[雙語(yǔ)翻譯]銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)外文翻譯--存款保險(xiǎn)制度對(duì)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響（節(jié)選）

1、中文 中文 5150 字， 字，3200 英文單詞， 英文單詞，17500 英文字符 英文字符文獻(xiàn)出處： 文獻(xiàn)出處：Anginer D, Demirguc-Kunt A, Zhu M. How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis [J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2014, 48:31

2、2-321.How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisisDeniz Anginer, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Min ZhuAbstractDeposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial syst

3、em safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between de

4、posit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years

5、leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the ‘‘moral hazard effe

6、ct’’ of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the ‘‘stabilization effect’’ of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negati

7、ve since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended con

8、sequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.Keywords: Bank risk，Systemic risk，De

9、posit insurance，Bank supervision and regulation，F(xiàn)inancial crisis 1. IntroductionIn response to the global financial crisis, a number of countries substantially increased the coverage of their financial safety nets in ord

10、er to restore market confidence and to avert potential contagious runs on their banking sectors. This has rekindled the debate on the impact of deposit insurance on banking sector stability and performance. While previo

11、us studies suggest that deposit insurance exacerbates moral hazard problems in bank lending and is associated with higher likelihood of banking crisis (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002), to the best of our knowledge

12、, there is no study that examines the impact of deposit insurance on bank risk and systemic stability during a period of global financial instability. This is an important gap in the literature since economic theories s

13、uggest that deposit insurance brings both benefits and costs that are likely to vary with economic conditions. That is, while deposit insurance can increase moral hazard and make financial systems more vulnerable to cr

14、ises during good times, it can also enhance depositor confidence and reduce the likelihood of contagious bank runs during turbulent periods such as the recent global financial crisis. The net effect of deposit insurance

15、 on bank risk and stability, therefore, depends on whether the benefits of deposit insurance can outweigh its costs.In this paper, we take advantage of the global financial crisis and study whether deposit insurance an

16、d banking risk and bank system fragility. In poor institutional set- tings, generous design features tends to destabilize the banking system and to undermine market discipline. Hovakimian et al. (2003) and Laeven (2002)

17、 show that weak institutional environments undermine deposit-insurance design. Cull et al. (2004) pro- duce evidence that, in weak institutional environments deposit insurance reduces financial development. Features of

18、 a country’s private and public contracting environments have been shown to be important in deposit-insurance adoption and design (Demi- rguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002).In this paper we test to see if the impact of deposit in

19、surance on bank risk and systemic stability is different during normal times and during crises periods. It is possible that the positive stabilization effects of deposit insurance can dominate the negative moral hazard

20、effects during economic downturns. During downturns banks may face tightened funding and limited investment opportunities, leaving little room for excessive risk taking. Deposit insurance can then help enhance depositor

21、 confidence and prevent systemic bank runs during the crisis, leading to lower risk and greater systemic stability. During non-stress periods, however, the reverse could be true since there would be plenty of investment

22、opportunities and little need for preventing bank runs. Alternatively, deposit insurance could also be a destabilizing (or stabilizing) influence throughout the whole sample period.For a sample of 4109 banks in 96 count

23、ries over the time period 2004–2009, we find supportive evidence that the influence of de- posit insurance on bank risk is different during normal periods and during systemic downturns. Specially, we show that exis

24、ting deposit insurance coverage is associated with lower systemic sta- bility and higher bank risk in the 2004–2006 pre-crisis period. However, the relationship between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic stabil

25、ity is reversed in the 2007–2009 crisis period. Nevertheless, the overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magni

26、tude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence.Our paper is related to Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), which studies the link between deposit insurance and the occurrence of banking crisis. Unli

27、ke Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) who focus on the likelihood of crisis of a particular country, we study the impact of deposit insurance on bank risk and system stability during a global crisis period and compar

28、e it to normal times. Our paper is also related to Fahlenbrach et al. (2011) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012), who investigate the determinants of bank performance during the recent crisis. While their focus is on bank

29、 characteristics that affect performance, we focus on the ef- fect of deposit insurance on bank risk and stability. We also add to the literature that has shown that features of a country’s private and public contractin

30、g environment to be important in deposit- insurance adoption, design and performance (see for instance, Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002). We show that good supervision can affect the state- varying benefits and costs of de