貿(mào)易增長(zhǎng)與環(huán)境【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Trade，Growth，and the Environment</p><p>　　Material Source: Journal of Economic Literature，</p><

2、p>　　Vol.42,No.1,(Mar，2004)pp.7-71</p><p>　　Author: Brian R. Copeland and M. Scott Taylor</p><p>　　3. Trade Liberalization and the Environment </p><p>　　We now turn to the impact

3、of international trade on the environment. We draw the usual distinction between trade and growth: trade liberalization changes relative goods prices by opening up the economy to increased foreign competition, while grow

4、th increases endowments or improves technology at given external prices. </p><p>　　While this distinction is clear, it may not always be accurate. There is empirical evidence that trade liberalization also s

5、timulates economic growth, and at a theoretical level, trade can alter the rate of growth if it spurs innovation or factor accumulation. In addition, trade may also pave the way for labor and capital mobility and technol

6、ogy transfer. Hence, trade can set in motion forces that shift the production. </p><p>　　We first examine the effects of trade on the environment in a small open economy facing fixed world prices to emphasiz

7、e three major points. First, the effect of trade liberalization on the environment depends on a country's comparative advantage, which in turn depends on country characteristics. There is no reason to expect trade to

8、 have the same effect on all countries. Second, the effects of trade on the environment depend on whether environmental policy is rigid or instead responsive to chang</p><p>　　Trade Frictions. For modeling p

9、urposes, we need to be specific about the trade barriers that are being reduced. Some trade barriers (such as tariffs) generate revenue; others, such as distance, generate productive activities such as transportation to

10、overcome them; and yet others, such as bureaucratic delays and regulations simply create trading costs. We don't want to focus on the details of trade policy, but simply capture the effects of increased opportunities

11、 to trade. To do so we assume the</p><p>　　With iceberg costs, an importer who wants to receive one unit of X from the foreign country has to ship 1+ units because is lost in transport. Trade therefore cons

12、umes real resources, and the magnitude of trade frictions increase as rises. </p><p>　　Trading costs drive a wedge between the domestic and foreign price of a good. As before let p denote the world price of

13、 X, then the domestic price of X for an importing country is: </p><p><b>　　(24)</b></p><p>　　Conversely, if Home exports X, then to deliver a unit of X to a foreign market (where the

14、 price is p), a home exporter must send 1+ units, which are acquired locally at the domestic price. Hence the domestic price is lower than the foreign price: </p><p><b>　　(25)</b></p><

15、p>　　It is convenient for us to use to refer to the domestic price, but the reader should keep in mind that whether this price is above or below the world price depends on the country's comparative advantage. </

16、p><p>　　3.1 Rigid Policy </p><p>　　Fixed Emission Intensities. The effects of trade liberalization on the environment depend on the environmental policy regime. We start with a simple case where go

17、vernment policy holds the emission intensity of production fixed. This scenario is instructive because it simplifies the analysis by ruling out a technique effect, and may be a realistic approximation of policy in many c

18、ountries (at least in the short run) because much pollution regulation tends to target emissions intensities, rather t</p><p>　　Consider a country importing the dirty good X. The domestic price is initially

19、above the world price, and as trade barriers fall, the domestic relative price of X falls. As with growth, we can decompose the effects of trade liberalization into scale, composition and technique effects. This is illus

20、trated in figure 3. The production frontier (for a given emission intensity) is depicted in the top half of the diagram, and pollution is measured as a function of X in the bottom half. Starting with p</p><p&g

21、t;　　The scale effect is positive and tends to increase pollution. Trade increases production efficiency (measured at world prices), and this leads to more output, and hence more pollution. The composition effect is negat

22、ive, because protection is being removed from the polluting good, inducing producers to shift towards the clean good. In our simple model where only one good pollutes, the composition effect always dominates the scale ef

23、fect, because trade liberalization has an unambiguous effect on </p><p>　　If instead home exports X, then trade liberalization raises . Producers shift along the production frontier towards the dirty good. T

24、his both increases the scale of production and shifts the composition of output towards the polluting good: both the scale and composition effects reinforce each other and lead to an increase in pollution. </p>&l

25、t;p>　　In summary, with fixed emission intensities, the composition effect is critical in determining the effects of trade liberalization. Moreover, the sign of the composition effect is ultimately determined by a coun

26、try's comparative advantage. If a country has a comparative advantage in clean industries, then clean industries expand with trade; and conversely, if it has a comparative advantage in polluting industries, then dirt

27、y industries expand with trade. </p><p>　　Fixed Emission Permits. Now suppose the government uses a marketable emission permit system to regulate pollution, and that it does not adjust the supply of permit

28、s in response to changes in the trade regime. Earlier, we noted the equivalence of permit and tax systems as a method of implementing the first best. But if we hold policy instruments fixed in the face of shocks to the e

29、conomy, this equivalence breaks down.</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p><b>　　貿(mào)易增長(zhǎng)與環(huán)境</b></p><p>　　資料來源: 經(jīng)濟(jì)文學(xué)期刊，42卷.第一章（2004.5）7-71頁(yè)</p><p>　　作者：Brian R.

30、 Copeland and M. Scott Taylor</p><p>　　3．貿(mào)易自由化和環(huán)境</p><p>　　現(xiàn)在我們來看國(guó)際貿(mào)易對(duì)環(huán)境因素的影響。我們用一般貿(mào)易理論來區(qū)分貿(mào)易和發(fā)展；也就是說，貿(mào)易自由化的變化是由于開放經(jīng)濟(jì)改變了商品的價(jià)格進(jìn)而增加了國(guó)外競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，同時(shí)增加了捐助或提升了技術(shù)的外部?jī)r(jià)格。</p><p>　　雖然這區(qū)別非常明顯，但不可能很準(zhǔn)確

31、。有證據(jù)說明貿(mào)易自由化也刺激了經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)；從理論層面說，貿(mào)易自由化刺激了創(chuàng)新或增加了要素積累改變了貿(mào)易的增長(zhǎng)速度。再者，貿(mào)易也可以鋪平道路或回歸于勞動(dòng)、資本流動(dòng)和技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓。因此，貿(mào)易也能產(chǎn)生力量推動(dòng)生產(chǎn)邊界轉(zhuǎn)移。</p><p>　　我們首先研究在小型開放經(jīng)濟(jì)里貿(mào)易對(duì)環(huán)境的影響。面臨的固定價(jià)格強(qiáng)調(diào)了三個(gè)主要觀點(diǎn)。第一，貿(mào)易自由化對(duì)環(huán)境的影響根據(jù)一個(gè)國(guó)家的比較優(yōu)勢(shì)，而這也取決于國(guó)家的特征。沒有理由去期待所有國(guó)家會(huì)產(chǎn)生

32、相同的環(huán)境影響。第二，貿(mào)易的環(huán)境效應(yīng)取決于政策是否僵化或者引起的新的貿(mào)易體制和經(jīng)濟(jì)情況能否適應(yīng)經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境的變化。最后，貿(mào)易自由化的福利對(duì)一個(gè)國(guó)家的比較優(yōu)勢(shì)和它的政策、政權(quán)影響都很敏感。</p><p>　　我們從一個(gè)2區(qū)模型來了解兩個(gè)主要的假設(shè)，與國(guó)家特征相聯(lián)系從而得出環(huán)保成果：污染避難所的假說和要素稟賦論的假說。這就規(guī)定的審查階段我們回顧實(shí)證的工作。</p><p>　　貿(mào)易摩擦。我們需要

33、具體列出在我們的模型當(dāng)中正在被減少的貿(mào)易壁壘這是建模的目的。有很多不同類型的貿(mào)易壁壘。一些（如關(guān)稅）產(chǎn)生收入；其他國(guó)家，像距離產(chǎn)生的生產(chǎn)活動(dòng)，例如交通運(yùn)輸，必須克服它們；另一些，如官僚主義的拖延和法規(guī)簡(jiǎn)單的創(chuàng)造了貿(mào)易成本。就這一點(diǎn)而言，我們不想集中關(guān)注于貿(mào)易政策的細(xì)節(jié)，而以一種簡(jiǎn)單的方式去抓住貿(mào)易影響帶來的更多機(jī)會(huì)。為此，我們假設(shè)國(guó)家與國(guó)家之間有些貿(mào)易摩擦。我們采用了貿(mào)易成本的“冰山”模型。</p><p>　　

34、那就是，一個(gè)進(jìn)口商想要從外國(guó)收到一個(gè)單位的X必須裝運(yùn)單位因?yàn)橄г谶\(yùn)輸中。貿(mào)易因此消耗真正的資源，貿(mào)易摩擦?xí)员兜脑黾?。交易成本?qū)使國(guó)內(nèi)和國(guó)外價(jià)格在一個(gè)協(xié)調(diào)的邊緣。讓P代表世界價(jià)格X，然后國(guó)內(nèi)價(jià)格為X進(jìn)口國(guó)就是：</p><p>　　反之，如果國(guó)內(nèi)出口?，然后出口提供一單位?去國(guó)外市場(chǎng)?國(guó)外市場(chǎng)價(jià)格為P),國(guó)內(nèi)出口商必須發(fā)出1+?單位，在當(dāng)?shù)孬@得的國(guó)內(nèi)價(jià)格為。因此國(guó)內(nèi)價(jià)格低于國(guó)外價(jià)格：</p>&l

35、t;p>　　這會(huì)方便我們使用參考國(guó)內(nèi)價(jià)格，但是讀者必須保持清醒的頭腦就是價(jià)格高于或低于世界價(jià)格取決于國(guó)家的比較優(yōu)勢(shì)。</p><p><b>　　3.1嚴(yán)格的政策</b></p><p>　　固定的排放程度。貿(mào)易自由化對(duì)環(huán)境的影響取決于環(huán)境政策。我們從一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的分析開始，政府政策是持有固定的生產(chǎn)排放強(qiáng)度。這個(gè)內(nèi)容是有啟發(fā)的，因?yàn)樗?jiǎn)化了分析，排除了技術(shù)的影響，可

36、能在很多國(guó)家是接近最真實(shí)的相似政策（至少在短期內(nèi)）因?yàn)槲廴緱l例的規(guī)定傾向于目標(biāo)強(qiáng)度的排放，而不是總的排放量。并且，這種條例包括了無污染的特殊條例規(guī)定。</p><p>　　首先，思考一個(gè)國(guó)家進(jìn)口了骯臟物品?，國(guó)內(nèi)價(jià)格最初高于世界價(jià)格，以及隨著貿(mào)易摩擦的下降，國(guó)內(nèi)相對(duì)價(jià)格?也下降。隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長(zhǎng)，我們可以將貿(mào)易自由化的影響分解成規(guī)模效應(yīng)，結(jié)構(gòu)效應(yīng)和技術(shù)效應(yīng)。具體見圖?，生產(chǎn)邊界（對(duì)于給定的排放強(qiáng)度）圖中所示為圖的上

37、半部分，污染的測(cè)量以?分界在底部的下一半。生產(chǎn)商的價(jià)格為在A點(diǎn)，貿(mào)易自由化減少了國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)廠商的價(jià)格X到點(diǎn)，產(chǎn)量從A點(diǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移到C點(diǎn)，污染從Z0下降到了Z2。如果我們測(cè)量產(chǎn)量的規(guī)模，國(guó)際市場(chǎng)世界價(jià)格為p，然后假設(shè)沿著AB虛線向下移動(dòng)（斜率為p）保持規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)不變。這個(gè)污染程度的變化我們可以分解成結(jié)構(gòu)效應(yīng)（A到B），它降低了污染使它從Z0到Z1，規(guī)模效應(yīng)（B到C），它使污染程度從Z1上升到了Z2。如上所述，技術(shù)效應(yīng)在這個(gè)例子中沒有影響假設(shè)。<

38、;/p><p>　　規(guī)模效應(yīng)是積極的，會(huì)增加污染。貿(mào)易增加了生產(chǎn)效率（以世界價(jià)格為準(zhǔn)），這將導(dǎo)致更多的產(chǎn)出，因此導(dǎo)致更多的污染。結(jié)構(gòu)效應(yīng)的影響是否定的，因?yàn)楸Ｗo(hù)主義已被從污染商品中刪除，誘導(dǎo)生產(chǎn)商轉(zhuǎn)移到清潔商品。在我們簡(jiǎn)單模型中，其中只有一種商品的污染，結(jié)構(gòu)效應(yīng)總是支配著規(guī)模效應(yīng)，因?yàn)橘Q(mào)易自由化明確影響著污染產(chǎn)品的輸出。如果經(jīng)濟(jì)在清潔商品中具有比較優(yōu)勢(shì)，在這個(gè)例子中，貿(mào)易對(duì)環(huán)境的影響是有利的。</p>

39、<p>　　相反，如果國(guó)內(nèi)出口X，那么貿(mào)易自由化將增長(zhǎng)。生產(chǎn)者沿著生產(chǎn)邊界轉(zhuǎn)向骯臟物品。這既增加了生產(chǎn)的規(guī)模也使產(chǎn)品的構(gòu)成轉(zhuǎn)向了污染商品，規(guī)模效應(yīng)和結(jié)構(gòu)效應(yīng)相輔相成，并引起污染的增加。 </p><p>　　總之，在固定排放強(qiáng)度中，結(jié)構(gòu)效應(yīng)在確定貿(mào)易自由化影響中是至關(guān)重要的，此外，結(jié)構(gòu)效應(yīng)的最終決定是根據(jù)國(guó)家的比較優(yōu)勢(shì)，如果一個(gè)國(guó)家在干凈的行業(yè)擁有優(yōu)勢(shì)，那么清潔產(chǎn)業(yè)隨著貿(mào)易擴(kuò)大；相反，如果它在污染行業(yè)擁