會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性外文翻譯---會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的第一篇解釋和意義

1、<p>　　會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的第一篇：解釋和意義</p><p>　　瓦茨, 會(huì)計(jì)新視野,2006年</p><p>　　內(nèi)容提要：本文是會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性兩篇文章中的第一篇。第一篇對穩(wěn)健性進(jìn)行了解釋以及探討了穩(wěn)健性對會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)督的影響。第二篇總結(jié)了穩(wěn)健性的實(shí)驗(yàn)證據(jù)及對穩(wěn)健性的解釋，并提出未來研究方向。文章證明了穩(wěn)健性的存在，對不同程度下的穩(wěn)健性進(jìn)行了不同的解釋。</p><p

2、>　　會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的定義是指要求對收益與損失的不對稱確認(rèn)，其極端形式下傳統(tǒng)的穩(wěn)健性定義為“不預(yù)期收益，但預(yù)期所有的損失”。盡管有人指責(zé)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性，但是穩(wěn)健性已經(jīng)存在了幾個(gè)世紀(jì)，并在近30年中有所加強(qiáng)。</p><p>　　支持穩(wěn)健性的一種理論解釋是：契約理論、股東訴訟理論、稅收理論和會(huì)計(jì)管制理論。在文章的第二篇中用證據(jù)表明契約和股東訴訟是最重要的因素，證據(jù)表明稅收和會(huì)計(jì)管制相對比較弱，盈余管理也可能產(chǎn)生穩(wěn)健性

3、，但這不能成為主要的因素。</p><p>　　對穩(wěn)健性的解釋和證明對會(huì)計(jì)管理機(jī)制有著重要的影響。財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)委員會(huì)曾試圖禁止會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性，以實(shí)現(xiàn)“信息中立”而忽略穩(wěn)健性長期存在的原因，這種意圖可能會(huì)失敗并產(chǎn)生意想不到的后果。消除會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性將會(huì)改變會(huì)計(jì)管理行為，并且會(huì)增大經(jīng)濟(jì)上的費(fèi)用。同樣的，研究人員和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)考慮把未來現(xiàn)金流量列入財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表，其產(chǎn)生的成本會(huì)對會(huì)計(jì)管理行為存在影響。</p><p>

4、;　　本文是會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性性研究的第一篇，研究的目的主要是：</p><p>　　1、對會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的解釋</p><p>　　2、對財(cái)務(wù)法規(guī)和準(zhǔn)則的設(shè)置</p><p>　　文章的第二篇的研究目的是：</p><p>　　1、總結(jié)穩(wěn)健性存在的證據(jù)</p><p>　　2、對證據(jù)進(jìn)行評估去辨別不同穩(wěn)健性的解釋</p&g

5、t;<p>　　3、對證據(jù)進(jìn)行評估去辨別穩(wěn)健性與非穩(wěn)健性</p><p>　　對會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性解釋的討論是大多是基于利用現(xiàn)有的文獻(xiàn)。然而，本文是立足于契約觀，包括了債務(wù)合同的約束的解釋(Watts 1993),以及與其使用的其他合同，如管理薪酬契約也會(huì)產(chǎn)生影響。本文也提供了新的論點(diǎn)，即使不考慮契約，一旦信息成本變化后管理層的行為也會(huì)產(chǎn)生會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的現(xiàn)象進(jìn)行了介紹。</p><p>

6、;<b>　　穩(wěn)健性的定義</b></p><p>　　傳統(tǒng)的穩(wěn)健性定義是“不預(yù)期收益，但預(yù)期所有的損失”(Bliss 1924)。預(yù)期收益是指所承認(rèn)的收益是通過法律允許的，是可以被證實(shí)前的收益。穩(wěn)健性原則并不意味著所有的收入現(xiàn)金流應(yīng)該在收入確認(rèn)前收到——賒賬銷售是被認(rèn)可的——但那些現(xiàn)金流應(yīng)該是可以被證實(shí)的。在實(shí)證文獻(xiàn)中穩(wěn)健性的概念被解釋為“相比確認(rèn)壞消息而言，會(huì)計(jì)人員傾向于尋找更多證據(jù)支持

7、好消息的確認(rèn)。”(Basu 1997,7)穩(wěn)健性是對收益和損失的不對稱確認(rèn)。這種解釋下收益與損失確認(rèn)差異越大，穩(wěn)健性程度也就越大，本文采用的就是這種“差異化驗(yàn)證”解釋的穩(wěn)健性。</p><p>　　穩(wěn)健性的一個(gè)重要結(jié)果就是不對稱地處理收益與損失，其后果是持續(xù)低估凈資產(chǎn)值。有些資本市場監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)、準(zhǔn)則制定者以及學(xué)者批評穩(wěn)健性，因?yàn)楫?dāng)前的低估收益會(huì)導(dǎo)致未來收入的夸大。例如會(huì)計(jì)研究公報(bào)(ARB)21美國注冊會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)19

8、39年規(guī)定：穩(wěn)健性在資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表中如果不確定性影響到了利潤表，這就是很重要的。</p><p>　　穩(wěn)健性主義來描述利潤表對某一特定時(shí)期的影響，這并不符合穩(wěn)健性的定義。穩(wěn)健性是自公司營運(yùn)開始在資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的累計(jì)收入或盈利。</p><p>　　會(huì)計(jì)核算中穩(wěn)健性的影響既長遠(yuǎn)又有意義。Basu(1997,8)認(rèn)為穩(wěn)健性的影響至少有500年了。最近的實(shí)證研究表明在過去的30年會(huì)計(jì)核算變得越來越穩(wěn)健。

9、鑒于許多資本市場的監(jiān)管機(jī)制、準(zhǔn)則制定方和學(xué)者對穩(wěn)健性的口誅筆伐，結(jié)果是令人吃驚的，穩(wěn)健性長期存在卻又遭受很多的批評。對穩(wěn)健性的批評者忽視了穩(wěn)健性存在的巨大利益，如果他們不理解穩(wěn)健性原則的好處而由此產(chǎn)生的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，很可能會(huì)嚴(yán)重?fù)p害財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表。</p><p>　　穩(wěn)健性原則的解釋與概述</p><p>　　研究人員提出很多對穩(wěn)健性報(bào)告的解釋，所有的題提議都是穩(wěn)健性原則應(yīng)是使用戶收益的公司會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)表。

10、有一種解釋是穩(wěn)健性的產(chǎn)生是因?yàn)樗囊徊糠质怯行У募夹g(shù)應(yīng)用于組織公司和與各方簽訂的合同契約。在這種契約觀的解釋下，穩(wěn)健性意味著是一種道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，是化解契約中由于各方報(bào)酬不對稱而帶來的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的一種手段。例如，穩(wěn)健性可以包含管理層的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為的合同用于會(huì)計(jì)核算。</p><p>　　即使把契約和管理會(huì)計(jì)行為從會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)告中分離，道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題仍將存在與財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中，只要會(huì)計(jì)管理績效措施告知投資者便會(huì)影響資產(chǎn)配置者的投資決策和

11、管理層的福利。管理層因此會(huì)傾向于使用有偏見的計(jì)量方法，穩(wěn)健性可以抑制機(jī)會(huì)主義行為，抵消公司管理層的樂觀偏見形成非對稱的管理偏見。</p><p>　　在實(shí)踐中，穩(wěn)健性大大的抵消了更多的管理層偏見，而且延遲了收入和低估累計(jì)收益及近資產(chǎn)。這些影響在契約中會(huì)增加公司的價(jià)值，因?yàn)樗鼈兿拗屏斯芾韺又械臋C(jī)會(huì)主義向自己以及其他各方的支付，例如股東。增加的公司價(jià)值是雙方共享的，能提高雙方的福利，在這個(gè)意義上說，穩(wěn)健性是一種有效的

12、契約機(jī)制。</p><p>　　穩(wěn)健性很可能是一個(gè)高效的在契約情況下的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告機(jī)制。下文討論的其他穩(wěn)健性的解釋，除了穩(wěn)健性是抵消管理層的偏見，非締約雙方也是能約束管理層和締約方的機(jī)會(huì)付款。鑒于此，穩(wěn)健性和它所產(chǎn)生的凈資產(chǎn)偏差也可能是必要的有效的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的組成部分，是“好”而不是“壞”的。</p><p>　　股東訴訟是穩(wěn)健性的另一個(gè)來源。管理層在高估利潤和資產(chǎn)的時(shí)候更容易面臨訴訟風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。通過

13、資產(chǎn)的低估可以降低預(yù)計(jì)的訴訟費(fèi)用。通過訴訟成本的不對稱來限制投機(jī)性支付的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，從這一程度的解釋表明，個(gè)人當(dāng)事人以外的公司也是這樣約束的，用穩(wěn)健性來降低訴訟風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。</p><p>　　稅收也是穩(wěn)健性產(chǎn)生的原因之一。對立的和損失進(jìn)行不對稱的確認(rèn)能使企業(yè)減少稅收的現(xiàn)值，從而提升公司的價(jià)值，推遲收入確認(rèn)加快支出確認(rèn)從而推遲納稅。</p><p>　　最后，財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告準(zhǔn)則的制定機(jī)構(gòu)和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)也在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)

14、告中有運(yùn)用穩(wěn)健性的動(dòng)機(jī)。正如類似一個(gè)不對稱的訴訟成本，準(zhǔn)則制定機(jī)構(gòu)對會(huì)計(jì)實(shí)務(wù)的規(guī)范成本也是不對稱的。在會(huì)計(jì)信息被高估時(shí)監(jiān)管方將面臨更多的指責(zé)，所以穩(wěn)健的會(huì)計(jì)信息可以降低政治成本。政治成本的不對稱就如不對稱的訴訟成本時(shí)是一致的，非契約方謹(jǐn)慎的制約了管理層和其他各方的投機(jī)付款行為。</p><p>　　在對穩(wěn)健性進(jìn)行了解釋，正如我們所見穩(wěn)健性原則通過契約、訴訟、稅收、會(huì)計(jì)管制來約束管理層和其他各方的投機(jī)付款行為。&l

15、t;/p><p>　　最近的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)表明會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性存在上升的趨勢，以不同的程度體現(xiàn)在四個(gè)穩(wěn)健性的解釋中。然而文中的第二篇中一些證據(jù)與兩種解釋一致并不意味著穩(wěn)健性。這些解釋之一是通過盈余管理來低估資產(chǎn)，承擔(dān)額外的費(fèi)用和過度的沖銷，以夸大未來收益(Hanna 2002)另一種解釋是管理層選擇放棄盈利(Hayn 1995)。而這些解釋可以解釋公司屬性所產(chǎn)生的保守主義，如暫時(shí)的損失。它們無法共同或單獨(dú)解釋凈資產(chǎn)，只是標(biāo)志性地

16、描述了穩(wěn)健性原則。</p><p>　　文章的第二篇用各種各樣對穩(wěn)健性的解釋來證明穩(wěn)健性在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中向資本市場的投資者提供信息的建設(shè)性作用。這意味著會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和準(zhǔn)則制定方都應(yīng)反思其反對穩(wěn)健性的行為。</p><p>　　契約觀對穩(wěn)健性的解釋</p><p>　　對穩(wěn)健性的四個(gè)解釋中，筆者認(rèn)為契約觀是最詳盡的解釋，因?yàn)樗欠€(wěn)健性的來源以及它的論點(diǎn)更有發(fā)展的空間。越來

17、越多的論點(diǎn)的解釋都只是從信息質(zhì)量的角度看問題的。此外，契約觀的解釋強(qiáng)調(diào)正式的契約，如債務(wù)契約和合同管理層的報(bào)酬，它們擴(kuò)大到了包括管理會(huì)計(jì)和管理系統(tǒng)的公司的組織安排，即使是稅收觀的解釋也是屬于契約觀的解釋之中。</p><p>　　會(huì)計(jì)中使用契約是非常那個(gè)古老的做法，跨越了幾個(gè)世紀(jì)公司都在采用(Watts 和 Zimmerman 1983)，用來進(jìn)行管理控制(De Ste Croix 1956 和Chadwick

18、1992)。研究者提出，這種長期過程中影響了當(dāng)代會(huì)計(jì)和財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告，導(dǎo)致穩(wěn)健性傾向于使用偏見的計(jì)量方法(Watts and Zimmennan1986; Watts 1993; Basu1995)。</p><p>　　相比之下，其它穩(wěn)健性的解釋是最近一段時(shí)間才出現(xiàn)的。股東訴訟的出現(xiàn)是在美國20世紀(jì)60年代，并隨著其發(fā)展而成為穩(wěn)健性的解釋之一，稅收系統(tǒng)影響財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的會(huì)計(jì)處理方法，是一種近期出現(xiàn)的解釋，可追溯到1909

19、年。一些謹(jǐn)慎的會(huì)計(jì)管制機(jī)構(gòu)的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告，它們的歷史可以回溯到1933年和1934年。</p><p>　　契約的解釋包含了三種屬性：及時(shí)性、可核性、不對稱性的可驗(yàn)證性。在債務(wù)、賠償和其他契約解釋中穩(wěn)健性成為了一個(gè)有效的契約機(jī)制，因?yàn)樗鼘ζ跫s的性能測試中要求使對收益的確認(rèn)比損失的確認(rèn)有更嚴(yán)格的核查標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。一如既往，由于不對稱的確認(rèn)導(dǎo)致收益的確認(rèn)比損失延遲，其結(jié)果是凈資產(chǎn)和累計(jì)收益不太可能被夸大，降低了違反契約的可能性。

20、</p><p>　　出處： Watts R L. Conservatism in accounting part Ι:explanations and implication [J]. Accounting Horizons,2003,(3):207-221.</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Conservat

21、ism in Accounting Part I: Explanations and Implications</p><p>　　Watts R L. Accounting Horizons,2003</p><p>　　SYNOPSIS: This paper is the first in a two-part series on conservatism in accounting

22、. Part I examines alternative explanations for conservatism in accounting and their implications for accounting regulators. Part II summarizes the empirical evidence on conservatism, its consistency with alternative expl

23、anations, and opportunities for future research. The evidence is consistent with conservatism's existence and, in varying degrees, the various explanations.</p><p>　　Conservatism is defined as the differ

24、ential verifiability required for recognition of profits versus losses. Its extreme form is the traditional conservatism adage: "anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses." Despite criticism, conservatism

25、 has survived in accounting for many centuries and appears to have increased in the last 30 years.</p><p>　　The alternative explanations for conservatism are contracting, shareholder litigation, taxation, an

26、d accounting regulation. The evidence in Part II suggests the contracting and shareholder litigation explanations are most important. Evidence on the effects of taxation and regulation is weaker, but consistent with thos

27、e explanations playing a role. Earnings management could produce some of the evidence on conservatism, but cannot be the prime explanation.</p><p>　　The explanations and evidence have important implications

28、for accounting regulators. FASB attempts to ban conservatism in order to achieve "neutrality of information" without understanding the reasons conservatism existed and prospered for so long are likely to fail a

29、nd produce unintended consequences. Successful elimination of conservatism will change managerial behavior and impose significant costs on investors and the economy in general. Similarly, researchers and regulators who p

30、ropose the i</p><p>　　INTRODUCTION</p><p>　　This paper is Part I in a two-part series on conservatism in accounting. The objectives of this paper are to:</p><p>　　1. Discuss the exp

31、lanations for conservatism; and</p><p>　　2. Draw implications for regulation and standard setting.</p><p>　　The objectives of Part II in the series are to:</p><p>　　1. Summarize the

32、 evidence on conservatism's existence;</p><p>　　2. Evaluate the evidence's ability to discriminate among conservatism explanations; and</p><p>　　3. Evaluate the evidence's ability to

33、 discriminate between conservatism and non-conservatism explanations.</p><p>　　The explanations discussion draws on existing literature. However, this paper develops a general contracting explanation for con

34、servatism that encompasses the existing debt contract dividend constraint explanation (Watts 1993) and predicts that other contracts employed within the firm, such as managerial compensation contracts, will also generate

35、 conservatism. The paper also offers a new argument that, even without contracting considerations, an information perspective produces conservatism once</p><p>　　Conservatism Defined</p><p>　　Ac

36、counting conservatism is traditionally defined by the adage "anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses" (Bliss 1924). Anticipating profits means recognizing profits before there is legal claim to the reve

37、nues generating them and that the revenues are verifiable. Conservatism does not imply that all revenue cash flows should be received before profits are recognized—credit sales are recognized—but rather that those cash f

38、lows should be verifiable. In the empirical literature the adage is </p><p>　　An important consequence of conservatism's asymmetric treatment of gains and losses is the persistent understatement of net a

39、sset values. Capital market regulators, standard setters, and academics criticize conservatism because this understatement in the current period can lead to overstatement of earnings in future periods by causing an under

40、statement of future expenses. For example Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) 2 (AICPA 1939) states:</p><p>　　Conservatism in the balance sheet is of dubious value if attained at the expense of conservatism i

41、n the income statement, which is far more significant.</p><p>　　Using "conservatism" to describe an income statement effect for a particular period was popularized by conservatism's critics. Th

42、at usage does not fit with the conservatism definition employed here. Conservatism refers to the cumulative financial effects represented in the balance sheet and to income or earnings cumulated since the firm began oper

43、ation.</p><p>　　Conservatism's influence on accounting practice has been both long and significant. Basu (1997, 8) argues that conservatism has influenced accounting practice for at least 500 years. Ster

44、ling (1970, 256) rates conservatism as the most influential principle of valuation in accounting .Recent empirical research on conservatism suggests not only that accounting practice is conservative, but also that practi

45、ce has become more conservative in the last 30 years. These results are surprising given the </p><p>　　Overview of Explanations for Conservatism</p><p>　　Researchers advance a number of explanat

46、ions for conservative reporting; all of them suggest that conservatism benefits users of the firm's accounting reports. One explanation is that conservatism arises because it is part of the efficient technology emplo

47、yed in the organization of the firm and its contracts with various parties. Under this contracting explanation, conservative accounting is a means of addressing moral hazard caused by parties to the firm having asymmetri

48、c information, asymmetri</p><p>　　Even if one separates contracting and managerial accounting from financial reporting, moral hazard problems will exist in financial reporting as long as the reports' acc

49、ounting measures inform investors about managerial performance and affect investors' asset allocation decisions and managers' welfare. These effects on managers' welfare will motivate managers to introduce bi

50、as and noise into the same accounting measures that regulators hope will inform investors, just as they motivate managers t</p><p>　　In practice, conservatism more than offsets managerial bias, and on averag

51、e defers earnings and understates cumulative earnings and net assets. In contracts these effects increase firm value because they constrain managements' opportunistic payments to themselves and other parties, such as

52、 shareholders. The increased firm value is shared among all parties to the firm, increasing everyone's welfare. In that sense, conservatism is an efficient contracting mechanism. Contracting explains three attr</p

53、><p>　　Conservatism is likely to be an efficient financial reporting mechanism in the absence of contracting. Other conservatism explanations discussed below suggest that, in addition to conservatism offsetting

54、 managerial bias in financial reporting, non-contracting parties in society also value conservatism's constraint on opportunistic payments to managers and other contracting parties. Given that, conservatism and the n

55、et asset bias it generates are probably necessary components of efficient financi</p><p>　　Shareholder litigation is another source of conservatism in recent years. Litigation also produces asymmetric payoff

56、s in that overstating the firm's net assets is more likely to generate litigation costs for the firm than understating net assets. By understating net assets, conservatism reduces the firm's expected litigation c

57、osts. The asymmetry in litigation costs is consistent with the legal system evolving to constrain opportunistic payments to managers and other parties to the firm. To that </p><p>　　The links between taxatio

58、n and reporting can also generate conservatism in financial reporting. Asymmetric recognition of gains and losses enables managers of profitable firms to reduce the present value of taxes and increase the value of the fi

59、rm. Delaying the recognition of revenues and accelerating the recognition of expense defers tax payments.</p><p>　　Finally, financial reporting standard setters and regulators have their own incentives to fa

60、vor conservative accounting and reporting. Just as there is an asymmetry in litigation costs, there is an asymmetry in regulators' costs. Standard setters and regulators are likely to face more criticism if firms ove

61、rstate net assets than if they understate net assets. Conservatism reduces the political costs imposed on standard setters and regulators. This asymmetry in political costs, like the asymmetry</p><p>　　The c

62、ommonalities among the four explanations suggest they might be manifestations of a single explanation. As we have seen, conservatism encouraged by contracting, litigation, and political costs.</p><p>　　The r

63、ecent empirical evidence suggesting that accounting conservatism exists and is on the rise in recent years is consistent, in varying degrees, with the four conservatism explanations. That however, some of the evidence ex

64、amined in Part II is also consistent with two explanations that do not imply conservatism. One of those explanations involves earnings management—management understates assets by taking excessive charges and excessive wr

65、ite-offs, perhaps in a "big bath," in order to overstat</p><p>　　The consistency of the evidence in Part II with the various conservatism explanations implies conservatism has a productive role in

66、financial reports providing information to capital market investors. That implication suggests regulators and standard setters should rethink or redirect their opposition to conservatism.</p><p>　　CONTRACTIN

67、G EXPLANATIONS FOR CONSERVATISM</p><p>　　Of the four conservatism explanations, I examine the contracting explanation most exhaustively because it is an early source of conservatism and its arguments are mor

68、e fully developed. The more developed arguments allow more complete articulation of the explanation's links to the standard setters' information perspective. Also, although contracting explanations emphasize form

69、al contracts, such as debt and management compensation contracts, they extend to the firm's organizational arrangements in</p><p>　　The contracting use of accounting is very old, spanning many centuries

70、of corporate use (Watts and Zimmerman 1983), and millennia for management control (de Ste Croix 1956; Chadwick 1992).Researchers suggest that long usage influenced the development and nature of contemporary accounting an

71、d financial reporting and led to the conservative bias examined here (Watts and Zimmennan1986; Watts 1993; Basu1995).</p><p>　　In contrast, other conservatism explanations rely on more recent phenomena. The

72、increase in shareholder litigation that began in the U.S. in the 1960s, and grew significantly afterward, is a" relatively recent explanation for conservatism. The tax system's influence on financial reporting a

73、ccounting methods, producing conservative methods such as LIFO, is another relatively recent explanation dating in the U.S. from 1909.Finally, and perhaps ironically given FASB's recent preference for neutrali</p&

74、gt;<p>　　Contracting explains three attributes of accounting measures: timeliness, verifiability, and asymmetric verifiability. In debt, compensation, and other contract explanations, conservatism emerges almost n

75、aturally as an efficient contracting mechanism because it is optimal for contracts' performance measures to have more stringent verification standards for gains than for losses. As before , the asymmetry in standards

76、 leads to greater delay in the recognition of gains than in the recognition of l</p><p>　　Source: Watts R L. Conservatism in accounting part Ι:explanations and implication [J]. Accounting Horizons,2003,(3):2