structuring the payments so they are c

44、ontingent on performance of the assets. This paper analyzes two alternative contingent payments.First, buyers can pay with stock, sharing the risk of the acquisition with the sellers as they will retain an equity positio

45、n in the acquirer. Second, acquiring firms can use earn out payments contingent on the performance of the assets being acquired (Kohers and Ang, 2000).</p><p>　　Buyers and sellers can operate assets together

46、 in an equity joint venture (JV) to improve the exchange of information on the quality of the assets. Nanda and Williamson (1995) describe several JVs that were conceived as a mechanism to exchange information conducive

47、to an eventual acquisition. In a sample of predominantly domestic JVs, Mantecon and Chatfield (2007) find that JVs can be mechanisms to transfer assets in the presence of valuation uncertainty. </p><p>　　The

48、 purpose of this article is to understand which of these mechanisms for reducing uncertainty is more beneficial to acquirers of cross-border corporate assets. I hypothesize that the use of earnouts and stock as a method

49、of payment and the formation of equity JVs conducive to acquisitions should be more valuable when investment uncertainty is more severe. This article contributes to the existing literature by testing this hypothesis in a

50、 sample of 30,783 acquisitions announced from 1985 to 200</p><p>　　The results show that the valuation effects to acquirers in cross-border deals depend on the information obtained about the assets before th

51、e acquisition. Buyers experienced large gains in the acquisition of assets that were operated in a JV, suggesting that acquirers profited from the information obtained while jointly operating the assets. I hypothesize th

52、at these gains should be positively associated with the degree of uncertainty being resolved. Consistent with this hypothesis, acquirers exp</p><p>　　Mechanisms to ameliorate investment risk in cross-border

53、acquisitions.Although the evidence on the valuation effects to acquirers of cross-border acquisitions remains inconclusive, these buyers face higher levels of uncertainty for several reasons. The due diligence process is

54、 complicated by different accounting and disclosure requirements. Assimilation of assets is also more difficult because of cultural differences that determine how business is conducted. In addition, legal systems with di

55、ffe</p><p>　　How can buyers reduce the uncertainty associated with crossborder acquisitions? Reuer (2005) suggests the use of contingent payments and operational relationships. The use of stock as currency c

56、an be a contractual tool to reduce investment risk because it has a contingent-pricing effect (Hansen, 1987). The target firm, accepting stock, signals positive information on the value of the acquirer and on the assets

57、being transferred. Buyers in turn signal their own quality as they prefer to use their</p><p>　　Acquiring firms can also reduce uncertainty by using earnout payments. Reuer et al. (2004) find that US firms u

58、se more contingent payouts when purchasing assets in high-tech and services industries for a sample of 3098 deals in the period 1995–1998. Kohers and Ang (2000) analyze 938 mergers with earnout payments. They report that

59、 earnouts facilitate the transactions in the presence of high information asymmetries.</p><p>　　Buyers face higher levels of uncertainty in cross-border acquisitions. This article contributes to the extant l

60、iterature by analyzing different mechanisms buyers can use to reduce investment uncertainty in a large sample of cross-border acquisitions of assets located in 128 countries. The results from this analysis indicate that

61、buyers experienced lower gains when the assets were located in a different country. The findings suggest that these inferior gains can be explained by more severe agency</p><p>　　Author: Tomas Mantecon</p

62、><p>　　Nationality: Amarica</p><p>　　Originate form: Journal of Banking & Finance,2009(33),640-641,650.</p><p><b>　　譯文2</b></p><p><b>　　跨國(guó)并購(gòu)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的緩解<

63、/b></p><p>　　在過(guò)去的20年中，企業(yè)資產(chǎn)的跨國(guó)收購(gòu)量比國(guó)內(nèi)并購(gòu)數(shù)量增加了近3倍。與國(guó)內(nèi)并購(gòu)相比，跨國(guó)并購(gòu)面臨一個(gè)更大的挑戰(zhàn) 由于買方對(duì)外國(guó)公司的機(jī)構(gòu)和文化價(jià)值觀不熟悉。公司并購(gòu)國(guó)外企業(yè)資產(chǎn)可能面對(duì)不同的會(huì)計(jì)方法和披露要求，這阻礙了盡職調(diào)查的過(guò)程。決定如何指定商業(yè)策略和經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)務(wù)的文化特殊性使得進(jìn)入買方內(nèi)部資產(chǎn)業(yè)務(wù)結(jié)構(gòu)更為復(fù)雜。收購(gòu)公司也可能會(huì)遇到不同產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)制度的法律，這一因素增加了未來(lái)現(xiàn)金流量

64、的不確定性。跨國(guó)并購(gòu)中更大程度的不確定性減少了作為交換的資產(chǎn)價(jià)值（阿克洛夫，1970；斯蒂格利茨，2000），并作為跨國(guó)并購(gòu)表現(xiàn)欠佳的解釋體現(xiàn)出來(lái)（Denis等人，2002年；Moeller和Schlingemann，2005）。 在這篇文章中，我會(huì)分析一些買家可以改善這些交易固有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的不同方案。這一分析重要性是讓那些希望在國(guó)外市場(chǎng)擴(kuò)大業(yè)務(wù)的企業(yè)理解最佳進(jìn)入策略。 </p><p>　　收購(gòu)公司調(diào)整投資結(jié)構(gòu)可以減

65、少不確定性，所以他們?nèi)Q于資產(chǎn)的績(jī)效。 本文分析了兩種可供選擇的有支出。第一，買家可以通過(guò)用股票支付與被并購(gòu)方同時(shí)分擔(dān)并購(gòu)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，因?yàn)檫@樣可以使并購(gòu)方和被并購(gòu)方在并購(gòu)活動(dòng)中保持同等風(fēng)險(xiǎn)地位。第二，企業(yè)可以對(duì)所并購(gòu)的資產(chǎn)進(jìn)行分期付款（Kohers和Ang，2000）。</p><p>　　買家和賣家可以在一個(gè)合資企業(yè)（JV）中將資產(chǎn)運(yùn)作聯(lián)合在一起，以提高資產(chǎn)信息交流的質(zhì)量。Nanda和Williamson (1995

66、)描述被看作是一種機(jī)制的合資企業(yè)有利于交流信息直至最終并購(gòu)購(gòu)。例子中，Mantecon和Chatfield（2007年）發(fā)現(xiàn)，國(guó)內(nèi)主要的合資企業(yè)，合資公司可以作為一種轉(zhuǎn)移資產(chǎn)估值存在的不確定性。</p><p>　　本文的目的是要了解哪些機(jī)制可以減少不確定性從而使得更為有利地行并購(gòu)境外合資企業(yè)。本人假設(shè)，當(dāng)投資更有價(jià)值的不確定性更加嚴(yán)重這種使用分期付款和股票作為支付方式和公平形成的合資企業(yè)投資應(yīng)該是有利于收購(gòu)，文

67、章從1985年到2005宣布收購(gòu)的30783個(gè)樣本示例有助于現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)的檢驗(yàn)這一假說(shuō)。這個(gè)樣本的收購(gòu)方來(lái)自75個(gè)國(guó)家，涉及6824個(gè)跨境的資產(chǎn)收購(gòu)的來(lái)自128個(gè)國(guó)家。</p><p>　　研究結(jié)果表明，并購(gòu)活動(dòng)中的估值影響取決于對(duì)獲得的信息資產(chǎn)收購(gòu)前。并購(gòu)方在該合資企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)資產(chǎn)中取得了巨大的收益，這表明并購(gòu)雙方在共同獲得信息去經(jīng)營(yíng)資產(chǎn)的并購(gòu)中獲利。筆者認(rèn)為，這些成果應(yīng)積極地與不確定性得到解決的程度聯(lián)系起來(lái)。根據(jù)這一

68、假說(shuō)，在合資企業(yè)中取得較大收益的并購(gòu)方所在的國(guó)家擁有較高水平的投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和更高水平的估值不確定性。這些結(jié)果表明，合資企業(yè)可以作為一個(gè)減少與跨界在嚴(yán)重的估值和收購(gòu)國(guó)家的投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)不確定性的過(guò)渡性使用機(jī)制。</p><p>　　改善投資機(jī)制跨境風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。雖然估值對(duì)跨國(guó)并購(gòu)者的影響的證據(jù)仍沒(méi)有定論，但是這使買家面對(duì)更高水平的不確定性。原因有以下幾個(gè)：盡職調(diào)查過(guò)程由于不同的會(huì)計(jì)和信息披露要求而變得復(fù)雜；資產(chǎn)同化也由于決定企業(yè)如何

69、經(jīng)營(yíng)的文化差異而變得更加困難； 此外，對(duì)少數(shù)股東不同級(jí)別的保護(hù)法律制度和強(qiáng)制合同執(zhí)行都增加了未來(lái)現(xiàn)金流量的難度值。</p><p>　　并購(gòu)者如何才能減少與跨境相關(guān)的不確定性收購(gòu)？ Reuer（2005）建議使用的分期付款和業(yè)務(wù)關(guān)系。作為貨幣使用的股票可以是一個(gè)合同工具來(lái)降低投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，因?yàn)樗幸粋€(gè)分期定價(jià)效應(yīng)（Hansen，1987）。目標(biāo)公司如果接受股票，并購(gòu)者和被并購(gòu)的資產(chǎn)表示看好。并購(gòu)者則相反，如果并購(gòu)者選

70、擇用股票收購(gòu)說(shuō)明他們高估了被收購(gòu)企業(yè)及其資產(chǎn)（邁爾斯和麥吉羅夫，1984）。因此，最終的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)對(duì)并購(gòu)中股票支付的使用取決于并購(gòu)方和目標(biāo)并購(gòu)企業(yè)的信息不對(duì)稱程度以及作為其相對(duì)的議價(jià)地位。</p><p>　　收購(gòu)公司也可以通過(guò)使用分期付款來(lái)減少并購(gòu)價(jià)格的不確定性。Reuer等發(fā)現(xiàn)，在1995-1998年期間的3098個(gè)樣本中，美國(guó)企業(yè)在購(gòu)買高科技資產(chǎn)和服務(wù)性領(lǐng)域的交易時(shí)更多使用分期付款。 Kohers 和Ang（

71、2000）分析938個(gè)并購(gòu)使用分期付款。他們認(rèn)為，分期付款為交易信息中存在較大不對(duì)稱性提供了便利。 </p><p>　　并購(gòu)者跨國(guó)的并購(gòu)中面對(duì)著更高水平的不確定性。本文通過(guò)分析現(xiàn)存的128個(gè)國(guó)家的資產(chǎn)跨國(guó)并購(gòu)樣本文獻(xiàn)有助于并購(gòu)者可以使用不同的機(jī)制，減少投資的不確定性。從這一分析的結(jié)果表明，當(dāng)并購(gòu)資產(chǎn)均位于在不同的國(guó)家時(shí)候，并購(gòu)者獲得較少的收益。研究結(jié)果表明，可以由跨國(guó)并購(gòu)的并購(gòu)者中存在的較嚴(yán)重的代理問(wèn)題來(lái)解釋這

72、些偏低的收益。結(jié)果表明，在跨國(guó)并購(gòu)中獲取較大收益的并購(gòu)是在一個(gè)共同經(jīng)營(yíng)資產(chǎn)收購(gòu)的合資企業(yè)中的。這些較大收益的收購(gòu)不能被解釋為是受上市的影響，或者由于合營(yíng)企業(yè)合同中嵌入看漲期權(quán)的存在，或通過(guò)對(duì)目標(biāo)公司小股東的剝奪。該研究結(jié)果顯示，分期付款與國(guó)內(nèi)并購(gòu)的較大收獲有直接關(guān)系，但沒(méi)有跡象表明在跨國(guó)并購(gòu)中并購(gòu)者受益于這些策略。結(jié)果表明，在合資企業(yè)所發(fā)生的信息交流提高了跨國(guó)并購(gòu)交易的價(jià)值，通過(guò)存在著的較高的不確定性、估值水平和國(guó)家投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)體現(xiàn)出來(lái)。因