外文翻譯--農(nóng)村公共基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施服務(wù)的私人供給補貼的競爭

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Private Provision of Rural Infrastructure Services:</p><p>　　Competing for Subsidies</p><p>

2、　　By Björn Wellenius, Vivien Foster, and Christina Malmberg-Calvo</p><p>　　Three billion people live in rural areas worldwide and many lack communication, electricity, water, sanitation, and transportat

3、ion services that are deemed essential for economic development and directly impact the quality of life. Monopoly provision ,inmost countries by the public sector, often leads to high investment and running costs,　weak o

4、peration and maintenance　,and limited responsiveness to local needs.　Market　distortions,　government intervention,　and hidden subsidies fail to promote ef</p><p>　　Market-oriented economic reforms have opened

5、 the way to more effective solutions for　infrastructure services based on private sector provision,　cost recovery through tariffs,　increasingly competitive markets,　and regulation where sufficient competition does not　ma

6、terialize.　These reforms aim at accelerating service growth and innovation　,making　production more efficient,　and increasing responsiveness to differing user needs and payment capabilities.</p><p>　　Gaps typ

7、ically remain　,however,　between what service providers are prepared to do　solely on commercial grounds and what governments consider necessary from broader　development perspectives.　Many rural areas and,　to a lesser exte

8、nt,　low-income urban　areas,　continue to be excluded.</p><p>　　Subsidies may be justified to narrow these gaps.　Loosely speaking,　a subsidy exists when　the costs incurred in supplying a service are not fully

9、recovered from the revenues raised　by selling this service,　the difference being met by other customers in the same or related　industries or by governments(Wad　dams Price 2000).The economic rationale for　subsidy is based

10、 on the existence of consumption and production externalities,　network　externalities,　and scale economies.　Also,　access to these servic</p><p>　　Rural subsidy practices</p><p>　　In the context o

11、f market-oriented economic policies, subsidies for rural infrastructure　services aim at developing sustainable markets for the private provision of these services.　Subsidies are designed to turn socially desirable invest

12、ments that are not profitable by　themselves into commercially viable undertakings. Projects that are not demonstrably　good for society at large or are unlikely to ever stand on their own do not justify subsidy　support an

13、d are seldom undertaken.</p><p>　　Good subsidy practice commits all participants to contribute to financing the provision of services:?</p><p>　　?Service providers invest and risk their own reso

14、urces to set up the facilities and　provide the services during a given time under specified conditions.</p><p>　　?Government subsidies help service providers meet some investment and start-up　costs. Subsidie

15、s are designed to reduce access barriers to which low-income groups　are especially sensitive, such as initial connection, equipment, or installation charges.</p><p>　　?Customers pay for the use of services a

16、t least as much as is needed to meet operating　and maintenance costs. Where domestic installations are involved, customers are also　required to pay part of the investment cost, as a confirmation of economic demand for　se

17、rvice and commitment to pay for service use. Consumption is subsidized only　exceptionally and limited to small amounts of service regarded as essential.</p><p>　　The design of subsidies is closely tied to th

18、e available service delivery mechanisms.　Subsidies are channeled through the service supply chain in ways that aim at being　neutral with respect to competition among service providers, service alternatives, and technolog

19、ies.</p><p>　　Water supply</p><p>　　Potable water and, to a lesser extent, sanitation services, are often a priority for rural　communities. Willingness to pay for improved services depends on th

20、e distance to, and　quality of, existing sources of water and sanitation facilities, as well as the consumers’　perceptions of the health threats of unimproved services. Solutions to improved water　supplies in rural areas

21、are almost always localized, the water supply (be it ground or　surface water) and its treatment and distribution being pro</p><p>　　After years of struggling to achieve sustainable rural water systems scatte

22、red in　communities across the rural landscape, most countries have now shifted from centralized　supply-driven service provision models to decentralized demand-responsive ones. Rural　water systems are often financed and c

23、onstructed through programs managed by　specialized national or regional agencies, and then handed over to be operated and　maintained by community-based organizations, such as water committees andcooperativ</p><

24、;p>　　There are recent cases of applying competition among firms for subsidized concessions　to provide new connections and upgrade existing systems.</p><p>　　In Paraguay the target is to provide piped wate

25、r service to about 2.0 million people in　rural areas, reaching 85 percent population coverage by 2010. During a pilot project, the　national agency responsible for service provision (SENASA) invited competitive bids for　a

26、 10-year exclusive concession to design, build, and operate water supply systems in four　small towns with a combined population of about 12,000. The concessionaire receives a　one-time subsidy of $150 per completed connec

27、tion. Prior t</p><p>　　In Colombia, construction companies are invited to bid for contracts to build and operate　water and sewerage systems for 10 to 15 years in about 25 small municipalities with less　than

28、12,000 inhabitants. These contracts are awarded to the bidders that request the　lowest one-time subsidy for investment. Investments are expected to be in the range of$0.5-1.0 m per municipality. Subsidies cover about 70

29、percent of investment, averaging　about $300 per connection or $60 per person served. Only munici</p><p>　　Source:　World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3365, August 2004</p><p><b>　　譯文：

30、</b></p><p>　　農(nóng)村公共基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施服務(wù)的私人供給：補貼的競爭 </p><p>　　作者：比約韋勒紐斯，福斯特，卡沃爾</p><p>　　世界上有多達30億的人口住在農(nóng)村地區(qū)，而大部分地區(qū)都缺少通訊，電力，飲水，衛(wèi)生設(shè)備和交通等服務(wù)。這些都是經(jīng)濟發(fā)展所必不可少的，它們直接影響人們的生活質(zhì)量。在很多國家這些供給都由公共部門壟斷，這樣的供給往往

31、是高投資，低回報，運營水平低和維護不及時，并且對當(dāng)?shù)匦枨蟮淖兓磻?yīng)也不及時。市場規(guī)避，政府介入，還有隱性的補貼，這些都難以對資源形成有效的利用，從而不能滿足社會需求；不能對窮人進行專門補貼；不能說清成本與收益或者減低對補貼的依賴。</p><p>　　市場導(dǎo)向的經(jīng)濟改革已經(jīng)向能夠更加有效的供給基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施服務(wù)的方案敞開大門。這些改革建立在競爭日漸激烈的市場和沒有具體化的充分競爭的市場規(guī)章的基礎(chǔ)上，通過稅收制度來回收成

32、本。這些改革旨在加速服務(wù)增長和創(chuàng)新，使產(chǎn)品供給更加有效，提高對不同用戶的需求和支付能力的反應(yīng)速度。</p><p>　　但是，服務(wù)供給者只準(zhǔn)備在商業(yè)范圍內(nèi)供給服務(wù)，這和政府?dāng)U大供給范圍的愿景之間存在差距。很多農(nóng)村地區(qū)，或者退一步講，低收入的農(nóng)村地區(qū)，仍然沒被包括在內(nèi)。</p><p>　　補貼也許能被證明是縮小差距的正確手段。寬泛的講，當(dāng)供給服務(wù)的成本小于收入時，補貼就會發(fā)生。差額由政府或

33、用戶以及其他企業(yè)支付。補貼的經(jīng)濟學(xué)原理是建立在消費和產(chǎn)品外在性，網(wǎng)絡(luò)外在性，和規(guī)模經(jīng)濟的基礎(chǔ)上的。在可接受的價格范圍內(nèi)獲得這些服務(wù)被認(rèn)為是能夠讓農(nóng)村地區(qū)人們公平有效的加入現(xiàn)代社會的必要條件。</p><p><b>　　農(nóng)村地區(qū)補貼實踐：</b></p><p>　　在市場導(dǎo)向的經(jīng)濟政策大背景下，對農(nóng)村地區(qū)公共基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的補貼旨在發(fā)展私人供給服務(wù)的市場。補貼被設(shè)計成能夠

34、使在商業(yè)方面上的不盈利的投在轉(zhuǎn)到社會需求投資上來。大致上不確定對社會有用或者很可能跟原來政策方向不一樣的計劃很難被繼續(xù)實施：</p><p>　　1、好的補貼實踐能讓參與方都對服務(wù)供應(yīng)商提供經(jīng)濟支持：</p><p>　　服務(wù)提供者為自己的資金投資而承擔(dān)風(fēng)險，建立一些基本的設(shè)施，并在一定條件下在給定時間內(nèi)提供服務(wù)。</p><p>　　2、政府幫助服務(wù)提供者具備充足

35、的投資啟動資金。補貼被用來減少低收入群體特別是敏感群體的進入壁壘，比如，初始連接，裝備，設(shè)施收費。對顧客的收費能夠至少彌補日常運營與維護成本。</p><p>　　3、與顧客關(guān)系密切的家庭設(shè)施，顧客需要支付一部分投資成本，彌補服務(wù)的投入成本以及服務(wù)的使用成本。只對例外的和必要的小額消費進行補貼。</p><p>　　補貼的設(shè)置與可取的服務(wù)輸送機制緊密聯(lián)系在一起。補貼通過服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈流轉(zhuǎn)。補貼

36、會通過各種方式發(fā)放給服務(wù)供應(yīng)商。</p><p><b>　　飲水供給：</b></p><p>　　飲用水，或者退一步說，衛(wèi)生系統(tǒng)服務(wù)，在農(nóng)村地區(qū)經(jīng)常是優(yōu)先得到的。為改良的服務(wù)付費的意愿隨服務(wù)距離和服務(wù)質(zhì)量，水質(zhì)，衛(wèi)生設(shè)備，還有顧客的健康觀念而定。農(nóng)村地區(qū)改良用水的解決方案經(jīng)常具有地方特色，水處理和輸送服務(wù)常被作為是一個該地區(qū)的突出系統(tǒng)。在水資源稀缺或者社區(qū)相聚較近

37、的地區(qū)，聯(lián)網(wǎng)解決方案具有經(jīng)濟意義。不同的產(chǎn)水技術(shù)有與其相應(yīng)的服務(wù)水平選項，這些選項范圍從共用設(shè)施到家庭終端等。衛(wèi)生系統(tǒng)的服務(wù)水平與技術(shù)選擇則根據(jù)人口規(guī)模與衛(wèi)生要求程度，供水服務(wù)水平，消費稅等而定。比較適合發(fā)展中國家大部分農(nóng)村地區(qū)的解決方案是實地衛(wèi)生系統(tǒng)。有時候在一些大型社區(qū)里面會裝一些陰溝和污水處理系統(tǒng)，但是成本很高。</p><p>　　在經(jīng)過為獲得被分散在農(nóng)村各個地區(qū)的合理的供水系統(tǒng)奮斗了數(shù)年后，很多國家現(xiàn)在

38、把集中的供應(yīng)驅(qū)動式的服務(wù)供給模式轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)榉稚⒌男枨篁?qū)動式的供應(yīng)模式。農(nóng)村地區(qū)的供水系統(tǒng)一般由特定的國家機構(gòu)或地方機構(gòu)出資修建，然后交由非營利性公眾組織運營管理，比如，供水合作委員會。公眾組織在簡單的供水與衛(wèi)生系統(tǒng)上做的越來越好，雖然他們只是處理一些簡單小額的項目而且還不能積累資金或者發(fā)展技術(shù)來升級完善系統(tǒng)完善。越來越多的國家正在尋找新的可持續(xù)的農(nóng)村供水系統(tǒng)模式，，大部分傾向于通過管理合同，租賃合同或者特許權(quán)的形式來讓私人部門運營現(xiàn)有服務(wù)系

39、統(tǒng)。</p><p>　　最近有幾個供應(yīng)競爭的例子。有些企業(yè)為特定補貼而提供新終端并進行現(xiàn)有系統(tǒng)升級。</p><p>　　在巴拉圭，它的目標(biāo)是在2010年前對多達2百萬的農(nóng)村人口提供自來水服務(wù)，使覆蓋率達到85%。在一場小規(guī)模試驗計劃中，負(fù)責(zé)提供服務(wù)的國家機構(gòu)爭取了一個10年的獨家特權(quán)用來設(shè)計，建造并運營供水系統(tǒng)，而這個系統(tǒng)覆蓋4個小鎮(zhèn)，12000人。特許權(quán)獲得者將能得到每終端150美元

40、的補貼。在投標(biāo)前，為未計量的終端征收的稅被定在5.26美元每月以及最初12立方米的每月3.95美元的稅加上未計量過的終端的額外每立方米0.53美元的稅，從而使服從于原則上的周期性調(diào)整。設(shè)計和服務(wù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)也在之前確立。特許權(quán)將被給向終端使用收費最低的地方供水系統(tǒng)和建筑承包商。雙方合同將把SENASA，社區(qū)，還有承包商運營商全多聯(lián)系到服務(wù)中去。截止2003年8月，四個系統(tǒng)中兩個已經(jīng)完成并投入運營。在波多黎各的納納瓦和靠近進亞松森的地區(qū)，第二個投

41、標(biāo)正在進行當(dāng)中。它將擁有更大更多社區(qū)的特許權(quán)，并能滿足7600人的使用。在第二次試驗中，稅和終端點收費已經(jīng)實現(xiàn)與參加試驗的社區(qū)談妥。投標(biāo)人所要求的一次性補貼將被作為招標(biāo)變量使用。</p><p>　　在哥倫比亞，建筑承包公司經(jīng)常被邀請投標(biāo)建立并運營水和污物處理系統(tǒng)10到25年。地區(qū)則一般是總?cè)丝谛∮?2000的小自治區(qū)。這些合同一般會給投資補貼要求最低的競標(biāo)者。投資預(yù)計將在0.5到1.0美元每直轄市米。補貼將包含

42、70%的投資，也就是300美元每終端點或者60美元每服務(wù)對象。只有同意支付至少涵蓋運營與維護成本的費用的自治區(qū)才有資格參加。合同雙方是承建運營商和自治區(qū)，后者將對監(jiān)督和項目實施負(fù)責(zé)。家庭自來水用戶預(yù)計將在未來2到5年內(nèi)由不足60%提高到90%,而使用污水處理系統(tǒng)的比例由不足30%提高到超過70%。供水覆蓋率在納納瓦鎮(zhèn)達到了100%，而污水處理系統(tǒng)覆蓋率也達到了同樣的水平，在兩年內(nèi)達到24小時連續(xù)供水的合同也已經(jīng)簽署。</p>