外文翻譯---資本結(jié)構(gòu)，股利政策，跨國經(jīng)營理論與實證研究

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Capital structure, dividend policy, and multinational: Theory versus empirical evidence</p>

2、<p>　　3.1.Factors influencing capital structure and dividend policy</p><p>　　It is important to examine the factors that impact capital structure and dividend policy so that appropriate control variabl

3、es can be included in the examination of the impact of multinational on capital structure and dividend policy. The list of these control variables must be based on extant theories and empirical evidence related to capita

4、l structure and dividend policy. Theories in these areas generally start with the well known results presented in Modigliani and Miller (1958) note that in </p><p>　　3.1.1. Operating leverage and other influ

5、ences</p><p>　　The operating leverage of a firm reflects its business risk. Firms with higher operating leverage face higher bankruptcy probabilities and should have lower financial leverage. However, higher

6、 operating leverage is generally associated with higher levels of fixed tangible assets — indeed the proportion of such assets is widely used in the literature as a measure of operating leverage. A firm's level of fi

7、xed assets should be associated positively with leverage as high levels of such assets can b</p><p>　　3.1.2. Trade-off theories</p><p>　　In the trade-off theory, capital structure decisions of f

8、irms depend on benefits and costs of using more debt. Less debt is used if the cost of bankruptcy is higher than the tax shield or other benefits of using debt (Kim & Sorensen, 1986; Graham, 2000). Therefore, the tra

9、de-off theory suggests a negative relationship between leverage and bankruptcy costs and a positive relationship between leverage and firm's marginal tax rate(Lasfer, 1995; Cloyd, Limberg, & Robinson, 1997). Acco

10、rding to Rozeff</p><p>　　3.1.3. Impact of agency costs</p><p>　　Availability of free cash flow creates an agency problem since managers can use some of the free cash available for their own bene

11、fit, thereby decreasing the value of the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To protect against this managerial sub-optimal behavior, firms with higher level of cash flow should use higher leverage. The asymmetric inform

12、ation model of Ross (1977) also notes that there should be a positive relationship between use debt and the firm's profitability. Agency theory also indic</p><p>　　The agency issue in dividend payout dec

13、isions is similar to capital structure decisions in the presence of agency costs. In agency model of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986), dividends and debt help control the agency costs of overinvestment if the

14、re are conflicts of interests between managers and stockholders. Thus, agency costs predict a positive relation between firm's free cash flow and payment of dividends. According to the signaling hypothesis of Ross (1

15、977),firms with high prof</p><p>　　3.1.4. Pecking order theory</p><p>　　The pecking order model (Myers & Majluf, 1984) contends that because of transaction costs and information asymmetry, f

16、irms finance new investments first with retained earnings, then successively with safe debt, risky debt and finally with equity. According to this pecking order model, more profitable firms should have lower leverage and

17、 lower short-term, but not long-term, payout controlling for investment opportunities. In a simple version of the pecking order model, firms with high investment </p><p>　　3.2.Interdependence between capital

18、 structure and dividend policy</p><p>　　Many of the factors discussed above have been shown to influence not only capital structure but also dividend policy. Easterbrook (1984)documents that dividends exists

19、 because they induce firms to float new securities suggesting that firm's dividend decisions linked to firm's financing decisions. Intuitively, it is clear that the firm's payout ratio determines its retentio

20、n ratio and, thus, its capital structure. Further, given the empirical evidence in support of the pecking order theory, corpo</p><p>　　There is considerable evidence of this interdependence between dividends

21、 and capital structure. For example, consistent with the pecking order hypothesis, Adedeji (1998) suggests that if firms respond to earnings shortages by borrowing to pay dividends because of reluctance to cut dividends,

22、 financial leverage may have a positive relationship with dividend payout ratio, and a positive or negative relationship with investments depending on whether firms borrow to finance investments or postpone/r</p>

23、<p>　　On the other hand, Jensen (1986) hypothesizes that dividends and debt are substitute mechanisms for controlling agency costs of free cash flows. Empirical finding of Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994) supports Jense

24、n's hypothesis. They find that dividend payout ratios of a sample of all equity firms are significantly higher than those of a control group of levered firms. Jensen et al. (1992) posits that firms with high dividend

25、 payouts might find debt financing less attractive than equity financing le</p><p>　　Thus, while the direction of the debt ratio–dividend policy relationship is not clear, it is clear that corporate capital

26、structure is determined simultaneously with its dividend policy. Consequently, any examination of the impact of multinational on capital structure must account for the impact of dividend policy. Recognizing the endogenou

27、s nature of some of the variables being tested, some studies do use simultaneous equation models to study the interdependence between capital structure and di</p><p>　　As this brief review shows, capital str

28、ucture and dividend policy are likely to be determined simultaneously in practice. A study of the relationship between capital structure and firm multinational must therefore include variables that determine both debt ra

29、tios and dividend payout ratios. Based on the theoretical and empirical evidences on capital structure and dividend policy, we enumerate the specific variables used here in estimating the relationship between debt, divid

30、ends, and firm multin</p><p>　　3.3.Variables influencing capital structure and dividend policy</p><p>　　Bus Risk used as a measure of business risk, is calculated as the standard deviation of th

31、e ratio of the first difference of EBIT and the average total asset over the past five-years (as in Jensen et al., 1992).Beta is used as an alternative measure of firm risk as a determinant of dividend payout (as in Roze

32、ff, 1982). The degree of operating leverage (DOL) is also used as a measure of business risk and is calculated as the average of the annual percentage change in EBIT divided by the percentag</p><p>　　Agency

33、and under-investment problems indicate that firms with higher growth opportunities (measured by the market-to-book ratio, MTB) will hold less debt controlling for profitability. In addition, Chang (1992) predicts that fi

34、rms with high profitability (ROA) use more debt in its capital structure controlling for investment opportunities. Firm's uniqueness (UNQ) in term of R&D and advertising expenses ratio proxies also for agency cos

35、t because the external stakeholders faces larger costs of mon</p><p>　　FundDeft = DIVt + Xt + ΔWt + Rt?Ct :</p><p><b>　　Where,</b></p><p>　　Ct operating cash flow, a

36、fter interest and taxes</p><p>　　DIVt dividend payments</p><p>　　Xt capital expenditures</p><p>　　ΔWt net increase in working capital</p><p>　　Rt current po

37、rtion of long-term debt</p><p>　　The agency issue in dividend payout decisions is similar to capital structure decisions in the presence of agency costs. Agency costs predict a positive relation between firm

38、's free cash flow(FreeCFLS) and payment of dividends. According to signaling hypothesis of Ross (1977), firms with high profitability (ROA) will pay out more dividends as costly credible signals. Firms with higher gr

39、owth opportunities (SalesGR) will pay out lower dividends especially when there is an alternative for using di</p><p>　　Return on Assets (ROA) is another important variable. Pecking order theory indicates mo

40、re profitable firms (ROA) should have lower leverage and lower payout controlling for investment opportunities and firms with high future growth opportunity should pay out lower dividends. Highly profitable firms can als

41、o use high dividends and high debt levels as signals for the good performance of the company (Ross, 1977). A firm's level of fixed assets (COL) should be associated with higher leverage as high</p><p>　　

42、Thus, we have the following variables:</p><p>　　(a) Dependent variables:</p><p>　　Leverage [Leverage=LTD/(LTD+MVE)]</p><p>　　DivPO [dividend payout ratio]</p><p>　　(b)

43、Independent variables:</p><p>　　Fsale (foreign sales ratio as a measure of degree of multinational)</p><p>　　M (distinguishing MNCs from DCs and =1 if Fsale > 20% and =0,otherwise)</p>

44、<p>　　BusRisk: business risk</p><p>　　Beta: firm's market beta a measure of equity market risk</p><p>　　DOL: degree of operating leverage</p><p>　　ROA, Return on Assets as

45、 a measure of Profitability</p><p>　　MTB, market-to-book ratio, as a measure of growth opportunities</p><p>　　SalesGR, growth rate of the firm, geometric average past 5-yr sales growth rate</

46、p><p>　　FreeCFLS, free cash flow divided by total sales</p><p>　　COL, assets that can be used as collateral, measured as PP&E/Total assets</p><p>　　UNQ, uniqueness, measured as (R&

47、amp;D + Adver. Exp)/ total sales</p><p>　　NDTS, non-debt tax shields, (Depreciation +Amortization)/Sales× Tax rate</p><p>　　FundDef, funding deficit</p><p>　　Lsize, natural log

48、 of total sales as a measure of size.</p><p>　　Source: Aggarwal, Raj Kyaw, NyoNyo Aung,2010.“Capital structure, dividend policy, and multinational: Theory versus empirical evidence”. International Review of

49、Financial Analysis. Vol.19, No.2, January,pp.140-150.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　資本結(jié)構(gòu)，股利政策，跨國經(jīng)營：理論與實證研究</p><p>　　3.1影響資本結(jié)構(gòu)和股利政策的因素</p><p>　　我們更應(yīng)該注意資本結(jié)構(gòu),股利

50、政策的影響因素,以便適當(dāng)?shù)目刂谱兞繙p少跨國資本結(jié)構(gòu)和股利政策的沖擊。這些控制變量列表必須立足于現(xiàn)存的資本結(jié)構(gòu)和股利政策理論和實證證據(jù)上。莫迪格雷尼和米勒（1958）在這一領(lǐng)域提出后了聞名于世的理論，在一個高效率的市場，沒有稅收，破產(chǎn)成本的世界，一個公司的價值是不影響資本結(jié)構(gòu)。這一理論已被修改并擴展，不僅影響稅收和破產(chǎn)成本，而且還涉及到現(xiàn)實世界中的代理問題，信息不對稱，道德風(fēng)險成本，以及其他摩擦和完美的偏差市場。</p>&

51、lt;p>　　3.1.1經(jīng)營杠桿和其他影響</p><p>　　一個企業(yè)的經(jīng)營杠桿反映其經(jīng)營風(fēng)險。具有較高的經(jīng)營杠桿企業(yè)面臨更高的破產(chǎn)概率，并應(yīng)具有較低的財務(wù)杠桿。然而，較高的經(jīng)營杠桿率通常伴隨較高水平的固定有形資產(chǎn)——該資產(chǎn)比例確實被廣泛地應(yīng)用在文學(xué)作為衡量經(jīng)營杠桿的作用。一個公司的固定資產(chǎn)水平應(yīng)與杠桿呈正相關(guān)，作為高層次的這些資產(chǎn)可以作為貸款的抵押物（郎和佛雷德，1988；隆和瑪麗茲，1985）。詹森，

52、索伯格和佐恩（1992）規(guī)定的資產(chǎn)作抵押可利用的積極影響的實證支持。非債務(wù)稅盾變量也為與非債務(wù)稅盾預(yù)計將有較低的債務(wù)水平（金和索倫森，1986）的高層次企業(yè)的重要。由于體制的不同，在經(jīng)理，銀行家，金融家，他們對公司風(fēng)險，資本結(jié)構(gòu)和股利政策的影響也可望隨企業(yè)規(guī)模和行業(yè)分類。</p><p><b>　　3.1.2權(quán)衡理論</b></p><p>　　在平衡理論、資本結(jié)構(gòu)

53、的決定取決于公司的優(yōu)勢和成本利用更多的債務(wù)。使用債務(wù)較少的破產(chǎn)成本比稅盾或使用效益更高的其他債務(wù)（金和索倫森，1986；格雷厄姆，2000）。因此，權(quán)衡理論認(rèn)為一個杠桿和破產(chǎn)成本之間負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系和企業(yè)之間的杠桿和邊際稅率正相關(guān)關(guān)系（朗斯福，1995；克洛伊德，林博和羅賓遜，1997）。根據(jù)約塞夫（1982），高風(fēng)險企業(yè)支付較低的股利說明股息，破產(chǎn)費用，和一個公司所使用的債務(wù)數(shù)額之間存在負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。</p><p>

54、　　3.1.3、代理成本的影響</p><p>　　自由現(xiàn)金流的可用性問題，因為建立一個機構(gòu)可以使用免費的現(xiàn)金為自己的利益提供了一些幫組，從而降低了企業(yè)的負(fù)債（莫迪格雷尼和米勒，1976）。為了防止這個管理分最佳狀態(tài)，具有較高的現(xiàn)金流應(yīng)該使用更高的杠桿水平的公司。羅斯（1977）在非對稱信息模型中也指出，負(fù)債和公司的盈利能力存在正相關(guān)關(guān)系。代理理論還表明，有高增長機會的公司將持有較少債務(wù)控制盈利能力，史圖斯（19

55、90）指出由于投資不足的問題，具有高增長機會的公司應(yīng)持有少量債務(wù)。張（1992）認(rèn)為具有高盈利能力的公司在資本結(jié)構(gòu)中使用更多的債務(wù)從而控制投資。</p><p>　　派息決定機構(gòu)的問題是類似的代理成本存在的資本結(jié)構(gòu)決策。在詹森和麥克林（1976），詹森（1986）的代理模式中，股息和債務(wù)有助于控制過度投資的代理成本是否有管理人員和股東之間的利益沖突。因此，代理公司之間的預(yù)測的成本和支付股息正相關(guān)。根據(jù)羅斯（197

56、7）的信號假說，具有高盈利的公司也將付出昂貴的可信的信息作為多分紅。然而，伊斯特布魯克（1984）說具有較高的增長機會的公司將減少股息支付，尤其是當(dāng)有一個可替代的監(jiān)測技術(shù)出現(xiàn)。</p><p>　　3.1.4、啄食順序理論</p><p>　　融資優(yōu)序模型（梅耶斯和麥吉拉夫，1984）認(rèn)為，由于交易成本和信息不對稱，企業(yè)融資新投資的留存收益，然后再先后是安全的債務(wù)，高風(fēng)險的債務(wù)與最終權(quán)益。

57、根據(jù)這一啄序模型，更有利可圖的企業(yè)應(yīng)具有較低的杠桿率和更低的短期，控制支出的投資機會，但不宜長期。在融資優(yōu)序模型的簡單版本，具有很高的投資和增長機會的公司預(yù)計將有較高的杠桿比率（投資的條件下，比內(nèi)部資本更多）。在一個融資優(yōu)序模式更復(fù)雜的版本，具有很高的投資和發(fā)展機會的公司將考慮降低負(fù)債比率在當(dāng)前以及未來的融資。與自由現(xiàn)金流代理理論相比，梅耶斯和麥吉拉夫(1984)預(yù)測，降低較多的自由現(xiàn)金流。啄食順序理論還預(yù)測，隨著未來高增長機會的公司應(yīng)

58、支付較低的股利。希亞姆和梅耶斯（1999）引入資金赤字模型來檢驗企業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)啄食理論假說。他們認(rèn)為，除了達(dá)到或接近其債務(wù)能力的公司，啄食理論預(yù)測，赤字將完全充滿新的債務(wù)問題。因此，我們可以預(yù)測赤字之間的資金關(guān)系，并利用積極的假設(shè)，這些公司都低于債務(wù)的能力之中。</p><p>　　3.2、相互依存關(guān)系資本結(jié)構(gòu)和股利政策</p><p>　　上面討論的許多因素已被證明不僅影響資本結(jié)構(gòu)，而且

59、還影響股息政策。伊斯特布魯克（1984）指出，股息的存在是因為它們誘導(dǎo)公司發(fā)行新證券，影響公司的股利決策與企業(yè)的融資決策。直觀地說，公司的派息率確定其保留比例和其資本結(jié)構(gòu)。此外，鑒于啄食順序理論的實證證據(jù)支持，企業(yè)的負(fù)債水平應(yīng)與現(xiàn)金流量和股利政策相關(guān)。事實上，因為股利政策和資本結(jié)構(gòu)存在依存，資本結(jié)構(gòu)的實證研究，重點是對跨國公司的影響，最有可能失誤，除非它們包括股利政策的評估。</p><p>　　有此股息和資本結(jié)

60、構(gòu)之間的相互依存關(guān)系相當(dāng)多的證據(jù)。例如，與啄食順序假說一致，阿迪（1998）認(rèn)為，如果企業(yè)通過借貸來支付，因為不愿削減股息紅利而收入短缺，財務(wù)杠桿可能與股利支付率呈正相關(guān)，推遲資助或降低投資取決于企業(yè)是否投資或貸款。這個假設(shè)債務(wù)與派息的關(guān)系是積極的經(jīng)驗證實了巴斯金（1989）的研究。因此，根據(jù)啄食順序假說，企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)與股息政策呈正相關(guān)。</p><p>　　另一方面，詹森（1986）推測，股息和債務(wù)是控制現(xiàn)金流

61、量的免費代理成本的替代機制。喬和阿格拉瓦爾（1994）支持詹森的假說。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，所有樣本股票的公司股利支付率顯著高于公司的杠對照組。詹森（1992）假定具有高股利支付債務(wù)融資的公司可能會發(fā)現(xiàn)小于股權(quán)融資導(dǎo)致債務(wù)與股息負(fù)相關(guān)的吸引力。正如有關(guān)派息政策阿倫和麥克瓦（2002）全面的調(diào)查指出，企業(yè)可能不想支付高股息當(dāng)他們支付其他固定資產(chǎn)融資費時。</p><p>　　因此，雖然債務(wù)的比例和股利政策的關(guān)系不明確，不過，企

62、業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)決策和股息政策是同時進(jìn)行的。因此，任何跨國公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)的影響，考試必須考慮股利政策的影響。由變量測試而得出的本質(zhì)性質(zhì)，做一些研究利用聯(lián)立方程模型來研究資本結(jié)構(gòu)與美國公司的股息支付率的相互依存。諾瓦尼亞和摩根（1996）運用三階段最小二乘法（3SLS）測試，以調(diào)查期間在1986-1988年之間的股息和美國公司的資本結(jié)構(gòu)決策的同時性，發(fā)現(xiàn)債務(wù)紅利的同時性是觀察經(jīng)驗只為子樣本，其中對紅利監(jiān)測理由是適當(dāng)?shù)?。然而，他們不檢查的跨國公司

63、資本結(jié)構(gòu)和股利政策的相互依存關(guān)系。</p><p>　　由于簡短的回顧表明，資本結(jié)構(gòu)和股利政策的決定可能會在實踐中同時進(jìn)行。一間跨國資本結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)關(guān)系的研究，因此必須包含兩個變量，確定債務(wù)比率和股利支付率?；趯Y本結(jié)構(gòu)和股利政策的理論和實證證據(jù)，我們列舉的債務(wù)估計，股息和跨國關(guān)系之間的特定變量。</p><p>　　3.3、變量影響資本結(jié)構(gòu)，股利政策</p><p&g

64、t;　　巴士風(fēng)險作為企業(yè)經(jīng)營風(fēng)險的一種標(biāo)準(zhǔn)偏差計算，基于過去五年第一個不同的息稅前利潤和平均總資產(chǎn)比例（如詹森，1992）。β作為替代方法判定企業(yè)風(fēng)險（如羅斯福，1982）。使用經(jīng)營杠桿率來衡量商業(yè)平均風(fēng)險，經(jīng)營杠桿的程度也被用來作為經(jīng)營風(fēng)險的措施，被看作是在每年的息稅前利潤在銷售百分比除以平均變化計算。</p><p>　　代理和滯后問題表明：將于較少債務(wù)控制高增長公司的盈利。此外，張（1992）預(yù)計高收益公司

65、使用更多的債務(wù)資本結(jié)構(gòu)控制投資機會。公司在研發(fā)和廣告費用的代理也是代理成本的長期唯一性，因為外部的利益相關(guān)者面臨更大的花費時的監(jiān)測，投資更多的無形資產(chǎn)為這些投資導(dǎo)致投資不足的問題和代理成本（隆和瑪麗茲，1985）。基金赤字是一種計量的代理成本。根據(jù)希亞姆和梅耶斯（1999），資金赤字是：</p><p>　　FundDeft=DIVt+Xt+ΔWt+Rt?Ct：</p><p>　　Ct營

66、運現(xiàn)金流量，利息和稅款 DIVt股利發(fā)放</p><p>　　Xt資本支出 ΔWt凈營運資本</p><p>　　Rt目前長期債務(wù)的部分</p><p>　　代理問題與派息決定資本結(jié)構(gòu)決策的代理成本。代理成本之間的正向關(guān)系預(yù)測公司的自由現(xiàn)金流和支付紅利的股票。根據(jù)信號假設(shè)的羅斯（1977），企業(yè)盈利能力高將會支

67、付更多的回報，昂貴的可靠的信息。公司成長率較高的機會將會支付較低股利是一種特別在使用派息的監(jiān)測技術(shù)所顯示布魯克（1984）。公司的過去五年的銷售增長用于派息回歸（羅斯福，1982）。</p><p>　　資產(chǎn)收益率是另一個重要的變量。融資優(yōu)序理論顯示，更多的盈利企業(yè)應(yīng)該有較低的財務(wù)杠桿和較低的支付控制投資機會和公司較高的未來增長要為此付出較低股利的機會。高收益的公司也可以使用高額股利和高負(fù)債的水平，作為信號性能良

68、好的公司（羅斯，1977）。公司的固定資產(chǎn)水平應(yīng)該伴隨著更高的經(jīng)營杠桿，高水平的該資產(chǎn)可作為抵押貸款（郎和佛雷德，1988；隆和瑪麗茲，1985）。這樣一種資產(chǎn)可供擔(dān)保也被用于詹森（1992）非負(fù)債稅盾的變量也用在回歸行業(yè)企業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)因素高可用非負(fù)債稅盾將有較低的債務(wù)水平（金和索倫森，1986）。詹森（1992），諾羅尼亞（1996），郭和里布（2000）和巴法拉，默恩和饒（1994）也要考慮到NDTS作為的決定因素的財務(wù)杠桿的

69、便利。作為格雷厄姆（2000）公司規(guī)模有負(fù)面影響的債務(wù)比例。</p><p>　　因此，我們有以下變量：</p><p><b>　　(a)從屬變量：</b></p><p>　　Leverage [Leverage=LTD/(LTD+MVE)]</p><p>　　DivPO[派息率]</p><p

70、><b>　　(b)獨立變量：</b></p><p>　　Fsale(國外銷售比率作為衡量程度的跨國經(jīng)營)</p><p>　　M(區(qū)分跨國公司從中衛(wèi)和=1如果Fsale > 20%和=0，否則)</p><p>　　BusRisk：商業(yè)風(fēng)險</p><p>　　Beta：公司的市場測試衡量股票市場風(fēng)險&l

71、t;/p><p>　　DOL：學(xué)位的操作杠桿作用</p><p>　　ROA：作為衡量盈利</p><p>　　MTB：作為衡量發(fā)展機會</p><p>　　SalesGR：生長速率，由公司的時間埋葬過去幾何平均銷售增長率</p><p>　　FreeCFLS：自由現(xiàn)金流除以總銷售</p><p>

72、　　COL：資產(chǎn)可以用來作為抵押，以房產(chǎn)、廠房、設(shè)備折舊/總資產(chǎn)</p><p>　　UNQ：獨特、以(R&D+亂發(fā)廣告。經(jīng)驗)/銷售總額</p><p>　　NDTS：非負(fù)債稅盾，(折舊攤銷)/銷售×+稅率</p><p>　　FundDef：資金赤字</p><p>　　Lsize：日常銷售記錄總額作為衡量的大小。<