（節(jié)選）外文翻譯---股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與股利政策來自馬來西亞的實(shí)證研究

1、<p>　　中文2612字，1590單詞，9300英文字符</p><p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p>　　Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy: Evidence from Malaysian Companies</p><p>　　Material Source: Int

2、ernational Review of Business Research Papers Vol.6 Author: Nathasa Mazna</p><p>　　1.0 Introduction</p><p>　　Recent studies such as Claessens et al. (2

3、000), Faccio et al. (2001) and La Porta et al. (1999) observe that many public listed companies located outside the US and UK have high concentration of ownership, with a single large shareholder or shareholder group pre

4、dominantly controlling companies. The evidence of large shareholders in developed countries beside US and UK, European countries and East Asian countries are against the concept of the separation of ownership from contro

5、l viewed by Berle </p><p>　　Dividend policy is one of companies’ decisions that are found to be influence by corporate ownership structure. Dividends can be used to mitigate agency problems in a company (Eas

6、terbrook 1984; Jensen 1986; Rozeff 1982), thus substitute large ownership as monitoring tools. On the other hand, large shareholders could use their power to expropriate corporate resources for their own private consumpt

7、ion. This could limit the dividend payments of companies that are associated with severe agency confl</p><p>　　The main focus of this study is to investigate the effect of the largest shareholder on the corp

8、orate dividend policy by examining Malaysian listed companies from 2002 to 2006. Malaysia provides an interesting background to examine this issue as the ownership structure is concentrated and large shareholders are in

9、control. On average, the study finds that the largest shareholder or a shareholder group owns around 40 percent of the company paid-up capital. In addition, the study also interested i</p><p>　　2.0 Literatur

10、e Review and Hypothesis Development</p><p>　　Agency theory suggests that large shareholders’ ownership may either alleviate or exacerbate agency conflicts. A high level of managerial ownership could minimize

11、 agency problems, as managers have to bear a portion of the losses arising from their divergent behaviour (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Morck et al. 1988). Large shareholders have a strong incentive to maximize the company’

12、s wealth, have control over the company to have their interest respected (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) and have the advan</p><p>　　Dividends also play a significant role in controlling possible agency conflicts

13、 between large shareholders and minority shareholders. By paying dividends, a pro-rata distribution can be guaranteed to all shareholders and limit corporate wealth from large shareholders’ control Dividends can also be

14、utilised by controlling shareholders to off-set the minority shareholders’ concern in an environment where expropriation by controlling shareholders prevails (Faccio et al. 2001). However, in the prese</p><p&g

15、t;　　Several studies have examined the relationship between the largest shareholder and dividend policy. A negative relationship between the largest shareholder and dividends are observed by Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Ma

16、ury and Pajuste (2002), Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006), Renneboog and Szilagyi (2006) and Renneboog and Trojanowski (2007) for companies from Germany, Finland, Italy, Netherland and UK, respectively. While a positive associ

17、ation between the largest shareholder and dividend payouts is ob</p><p>　　Recent studies has analyse the effect of other large shareholders, beside the largest shareholder on companies based from agency pers

18、pectives. Other large shareholders could monitor the controlling shareholder (Bolton and von Thadden 1998; Pagano and Roell 1998). The monitoring role play by the other large shareholders thus, could limit the expropriat

19、ion of minority shareholders’ resources. However, other large shareholders may collude with the controlling shareholder in expropriating corporate </p><p>　　The existence of controlling shareholders in East-

20、Asian companies, namely Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand had been related to the conflicts between large shareholders and minority shareholder, which lead to

21、 expropriation of minority shareholders (Claessens et al. 1999). In line with this view, the hypotheses of this study are as follows:</p><p>　　Hypothesis 1. The dividend policy of Malaysian companies is neg

22、atively related to the ownership interest of the largest shareholder.</p><p>　　Hypothesis 2. The dividend policy of Malaysian companies is positively related to the ownership interest of the second largest

23、shareholder ownership.</p><p>　　5.0 Conclusion</p><p>　　This study examines the relationship between large shareholders and dividend policy of Malaysian listed companies. Analysis has been carri

24、ed out with the view that companies’ dividend policy may be used to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. Malaysia provides an excellent setting to investigate the relationship as the corporate ownership structu

25、re is characterized as concentrated in nature. Furthermore, this study provides evidence from East-Asian country, where this region is describ</p><p>　　The Tobit regression results suggest that controlling s

26、hareholders does influence the dividend policy of Malaysian listed companies. Contrarily to the notion that the largest shareholder might expropriate the companies’ wealth, the study observes that companies with high lev

27、el of the largest shareholding have higher dividend payouts. The presence of second largest shareholder also has a significant and positive effect on companies’ dividend payout. This indicate that the presence of other l

28、arge </p><p>　　Overall, the study finds that large shareholders have effects on Malaysian dividend policy. However, further tests are needed to ensure that the study’s findings are robust and valid. Hence th

29、e result of this study should be interpreted with caution. It is recommended that further research is done in on this issue. Future research also can tests whether the type of the largest shareholder, i.e. whether the la

30、rge shareholder is a family or the Government, have an impact on dividend policy. In add</p><p>　　It is hoped that this study will add to the literature and enhance the understanding of the subject by provid

31、ing evidence from an Asian country. In addition, the ongoing CG reform in Malaysia may result in dividend policy being used as a CG tool, especially in an environment where conventional governance instruments have proven

32、 unsuccessful with regard to their monitoring function (Tam and Tan 2007). Thus, this study may also provide insights and additional guidance for policy makers in improvin</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></

33、p><p>　　股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與股利政策：來自馬來西亞的實(shí)證研究</p><p>　　資料來源: 國際商務(wù)研究論文綜述第6卷 作者：拉馬</p><p><b>　　1.0簡(jiǎn)介</b></p><p>　　最近的研究，如Claessens（2000），F(xiàn)accio（2001）和La Porta （1999）等觀察到許

34、多美國和英國之外的上市公司有很高的所有權(quán)的集中度，主要由單一大股東或股東集團(tuán)控制公司。Berle and Means（1932）提出發(fā)達(dá)國家的股東，如美國和英國、歐洲國家和東亞國家對(duì)股權(quán)分離和控制的概念。大股東能夠有效控制、影響公司的決策，決定公司如何運(yùn)行，并決定企業(yè)的政策。然而，正如Holderness（2003）提出的，大股東并不發(fā)達(dá)的所有權(quán)文學(xué)，特別是其第一大股東。最大的股東是一組獨(dú)特的股東，因?yàn)樗麄兂钟械墓煞菘梢杂绊懶б婧统杀荆?/p>

35、尤其是投資成本（Claessens et al. 2002; Truong and Heaney 2007）。</p><p>　　股利政策是由一個(gè)公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)決定的。在一家公司里，紅利可以用來減輕公司代理問題（Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986; Rozeff 1982），因此用來替代大型所有權(quán)的監(jiān)測(cè)工具。另一方面,大股東將會(huì)利用他們的能力來廢除對(duì)自己的私人企業(yè)的資源的消費(fèi)。這可能限制

36、公司股利發(fā)放，并伴有嚴(yán)重的代理沖突（Faccio et al. 2001）。針對(duì)這一論點(diǎn)，有必要審查大股東之間的關(guān)聯(lián)，特別是規(guī)模最大股東股息紅利政策，以獲得更好的適合企業(yè)的決定。</p><p>　　本文主要是探討從2002年到2006年，影響最大的股東對(duì)馬來西亞上市公司股利政策的影響。作為股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)集中，馬來西亞提供了一個(gè)有趣的背景來研究大股東控制這個(gè)問題。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，最大的股東或股東集團(tuán)擁有大約百分之四十的公司注

37、冊(cè)資本繳足。此外，本次研究所感興趣的另一問題是第二大股東對(duì)上市公司股利政策的影響,因?yàn)樗怯^察到超過75%的一個(gè)重要的第二大股權(quán)。在此之前，關(guān)于股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與股利政策的研究主要側(cè)重于美國和英國的公司，那里的市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管完善，并擁有廣泛分發(fā)。只有少數(shù)的研究檢驗(yàn)了最大的股東之間的關(guān)系以及紅利政策,現(xiàn)有的證據(jù)主要集中在歐洲公司（e.g. Goergen et al. 2005; Mancinelli and Ozkan 2006; Maury and

38、 Pajuste 2002）。</p><p>　　2.0文獻(xiàn)回顧與假設(shè)發(fā)展</p><p>　　代理理論表明，大股東所有權(quán)可以減輕代理沖突加劇。一個(gè)擁有高層次的管理可以最大限度地減少代理問題，作為管理者必須承擔(dān)由彼此的行為所產(chǎn)生的部分虧損（Jensen and Meckling 1976; Morck et al. 1988）。大股東有強(qiáng)烈的動(dòng)機(jī)使公司的財(cái)富最大化，讓他們的利益得到控股權(quán)

39、的尊重（Shleifer and Vishny 1997），并在公司收集信息和檢測(cè)上有優(yōu)勢(shì)（Shleifer and Vishny 1986）。盡管如此，大股東的利益可能與中小股東的不相稱，從而導(dǎo)致大股東可能征收中小股東（Shleifer & Vishny, 1997）。</p><p>　　代理理論也表明股息可以作為公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)，以減輕代理問題。Rozeff （1982）開發(fā)最佳派息/成本最小化模型和假

40、設(shè)的股息支付部分監(jiān)控設(shè)備。股息也可以通過減少代理沖突服從公司的監(jiān)測(cè)審議資本市場(chǎng)（Easterbrook 1984）。假設(shè)基于自由現(xiàn)金流Jensen（1986）高支付紅利的現(xiàn)金可能會(huì)限制可供管理者。因此，經(jīng)理的額外津貼的投資項(xiàng)目，或不經(jīng)濟(jì)的浪費(fèi)，可最小化。該政策協(xié)會(huì)之間的關(guān)系管理所有權(quán)和股利政策，已被廣泛研究和分析（e.g.Agrawal and Jayaraman 1994; Moh'd et al. 1995; Rozeff

41、1982）。有證據(jù)表明，支付較低股利的公司，股權(quán)管理也相對(duì)較高。</p><p>　　對(duì)大股東和小股東之間的沖突，股息也扮演著一個(gè)重要的角色。通過支付股息，按比例分布可以保證所有股東，并限制企業(yè)財(cái)富股東大的控制。股息也可以通過控制利用股東抵消關(guān)注的環(huán)境中，其中少數(shù)股東股東通過控制征用盛行（Faccio et al. 2001）。然而，大股東的存在，降低股利發(fā)放股息是不需要函數(shù)作為替代機(jī)構(gòu)控制裝置（Goergen

42、et al. 2005）。股息被視為替代機(jī)制，以大股東所有權(quán)減輕代理問題。有幾項(xiàng)研究審查了與大股東之間的股息關(guān)系政策。Gugler and Yurtoglu （2003），Maury and Pajuste （2002）, Mancinelli and Ozkan（2006）, Renneboog and Szilagyi（2006）and Renneboog and Trojanowski （2007）分別從英國、德國、芬蘭、意大利、

43、荷蘭等的公司對(duì)第一大股東和分紅派息之間的負(fù)向關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究。雖然股東和最大的正相關(guān)關(guān)系派息由Truong和Heaney（2007）的研究根據(jù)來自37個(gè)國家的樣本。</p><p>　　最近的研究在對(duì)大股東的研究基礎(chǔ)上，分析了其他大股東的影響。其他大型股東可以監(jiān)視控股股東（Bolton and von Thadden 1998; Pagano and Roell 1998）。其他公司的大股東扮演監(jiān)控角色，因此,可能會(huì)

44、限制少數(shù)股東征用資源配置的能力。但是，其他大股東可能與控股股東勾結(jié)在一起征收企業(yè)資源共享的私人利益（Faccio et al. 2001; Pagano and Roell 1998）。實(shí)證證據(jù)對(duì)大股東的股息政策的影響是有限的。Faccio et al.（2001）發(fā)現(xiàn)，歐洲存在大股東在多個(gè)最大限度地減少了征收股東活性的控制，從而導(dǎo)致更高的分紅，而在亞洲，低股息率得到遵守。 他們的結(jié)論是, 在亞洲控股股東與其它大股東少數(shù)股東廢

45、除。一些國家的研究指出，分析公司的其他大股東的影響,尤其是第二大股東股利政策產(chǎn)生各種各樣的結(jié)果。芬蘭，Maury and Pajuste（2002）表明，股息支付與第二大股東負(fù)相關(guān)。相反的，Gugler and Yurtoglu（2003）在德國發(fā)現(xiàn)了股息支付和第二大股東呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系的情況。</p><p>　　東亞公司存在控股股東，即香港、印尼、日本、韓國、馬來西亞、菲律賓、新加坡、臺(tái)灣和泰國曾經(jīng)和少數(shù)民族有關(guān)

46、的大股東之間的沖突股東，從而導(dǎo)致少數(shù)股東征用（Claessens et al. 1999）。按照這種觀點(diǎn),本研究假設(shè)如下：</p><p>　　假設(shè)1：馬來西亞公司的股利政策與所有權(quán)利益相關(guān)的最大股東呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。</p><p>　　假設(shè)2：馬來西亞公司公司的股利政策與所有權(quán)相關(guān)的第二大股東呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系。</p><p><b>　　5 結(jié)論</b

47、></p><p>　　本研究探討了馬來西亞上市公司大股東與股利政策之間的關(guān)系。分析認(rèn)為，股利政策可能成為大股東攫取小股東利益的工具。馬來西亞為調(diào)查提供了一個(gè)良好的環(huán)境：企業(yè)所有制結(jié)構(gòu)的特點(diǎn)是集中的性質(zhì)。此外，東亞國家也為此項(xiàng)研究提供了證據(jù)，該地區(qū)主要是大股東與中小股東之間存在嚴(yán)重沖突。</p><p>　　Tobit回歸研究的結(jié)果表明, 馬來西亞上市公司股利政策的影響因素是控股股東

48、。相反的觀點(diǎn)，即最大股東可能會(huì)侵占公司的財(cái)產(chǎn)，研究指出，公司的大股東擁有較高的股利支付權(quán)。第二大股東的存在具有顯著的影響，而且對(duì)公司的派息也有積極的影響。這表明，許多其他公司的股東在鼓勵(lì)大股東支付更高股息?？偟膩碚f,這項(xiàng)研究表明，馬來西亞上市公司的大股東對(duì)股利政策有一定影響。然而，需要進(jìn)一步的檢驗(yàn)，以確保該研究的調(diào)查結(jié)果健全和有效。因此本研究的結(jié)果在被引用的時(shí)候應(yīng)該要謹(jǐn)慎。建議對(duì)這個(gè)問題的看法做進(jìn)一步的研究。未來的研究也可以測(cè)試是否是最

49、大股東的類型，即是否大股東是一個(gè)家族或政府，對(duì)股利政策的影響。此外，未來的研究可以探討，東亞的公司大股東之間的關(guān)系以及紅利政策。如果有大股東之間的關(guān)系以及紅利政策，每個(gè)國家的法律制度在東亞也可以解釋。</p><p>　　我們希望這項(xiàng)研究將增加人們對(duì)文學(xué)的理解和提高亞洲國家對(duì)這項(xiàng)研究的水平。此外，馬來西亞的改革，正在進(jìn)行的企業(yè)管治可能導(dǎo)致股利政策的監(jiān)測(cè)功能，用來作為企業(yè)管治，特別是在傳統(tǒng)的環(huán)境管理手段已被證明不成