國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)與貿(mào)易外文翻譯6

1、<p>　　本 科 生 畢 業(yè) 論 文</p><p>　　外 文 資 料 翻 譯</p><p>　　專 業(yè) 國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)與貿(mào)易 </p><p>　　班 級(jí) </p><p>　　姓 名

2、 </p><p>　　指導(dǎo)教師 </p><p>　　所在學(xué)院 外經(jīng)貿(mào)學(xué)院　 </p><p>　　附 件1.外文資料翻譯譯文;2.外文原文</p><p>　　出口稅及收入分配：菲律賓椰子征稅</p><p><b>

3、;　　彼得沃爾</b></p><p><b>　　世界經(jīng)濟(jì)回顧</b></p><p>　　2002 - 斯普林格138卷，第3期，437-458，分類號(hào)：10.1007/BF02707948</p><p>　　出口的稅收往往是有爭(zhēng)議的。出口國(guó)在國(guó)際市場(chǎng)上對(duì)特定的商品擁有壟斷權(quán)的情況下，有一個(gè)著名的論證用于支持適用于那些商品的

4、一種出口稅。在沒有出口稅的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)均衡的情況下，出口水平將達(dá)到生產(chǎn)的邊際成本等于國(guó)際和國(guó)內(nèi)的價(jià)格，但如果有市場(chǎng)力量的存在，邊際收益比價(jià)格低，這意味著邊際成本大于邊際收益。出口稅的目的是通過限制出口量來利用這個(gè)差額，也可以通過減少國(guó)內(nèi)價(jià)格和國(guó)際價(jià)格的對(duì)比來利用這個(gè)差額。當(dāng)邊際成本等于邊際收益的時(shí)候最優(yōu)稅收限制出口的水平，這是由出口稅比例稅率等于對(duì)與國(guó)際價(jià)格相關(guān)商品的出口需求彈性絕對(duì)值的相反數(shù)得出的。（科登1974年）。</p>

5、<p>　　對(duì)于出口稅的政治案件常常顯得尤為強(qiáng)烈并連帶著大型貨幣貶值。眾所周知，在這種情況下出口商得到意外收益，這些收益稅通常得到支持，同時(shí)也能促進(jìn)政府的收入。但是，這種論證是完全不同于上述國(guó)際貿(mào)易條件的論點(diǎn)。由于國(guó)內(nèi)價(jià)格相對(duì)貶值的影響是暫時(shí)的，應(yīng)付給出口商的意外收獲也是暫時(shí)的，因此這種論證是很大程度上得建議臨時(shí)稅，而貿(mào)易條件論證的默示條款稅是永久的。此外，貿(mào)易條件論證提出對(duì)特定商品征稅 –該特定商品是在該國(guó)擁有壟斷力量的 -

6、 而潛在的意外收益論證適用于所有的出口，也將同樣適用于在世界市場(chǎng)上完全不擁有壟斷勢(shì)力的國(guó)家。</p><p>　　在世界市場(chǎng)上存在一定程度的壟斷勢(shì)力也許是最頻繁的在一個(gè)國(guó)家生產(chǎn)上具有特定的自然比較優(yōu)勢(shì)的初級(jí)商品。出口商關(guān)心的往往是發(fā)展中國(guó)家。但是，許多棘手的問題出現(xiàn)在決定是否應(yīng)引入稅收（或繼續(xù)引入），如果是引入，應(yīng)該以何種稅率。什么是和長(zhǎng)期運(yùn)行的出口商品的國(guó)際需求彈性相關(guān)的呢？什么將是該國(guó)貿(mào)易伙伴對(duì)待征收此稅的反

7、應(yīng)呢？什么將是這種稅在征收范圍內(nèi)的分配效應(yīng)呢？</p><p>　　菲律賓對(duì)這些問題提供了一個(gè)很好的例子。菲律賓是迄今為止世界上最大的椰子產(chǎn)品出口國(guó)，最重要的是椰子油。從20世紀(jì)70年代到80年代初期，菲律賓馬科斯政府采取行動(dòng)，利用國(guó)家明顯的壟斷權(quán)在國(guó)際市場(chǎng)上對(duì)椰油大量征收出口稅。這項(xiàng)稅收是不得人心的。公眾關(guān)注的是其收入分配的影響，該影響來源于椰子產(chǎn)品稅降低了國(guó)內(nèi)價(jià)格的明顯事實(shí)，從而抑制椰子生產(chǎn)者，主要是影響低收

8、入的小農(nóng)戶的收入。此外，據(jù)稱該計(jì)劃的管理存在腐敗，其收入挪用被頻繁的指控（Intal和Power 1990年，1991年）。</p><p>　　上述問題被當(dāng)時(shí)的政府拒絕了，但根據(jù)這些評(píng)論出口稅在1985年被取消，馬科斯政府1986年被“人民力量”的反抗所取代。該稅尚未恢復(fù)，1997年的亞洲危機(jī)和菲律賓貨幣貶值，它引發(fā)了一場(chǎng)政府稅收潛能的復(fù)興，以提高公眾利益的外匯收入和政府收入。椰子產(chǎn)品出口稅仍然是政府及其可能的

9、經(jīng)濟(jì)影響的政策選擇仍然是在菲律賓一個(gè)有爭(zhēng)議的問題。</p><p>　　除了椰子出口對(duì)菲律賓經(jīng)濟(jì)的重要性和圍繞早期椰子征稅的爭(zhēng)議，很少會(huì)有對(duì)菲律賓椰子出口退稅影響的經(jīng)濟(jì)分析。在菲律賓公眾的心目中，先前的出口稅可以理解為是與腐敗和“權(quán)貴資本主義”相聯(lián)系的前馬科斯政府。但問題是，菲律賓椰子產(chǎn)品出口稅在現(xiàn)在是否可以在原則上合乎情理，若其收入分配腐敗的不是其中一個(gè)因素，若在同樣的稅率下，則使得這個(gè)分析性的問題仍得不到解決

10、，原因是做了這樣復(fù)雜的稅收收入分配。</p><p>　　在菲律賓的椰子油出口的國(guó)際需求彈性上利用了經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義的例證，并利用了一個(gè)剛剛建成的菲律賓經(jīng)濟(jì)的一般均衡模型。這個(gè)分析中利用模擬該模型，以確定對(duì)椰子油出口的“最佳”的稅值，并闡明其收入分配的影響。該模擬練習(xí)利用一個(gè)大型線性菲律賓經(jīng)濟(jì)的一般均衡模型的使用。其主要區(qū)別特征是一個(gè)高度細(xì)分生產(chǎn)部門之間分配的收入，按收入的以五分之一收入為家庭的收入分配細(xì)部處理（沃爾19

11、97年，2002年）。該模型結(jié)合使用近來的軟件開發(fā)來適應(yīng)線性模型逼近到非線性問題的解決。</p><p>　　本分析中政策的相關(guān)性是多方面的。首先，該模擬的是一個(gè)回顧性政策分析的工作。直到80年代中期還在探索的一項(xiàng)重要政策的經(jīng)濟(jì)效應(yīng)，但其影響直到今天仍存在爭(zhēng)議。為了理解為什么這個(gè)政策被使用，不管它是否是可取的，還是這種稅收是否應(yīng)重新推出，這是對(duì)其經(jīng)濟(jì)影響的理解所必需的。如果它是被相關(guān)體系知識(shí)所補(bǔ)充的，一般均衡分析

12、能有助于實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目的。其次，因?yàn)橹匦乱脒@種稅，目前仍是菲律賓政府的政策選擇，這不僅僅是因?yàn)槎愂仗岣叩挠绊?，其影響中的一般均衡分析，可能在目前的政策辯論中發(fā)揮建設(shè)性作用。第三，由于出口稅是許多其他發(fā)展中國(guó)家重要的政策手段，尤其是對(duì)初級(jí)產(chǎn)品出口大國(guó)，菲律賓著名的“椰子征稅”影響的詳細(xì)分析，可以在政策辯論中作出建設(shè)性貢獻(xiàn)。</p><p>　　在方法論的層面上，對(duì)一種稅收福利最大化水平的推導(dǎo)是這種類型的新模式。建?？?/p>

13、架也為延伸出口退稅圍繞收入分配影響的一般分析提供了可能性。</p><p>　　Export Taxes and Income Distribution: The Philippines Coconut Levy</p><p>　　Peter Warr</p><p>　　Review of World Economics</p><p>

14、　　2002 – Springer</p><p>　　Volume 138, Number 3, 437-458, DOI: 10.1007/BF02707948</p><p>　　The taxation of exports is often controversial. In cases where the exporting country possesses a degree

15、 of monopoly power in the international market for a particular commodity, there is a wellknown argument in favour of an export tax applied to that good. Under a competitive equilibrium with no export tax, exports will r

16、each the level where the marginal cost of production is equal to the international and domestic price, but if market power exists, marginal revenue is less than price, implying </p><p>　　The political case f

17、or an export tax often seems especially strong following a large currency depreciation. As is well known, exporters receive windfall gains in these circumstances and there is often support for a tax on these gains, simul

18、taneously contributing to government revenue. But this argument is quite different from the international terms of trade argument outlined above. Since the domestic relative price effects of a depreciation are temporary,

19、 the windfall gains accruing to exporter</p><p>　　Cases in which a degree of monopoly power exists in the world market are perhaps most frequent with primary commodities in which one country has a particular

20、 natural comparative advantage in production. The exporters concerned are often developing countries. But many difficult questions arise in determining whether such a tax should be introduced (or continued) and if so, a

21、t what rate. What is the long-run international elasticity of demand for the export commodity concerned? What would be the</p><p>　　The Philippines provides a good example of these issues. It is by far the

22、world's largest exporter of coconut products, most importantly coconut oil. From the early 1970s through the first half of the 1980s, the Marcos government of the Philippines acted to exploit the country's appar

23、ent monopoly power in the international market for coconut oil by imposing a substantial export tax, known domestically as the 'coconut levy'. The tax was unpopular. There was public concern about its income dist

24、ri</p><p>　　The above concerns were denied by the government of the time, but in response to these criticisms the export levy was abolished in 1985, shortly before the Marcos government was itself displaced

25、 by the "peoples' power" revolt of 1986. The tax has not been reinstated since, even though the Asian crisis of 1997 and the large depreciation of the Philippine currency which followed it provoked a renewe

26、d public interest in the potential of such a tax to enhance foreign exchange earnings and public re</p><p>　　Despite the importance of coconut exports for the Philippine economy and the controversy surroundi

27、ng the earlier coconut levy, there has been little economic analysis of the effects within the Philippines that may follow from an export tax on coconut products. In the minds of the Philippine public, the former export

28、levy is understandably associated with the corruption and 'crony capitalism' of the former Marcos government. But the analytical question of whether an export tax on Philippine coco</p><p>　　The pre

29、sent paper examines these issues, drawing on available empirical evidence on the elasticity of international demand for Philippine coconut oil exports and utilizing a recently constructed general equilibrium model of the

30、 Philippine economy. The analysis uses simulations with this model to determine the 'optimal' value of a tax on coconut oil exports and also to clarify its income distributional impact. The simulation exercise ma

31、kes use of a large, linearized general equilibrium model of t</p><p>　　The policy relevance of this analysis is several-fold. First, the simulations are an exercise in retrospective policy analysis. We are e

32、xploring the economic effects of a policy that was important until the mid-1980s but whose impacts remain controversial today. To understand why this olicy was used, whether it was desirable and whether such a tax should

33、 be re-introduced, an understanding of its economic effects is required. A general equilibrium analysis can contribute to this end, provided it </p><p>　　At a methodological level, the derivation in this pap

34、er of the welfaremaximizing level of a tax is new for this type of model. The modelling framework also makes it possible to extend the usual analysis of an export tax to encompass its income distributional implications a

35、nd we demonstrate this capability in the final section of the paper.</p><p>　　出口退稅對(duì)產(chǎn)業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的影響：以印度尼西亞的棕櫚油產(chǎn)業(yè)為例</p><p>　　莫漢默德F·漢森，米歇爾R·瑞德，瑪麗A·馬爾尚</p><p><b>　　經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展雜志&

36、lt;/b></p><p>　　2001年12月，第2號(hào)，26卷</p><p>　　本研究利用時(shí)間序列分析了印度尼西亞出口棕櫚油行業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)出口稅的動(dòng)態(tài)效果。在向量自回歸模型的結(jié)果表明出口隨著稅收征收急劇下降。本研究表明，征收出口稅對(duì)印度尼西亞棕櫚油行業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力有持久的，負(fù)面的影響。方差分解顯示，超過83%的凈出口份額的預(yù)測(cè)誤差的波動(dòng)是以它本身的沖擊解釋的，還有8.6％和8.4％分別

37、是以出口退稅和相對(duì)出口價(jià)格解釋的。</p><p><b>　　一、引言</b></p><p>　　棕櫚油在印度尼西亞經(jīng)濟(jì)中有兩個(gè)重要特征。首先，棕櫚油是一種重要的出口商品，可以提供出口收入，并給數(shù)百萬的農(nóng)民家庭帶來就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)。其次，棕櫚油是政府認(rèn)為的印尼最基本的食用油的主要來源。 “基本商品”可承受價(jià)格的有效性是印度尼西亞政府對(duì)維持經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治穩(wěn)定的關(guān)鍵。由于是這種地

38、位，棕櫚油行業(yè)受政府的嚴(yán)重干預(yù)，這是不足為奇的。政府通過投資政策干預(yù)棕櫚油的生產(chǎn)，特別是對(duì)于小農(nóng)戶發(fā)展項(xiàng)目和擴(kuò)大印度尼西亞棕櫚油的出口。同時(shí)，政府在國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)干預(yù)，以保證可承受價(jià)格的棕櫚油供應(yīng)充足。在這方面，印度尼西亞政府使用了很多政策措施，如國(guó)內(nèi)的分配價(jià)格，出口限制和出口退稅等。</p><p>　　1991年6月，作為其貿(mào)易自由化政策的一部分，政府也放寬了所有的棕櫚油貿(mào)易限制，包括國(guó)內(nèi)出口分配價(jià)格和出口數(shù)量限制

39、。這項(xiàng)放寬政策導(dǎo)致了國(guó)內(nèi)棕櫚食用油的價(jià)各的大幅增加，并且印度尼西亞的棕櫚油出口份額在世界市場(chǎng)上顯著增加。隨著食用油價(jià)格上升，印度尼西亞政府頒布了一項(xiàng)新政策，對(duì)棕櫚油產(chǎn)品征收出口稅：毛棕櫚油（CPO）;提煉，漂白，脫臭（RBD）的棕櫚油;原油油脂和RBD的油脂（棕櫚烹飪油）。這些新稅種是在1994年至1997年生效的。在1998年初，隨著印尼經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)和政治動(dòng)亂，印度尼西亞政府禁止了毛棕櫚油及其產(chǎn)品的出口。 鑒于這些獨(dú)特的事件，本

40、研究的目的是使用計(jì)量時(shí)間序列分析棕櫚油出口稅對(duì)棕櫚油出口額和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的動(dòng)態(tài)效應(yīng)。具體來說，使用向量自回歸模型（VAR的），并連同脈沖響應(yīng)函數(shù)和方差分解來探討出口稅的動(dòng)態(tài)效果。這項(xiàng)研究通過運(yùn)用計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)間序列的方法增加了研究文獻(xiàn)，以分析出口稅對(duì)短期和長(zhǎng)期的產(chǎn)業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的的影響，。這種動(dòng)態(tài)的透視不同于以往使用靜態(tài)模型的研究，。決策者可用這些結(jié)論分析出口退稅政策的影響，當(dāng)多年生作物的出口稅被考慮時(shí)這些結(jié)論也應(yīng)被考慮在內(nèi)。</p>&

41、lt;p><b>　　二、文獻(xiàn)綜述</b></p><p>　　出口稅主要是用于發(fā)展中國(guó)家，目的是產(chǎn)生的政府收入，或者是因?yàn)檎卧虮Ｗo(hù)特殊群體。出口稅對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)下的小國(guó)家的影響，導(dǎo)致在出口國(guó)價(jià)格低于國(guó)際價(jià)格（里德，2000；麥卡拉和杰森林，1985）。在這項(xiàng)政策下，出口國(guó)的將喪失生產(chǎn)商，因?yàn)樗麄兘邮茌^低的價(jià)格和出口下降。經(jīng)過降低價(jià)格，出口國(guó)獲得更多消費(fèi)者并給政府帶來的稅收。就一

42、個(gè)出口大國(guó)而言出口稅的影響的的情況是不同的（即，一個(gè)國(guó)家面臨的需求曲線向下傾斜）。如果在世界市場(chǎng)上有市場(chǎng)支配力，出口退稅則會(huì)導(dǎo)致國(guó)內(nèi)產(chǎn)量減少，那么說來，出口則下降并且國(guó)際價(jià)格上漲。假若是這樣的話，出口國(guó)的消費(fèi)者，生產(chǎn)者和政府都可從這一政策上獲利（里德，2000；麥卡拉和杰森林，1985）。</p><p>　　對(duì)出口稅影響的實(shí)證研究已經(jīng)由秋山（1992）;布魯斯和佩雷斯加西亞（1992）;沃爾（1997）和馬克斯

43、，拉爾森和波默羅伊（1998）進(jìn)行調(diào)查。秋山（1992）研究了在大國(guó)情況下，對(duì)（可可）多年生作物的最優(yōu)稅收的影響。尤其是，他的研究以一種最佳的出口稅，生產(chǎn)者剩余和政府儲(chǔ)備的影響為中心。他的研究結(jié)果表明，出口稅大大影響了在農(nóng)民和政府之間國(guó)家福利的分配，也大大影響了可可長(zhǎng)期的生產(chǎn)。布魯斯和佩雷斯加西亞（1992）利用有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性全球貿(mào)易模式研究了一項(xiàng)美國(guó)的出口稅對(duì)林產(chǎn)品的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響。他們的研究結(jié)果顯示，美國(guó)消費(fèi)者的福利損失和從木材種植者到中間商的

44、大量財(cái)富的轉(zhuǎn)移，。沃爾（1997年）進(jìn)行了一項(xiàng)關(guān)于泰國(guó)大米出口稅的類似研究，并且計(jì)算出了經(jīng)濟(jì)收益和經(jīng)濟(jì)損失。</p><p>　　最后，馬科斯，拉爾森和波默羅伊（1998）利用靜態(tài)模型分析了棕櫚油的出口稅對(duì)印尼收入分配的影響。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，出口退稅降低了棕櫚油產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格，如果其他條件不變，那么則使消費(fèi)者受益。此外，他們還發(fā)現(xiàn)，這種稅降低棕櫚油生產(chǎn)商所賺取收益，而中間商的損失也略有增幅。政府從出口稅收獲得收益，但從政府

45、作為業(yè)主的棕櫚產(chǎn)業(yè)所有者的角度看政府損失了更多收益。因此，最終結(jié)果是，政府喪失了棕櫚油的出口稅。我們的研究利用動(dòng)態(tài)得時(shí)間序列模型擴(kuò)展了他們的研究，評(píng)估了印度尼西亞棕櫚油出口稅對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的短期和長(zhǎng)期的影響。</p><p>　　上述文學(xué)主要研究出口貿(mào)易政策的分配效應(yīng)，即識(shí)別誰收益誰損失。此外，大多數(shù)研究使用一般均衡貿(mào)易模式，以鑒定和評(píng)估政策影響。在一般均衡貿(mào)易模式隱含的假設(shè)是所有部門和行業(yè)都將處于平衡狀態(tài)并且在外生政

46、策沖擊后都將恢復(fù)到平衡。在這些模型中，完整的供需系統(tǒng)的估計(jì)，和特定的貿(mào)易政策影響的評(píng)估都使用樂這些估計(jì)供求參數(shù)。這種方法的一個(gè)局限是，它無法獲取特定貿(mào)易政策對(duì)模型中的變量的動(dòng)態(tài)效果。</p><p>　　在這項(xiàng)研究中，計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)間序列分析方法，分析了對(duì)出口業(yè)績(jī)的出口稅的動(dòng)態(tài)行為。指定矢量回歸（VAR）模型并且由此產(chǎn)生了脈沖響應(yīng)函數(shù)和方差分解分析。脈沖響應(yīng)函數(shù)揭示了出口額如何對(duì)來自其他因素的“沖擊”做出回應(yīng)，諸如出

47、口稅。方差分解表明預(yù)測(cè)誤差變化的數(shù)量與取決于其他變數(shù)沖擊的出口額相一致。這種方法有其局限性，因?yàn)樗荒芨櫰渌块T特定貿(mào)易政策的溢出效應(yīng)，并且也沒有考慮到該部門完整的供求體系。盡管有這些限制，向量自回歸模型提供了一個(gè)關(guān)于貿(mào)易政策的有用并獨(dú)特的動(dòng)態(tài)視角。</p><p>　　Effects of an Export Tax on Competitiveness: The Case of the Indonesian

48、 Palm Oil Industry</p><p>　　Mohamad F. Hasan, Michael R. Reed and Mary A. Marchant</p><p>　　Journal of economic development</p><p>　　Volume 26, Number 2, December 2001</p>&l

49、t;p>　　This research analyzes the dynamic effects of an export tax on export performance of the Indonesian palm oil industry using time series analysis. The vector autoregressive model results show exports fell dramati

50、cally with the imposition of the tax. This research showed that the imposition of an export tax has long-lasting, negative effects on competitiveness of the Indonesian palm oil industry. The variance decomposition reveal

51、s that more than 83% of the variation in the forecast error of the ne</p><p>　　I. Introduction</p><p>　　Palm oil has two important characteristics in the Indonesian economy. First, palm oil is a

52、n important export commodity that provides export earnings and generates employment opportunities for millions of farm families. Second, palm oil is the primary source for cooking oil, which the government considers “an

53、essential commodity” for Indonesia. The availability of “essential commodities” at affordable prices is key to the Indonesian government’s policy of maintaining economic and political stabil</p><p>　　Concurr

54、ently, the government intervenes in domestic markets to guarantee an adequate supply of palm oil at affordable prices. In this regard, the Indonesian government uses a variety of policy measures, such as a domestic alloc

55、ation price, export restrictions and an export tax.</p><p>　　In June 1991, as a part of its trade liberalization policies, the government lifted all palm oil trade restrictions, including domestic allocation

56、 prices and export quantity restrictions. This liberalization policy resulted in a considerable increase in the domestic price of palm cooking oil, along with a significant increase in Indonesian export shares of palm oi

57、l in the world market. </p><p>　　Concerned with the cooking oil price increase, the Indonesian government issued a new policy imposing export taxes on palm oil products: crude palm oil (CPO); refined, bleach

58、ed, deodorized (RBD) palm oil; crude olein; and RBD olein (palm cooking oil). These new taxes were in effect from 1994 to 1997. At the beginning of 1998, following the economic crisis and political turmoil in Indonesia,

59、the Indonesian government banned exports of CPO and its products.</p><p>　　Given these unique events, the objective of this research is to analyze the dynamic effects of a palm oil export tax on export perfo

60、rmance and competitiveness using econometric time series analysis. Specifically, a vector autoregressive model (VAR) is used along with the impulse response function and variance decomposition to investigate the dynamic

61、effects of an export tax.</p><p>　　This study adds to the literature by applying econometric time series methods in analyzing the effects of an export tax on industrial competitiveness in both the short and

62、long run. This dynamic perspective differs from previous studies, which use a static model. These results can be used by policy makers to analyze the impact of export tax policies and should be considered when an export

63、tax on perennial crops is considered.</p><p>　　II. Literature Review</p><p>　　Export taxes are predominantly used by developing countries with the objective either to generate government revenue

64、s or to protect particular groups for political reasons. The effect of an export tax by a small country under a competitive market structure causes the price in the exporting country to fall below the world price (Reed (

65、2000), McCalla and Josling (1985)). Under this policy, producers in the exporting country will lose because they receive lower prices and exports decline. Consumers</p><p>　　Empirical studies on the effect o

66、f export taxes have been conducted by Akiyama (1992); Bruce and Perez-Garcia (1992); Warr (1997); and Marks, Larson, and Pomeroy (1998). Akiyama (1992) examined the effect of an optimal tax on perennial crops (cocoa) in

67、a large country case. In particular, his research focused on an optimal export tax and its implications on producer surplus and government reserves. His results showed that an export tax significantly affected the distri

68、bution of national welfare </p><p>　　Finally, Marks, Larson, and Pomeroy (1998) analyzed the effect of an export tax for palm oil on the distribution of income in Indonesia using a static model. They found t

69、hat an export tax reduced the price of palm oil products, ceteris paribus, thus, benefiting consumers. In addition, they found that the tax lowered profits earned by palm oil producers, and that processors lost slightly

70、as well. The government gained revenue from the export tax, but lost more revenue in the government’s role as </p><p>　　Most of the above literature focused on the distributional effects of the export trade

71、policy, namely, identifying who gains and who loses. In addition, most studies used general equilibrium trade models to identify and estimate policy impacts. Implicit in a general equilibriu m trade model is the assumpti

72、on that all sectors are in equilibrium and sectors would return to equilibrium after the exogenous policy shock. In these models, complete demand-supply systems are estimated and the effects of</p><p>　　In t

73、his study, econometric time series analysis is used to analyze the dynamic behavior of an export tax on export performance. A vector autoregressive (VAR) model is specified and the resulting impulse response function and

74、 the variance decomposition are analyzed. The impulse response function reveals how export performance responds to “shocks” from other variables, such as an export tax. The variance decomposition indicates the amount of