論感性認(rèn)識得以可能的條件——基于對科學(xué)實踐觀的一種解讀

1、中共上海市委黨校碩士學(xué)位論文論感性認(rèn)識得以可能的條件——基于對科學(xué)實踐觀的一種解讀姓名：韓旭申請學(xué)位級別：碩士專業(yè)：馬克思主義哲學(xué)指導(dǎo)教師：劉衛(wèi)平20100506IIABSTRACT This paper thinks that proving practice is the final condition of making consciousness possible and the real origin of m

2、otility of consciousness is the key point of presenting of scientific Marxist viewpoint of practice. Only in this way can we surpass the intuitive, commonsensible, mechanical materialism and the

3、 version of idealism that simply considers practice as implementation of idea. The key to this is to prove that practice is the final condition that makes perceptual knowledge possible. So, th

4、e paper begins with asking constantly the conditions that make perceptual knowledge possible to fundamentally analyze the process of cognition. By analyzing the fundamental condition— differentiation-

5、 bond— and perception judgment, the paper reveals it is through practice building up kinds of intellectual category to shape forms of sensible intuition and tend to universals to show out objects

6、 that cognition become possible . The expectation in practice directly shows the appearance of aware differentiation- bond. Here the development of forms of sensible intuition is connected directly

7、 with the formation of universal. It shows, in the development of differentiation- bond, objects gradually become cognitive objects in understanding. Universal shows what things mean to man. Perception is

8、 that subjects point into the meanings’side of universal through analogies between present sensuousness and the things’side of universal, which establishes expectations to decide what to do. Here t

9、hrough analyzing cognition oneself, we discover something beyond cognition that is practice and its physical, tool conditions. Next, the paper discusses the specific possibility that practice builds u

10、p kinds of intellectual category to shape forms of sensible intuition and to tend to universals. Having entered into a field about Jean Piaget’ s genetic epistemology，we discover there is a transi

11、tion from physical behavior to practice in our consciousness development process. Practice can only be essentially social practice featuring language. This kind of practice is root of qualitative differe

12、nce between animal psyche and human wisdom in the evolution of intelligence. In the end, the paper points out social practice featuring language is the human existing way , and the root of co

13、nsciousness and cognition, showing the possibility of a kind of practical existentialism. Reason begins with starting point of cognition, and its motility always originates from practical motility