工程管理畢業(yè)設(shè)計外文翻譯--政治制度建設(shè)，制度建設(shè)

1、<p><b>　　本科畢業(yè)設(shè)計</b></p><p><b>　　外文文獻及譯文</b></p><p>　　文獻、資料題目： URBAN RENEWAL POLICY IN CHICAGO </p><p>　　文獻、資料來源：期刊Journal of Urban Affairs 第31期</p>

2、;<p>　　文獻、資料發(fā)表（出版）日期：2000.8</p><p>　　院 （部）： 管理工程學(xué)院</p><p>　　專 業(yè)： 工程管理</p><p>　　班 級： 工管081</p><p>　　姓 名： 李洪硯</p><p>　　學(xué) 號： 2008021014<

3、/p><p><b>　　指導(dǎo)教師： 亓霞</b></p><p>　　翻譯日期：2012.6.3</p><p><b>　　外文文獻：　</b></p><p>　　Advanced Encryption Standard</p><p>　　REGIME BUILDING,

4、 INSTITUTION BUILDING:</p><p>　　URBAN RENEWAL POLICY IN CHICAGO,</p><p><b>　　1946–1962</b></p><p><b>　　JOEL RAST</b></p><p>　　University of Wisc

5、onsin-Milwaukee</p><p>　　ABSTRACT:Urban regime analysis emphasizes the role of coalition building in creating a capacity</p><p>　　to govern in cities. Through a case study of urban renewal poli

6、cy in postwar Chicago, this article</p><p>　　considers the role played by political institutions. Conceptualizing this historical period as one</p><p>　　of regime building, I show how existing p

7、olitical institutions were out of sync with the city’s new</p><p>　　governing agenda of urban renewal and redevelopment following World War II. Creating a capacity</p><p>　　to govern in urban re

8、newal policy required both coalition building and a fundamental reworking of</p><p>　　formal governing institutions.</p><p>　　It was spring 1964, and Chicago was in the midst of its greatest con

9、struction boom since therebuilding effort following the Great Chicago Fire of 1871. In the third of a series of articles on Chicago’s postwar revitalization, the Chicago Tribune celebrated the accomplishments of the past

10、 10 years: more than six million square feet of new office space constructed downtown; nearly 1,000 acres of “blighted” land cleared for new development; a total of 27 urban renewal projects completed, under way,</p&g

11、t;<p>　　The accomplishments of Chicago’s urban renewal program during Mayor Daley’s first decadein office are all the more remarkable when examined alongside the record of his predecessor as mayor, Martin H. Kenne

12、lly. Plans for urban renewal in Chicago, orchestrated largely by business leaders, were under way when Kennelly was elected mayor in 1947. Kennelly enthusiasticallyembraced the business community’s redevelopment agenda a

13、nd eagerly sought federal funding forslum clearance and public housing. How</p><p>　　How was Chicago’s urban renewal program transformed from its origins as a weak andconflict-ridden initiative into the poli

14、tical and economic steamroller it ultimately became underthe leadership of Richard J. Daley? Scholars of urban political development have identified thepost-World War II era as a period of regime building (Cummings, 1988

15、; DeLeon, 1992; Ferman,1996; Levine, 1989; Mollenkopf, 1983; Spragia, 1989; Stone, 1989). In what Robert Salisbury(1964) called “the new convergence of power,</p><p>　　Ac-cording to urban regime theorists, t

16、he success of postwar redevelopment efforts was determinedmore by the strength and cohesiveness of such coalitions—or “regimes”—than by the formalpowers of local government (Stone, 1989; Stone & Sanders, 1987). Effec

17、tive governance in de-velopment policy was achieved when resources controlled by government and nongovernmentalactors (mainly business) were deployed around a shared agenda. What mattered most, in otherwords, was not the

18、 formal machinery of loca</p><p>　　While a focus on informal governing arrangements—in particular, the mobilization of resourcesthrough regime building—explains much about how governing capacity was created

19、in postwarcities, informal arrangements are not the whole story. As Skocpol (1992) has argued, policyoutcomes are determined in part by the “fit” between the goals of politically active groups and existing political inst

20、itutions. Governing institutions serve as “staging grounds” or “rules of thegame” for political action, favo</p><p>　　The overall structure of political institutions provides access and leverage to some grou

21、psand alliances, thus encouraging and rewarding their efforts to shape government policies,while simultaneously denying access and leverage to other groups and alliances . . . . Thismeans that the degree of success that

22、any politically active group or movement achieves isinfluenced not just by the self-consciousness and “resource mobilization” of that social forceitself.</p><p>　　In general, the governing institutions of ci

23、ties immediately following World War II were ill-suited to the task of large-scale redevelopment. Urban renewal and redevelopment required strongexecutive leadership and centralized planning and development authority. In

24、 many cases, however,the powers of city government were highly fragmented. Political machines, while typically indecline, were still a significant presence in many cities, dispersing power among ward bosses(Teaford, 1990

25、). Even in nonma</p><p>　　Urban regime theorists examining development politics in postwar cities have paid scant atten-tion to such institutional shortcomings. However, the architects of postwar urban redev

26、elopmentwere clearly aware of them. In cities across the country, regime building was accompanied byefforts to reorganize city government and create new governing institutions more conducive tothe new redevelopment agend

27、a. In Philadelphia, New York, St. Louis, Boston, Chicago, and else-where, new city charters, charte</p><p>　　While the focus of this study is on regime building in postwar Chicago, Chicago’s urban re-newal e

28、xperience provides lessons for modern-day reformers as well. Episodes of regime buildingare conceptualized here as politically contingent periods in which the breakdown of old alliancesand governing agendas has yet to be

29、 followed by the consolidation of new governing arrange-ments. The evidence from Chicago suggests that proponents of regime change in contemporarycities should consider more carefull</p><p>　　REGIME BUILDING

30、 FOR URBAN RENEWAL</p><p>　　Following World War II, Chicago faced challenges similar to those of other cities around thecountry. Middle-class residents were moving to the suburbs in growing numbers, leaving

31、behinda population that was increasingly poor and non-white. A semicircle of substandard housing and businesses covering roughly 15,000 acres extended outward several miles from the centralbusiness district (MHPC, 1946a)

32、. Property values were falling in many areas of the city, includingdowntown Chicago. </p><p>　　From 1939 to 1947, the assessed valuation of property in the central businessdistrict fell from $552 million

33、to $481 million, a drop of 13% (Teaford, 1990, p. 19).Downtown business leaders, alarmed about the implications of these trends for their corporateproperty holdings, took the lead in developing an action plan to address

34、the growing crisis. Themost influential business organization at the time was the Metropolitan Housing and PlanningCouncil (MHPC), an organization founded in 1934 to provi</p><p>　　In 1946, MHPC released a r

35、eport containing a strategy for urban renewal that would ultimatelybe embraced by both city and state policymakers (MHPC, 1946a).2According to the report,Chicago’s problems stemmed, above all, from the unchecked growth o

36、f blight. To reverse the tide,government would have to take steps to make inner-city locations attractive once again to privatenvestors. MHPC proposed that a public agency with eminent domain powers be charged withassemb

37、ling parcels of land in inner-city</p><p>　　During the following months, Milton Mumford, Holman Pettibone, and other members ofMHPC’s inner circle worked with Republican Governor Dwight Green and Democratic

38、MayorMartin Kennelly to secure bipartisan support for state urban renewal legislation (Hirsch, 1998).</p><p>　　These efforts culminated in the passage of two bills, the Blighted Areas Redevelopment Actand th

39、e Relocation Act, in July 1947. The bills, which extended eminent domain powers toslum clearance projects and provided state funding for slum clearance and public housing,substantially embodied the program for urban rene

40、wal unveiled by MHPC less than a yearearlier.MHPC’s efforts received a boost with the election of Martin Kennelly as mayor in 1947.Chicago had been governed since the early 1930s by a </p><p>　　In the nation

41、al electionsof 1946, half of the Chicago area’s congressional seats were won by Republicans (O’Malley,1980). To preempt the growing reform wave, leaders of the city’s Democratic organization choseKennelly as the party’s

42、nominee for mayor. A successful business executive with no previous ties to the machine, Kennelly was appealing to reformers. However, as the machine’s candidate formayor with no political base of his own, he had little

43、political leverage to assert his independencefr</p><p>　　While progress on urban redevelopment during the early postwar years was heartening tocivic leaders and other proponents of urban renewal, problems so

44、on began to surface. Landassembly, slum clearance, and public housing construction were all taking much longer thanoriginally expected, in some cases placing the completion of projects in jeopardy. The crux of theproblem

45、, most civic leaders agreed, was the fragmentation of the city’s administrative powers,which posed a barrier to quick, decisive ac</p><p>　　A second and related problem was posed by the weakness of the execu

46、tive branch of citygovernment. Formally speaking, Chicago was a council-governed city. City council held thepower of approval over mayoral appointments, it prescribed the duties and powers of most city</p><p&g

47、t;　　officers, and it could create new city departments and agencies at will. It also exercised variousadministrative powers, including preparation of the city budget, awarding of city contracts, andapproval of zoning var

48、iances. For urban renewal projects, council approval was required fordesignation of project areas, site plans, the terms of sale of city-owned land to developers,rezonings, and street closings (Chicago City Council, 1953

49、). A council majority could blockvirtually any action by the may</p><p>　　As a comprehensive program for urban redevelopment, urban renewal policy required a city-wide perspective on the part of local govern

50、ment officials. However, aldermen were frequentlyindifferent to planning and development issues that did not directly concern their wards.4In situ-ations where their wards were affected, the needs of ward constituents ty

51、pically came first. If anurban renewal or public housing project was opposed by a substantial number of ward residents,the alderman representing th</p><p>　　Planscalled for the construction of 1,400 new hous

52、ing units on the site. While the project received the endorsement of Mayor Kennelly and strong backing from the city’s business leadership, it wascontroversial. More than 2,000 families currently living in the area would

53、 have to be relocated(Buck, 1949). In addition, the developer, New York Life Insurance Co., insisted on the closureof a four-block stretch of Cottage Grove Avenue, a major South Side arterial that bisected theproject foo

54、tprint.The</p><p>　　GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION: PHASE I</p><p>　　By the early 1950s, urban renewal advocates in Chicago had identified the fragmentation ofthe city’s urban renewal powers as a pri

55、ncipal cause of Chicago’s sluggish redevelopment efforts.As one civic group put it, “It is obvious that Chicago has too many agencies working on differentsegments of its housing problem, and that this creates pointless r

56、ivalries, overall administrativeinefficiency, excessive costs and public confusion” (Citizens Committee to Fight Slums, 1954,p. 23).</p><p>　　In 1951, the city council Committee on Housing commissioned a stu

57、dy of the organization andadministration of the city’s urban redevelopment program. The study was initiated by committeechairman Robert Merriam, a reform alderman from Hyde Park who had served as MHPC’sdirector from 1946

58、 to 1947. Released in July 1952, the study reaffirmed what MHPC andother urban renewal proponents had been arguing for several years: Chicago’s “bewildering”administrative organizational structure had created a situ</

59、p><p>　　The study’s principal recommendation was the creation of a new cityDepartment of Redevelopment and Housing, which would assume the duties of the HousingAuthority, the Land Clearance Commission, and seve

60、ral other existing urban renewal agencies,all of which would be abolished.7</p><p>　　Response to the report was less than enthusiastic. During the housing committee’s first day ofhearings on the report, repr

61、esentatives from the Housing Authority and other affected agenciesrepeatedly criticized the study findings, prompting one committee staff member to suggest thatnongovernmental groups be invited to testify at subsequent h

62、earings (Siegel, 1952). As thisindividual observed, “As long as the recommendation of the report involves the doing away withexisting agencies and the transfe</p><p>　　Yet civic groups responded cautiously t

63、o the report as well. In a letter to the council’s housingcommittee, the chair of MHPC’s newly formed committee on administrative reorganization rec-ommended a gradual approach to administrative change (Pois, 1953). The

64、proposal was “a fineplan in theory, but utterly dangerous to attempt at this time” because of the control city councilwould exercise over the proposed new department (MHPC, 1952a). To be successful, adminis-trative reorg

65、anization would have </p><p>　　Such an effort was, in fact, under way and gaining momentum at the time. In 1952, a reformgroup calling itself the Citizens of Greater Chicago launched an initiative to produce

66、 a new citycharter for Chicago (Chicago Tribune, 1953a). Under the organization’s proposed charter reformbill, administrative functions exercised by city council, such as preparation of the city budget,would be transferr

67、ed to the mayor’s office (Chicago Tribune, 1953b). In addition, the size ofcity council would be reduced</p><p>　　Business leaders were largely supportive of the Citizens of Greater Chicago. MHPC, whichviewe

68、d charter reform as a necessary prerequisite for consolidation of the city’s urban renewalagencies, quickly developed a partnership with the organization (MHPC, 1952a,b).8In June 1953,the MHPC Board of Governors voted to

69、 endorse the organization’s charter reform bill (MHPC,1953). Despite the backing of the city’s business leadership, however, charter reform faced anuphill battle in the state legislature.</p><p>　　While char

70、ter reform was being debated, Mayor Kennelly took steps of his own to reorganizecity government. Concerned that the Citizens of Greater Chicago was “moving too rapidly” in itsefforts to obtain a new charter for the city,

71、 Kennelly appointed a 15-member Home Rule Com-mission to study the organization of city government and provide recommendations for reform(Chicago Tribune, 1953f).10The commission, chaired by Chicago Association of Commer

72、ce andIndustry director Leverett Lyon, issued its </p><p>　　The recommendations of the Home Rule Commission were enthusiastically endorsed by thecity’s major newspapers and top businessorganizations (Chicago

73、 Tribune, 1954, 1955a). How-ever, as the city’s experience with charter reform a year earlier had shown,assembling legislativemajorities around government reorganization in Chicago would be difficult without the cooper-a

74、tion of the city’s Democratic Party regulars. Initiatives that served to strengthen the powers ofthe mayor seemed unlikely to attract</p><p>　　By 1954, urban renewal in Chicago had reached an impasse. At thi

75、s juncture, the fit between thecity’s administrative structures and the goals of urban renewal stakeholders favored defenders ofthe status quo, providing multiple points of leverage for neighborhood residents, ward polit

76、icians,and other urban renewal opponents to delay and obstruct renewal efforts. For redevelopment tooccur at the speed and scale envisioned by the city’s regime builders, institution building wasnecessary. The powers<

77、/p><p>　　GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION: PHASE II</p><p>　　By the end of Martin Kennelly’s second term as mayor of Chicago, the city’s Democratic Partywas once again on solid footing. Kennelly had serve

78、d his purpose by restoring the machine’scredibility with voters and was now viewed by the party’s inner circle more as a liability thanan asset (O’Malley, 1980). Given his political weakness, party leaders never expected

79、 the mayorto seriously pursue reform, and Kennelly largely obliged. However, in certain areas, such ascivil service appointments, he asse</p><p>　　During his first year in office, Daley also took steps to co

80、nsolidate the city’s planning powersin the mayor’s office. Since 1909, the city’s principal planning body had been the ChicagoPlan Commission, an advisory body whose 35 members served without pay. Dependent on citycounci

81、l for its budget and for approval of its plans, the commission had no obligation to servethe city’s executive branch. Business leaders had long complained that the Plan Commission’ssubservient relation

82、</p><p>　　In February 1956, Daley’s housing and redevelopment coordinator, James Downs, presentedthe mayor with a proposal to create a new Department of City Planning (Downs, 1956). Un-der the proposal, most

83、 of the Plan Commission’s functions would be transferred to the newdepartment, which would be headed by a commissioner appointed by and responsible to themayor. The departmental status of the new agency would significant

84、ly diminish the authorityof city council over city planning, a change applauded by </p><p>　　With enhanced executive powers and a new planning department under his direction, Daley wasin a considerably stron

85、ger position than his predecessor to pursue a program of urban redevelop-ment. He quickly signaled that redevelopment—downtown redevelopment, in particular—wouldbe a priority of his administration. In 1958, Daley’s new D

86、epartment of City Planning releasedits Development Plan for the Central Area of Chicago, an ambitious land-use plan that proposedto anchor the downtown corporate and </p><p>　　While the Central Area Committe

87、e worked with city officials to implement the 1958 Devel-opment Plan, MHPC renewed its efforts to promote administrative reorganization of the city’surban renewal bureaucracy. This initiative had stalled while Kennelly w

88、as mayor due to fears thatcity council influence over a reorganized bureaucracy would undermine its effectiveness (MHPC,1952a; Pois, 1953). With the formal and informal powers of the mayor vis-`a-vis city council nowstre

89、ngthened, MHPC no longer view</p><p>　　The Daley administration appeared to share MHPC’s interest in administrative reorganization.In June 1955, housing and redevelopment coordinator James Downs asked MHPC t

90、o conducta review of the city’s existing administrative structure for urban renewal and to make recom-mendations for reorganization (MHPC, 1958b). In response, MHPC established a committee onunification, which issued its

91、 findings in a draft report completed in December 1956 (MHPC,1956a). The committee recommended that the city’s s</p><p>　　Mayor Daley indicated to MHPC that he was “anxious to push unification” (MHPC, 1958b,

92、p. 2). At the city’s request, MHPC drafted state enabling legislation to increase Chicago’s homerule powers in urban renewal policy. The proposed statute, an amendment to the Illinois Citiesand Villages Act, was broadly

93、permissive, allowing Chicago and any other Illinois municipalityto determine “the number, or kind, or powers” of urban renewal agencies they chose to create(MHPC, 1957a). Although MHPC did not re</p><p>　　Ef

94、forts to reorganize the city’s urban renewal bureaucracy sparked a heated debate betweentwo of the city’s most influential business groups, MHPC and the Central Area Committee.While both groups agreed on the need for adm

95、inistrative reorganization, they disagreed aboutthe form reorganization should take. In a January 1957 letter to Mayor Daley, Central AreaCommittee chairman Holman Pettibone cautioned the mayor against legislation that w

96、ould permitthe consolidation of either the Chicago Housing</p><p>　　Faced with conflicting proposals for administrative reorganization, Daley chose the status quo.In 1957, Daley introduced MHPC’s bill in the

97、 General Assembly as city-sponsored legislation.Assuming that the mayor’s endorsement of the bill would guarantee its passage, MHPC did notorganize a significant lobbying campaign of its own in the legislature (MHPC, 196