外文翻譯--政府當押貸款供應(yīng)規(guī)定的作用來自美國的51個司法管轄區(qū)的證據(jù)

1、<p><b>　　中文3500字</b></p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　The effects of government regulations on the supply of pawn loans: evidence from 5

2、1 Jurisdictions in the U.S.</p><p>　　Not we contribute to the modest amount of existing empirical research on the fringe banking industry by examining the effects of two jurisdiction-specific restrictive reg

3、ulations on the supply of pawn loans. Controlling for poverty levels, education levels, and population density, state-by-state data presented in this paper from the 51 political jurisdictions in the United States suggest

4、s considerable effects in expected ways on five aspects of supply from the two regulations. More specifically,</p><p>　　The lending activities of those working outside traditional depository financial instit

5、utions are sometimes characterized as fringe banking operations. Of the established fringe bankers, pawnshops constitute the most mature segment.1 Having been around for hundreds of years, pawnbrokers make very small (us

6、ually under $100) loans, for short periods of time (usually around 2 months), taking physical possession of personal items as collateral. In the standard pawn transaction, the collateral is ret</p><p>　　With

7、 a few notable exceptions (which will be examined in the next section), academic research on the pawnshop industry has suffered from neglect for a long time. As Caskey (1991) has pointed out, this neglect from the academ

8、ic community is unfortunate, as the percentage of the population served by the pawn industry may reach as high as 10%. Furthermore, Caskey (1991) states, B. . .economists will have a very incomplete understanding of cred

9、it markets if attention is not also given to the financi</p><p>　　In order to help correct this large gap in the academic literature, this paper will present a highly comprehensive study of the effect of two

10、 specific government regulations on five measures of the supply of pawn services. The main contributions of this paper are twofold. First of all, we extend the work of Caskey (1991, 1994) about the effects of pawnshop re

11、gulations on the number of pawnshops in a state by expanding his sample from 28 states to 51 jurisdictions. We also use an additional measu</p><p>　　The second main way this paper contributes to the academic

12、 literature is by looking at the impact of pawnshop regulation on aspects of individual pawnshop behavior. We empirically test Johnson and Johnson’s (1998) hypotheses concerning the impact of pawnshop regulation on avera

13、ge loan amounts and loan/value ratios of individual pawnshops. We also look at the impact of regulation on the number of hours pawnshops operate. Overall, we find that pawnshop regulation has strong negative effects on f

14、iv</p><p>　　As noted above, the academic research on the pawn industry is not large. However, the work that has been done in recent years has provided key insights and has prompted further research as well.&

15、lt;/p><p>　　The Demand for Pawn Loans:</p><p>　　The research of Johnson and Johnson (1998) on the personal and financial characteristics of those borrowing from pawnshops makes it clear that the ty

16、pical pawn borrower is not one that traditional banking institutions want as a customer. Relative to most Americans, pawn borrowers tend to have less education, less accumulated wealth, lower incomes, less stable employm

17、ent, higher bankruptcy rates, and a host of demographic and lifestyle patterns that quite obviously do not fit well with the model </p><p>　　For those having the characteristics mentioned, the alternatives t

18、o pawnshop borrowing are few.2 This lack of borrowing alternatives suggests that the demand for pawn loans, while not large relative to the entire consumer loan market, is rather inelastic for the substantial segment of

19、the population meeting the characteristics noted.</p><p>　　The inelastic demand for pawn loans can also be understood in terms of time preferences. Understanding that time preferences can be a function of ma

20、ny things, it is easy to see that people having the characteristics described would tend to have high time preferences in the sense that they often tend to be somewhat desperate at the margin where they find it necessary

21、 to seek the services of a pawnshop.</p><p>　　In addition to their research on the characteristics of pawn borrowers, Johnson and Johnson (1998) specifically theorize that loan-to-value ratios and average lo

22、an sizes might be expected to vary in response to a pawn market burdened with restrictive regulations. They did not, however, attempt to test this empirically.</p><p>　　The Supply of Pawn Loans:</p>&

23、lt;p>　　On the supply side, the work of Caskey (1991, 1994, 1997) has been significant. Controlling for education levels, poverty levels, population density, and the requirement to return excess proceeds from the sale

24、of collateral items, in an analysis of pawn activities in 28 states with effective interest rate ceilings, Caskey found the number of existing pawnshops to be positively related to the height of the ceilings. This resear

25、ch has been successful in demonstrating the importance of the pawn ind</p><p>　　Though the work by Caskey has been perhaps the only recent empirical research on pawnshop loan supply, his study was limited to

26、 only those states with effective interest rate ceilings, and it was limited in the aspects of supply that it measured. The small sample of 28 states versus the 51 jurisdictions covered in the current study may explain C

27、askey’s result showing a positive relationship between the collateral return regulation and the number of pawnshops. Also, studying five dimensions of pa</p><p>　　Price Regulation and Unintended Consequences

28、:</p><p>　　Any empirical examination of the effects of pawnshop regulations on the supply of pawnshop loans is likely to have much broader implications. For example, buying and selling continue, and the cons

29、tant effort to capture pure entrepreneurial gain keeps the market in perpetual motion’’ (Kirzner, 1985). This study adds to this line of research on price ceilings and consumer protection by providing important insights

30、on a heavily regulated credit market for low-income consumers.</p><p>　　The focus of this study is on the supply side of the pawn industry. Do government restrictions on the behavior of pawnbrokers have the

31、effect of limiting competition in the market for pawn loans? Or do regulations have the effect of enhancing competition through a leveling of the playing ?eld between borrowers and lenders? One way of attempting to answe

32、r these questions is to look at the differences in the ways pawnshops operate with varying degrees of regulation. In this study, this task is und</p><p>　　Article provides a summary of the essential portions

33、 of the results of the ?ve core equations for the ?ve hypotheses. This table shows a composite picture of the essential features of the study. All of the dependent variables, each of which represents a different way in w

34、hich pawnshops can re-arrange their affairs in a world of restrictive regulations, are in?uenced signi?cantly in the expected direction by either the RETURN restriction or the INT25 restriction, or both—after controlling

35、 for pop</p><p>　　These results suggest that the two legal restrictions on the behavior of pawnshops that were the focus of this study are exactly that—restrictions. They restrict economic activity. They are

36、 legal prohibitions against certain behaviors that are otherwise considered mutually advantageous from the perspectives of both borrowers and lenders. Viewing pawnshop regulations as restrictions or prohibitions helps us

37、 to understand the reduced levels of supply that are the core results of the study. </p><p>　　Overall, it appears that the percentage reductions in these different aspects of supply are likely to be larger t

38、han the percentage reductions in price or changes in other bene?ts accruing to the borrowers as a result of these regulatory measures. This implies a rather elastic supply. Especially those equations relating directly to

39、 the number of pawnshops point to a very elastic supply.</p><p>　　Conclusion:</p><p>　　Regulation of an unpopular and unimpressive industry is likely to be tempting for aspiring politicians and

40、others with strong moral intuitions who are willing to use the force of law to manipulate the rules that govern society. Kirzner (1985) has suggested:</p><p>　　Given sufficiently strong value judgments on th

41、e part of would-be regulators—whether in favor of environmental purity,or an egalitarian distribution of wealth, or freedom from pornography or from disease, or national prestige, or the enrichment of the arts, or about

42、whatever—criticisms of intervention from the perspective of these value judgments may (properly) carry little weight.</p><p>　　Conversely, criticisms of pawnshop regulations are not likely to be popular in a

43、 world where strong (though perhaps uninformed or misplaced) value judgments a rein vogue. And yet, as Frederic Bastiat (1845/1964) so eloquently pointed out over 150 years ago, the task of the economist is to ferret out

44、 the unseen or non-obvious consequences of alternative policies, so that those involved in crafting laws that govern society will not be guided by erroneous judgments of the likely consequences of the</p><p>

45、;　　To that end, this study is a marginal but valuable contribution to understanding some of the consequences of pawnshop regulations. Specifically, this study suggests that the supply of pawn services may be restricted i

46、n five ways through the enactment and implementation of restrictive regulations in the industry.</p><p>　　One promising area for future research concerns the issue of lax enforcement of interest rate ceiling

47、s and return requirements (Caskey, 1991, 1994). The fact that this study found strong effects of these two regulations in spite of the possibility of lax enforcement in some jurisdictions suggests two different explanati

48、ons. One is that the pawnshops that survive after regulations are enacted are the ones that are most adept at avoiding enforcement or are the most politically well connected. The </p><p>　　The question of wh

49、ether or not pawnshop regulations really do assist the poor is another promising area for future research. The answer to this question, of course, ultimately entails a value judgment that is not within the scope of this

50、study. But to the extent the conclusions of this study assist with understanding the consequences of pawnshop regulations, the study may be of great importance to those who are willing to make such normative judgments on

51、 the matter. There is, however, one thing </p><p>　　Source: Joshua D. Shackman and Glen Tenney,2006 “The Effects of Government Regulations on the Supply of Pawn Loans: Evidence from 51 Jurisdictions in the U

52、.S.</p><p>　　” . Journal of Financial Services Research,vol.30,no.1,april,pp.69-91.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　政府當押貸款供應(yīng)規(guī)定的作用：來自美國的51個司法管轄區(qū)的證據(jù)</p><p>　　我們通

53、過檢驗關(guān)于當押貸款供應(yīng)的兩個專門管轄規(guī)定的作用，促成了目前關(guān)于邊緣銀行業(yè)的實證研究。本文利用了來自美國的51個政治司法管轄區(qū)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，分析了對于貧困水平，教育水平，人口密度的控制與這兩個規(guī)定的關(guān)系，發(fā)現(xiàn)這兩個規(guī)定在預(yù)期的方向?qū)ξ鍌€方面供應(yīng)有相當大的影響作用。更確切的說，該項研究表明，利率上限和以出售抵押品來超額收益的需求，將會導(dǎo)致商店營業(yè)時間，貸款/價值比率，貸款次數(shù)的減少，以及現(xiàn)有典當行數(shù)量的減少。</p><p

54、>　　那些傳統(tǒng)托管所以外金融機構(gòu)的借貸活動，有時被稱作邊緣銀行業(yè)。其中，典當行是已設(shè)立的邊緣銀行業(yè)者中最成熟的部分。幾百年來，典當行發(fā)放的貸款都很少(通常低于100美元)，貸款時間也很短（通常2個月左右），通常需要拿個人物品的來做抵押。在標準的典當交易中，抵押品會根據(jù)借款人的還款情況歸還到借款人手里。如果借方選擇不償還借款，物品所有權(quán)將自動轉(zhuǎn)移到貸方。</p><p>　　除了少數(shù)明顯的例子例外（將在下一節(jié)

55、審查），關(guān)于典當行業(yè)的學術(shù)研究，很長一段時間被人們所忽視。正如卡斯基（1991）所指出的那樣，學術(shù)界的這一忽視是不正確的。因為典當行業(yè)所服務(wù)的人口比例可能高達10％。此外，卡斯基（1991）指出，如果不考慮到金融市場正面臨數(shù)以百萬計的美國人獨立運營銀行體系的局面，經(jīng)濟學家對信貸市場將有一個不完全的理解。</p><p>　　為了幫助糾正這種現(xiàn)象在學術(shù)文獻中的大差距，本文將就兩個明確的政府規(guī)定對五個典當服務(wù)的供應(yīng)措

56、施的作用，做了非常全面的研究。本文的主要貢獻是雙重的。卡斯基（1991，1994）研究了，在一個國家，關(guān)于典當行數(shù)量的規(guī)定有什么作用呢？首先，我們延續(xù)了他的研究，把他取自28個國家的樣本，擴展到51個司法管轄區(qū)。我們還在每個管轄區(qū)內(nèi)典當行密度采取了附加措施。我們肯定卡斯基（1991，1994）的研究結(jié)果中利率上升和典當行的數(shù)量呈正相關(guān)這一說法，但是在抵押品歸還關(guān)系的存在和典當行的數(shù)量之間呈現(xiàn)巨大的消極關(guān)系這方面，我們否認他的結(jié)果。<

57、;/p><p>　　本文也通過觀察個人典當行行為規(guī)定的作用，來幫助研究學術(shù)文獻。約翰遜和約翰遜（1998年）的假設(shè)關(guān)系是關(guān)于平均貸款額和個人典當行的貸款/價值比率的典當行規(guī)定有什么作用？我們以實證驗證了它。同時，我們也審視了典當行營業(yè)時間規(guī)定的影響?？偟膩碚f，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，典當行規(guī)定在典當行貸款供應(yīng)的五個不同方面有很強的負面影響。這些結(jié)果暗示，金融服務(wù)行業(yè)作為一個整體，對研究價格上限和其他行業(yè)的法規(guī)也有影響。綜上所述，以

58、前所做的典當行業(yè)學術(shù)研究并非很深。然而，近幾年來所做的工作，為探索典當行業(yè)提供了重要的見解，并且促進了人們對典當行業(yè)更進一步的研究。</p><p><b>　　當押貸款的需求：</b></p><p>　　約翰遜和約翰遜（1998）對當押貸款的個人特點和財務(wù)特征做的研究表明，傳統(tǒng)的銀行機構(gòu)不想要這種典型的當押借款人做自己的客戶。因為相對于大多數(shù)美國人來說，當押借款人

59、往往受教育程度較低，累積的財富少，收入較低，沒有穩(wěn)定的職業(yè)，破產(chǎn)率高，而且還有很多不同的生活方式。這明顯不符合人們心中固有的傳統(tǒng)銀行貸款環(huán)境。當押商已認識到這部分人口的特點，并在這個結(jié)構(gòu)的基礎(chǔ)上，以一個完全不同的方式改變了他們的服務(wù)業(yè)務(wù)，以適應(yīng)這一類客戶的需求。為了有利地服務(wù)這部分人口，在典當行貸款時無需調(diào)查貸款人的信用狀況，存款賬戶余額和就業(yè)經(jīng)歷。但（如上所述）抵押物的實際所有權(quán)歸放款人所有。</p><p>

60、　　對于符合上述特點的那些貸款人來說，他們沒有太多選擇的余地，只好選當押貸款。與整個顧客借貸市場無關(guān)，對滿足上述特征的大部分人口來說，當押貸款是解決了他們的迫切需求的。</p><p>　　對當押貸款的無條件需求，也可以理解為時間優(yōu)待。時間優(yōu)待是很多其他貸款沒有的功能。擁有上述特征的人群往往處在邊緣絕望時，才意識到典當行當押貸款的必要性，因為他們將得到很高的時間優(yōu)待。</p><p>　　

61、除了對當押借款人特征的研究，約翰遜和約翰遜（1998年）的推論明確指出，典當市場一直被規(guī)定所限制，作為回報，貸款與價值比率和平均貸款規(guī)模將會有相應(yīng)的變化。然而，他們還沒有用實證驗證這一觀點。</p><p><b>　　當押貸款的供應(yīng)：</b></p><p>　　在供應(yīng)方面，卡斯基（1991年，1994年，1997年）的結(jié)論很重要。對于控制貧困水平，教育水平，人口密

62、度和出售抵押品來取得超額收益的需求，在分析有實際利率上限的28個國家典當活動中，卡斯基發(fā)現(xiàn)，現(xiàn)存的典當行數(shù)量絕對與利率最高上限相關(guān)。約翰遜和約翰遜發(fā)現(xiàn)了當押借款人的普遍特征。這項研究成功地證明了典當行業(yè)對這群人的重要性。我們在卡斯基的理論中可以推斷出典當行業(yè)有相當靈活的供應(yīng)。這一靈活供應(yīng)讓許多投資商想進入和退出典當行業(yè)相對容易很多。</p><p>　　但是卡斯基的理論是近期關(guān)于當押貸款供應(yīng)的唯一實證研究，而且他

63、的研究僅限于那些擁有實際利率上限的國家和他所能想到的一個供應(yīng)方面，缺乏一定的周密性。這個涵蓋了28個國家和51個司法管轄區(qū)的近期研究樣本，不但說明卡斯基的結(jié)論顯示：抵押品歸還法規(guī)和典當行數(shù)量呈正相關(guān)。此外，還研究了典當行供應(yīng)的五個方面，而不僅僅限于一個方面。針對靈活的當押貸款供應(yīng)方面，開展了更為廣闊的一面。</p><p>　　價格管制和出乎意料的后果：</p><p>　　人們就當押貸款

64、供應(yīng)的典當行規(guī)定具體有什么作用做了實證調(diào)查。任何類的實證調(diào)查都可能對該項研究具有更為廣泛的影響。例如，繼續(xù)購買和出售，不斷地努力使企業(yè)獲取純利潤，才可以維持市場永恒的運轉(zhuǎn)（Kirzner，1985）。該項研究為低收入消費者提供關(guān)于信貸市場的重要信息，加深了對價格上限的研究和對消費者的保護的研究。</p><p>　　本研究的重點在典當行業(yè)的供應(yīng)方面。政府對當押商的管制，是否對限制市場的當押貸款競爭有影響？通過借方

65、和貸方達成協(xié)議，那些規(guī)章制度是否真的對加強競爭有作用？有一個方法可以回答這些問題，就是看典當行改變經(jīng)營監(jiān)管程度的差異。在這項研究中，這個任務(wù)以檢驗五個量化假說開始。旨在為作為典當行規(guī)定可能引起的數(shù)個變化，提供深刻的見解。</p><p>　　文章提供了五個假說的五個核心部分的基本方程的結(jié)果概要。此表綜合的顯示了，該項研究的重要特征。典當行可以以不同地方式在一個受嚴格管制的世界重新安排他們的事務(wù)。人口密度，貧困程度

66、和受教育程度在51個司法管轄區(qū)受到控制后，所有可依據(jù)的變量在預(yù)期的方向明顯受到嚴格管制和INT25規(guī)章的影響。</p><p>　　這些結(jié)果表明，兩個關(guān)于典當行行為的法規(guī)其實是有限制。他們限制經(jīng)濟活動。他們是相對于某些行為的法律禁令，例如，在不同的角度考慮了借方和貸方雙方的互利行為。把典當行的規(guī)定視為限制或禁令，這樣可以幫助我們了解供應(yīng)強度的降低。這是該項研究的核心結(jié)果。</p><p>

67、　　總的來說，這些不同方面的供應(yīng)比例的下降，可能比價格比例的下降和調(diào)整措施給借方帶來其他福利的變化比例更大。這意味著相當靈活的供應(yīng)。尤其是那些方程，直接涉及到可以靈活供應(yīng)的典當行數(shù)量。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)論：</b></p><p>　　對不得人心且不起眼的一個行業(yè)監(jiān)管，很可能是為了吸引那些政客和人們的注意。因為他們想用法律的力量來操作管理社會的規(guī)章。科爾

68、斯諾（1985）提到：不管是否有利于環(huán)境的凈化，財富的平等分配，色情或疾病的自由，國家的信譽維護，藝術(shù)的豐富或關(guān)于所有一切的可能性，對所有可能的調(diào)整，已給予充分強大的價值判斷。因此對來自價值判斷前景的干涉，人們不會有太多的批判。</p><p>　　相反，對典當行規(guī)的批評可能不適合在一個具有強大的價值判斷控制時尚的世界里盛行。費雷德里克巴斯夏（1845/1964）在150年前強有力的指出，經(jīng)濟學家的任務(wù)就是搜集那

69、些非正統(tǒng)的政策所引起的未被發(fā)現(xiàn)或不明顯的現(xiàn)象，為的是讓那些被卷入管理社會的法律的人們，不會因所推薦的政策可能引起的結(jié)果，做出錯誤的判斷，進而而被誤導(dǎo)。</p><p>　　為此，該項研究為了解一些典當行規(guī)定的影響，做了雖小但很有價值的貢獻。確切的說，這項研究表明，制定和實施嚴格的行業(yè)法規(guī)后，典當服務(wù)的供應(yīng)，可能在這五個方面有所限制。</p><p>　　這是一個今后很有研究希望的領(lǐng)域，關(guān)系

70、到對利率上限的管制松懈程度和回報需求的問題（卡斯基，1991年，1994年）。盡管有些管轄區(qū)可能有執(zhí)法不嚴的可能性，但對這項研究發(fā)現(xiàn)這兩個法規(guī)的強大作用，有兩種不同的解釋。其中一種解釋是，那些善于避開強制，或善于在政治上搞好關(guān)系的典當行，才能在法規(guī)下生存。這些規(guī)定可能會減少典當行的數(shù)量，對那些善于避開強制的典當行有效。還有一種可能性，就是該項研究實際上低估了這些規(guī)定的力量。如果可以找出一個測量實施程度的可靠方法，那就可以對兩個主要規(guī)定實

71、施調(diào)整測定，來確定這個調(diào)整是否對結(jié)果有所影響。對進一步的研究來說，這是一個成熟的領(lǐng)域。</p><p>　　典當行規(guī)是否真的可以幫助窮人，是今后另一個有希望的研究領(lǐng)域。當然，這個問題的答案，最終需要一個價值判斷，但這不在該項研究的范圍內(nèi)。該項研究結(jié)果協(xié)助了解典當行規(guī)定的重要性，對想要為此事做出規(guī)范性判斷的那些人很重要。不過只有一件事我們可以很自信的說出：那就是我們在這里研究過的典當行規(guī)定，來自典當服務(wù)供應(yīng)的其他方