外文翻譯--地方政府績(jī)效審計(jì)一項(xiàng)對(duì)芬蘭和挪威地方政府資金效益審計(jì)效率價(jià)值認(rèn)識(shí)的探索性研究

1、<p>　　4960漢字，2730單詞，15650英文字符</p><p>　　出處：Source：Age Johnsen，Pentti Meklin，Lasse Oulasvirta，Jarmo Vakkuri. Performance auditing in local government：an exploratory study of perceived efficiency of munici

2、pal value for money auditing in Finland and Norway[J].The European Accounting Review，2001，10(3)：583-599.</p><p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　

3、Performance auditing in local government: an exploratory study of perceived efficiency of municipal value for money auditing in Finland and Norway</p><p>　　Performance auditing, or value for money (VFM) audi

4、ting, has been a long-standing component of accountability in public administration. During the 1980s and 1990s performance auditing has allegedly been increasingly adopted in the new public management. While there has b

5、een much research on public management and performance auditing in central government, local government has been relatively neglected in the literature. Municipalities and counties in local government have an important r

6、ole in pu</p><p>　　The emphasis in this study is, first of all, on highlighting characteristics of performance auditing systems in practice. In what respects are auditing systems similar in different countri

7、es? How do they differ? Second, the study examines perceived efficiency in conducting performance audits. For example: What are the roles and functions of performance auditing in local government? Who are the users of pe

8、rformance audit products? Does performance audit information contribute to performance impro</p><p>　　Proposition 1. The auditees in the municipalities do not use performance audit reports.</p><p&

9、gt;　　Proposition 2. Performance audit reports are published but they are not used in the administrative or political processes in the municipalities.</p><p>　　Proposition 3. When used, performance audit repo

10、rts are used in performance measurement and evaluation of the auditee compared to other departments, services or municipalities.</p><p>　　This study is explorative and comparative. The focus of the analysis

11、is on performance auditing systems and practices, including performance measurement, that are used to assess and verify value for money in local government and to enhance the accountability of municipalities and counties

12、. The study examines the efficiency of performance auditing by asking nine informants (experts) how they used performance audit reports and how they perceived the efficiency of conducting performance audits. Adm</p>

13、;<p>　　In Finland, performance auditing is carried out by managers, internal auditors and by higher political bodies (municipal boards and the auditing committees) contracting auditing from private audit firms. In

14、 the Finnish case special attention must be devoted to the role of auditing committees in performance auditing. Therefore, the system of municipal auditing is briefly elaborated in the following. From the beginning of 19

15、97 the municipal auditing system was divided into two elements: a professi</p><p>　　In Norway both financial and performance auditing are mandatory by the municipal act, but only municipal auditors are allow

16、ed to produce municipal auditing. In 2000 there were about 1,000 persons employed in 100 municipal audit entities. All these audit entities were members in the Norwegian Municipal Audit Association. Only nine municipal a

17、uditors audited one municipality. Of the remaining auditors 73 were joint co-operations (district auditors) employed and financed by the municipalities invol</p><p>　　In Norway the first informant was the ch

18、ief administrative officer in one of the largest counties (more than 400,000 inhabitants). The second informant was the chief audit officer in one of the largest cities (over 200,000 inhabitants in the municipality). The

19、 third informant was the chief administrative officer in one of the larger municipalities (over 20,000 inhabitants in the municipality). For Norway the interviews were conducted in April and May 2000. In Finland six info

20、rmants were intervie</p><p>　　First of all, it can be clearly notified that all the informants considered performance auditing to be a useful activity. However, the informants emphasized more its value as a

21、management tool giving information for the future development of organizational activities than its value as a source of performance information for councillors. For instance, the chief administrative officer of health c

22、are pointed out that performance auditing gave useful information regarding the relationship between th</p><p>　　Are the evaluation reports used in Finnish municipalities? Who uses them? According to the inf

23、ormants, reports are used by the municipal management and political decision-makers. Evaluation information is used to develop management systems and to improve the quality of the next municipal budget plan. However, the

24、 use of reports in practical development work is still defective. The higher levels of management used the evaluation information more than other levels of the organization. The quality </p><p>　　As a matter

25、 of fact, the observations above are consistent with a recent research study of ten auditing committees in Finnish local governments (Huuskonen, 2000). There it was observed that in some small municipalities the informat

26、ion value of the evaluation reports was modest. The evaluation reports were also highly unstandardized both in terms of quantity and quality. In some small municipalities the reports may be only one or two pages long, gi

27、ving a judgement of the state of affairs, while i</p><p>　　The informants’ statements as well as other studies seem to explain some of the controversies in reporting and utilizing the reports for evaluating

28、the achievements of goals. Several auditing committees have criticized the budget plans of local municipalities for not including clear and measurable goals. This lack of measurable objectives is presumed to hinder effec

29、tive work of the auditing committees (Kallio et al., 2000). Indeed there are significant variations, for example, in the number of b</p><p>　　It can hardly be proposed that the evaluation work done by the au

30、diting committees (Vuorinen, 1999) even in the big municipalities satisfy the criteria of systematic evaluation or scientific research, which would be based on detailed data collection of inputs, outputs, results and imp

31、acts of activities that would then be connected with the goals and objectives decided by the council. As many informants stated, the auditing committees did not have enough resources for handling such a task. On the</

32、p><p>　　There was an unambiguous, positive attitude to performance audit among the three Norwegian informants. Performance audit was not regarded as an unnecessary mandatory task, but some instrumental task wit

33、h the purpose of improving the municipal management. In particular it was regarded as an important and efficient tool for control and reform of the public sector. Performance auditing was regarded as a part of a double-l

34、oop learning process. </p><p>　　The chief administrative officer of the county did, however, point to dysfunctions, which could reduce the chief administrative officer’s legitimacy. He, in this respect, spec

35、ifically mentioned the possibility of the council’s political opposition taking certain parts of the audit report out of context and maximizing the political gain from this, in particular with the active use of media. He

36、 furthermore held it as undesirable that the auditor’s report due to a clause in the municipal act , shou</p><p>　　Our informants estimated that 15–20% of the resources were used in performance auditing, but

37、 that 40–50% was desirable. Our finds are relatively similar to an earlier Norwegian study of desired and factual use of resources on performance auditing (Schwanitz, 1997). She reported results indicating that in 1995 o

38、nly 13% of the Norwegian municipal auditors’ resources were used in performance auditing. According to her survey the municipal auditors claimed that the desired level of performance audit</p><p>　　The perfo

39、rmance audit intended functions (the 3Es) were only partly achieved. The two chief administrative officers thought the main reason for this could be poorly performed audits, mainly due to lack of competence among the aud

40、itors. However, they both pointed out that there had been a noticeable improvement of the audits in later years. The informant from the municipal audit, on the other hand, thought that if the resources had been adequate

41、according to the audit tasks, the quality of the au</p><p>　　In so far as there were audit reports of good quality, these were, according to the two chief administrative officers, used actively. The county c

42、hief administrative officer had the strong impression that the reports first of all were used by the management leadership and by the politicians. Lower in the organizational hierarchy there was little interest in the wo

43、rk of the municipal auditor. He mentioned that poor quality of the audit reports could be a possible reason for this lack of interest </p><p>　　The municipal chief administrative officer pointed out that the

44、 marginal utility of performance audits most likely was larger than the marginal utility of traditional (financial) audit. With the use of sampling and the more recent development in audit information technology, this co

45、uld be likely. On our question if the performance audit was performed to the detriment of traditional (financial) audit, the informants answered that the resources were fixed. The extension of the scope of operation f<

46、;/p><p>　　It seems to be fair to conclude that performance auditing has specific instrumental functions in local government. Moreover, performance audit reports are used, albeit somewhat differently than might

47、have been expected, by the symbolic and decoupling propositions. Compared to financial statement auditing, performance auditing has a more conspicuous connection to both performance improvement and day-to-day management

48、processes in the municipalities and counties. Particularly, our third propositio</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　地方政府績(jī)效審計(jì)：一項(xiàng)對(duì)芬蘭和挪威地方政府資金效益審計(jì)效率價(jià)值認(rèn)識(shí)的探索性研究</p><p>　　績(jī)效審計(jì)，又稱資金效

49、益審計(jì)，已經(jīng)成為公共管理問責(zé)制的一個(gè)重要組成部分。在上世紀(jì)八九十年代，績(jī)效審計(jì)就開始被越來越多的運(yùn)用于公共管理項(xiàng)目。雖然已有大量針對(duì)中央政府的公共管理和績(jī)效審計(jì)的研究，但是針對(duì)地方政府部分的研究卻經(jīng)常被忽略。在大多數(shù)歐洲國(guó)家，縣級(jí)以下城市對(duì)公共部門的服務(wù)和生產(chǎn)起著重要作用。因此，地方政府績(jī)效審計(jì)是十分重要的，它應(yīng)該受到重視。本研究旨在填補(bǔ)地方政府績(jī)效審計(jì)這一空白。探究如何在這方面執(zhí)行績(jī)效審計(jì)，例如當(dāng)?shù)卣绾螌?duì)政府支出進(jìn)行評(píng)估和審核，從

50、而完善對(duì)當(dāng)?shù)卣目?jī)效計(jì)量問責(zé)制。本次分析研究的信息提供者是一些審計(jì)師和被審計(jì)方，他們對(duì)芬蘭和挪威的地方政府所開展的績(jī)效審計(jì)的效率展開討論，闡述他們對(duì)地方政府績(jī)效審計(jì)的理解。盡管績(jī)效審計(jì)報(bào)告的質(zhì)量會(huì)存在一些問題，但信息提供者認(rèn)為績(jī)效審計(jì)將成為地方政府公共管理中一個(gè)非常有用的工具。</p><p>　　這項(xiàng)研究要強(qiáng)調(diào)的是：第一，在實(shí)踐中突出績(jī)效審計(jì)系統(tǒng)的特點(diǎn)。在不同的國(guó)家審計(jì)制度有哪些方面相似？他們又有什么不同？第

51、二，研究探討績(jī)效審計(jì)效率的必要性。地方政府績(jī)效審計(jì)的作用和職能是什么？誰是績(jī)效審計(jì)產(chǎn)品的使用者？績(jī)效審計(jì)的信息是否有助于改善地方政府績(jī)效？在進(jìn)行績(jī)效審計(jì)時(shí)，存在不確定的審計(jì)意見和模糊的審計(jì)意見，因此，問題很多，我們確定了三個(gè)命題進(jìn)行研究，這些命題是建立在社會(huì)理論和新制度理論上的。</p><p>　　命題1：被審計(jì)方不用績(jī)效審計(jì)報(bào)告。</p><p>　　命題2：績(jī)效審計(jì)報(bào)告被公布但在地方

52、政府的行政管理過程中不被利用。</p><p>　　命題3：績(jī)效審計(jì)報(bào)告被用于對(duì)被審計(jì)方進(jìn)行績(jī)效計(jì)量和評(píng)估，多過用于其他部門和地方政府的服務(wù)。</p><p>　　這項(xiàng)研究是具有探索性和比較性的研究。研究分析的重點(diǎn)在于績(jī)效審計(jì)的系統(tǒng)和做法，包括當(dāng)?shù)卣畬?duì)用于政府經(jīng)費(fèi)開銷所進(jìn)行的評(píng)估和核查，加強(qiáng)對(duì)地方政府的績(jī)效計(jì)量的問責(zé)制。為了完成績(jī)效審計(jì)報(bào)告，我們通過詢問專家，了解他們?nèi)绾卫每?jī)效審計(jì)報(bào)告

53、，以及他們對(duì)進(jìn)行績(jī)效審計(jì)和他們關(guān)于績(jī)效審計(jì)效率的看法。我們不會(huì)采用專家的所有意見，因?yàn)樗麄冎荒艽硭麄冏约旱慕嵌?。我們從處于?jī)效審計(jì)核心領(lǐng)域或擁有豐富績(jī)效審計(jì)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的審計(jì)師和被審計(jì)方中迅速挑選了一批信息提供者。通過采訪和私聊的方式與信息提供者見面。這是探索性的一面。此外，我們描述了在芬蘭和挪威兩個(gè)國(guó)家的績(jī)效審計(jì)制度系統(tǒng)，以此體現(xiàn)了研究的比較性。通過這個(gè)研究設(shè)計(jì)，我們想了解到更多有關(guān)地方政府績(jī)效審計(jì)的理論和看法 (Eisenhardt，19

54、89)。我們不認(rèn)為我們研究的數(shù)據(jù)是可以權(quán)威表明芬蘭和挪威的情況。但是，我們的課題研究已經(jīng)探索到了績(jī)效審計(jì)在一個(gè)國(guó)家重要的政治核心環(huán)境下要如何運(yùn)用。事實(shí)上，這些研究的數(shù)據(jù)是可以運(yùn)用于這兩個(gè)國(guó)家以外的其他國(guó)家進(jìn)行研究。</p><p>　　在芬蘭，地方政府績(jī)效審計(jì)的開展，是由管理人員和更高級(jí)的政府機(jī)構(gòu)（政府議會(huì)和職業(yè)審計(jì)委員會(huì)）的內(nèi)部審計(jì)員承包給私人審計(jì)事務(wù)所進(jìn)行的。在芬蘭，必須特別注意的是職業(yè)審計(jì)委員會(huì)在績(jī)效審計(jì)中

55、扮演的角色。對(duì)地方審計(jì)系統(tǒng)的簡(jiǎn)要闡述如下。從1997年開始，地方審計(jì)系統(tǒng)被分為兩個(gè)部門：一個(gè)是專業(yè)的外部審計(jì)部門，一個(gè)是政府審計(jì)部門；政府機(jī)構(gòu)在進(jìn)行績(jī)效審計(jì)過程中，所有評(píng)估地方級(jí)財(cái)政報(bào)表和年度報(bào)告的外部審計(jì)師都必須通過公共部門審計(jì)師的專業(yè)認(rèn)證。這在立法的基礎(chǔ)上，由地方政府議會(huì)指定專業(yè)審計(jì)師的壟斷局面就被結(jié)束了。在當(dāng)?shù)貦C(jī)構(gòu)系統(tǒng)中，所有經(jīng)認(rèn)證的審計(jì)事務(wù)所和審計(jì)人員都可以通過競(jìng)標(biāo)的方式獲得地方政府的外部審計(jì)合同。還有一個(gè)重要的因素是審計(jì)委員會(huì)

56、及其績(jī)效審計(jì)工作。審計(jì)委員會(huì)在每個(gè)地方政府都是有義務(wù)需要履行的（無論是在地方政府還是聯(lián)合機(jī)構(gòu)）。它主要有三個(gè)職能：第一，當(dāng)?shù)卣耐獠繉徲?jì)由審計(jì)委員會(huì)組織。審計(jì)委員會(huì)除了組織和計(jì)劃自有工作，還要負(fù)責(zé)對(duì)已通過認(rèn)證的外部審計(jì)師進(jìn)行選拔。第二，所有的審計(jì)事項(xiàng)（包括外部審計(jì)報(bào)告），需要議會(huì)決策的都由審計(jì)委員會(huì)進(jìn)行安排。第三，有關(guān)地方政府預(yù)算，需要議會(huì)確定目標(biāo)和實(shí)現(xiàn)績(jī)效的特殊評(píng)估報(bào)告由審</p><p>　　在挪威，財(cái)政和

57、績(jī)效審計(jì)在地方政府中都具有強(qiáng)制性的作用，但只有從屬地方政府的審計(jì)師，才被允許進(jìn)行地方政府審計(jì)。在2000年，100個(gè)地方級(jí)審計(jì)單位，雇用約1000人從事審計(jì)工作。這些審計(jì)單位都是挪威地方政府審計(jì)協(xié)會(huì)的成員。每九個(gè)地方級(jí)審計(jì)師審核一個(gè)市級(jí)城市。剩下的73個(gè)審計(jì)師參與共同合作（跨區(qū)域?qū)徲?jì)）所涉及的市級(jí)政府財(cái)政，并且審計(jì)兩個(gè)或兩個(gè)以上的城市。最后剩下的18個(gè)實(shí)際從屬于縣級(jí)審計(jì)師。所有縣級(jí)的審計(jì)報(bào)告都要報(bào)告給市級(jí)或者縣級(jí)議會(huì)監(jiān)督委員會(huì)。<

58、/p><p>　　在挪威的研究采訪中，第一個(gè)被采訪的信息提供者曾是一個(gè)大城市（居民超過40萬）的主要行政官員。第二個(gè)被采訪的信息提供者曾是在一個(gè)大城市（居民超過20萬）擔(dān)任首席審計(jì)師。第三個(gè)被采訪信息提供者曾是一個(gè)較大城市(居民超過20000)擔(dān)任主要行政官員。我們對(duì)挪威的調(diào)查研究活動(dòng)分別在2000年的4月、5月進(jìn)行。而在芬蘭，我們?cè)L問了來自兩個(gè)大城市（約20萬居民）的六位信息提供者。調(diào)查研究活動(dòng)在2000年6月進(jìn)行

59、。從一個(gè)大城市來的消息提供者有財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān)，首席醫(yī)療行政官以及審計(jì)經(jīng)理。從其他城市來的消息提供者有審計(jì)經(jīng)理，財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān)，教育和文化活動(dòng)部門主任。</p><p>　　首先，所有的消息提供者都明確表示績(jī)效審計(jì)是一個(gè)十分有用的。這些消息提供者也強(qiáng)調(diào)道，績(jī)效審計(jì)作為管理工具，它為機(jī)構(gòu)活動(dòng)的未來發(fā)展提供信息的價(jià)值，要比它作為信息資源為政治家提供績(jī)效信息的的價(jià)值大很多。比如，一個(gè)醫(yī)療保健行政官員指出，績(jī)效審計(jì)在關(guān)于怎樣利用經(jīng)濟(jì)資

60、源對(duì)城市衛(wèi)生保健活動(dòng)的影響和關(guān)系方面，為他提供了非常有用的信息。</p><p>　　芬蘭市政府是否利用了這些績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)報(bào)告？如果不是，那又是誰利用了它們？信息提供者表示，其實(shí)報(bào)告是用于地方政府管理，被政治決策者所使用的。評(píng)估信息用于開發(fā)管理系統(tǒng)和提高下一個(gè)地方政府預(yù)算計(jì)劃的質(zhì)量，但事實(shí)上，報(bào)告在實(shí)際使用時(shí)存在缺陷。高層管理人員是評(píng)價(jià)信息的使用最多的階層，但對(duì)于他們來說評(píng)價(jià)報(bào)告的質(zhì)量總是不夠高。在目標(biāo)設(shè)定方面就存在

61、許多問題。有人認(rèn)為，缺乏審計(jì)報(bào)告標(biāo)準(zhǔn)體系，因此報(bào)告的信息使用起來很麻煩。也有人認(rèn)為，地方政府需要一種新的思維方式來支持績(jī)效審計(jì)，用于分析地方政府活動(dòng)。</p><p>　　事實(shí)上，以上的發(fā)現(xiàn)是與芬蘭地方政府和審計(jì)委員會(huì)有關(guān)。最近的一項(xiàng)研究意見和以上結(jié)論是一致的(Huuskonen，2000)。地方政府和審計(jì)委員會(huì)之間確實(shí)存在很大的分歧。例如，地方政府的大多數(shù)管理人員，習(xí)慣于先結(jié)合績(jī)效目標(biāo)，列出部門計(jì)劃，再與金錢預(yù)

62、算撥款項(xiàng)目掛鉤。而事實(shí)上，績(jī)效審計(jì)需要部門先列出計(jì)劃，才能制定績(jī)效目標(biāo)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)一些小城市的評(píng)價(jià)報(bào)告的績(jī)效信息價(jià)值是有限的，并不能達(dá)到管理人員預(yù)期的信息要求。無論在數(shù)量上還是質(zhì)量上，評(píng)估報(bào)告都非常不規(guī)范。這些報(bào)告可能只有一兩頁長(zhǎng)，讓人覺得很不可靠，像是審計(jì)人員在敷衍了事，但在大城市的報(bào)告則可能有二三十頁長(zhǎng)，審計(jì)人員會(huì)對(duì)審計(jì)目標(biāo)的結(jié)果進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)地評(píng)價(jià)服務(wù)。</p><p>　　信息提供者的陳述以及其他研究似乎對(duì)一些關(guān)

63、于績(jī)效審計(jì)報(bào)告和一些利用績(jī)效審計(jì)報(bào)告評(píng)價(jià)目標(biāo)成功案例的爭(zhēng)論進(jìn)行了解釋。審計(jì)委員會(huì)批評(píng)當(dāng)?shù)卣念A(yù)算計(jì)劃不明確，目標(biāo)不可衡量。這種不可衡量的目標(biāo)被假定為對(duì)審計(jì)委員會(huì)的工作效率造成了阻礙(Kallio et al.，2000)。實(shí)際上是有不同的，比如說，地方議會(huì)認(rèn)為對(duì)于結(jié)合績(jī)效目標(biāo)的金錢預(yù)算經(jīng)費(fèi)應(yīng)該和預(yù)算撥款項(xiàng)目掛鉤；被檢查到的績(jī)效目標(biāo)變化范圍從零（沒有明確的目標(biāo)）到超過200個(gè)相關(guān)聯(lián)的項(xiàng)目(Helin and Möttö

64、;nen，1999)。在此之后，有很多人認(rèn)為，地方政府只要在確定目標(biāo)時(shí)越明確，審計(jì)委員會(huì)對(duì)評(píng)價(jià)工作就越有信心 (Huuskonen，2000，與Kallio et al.有相似的看法，2000)。所以，不能說績(jī)效審計(jì)存在的問題都是因?yàn)榈胤秸娜狈δ繕?biāo)和目標(biāo)嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)性不足。相反，目標(biāo)的模糊(March，1978)是認(rèn)識(shí)和發(fā)展地方政府績(jī)效審計(jì)操作的一個(gè)重要方面。畢竟，審計(jì)不一定是一種結(jié)果，而主要是達(dá)到目的的手段。</p><

65、;p>　　即使在大城市，審計(jì)委員會(huì)進(jìn)行評(píng)估工作(Vuorinen，1999)也要基于有詳細(xì)的數(shù)據(jù)，這樣才能滿足系統(tǒng)的評(píng)價(jià)和科學(xué)的研究要求。評(píng)估活動(dòng)是與審計(jì)目標(biāo)以及議會(huì)的決定相關(guān)聯(lián)的。正如許多信息提供者指出，在審計(jì)委員會(huì)沒有足夠的資源進(jìn)行審計(jì)的時(shí)候，審計(jì)委員會(huì)可以指定由外部研究人員進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià)，或使用轄區(qū)內(nèi)已有的評(píng)價(jià)信息綜合起來進(jìn)行評(píng)估工作。</p><p>　　挪威的三個(gè)信息提供者對(duì)績(jī)效審計(jì)的態(tài)度非常樂觀。他們

66、認(rèn)為績(jī)效審計(jì)不應(yīng)當(dāng)被視為一個(gè)不必要的強(qiáng)制性工作，而是一個(gè)對(duì)提高地方政府管理目標(biāo)有幫助的工作。它更應(yīng)該被看作成一個(gè)用于控制和改革公共部門的重要且有效的工具，或是雙循環(huán)研究的一部分。</p><p>　　一個(gè)縣政主任也有提到績(jī)效審計(jì)不好的地方，就是可能會(huì)削弱行政管理人員的執(zhí)法權(quán)力。他特別提到了議會(huì)的政治反對(duì)派，可能會(huì)利用績(jī)效審計(jì)報(bào)告的某些部分?jǐn)嗾氯×x，然后利用媒體大肆宣傳，以便從中獲得最大的政治利益。他還指出，審計(jì)師

67、是要基于法律法規(guī)的基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行審計(jì)報(bào)告的，他們的工作必須報(bào)告給議會(huì)的控制委員會(huì)。有這種程序的存在，“矛盾對(duì)立互相監(jiān)督”的原則就被破壞了。通過這個(gè)例子可以看出，在出具報(bào)告之前，了解這個(gè)程序的相關(guān)人員，必須協(xié)調(diào)好雙方的關(guān)系，以保證整個(gè)審計(jì)報(bào)告的公正性和獨(dú)立性。</p><p>　　我們的信息提供者預(yù)計(jì)地方政府人力物力資源的15-20%將被用于績(jī)效審計(jì)，理論上應(yīng)該達(dá)到資源的40-50%。這個(gè)預(yù)計(jì)與早期關(guān)于挪威對(duì)績(jī)效審計(jì)需

68、要的資源和使用的情況的研究結(jié)果相類似(Schwanitz，1997)。當(dāng)時(shí)報(bào)告的結(jié)果表明，1995年挪威地方政府審計(jì)人員的資源僅有13%用于績(jī)效審計(jì)。根據(jù)她的調(diào)查，地方政府人員對(duì)績(jī)效審計(jì)的期望水平應(yīng)是資源總量的30%。</p><p>　　績(jī)效審計(jì)預(yù)定的職能(the 3Es)只實(shí)現(xiàn)了一部分。有行政人員認(rèn)為導(dǎo)致審計(jì)表現(xiàn)欠佳的主要原因，是由于審計(jì)人員的能力不足。但是，他們認(rèn)為，之后的幾年里，審計(jì)工作會(huì)有明顯的改善。另

69、一方面，有人認(rèn)為只要有足夠的完成審計(jì)任務(wù)的資源，審計(jì)質(zhì)量就會(huì)很高。地方政府審計(jì)歷來傾向于“檢察書”，對(duì)于政府的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)總是視而不見，也沒有相應(yīng)的處理步驟。為了提高績(jī)效審計(jì)，地方政府審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)招募了在傳統(tǒng)審計(jì)領(lǐng)域有豐富經(jīng)驗(yàn)的或者受過審計(jì)專業(yè)系統(tǒng)教育的人員參與工作。本次招募的目的，是通過建立審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)框架，整合審計(jì)人員與審計(jì)部門的資源，從而加強(qiáng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)能力。這似乎也是為改變和提高審計(jì)人員的素質(zhì)所采取的有效措施。有地方政府行政官員提到，他所在的轄區(qū)已經(jīng)開

70、始和附近的四個(gè)轄區(qū)聯(lián)合建立跨區(qū)域合作，恰恰因?yàn)檫@個(gè)工作使得績(jī)效審計(jì)的質(zhì)量得到了提高。此人還介紹了一個(gè)不成功的護(hù)理服務(wù)績(jī)效審計(jì)項(xiàng)目。這個(gè)審計(jì)案例失敗的原因在于在一些審計(jì)方法上存在問題，而且審計(jì)項(xiàng)目的審計(jì)結(jié)論被夸大了。</p><p>　　根據(jù)兩位信息提供者的說法：只有質(zhì)量好的審計(jì)報(bào)告才會(huì)被利用。讓這兩個(gè)信息提供者印象深刻的是，報(bào)告首先是被處于管理層的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)和政治家所使用的。在組織結(jié)構(gòu)中級(jí)別較低的官員，對(duì)地方政府審計(jì)的

71、工作并沒有太多的熱情。他提到，審計(jì)報(bào)告質(zhì)量差，可能是造成人員對(duì)政府審計(jì)工作沒有興趣的原因。另一方面，一位市政行政人員強(qiáng)烈認(rèn)為這些審計(jì)報(bào)告在整個(gè)組織的哪些地方是有用，非常重要。有一種傾向表明，高層管理人員對(duì)審計(jì)報(bào)告的使用是最頻繁的?？?jī)效審計(jì)中的信息都是服務(wù)于決策者和被審計(jì)方的。而這些人便是同屬于高層管理人員這一個(gè)使用報(bào)告的人群。</p><p>　　有人指出，績(jī)效審計(jì)的邊際效用極有可能比傳統(tǒng)的（財(cái)務(wù)）審計(jì)邊際效用要

72、大。隨著審計(jì)抽樣和近期發(fā)展出來的審計(jì)信息技術(shù)的使用，這是極有可能的。在我們看來，績(jī)效審計(jì)可能會(huì)破壞傳統(tǒng)（財(cái)務(wù)）審計(jì)，但信息提供者認(rèn)為資源是可以利用的。審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)的經(jīng)營(yíng)范圍從主要的財(cái)務(wù)審計(jì)延伸到了同時(shí)進(jìn)行績(jī)效審計(jì)，導(dǎo)致了對(duì)金融審計(jì)的重視減少。對(duì)于這一點(diǎn)，有人補(bǔ)充道，目前的形勢(shì)要求創(chuàng)新，需要產(chǎn)生能代表有關(guān)審計(jì)師工作的效益，效率，工作組織和管理審計(jì)師的新思路。這樣，地方政府審計(jì)師亦可以提高他們的績(jī)效方法。</p><p>

73、;　　這似乎可以公正的得出結(jié)論，績(jī)效審計(jì)是當(dāng)?shù)卣哂刑囟üδ艿墓ぞ?。更多地，?jī)效審計(jì)報(bào)告在被利用的時(shí)候，由于脫離了大眾對(duì)它的想象，因此多出了許多不同的設(shè)想。與財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表審計(jì)相比較，績(jī)效審計(jì)對(duì)地方政府在提高績(jī)效和日常管理績(jī)效程序中有著較為突出的表現(xiàn)。特別是，我們的第三個(gè)命題，是支持我們研究結(jié)果的強(qiáng)力保障。我們利用了數(shù)據(jù)對(duì)重要的管理目標(biāo)做出了判斷，并且突出了私人會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所在芬蘭地方政府審計(jì)領(lǐng)域的位置，這似乎說明績(jī)效審計(jì)在芬蘭相對(duì)形成了管理

74、顧問公司之風(fēng)。而在挪威，特別是在清算過程中，被審計(jì)方的參與程度低，審計(jì)師進(jìn)行績(jī)效審計(jì)的情況較芬蘭相比，似乎更傾向于會(huì)計(jì)師的風(fēng)格。</p><p>　　資料來源：艾及·約翰森，潘提·邁克林，拉瑟·歐拉斯維塔，亞莫·維庫瑞. 地方政府績(jī)效審計(jì)：一項(xiàng)對(duì)芬蘭和挪威地方政府資金效益審計(jì)效率價(jià)值認(rèn)識(shí)的探索性研究[J].歐洲會(huì)計(jì)評(píng)論，2001，10(3)：583-599.</p&g