上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)問題研究外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　中文3400字</b></p><p><b>　　畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</b></p><p>　　所在學(xué)院： </p><p>　　專 業(yè)： </p><p>　　班 級(jí)

2、： </p><p>　　學(xué) 號(hào)： </p><p>　　姓 名： </p><p>　　指導(dǎo)教師： </p><p>　　2014 年 11 月 3 日

3、</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　題目： 上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)問題研究</p><p><b>　　一、股權(quán)激勵(lì)概述</b></p><p>　　(一)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的定義</p><p>　　股權(quán)激勵(lì)是通過經(jīng)營者獲得公司股權(quán)形式給予企業(yè)經(jīng)營者一定的經(jīng)

4、濟(jì)權(quán)利，使他們能夠以股東的身份參與企業(yè)決策﹑承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、分享利潤，從而勤勉盡責(zé)地為公司長期發(fā)展服務(wù)的一種激勵(lì)方法。</p><p>　　(二)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的作用</p><p><b>　　1.激勵(lì)作用</b></p><p>　　使被激勵(lì)者擁有企業(yè)的部份股權(quán)，用股權(quán)這個(gè)紐帶將被激勵(lì)者的利益與企業(yè)的利益緊緊綁在一起，實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)經(jīng)營者的長期激勵(lì)，使其能積極

5、、自覺地按照實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)既定目標(biāo)的要求，為了實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)利益和股東利益的最大化而努力工作，釋放出其人力資本的潛在價(jià)值，提高資本運(yùn)營效率，提高生產(chǎn)率，增強(qiáng)企業(yè)凝聚力，并最大限度地降低監(jiān)督成本。</p><p><b>　　2.約束效應(yīng)</b></p><p>　　約束作用主要表現(xiàn)在兩方面，一是因?yàn)楸患?lì)者與所有者已經(jīng)形成了“一榮俱榮、一損俱損”的利益共同體，如果經(jīng)營者因不努力工

6、作或其它原因?qū)е缕髽I(yè)利益受損，比如出現(xiàn)虧損，則經(jīng)營者會(huì)同其他股東一樣分擔(dān)企業(yè)的損失；二是通過一些限制條件(比如限制性股票) 使被激勵(lì)者不能輕意離職———若被激勵(lì)者在合同期滿前離職，則會(huì)損失一筆不小的既得經(jīng)濟(jì)利益。3.穩(wěn)定與共贏</p><p>　　由于股權(quán)激勵(lì)工具都對(duì)激勵(lì)對(duì)象行權(quán)條件中都附帶有服務(wù)期的限制，使其不能輕易離職。特別是對(duì)于高管和技術(shù)骨干、銷售骨干等“關(guān)鍵員工”，股權(quán)激勵(lì)的力度往往較大，所以股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)于

7、穩(wěn)定“關(guān)鍵員工”的作用也比較明顯。實(shí)現(xiàn)了企業(yè)與員工長期穩(wěn)定合作，結(jié)合利益共同體就形成個(gè)人與企業(yè)的共贏。</p><p>　　二、上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的問題及成因分析</p><p>　　(一)上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)存在的問題</p><p>　　1.股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施受限</p><p>　　從 2007 年 12 月 20 日啟動(dòng)的第二批股權(quán)激勵(lì)，

8、共有 26 家上市公司公布了股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃，截止 2008 年底所有 26 家公司股價(jià)跌破行權(quán)價(jià)。但不同于2008 年，2009 年只有兩家公司取消和否定了股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃。2008年間高比例的公司提出了終止股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃導(dǎo)致實(shí)施受限，從另一個(gè)側(cè)面影射出股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施過程中必然存在一些問題。</p><p>　　2.股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)象考核方法單一</p><p>　　從下表中發(fā)現(xiàn)，目前對(duì)絕大多數(shù)上市公司的

9、激勵(lì)對(duì)象的考核是以會(huì)計(jì)指標(biāo)為基礎(chǔ)，且大部分公司采用了 2 到 3 個(gè)財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)，即主要以凈利潤增長率、凈資產(chǎn)收益率為主要指標(biāo)。激勵(lì)對(duì)象存在辭職套現(xiàn)行為。伴隨著上市公司高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)熱潮的是大批高管辭職套現(xiàn)。三花股份披露的2007年年報(bào)表明，2006年3月份辭職的該公司1名原副總裁、2名董事，2007年分別減持了所持有的全部三花股份 88.83 萬股和 50.10 萬股；該公司原董事長張亞波于2007年4月辭去董事長及董事職務(wù)，其以“高管股份

10、”形式鎖定的565萬的股份在2007年11月9日也已自動(dòng)解除鎖定，獲得上市流通權(quán)。雖然還不能斷言上市公司高管辭職的主要原因就是為了套現(xiàn)，但是擁有大量上市公司股份卻又不具有控股權(quán)的高管所表現(xiàn)出的強(qiáng)烈減持套現(xiàn)的動(dòng)機(jī)值得警醒。</p><p>　　(二)上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)問題成因分析</p><p>　　1.股票期權(quán)行權(quán)價(jià)設(shè)定不當(dāng)影響激勵(lì)效果</p><p>　　股票期權(quán)計(jì)

11、劃能否對(duì)經(jīng)營者實(shí)現(xiàn)激勵(lì)以及激勵(lì)程度的大小取決于行權(quán)價(jià)的制定，而行權(quán)價(jià)又以股權(quán)激勵(lì)行權(quán)時(shí)公司股票價(jià)格為依據(jù)。市場有效時(shí)，經(jīng)營者通過努力工作使企業(yè)業(yè)績提升，股票價(jià)格能及時(shí)反映該變化，經(jīng)營者通過行權(quán)就能獲利，股票期權(quán)因此就能實(shí)現(xiàn)激勵(lì)功能。若市場無效，股票價(jià)格對(duì)經(jīng)營者的經(jīng)營業(yè)績和企業(yè)價(jià)值不敏感甚至負(fù)向反映，股價(jià)的變動(dòng)不僅取決于經(jīng)理人本身努力，宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)、行業(yè)發(fā)展等因素對(duì)股票價(jià)格影響都非常大，這就有可能在制定行權(quán)價(jià)時(shí)出現(xiàn)極大的偏差，還可能在經(jīng)營者通

12、過努力經(jīng)營，提高公司業(yè)績，企業(yè)價(jià)值上升后，而股票價(jià)格卻沒有完全反映出，這樣就會(huì)損害經(jīng)營者的期權(quán)利益，挫傷其積極性。因此在設(shè)定股票期權(quán)價(jià)格時(shí)應(yīng)剔除系統(tǒng)因素的影響，在整體經(jīng)濟(jì)波動(dòng)時(shí)進(jìn)行動(dòng)態(tài)行權(quán)價(jià)格的確定，增強(qiáng)股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)的有效性。</p><p>　　2.企業(yè)的業(yè)績?cè)u(píng)價(jià)體系不完善</p><p>　　目前推出的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案中，經(jīng)營者績效評(píng)價(jià)考慮的因素不全面，主要側(cè)重評(píng)價(jià)財(cái)務(wù)績效(僅運(yùn)用了財(cái)務(wù)指

13、標(biāo))，指標(biāo)比較單一，幾乎均以ROE 和凈利潤增長率為評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)。財(cái)務(wù)評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)只反映結(jié)果，不反映過程，會(huì)造成企業(yè)管理層過分注重歷史，而缺少對(duì)未來業(yè)績的預(yù)測，片面追求暫時(shí)的盈利能力取得和維持短期的財(cái)務(wù)成果，助長其急功近利和短期投機(jī)的行為。使投資者不能全面了解企業(yè)的經(jīng)營狀況，不利于資本的優(yōu)化配置，一定程度上導(dǎo)致了企業(yè)過度注重財(cái)務(wù)績效，而忽視了影響企業(yè)長遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展的有關(guān)事項(xiàng)。因此，在對(duì)激勵(lì)對(duì)象評(píng)價(jià)考核時(shí)還應(yīng)加入非財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)。</p>&l

14、t;p>　　3.股權(quán)激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制不健全</p><p>　　上市公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)比較混亂，所有權(quán)缺位導(dǎo)致產(chǎn)權(quán)制度混亂，有很多上市公司有執(zhí)行董事參與薪酬委員會(huì)決策，薪酬委員會(huì)主席由公司董事長或母公司領(lǐng)導(dǎo)兼任，就是說制定經(jīng)理層激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的“薪酬委員會(huì)”成員與享受激勵(lì)的高管層重疊，實(shí)質(zhì)上變成了自己給自己制定激勵(lì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。</p><p>　　股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的制定者與激勵(lì)對(duì)象沒有分離，加上缺乏股東的

15、有效監(jiān)督，導(dǎo)致股權(quán)激勵(lì)門檻較低，高管普遍均享受到股權(quán)激勵(lì)，股權(quán)激勵(lì)變相的變成了一種股權(quán)分紅。在退出機(jī)制及相關(guān)限制條件的設(shè)計(jì)上較為寬松，股權(quán)激勵(lì)的有效期限也較短，高管在短期內(nèi)就能通過行權(quán)獲得大量收益，這種現(xiàn)象與股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制的長期性相違背，因此上市公司對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的內(nèi)部約束形同虛設(shè)。</p><p>　　三、解決上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)問題的對(duì)策</p><p>　　(一)完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)</

16、p><p>　　公司治理不完善，在“內(nèi)部人控制”的情況下引入股權(quán)激勵(lì)，必然出現(xiàn)經(jīng)營者為自己定薪定股，損害公司和股東利益的情況。健全的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)是上市公司健康運(yùn)行的重要制度基礎(chǔ)，也是股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制發(fā)揮作用的必要條件，設(shè)立獨(dú)立董事制度，監(jiān)督董事會(huì)對(duì)人事、薪酬、戰(zhàn)略等重大問題的決策的合法性、公正性、獨(dú)立性；設(shè)立監(jiān)事會(huì)制度，保證公司內(nèi)部治理層面董事會(huì)相關(guān)決策有益于公司的整體利益，同時(shí)也確保監(jiān)督管理層執(zhí)行董事會(huì)決策更具有效性；

17、建立內(nèi)控制度，對(duì)企業(yè)內(nèi)部各項(xiàng)業(yè)務(wù)活動(dòng)進(jìn)行有效控制；建立審計(jì)委員會(huì)制度，對(duì)企業(yè)內(nèi)部財(cái)務(wù)運(yùn)行機(jī)制有效地進(jìn)行監(jiān)管。為了避免監(jiān)事會(huì)人員和董事會(huì)人員由于長期“磨合”，使約束失效，監(jiān)事會(huì)人員應(yīng)采用輪換制，每3 年或 5 年進(jìn)行一次人員調(diào)整。</p><p>　　(二)健全獨(dú)立董事制度</p><p>　　上市公司基本均聘任了獨(dú)立董事，對(duì)上市公司的內(nèi)部業(yè)務(wù)起到一定的監(jiān)督作用，但是引入獨(dú)立董事制度的時(shí)間較

18、短，各種配套制度和外部環(huán)境還不完善，在一定程度上制約了其的充分發(fā)揮。很多公司都是由大股東或管理層向董事會(huì)提出獨(dú)立董事人選，再以董事會(huì)的名義提名，這樣的提名機(jī)制難以保障獨(dú)立董事獨(dú)立于大股東和管理層，獨(dú)立董事個(gè)體獨(dú)立性與整體獨(dú)立性則受到影響，導(dǎo)致董事會(huì)控制力弱化。還有不少獨(dú)立董事缺乏企業(yè)管理的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，對(duì)企業(yè)的運(yùn)作不熟悉，難以擔(dān)負(fù)起監(jiān)督公司規(guī)范運(yùn)作的重任，同時(shí)上市公司還會(huì)出于各種考慮，盡量不提供或少提供不利于公司的資料，甚至有意不通知獨(dú)立董事參

19、加董事會(huì)會(huì)議，造成獨(dú)立董事無法獲取充足的信息，致使獨(dú)立董事的知情權(quán)很難得到保證，難以發(fā)揮其作用。</p><p>　　(三)實(shí)施企業(yè)文化理念激勵(lì)</p><p>　　1.塑造企業(yè)文化進(jìn)行精神激勵(lì)</p><p>　　企業(yè)文化是企業(yè)的精神文化、制度文化和物質(zhì)文化的總和，是企業(yè)長期經(jīng)營發(fā)展過程中逐漸形成的適合本組織特點(diǎn)的經(jīng)營理念，由于優(yōu)秀的企業(yè)能帶給員工強(qiáng)烈的歸屬感、榮

20、譽(yù)感及積極的精神狀態(tài)，因此企業(yè)文化的塑造已成為當(dāng)代企業(yè)精神激勵(lì)的重要手段。在員工進(jìn)入企業(yè)后，定期對(duì)員工進(jìn)行企業(yè)價(jià)值、理念的培訓(xùn)，并經(jīng)常組織企業(yè)內(nèi)部團(tuán)隊(duì)活動(dòng)，增強(qiáng)企業(yè)榮譽(yù)感，使員工切實(shí)體會(huì)到個(gè)人與集體形成的共同體，這樣員工才有動(dòng)力盡心盡力為企業(yè)貢獻(xiàn)自己的能力。</p><p>　　2.運(yùn)用企業(yè)貢獻(xiàn)值法增強(qiáng)員工歸屬感</p><p>　　增強(qiáng)企業(yè)歸屬感可以通過建立員工企業(yè)累計(jì)貢獻(xiàn)值檔案的方式，

21、每一名進(jìn)入企業(yè)的員工都會(huì)設(shè)置自己的企業(yè)貢獻(xiàn)值檔案，由人事部統(tǒng)一管理。企業(yè)必須有完整的評(píng)判系統(tǒng)，基本思路是員工對(duì)企業(yè)的貢獻(xiàn)值通過累計(jì)貢獻(xiàn)值分體現(xiàn)，每 1分為一個(gè)貢獻(xiàn)值。</p><p>　　在評(píng)分體系中設(shè)立團(tuán)隊(duì)加分和個(gè)人加分體系，二者不沖突，可以重復(fù)累加。每個(gè)車間或部門都可成為一個(gè)團(tuán)隊(duì)，企業(yè)對(duì)每個(gè)團(tuán)隊(duì)都有相對(duì)應(yīng)的考核指標(biāo)，每個(gè)月對(duì)每個(gè)團(tuán)隊(duì)都有最低分 10 分，即整體曠工率在正常范圍內(nèi)即可獲得；業(yè)績方面，若團(tuán)隊(duì)能完成

22、每月任務(wù)可加分 50，高出目標(biāo)的百分點(diǎn)也會(huì)體現(xiàn)在加分上，例如，若本月生產(chǎn)車間目標(biāo)生產(chǎn)100件產(chǎn)品并且次品率在 2%以內(nèi)，實(shí)際完成200 件產(chǎn)品且次品率均在 2%以內(nèi)，則本月團(tuán)隊(duì)中每個(gè)人會(huì)加分50+50×(200- 100)/100=100。</p><p>　　每年年末人事部門對(duì)每個(gè)人和各部門當(dāng)年企業(yè)貢獻(xiàn)值進(jìn)行核算，同時(shí)算出累計(jì)貢獻(xiàn)值，根據(jù)當(dāng)年企業(yè)貢獻(xiàn)值高低確定評(píng)出一定數(shù)量的年度優(yōu)秀員工和優(yōu)秀團(tuán)隊(duì)，每個(gè)

23、部門由于工作性質(zhì)、員工人數(shù)等因素不同所分到得優(yōu)秀員工比例也不同，需要人事部門認(rèn)真權(quán)衡。對(duì)于優(yōu)秀員工和優(yōu)秀團(tuán)隊(duì)每年中會(huì)有貢獻(xiàn)值獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)分，同時(shí)配以物質(zhì)激勵(lì)(如現(xiàn)金激勵(lì)、股權(quán)激勵(lì)等)。</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Listed Companies Incentive Research</p><p>　　1、Over

24、view of equity incentive </p><p>　　1.1 The definition of equity incentive </p><p>　　Equity incentive is obtained in the form of company shares by operators to give business owners a certain econ

25、omic rights, enabling them to participate in corporate decision-making capacity as shareholders ﹑ risk, profit-sharing, so that due diligence services for the company's long-term development of an incentive method .

26、</p><p>　　1.2 The role of incentive stock options </p><p>　　1.2.1 The incentives </p><p>　　So be excited owned a minority share of enterprises with equity this link will be excited

27、with the interests of those companies closely tied together, to achieve long-term incentive for operators to enable them to actively and consciously in accordance with established enterprise requires that the target in o

28、rder to achieve corporate interests and maximize the interests of shareholders and work hard, releasing the potential value of their human capital, improve capital operational efficiency, in</p><p>　　1.2.2 C

29、onfinement effect </p><p>　　Constraints role is mainly manifested in two aspects, one is excited because the owner has been formed by "a prosperity, a loss for both sides," the interests of the com

30、munity, if the operators do not work hard or because of other reasons, to the detriment of the interests of enterprises, such as the emergence losses, the operators jointly with other shareholders share the same loss of

31、business; the second is through a number of constraints (such as restricted stock) so that those who can not li</p><p>　　Since the equity incentive tools for incentive target vesting conditions are included

32、with limited service period, it can not easily leave. Especially for executives and technology backbone, the backbone of sales and other "key employees" equity incentive efforts tend to be larger, so the equity

33、 incentive for stability "key employees" role is relatively obvious. Enterprises and employees to achieve a long-term stable cooperation, combining to form a community of interests and win-win for individ</p

34、><p>　　2、The problem and cause analysis of listed companies equity incentive </p><p>　　2.1 A listed company equity incentive Problems </p><p>　　2.1.1 The implementation of restricted s

35、tock incentive </p><p>　　From December 20, 2007 start of the second batch of incentive, a total of 26 listed companies announced equity incentive plan, as of the end of 2008 all 26 company's share price

36、fell below the exercise price. But unlike 2008, in 2009 only two companies to cancel and deny the equity incentive plan. 2008 between a high proportion of the company proposed a termination causes the implementation of r

37、estricted stock incentive plan, mapping out from the other side, there are some issues of equity incen</p><p>　　2.1.2 Assessment of equity incentive target single </p><p>　　Found from the table

38、below, the vast majority of listed companies is currently the object of the assessment is based on incentive-based accounting indicators, and most of the company adopted the 2-3 financial indicators, ie mainly in the net

39、 profit growth, return on net assets was the main indicators. Presence resign cash incentive target behavior. Along with executives of listed companies is a large number of equity incentive boom executives to resign cash

40、. 2007 Annual Report of the shares of t</p><p>　　2.2 Equity Incentive Cause Analysis of Listed Companies </p><p>　　2.2.1 The stock option exercise price is set improperly influence the incentiv

41、e effect </p><p>　　Stock option plan can achieve the incentive for operators as well as the degree of excitation depends on the development of the exercise price, the exercise price and the right line again

42、equity incentive is based on the company's stock price. When the market effectively, operators work hard to enable enterprises to enhance the performance, stock prices can reflect this change, the operator will be ab

43、le to profit through the exercise of stock options and therefore be able to achieve excitation f</p><p>　　2.2.2. The enterprise performance evaluation system is imperfect </p><p>　　Currently lau

44、nched equity incentive program, the factors considered by the operator performance evaluation is not comprehensive, focused primarily on the evaluation of financial performance (using only the financial indicators), indi

45、cator is relatively simple, almost are ROE and net profit growth for the evaluation. Financial evaluation reflect only the results do not reflect the process will result in an excessive focus on the history of corporate

46、management, and the lack of future performance </p><p>　　2.2.3 Equity Incentive mechanism is not perfect </p><p>　　Internal governance structure of listed companies is a bit confusing, ownership

47、 of the property rights system resulting in the absence of confusion, a lot of executive directors of listed companies to participate in the decision-making of the Remuneration Committee, the Chairman of the Remuneration

48、 Committee led by the chairman or part-time parent, that the development of Executive Incentive Plan members of the "remuneration Committee" overlap with senior executives enjoy incentives, in essence,</p>

49、;<p>　　Makers with the incentive target equity incentive plan no separation, coupled with the lack of effective supervision of shareholders, resulting in a lower equity incentive threshold, executives were general

50、ly enjoy the incentive, equity incentive becomes a disguised equity dividends. In the design of the exit mechanism and associated restrictions on the more relaxed, equity incentive shorter validity period, executives in

51、the short term will be able to get a lot of benefits through exercise, a p</p><p>　　3、The shares of listed companies the incentive problem solving strategies </p><p>　　3.1 Improve the corporate

52、governance structure </p><p>　　Corporate governance is imperfect, the introduction of equity incentive under "internal control", the operators set their own salary for a given situation stocks, dam

53、age to the company and shareholders interests inevitable. Sound corporate governance structure of listed companies is an important basis for the healthy operation of the system, but also the role of equity incentives nec

54、essary condition for the establishment of an independent director system, supervisory board on major issues of per</p><p>　　3.2 Improve the independent director system </p><p>　　China's list

55、ed companies are hired basically independent directors of listed company's internal business play a supervisory role, but the time of the introduction of the independent director system is short, various ancillary sy

56、stems and the external environment is not perfect, to a certain extent, restricted its full play. Many companies are major shareholders or management proposed by the independent director candidates to the Board, on behal

57、f of the board of directors nominated again, this me</p><p>　　3.3 The implementation of the concept of corporate culture Incentive </p><p>　　3.3.1 Shaping corporate culture inspired by the spiri

58、t.</p><p>　　Corporate culture is the sum of the spirit of enterprise culture, institutional culture and material culture, is suitable for the characteristics of the philosophy of the organization long-term b

59、usiness development process gradually, due to the excellent corporate employees can bring a strong sense of belonging, pride and positive mental state, so the corporate culture has become an important means of shaping co

60、ntemporary entrepreneurship incentives. After the employee into the enterprise, regul</p><p>　　3.3.2 The use of corporate contributions to enhance their sense of belonging value method </p><p>　

61、　Enhance their sense of belonging to the cumulative contribution value by establishing enterprise employees archives way, every employee will be set into the enterprise's contribution to the value of their corporate

62、archives, unified management by the Ministry of Personnel. Companies must have a complete evaluation system, the basic idea is the contribution of staff of the enterprise value divided by the cumulative contribution refl

63、ects the value of the contribution of each one into a value. </p><p>　　In the scoring system set up team points and individual points system, the two do not conflict, you can repeat accumulate. Each workshop

64、 or department can become a team, business has a corresponding assessment indicators for each team, each team has a minimum monthly for 10 points, that overall absenteeism rate within the normal range can be obtained; fi

65、nancial performance, if the team can complete the task month plus 50 percentage points higher than the target will be reflected in the extra poi</p><p>　　End of each year for accounting and personnel departm

66、ents and various departments each year for contributions to the value of the enterprise, while the cumulative contribution value is calculated according to the level of contribution to the value determined when the compa

67、nies named a number of excellent staff and excellent team of the year, due to the nature of each department, employee the number of different factors such as the proportion of outstanding employees have assigned differen