經(jīng)理報酬激勵強度評價的研究.pdf

1、湖南大學(xué)碩士學(xué)位論文經(jīng)理報酬激勵強度評價的研究姓名：程瑞娟申請學(xué)位級別：碩士專業(yè)：會計學(xué)指導(dǎo)教師：徐莉萍20091001碩士學(xué)位論文AbstractUnderthefinancialcrisis，averagenetprofitofallListedcompanieshasfallen，butexecutivepaydidnotfallbutactuallyincreasedSopaydistancebetweenexecutivean

2、dworkersbecomemuchlargerTheGovernmentissuedanumberoflawsandregulationstoregulateexecutivecompensationbutitdidnotquantifythescopeofexecutivecompensation，andtherulesarelackofmaneuverabilityInthispaperwebuildaevaluationinde

3、xsystemofexecutivepaysoithelptheGovernmenttoformulatethestandardsregulatingexecutivecompensationFirst，weanalysizesthefactorsthataffectthestrengthofmanagercompensationSoastobuildthesystemofexecutivecompensationincentivein

4、dexWebuildtheevaluationsystemfromtwoaspects：efficiencyandequityTheefficiencyindexincludesperformancesensitivityofexecutivecompensation，firmsizesensitivityofexecutivecompensationTheequityindexincludetheratioofmanagersandw

5、orkerscompensationtheratioofareaaveragepayandexecutivecompensation，theratioofindustryaveragepayandmanagercompensationSecondlyweanalysisChina’smanagerscompensationbytheevaluationindex，theresultsisthatwedividedincentivecom

6、pensationintothreeparts：little，moderateandexcessiveweretestedthereasonsofthesimilaritiesanddifferencesWefindthatthemajorshareholdingsignificantlyinhibitthelackofcorporatemanagersincentivepaywhilethemanagerstimulateexcess

7、ivecorporatecompensationhadnosignificanteffect；Enterpriseswithinsufficientincentivesformanagersrelatedtostrongcorporateperformance，andcompanysizeweaklyrelated；corporatewithexcessiveexecutivehasaweakcorrelationtoperforman

8、ce，stronglycorrelatedwithcompanysize；boardsizeandcompositionhadnoimpactonexecutivepayinallcompaniesFinallyaccordingtopreviousresearchfindings，fromthemarket，governmentandenterpriseperspectives，wemakeanumberofrecommendatio