國有控股上市公司高管激勵制度研究[畢業(yè)論文]

1、Ⅰ本科畢業(yè)論文本科畢業(yè)論文（20_20__屆）屆）國有控股上市公司高管激勵制度研究國有控股上市公司高管激勵制度研究所在學(xué)院商學(xué)院專業(yè)班級財務(wù)管理學(xué)生姓名學(xué)號指導(dǎo)教師職稱完成日期年月日ⅡAbstractBusinessownershipmanagementrightsareseparatedfromcompanyinmodernenterprisesystem.Itinevitablybringstheconflictbetweenthe

2、ownersoperats.Thepursuitofbusinessownersistheresidualclaimthepursuitofmanagersistheutilitymaximization.Howtomakethegoalofenterprisemanagersequalstothegoalofownersindertoperfmingareasonablepoweractivelyseekingdevelopment.

3、Thekeypointistoestablishaperfectincentiveoperatbindingmechanism.ThestateownedenterprisesholdaconsiderableProptioninthelistedcompaniesinchina.Pushingdevelopingthesocialistmarketeconomymustbebasedonthestateownedenterprises

4、thesecompaniesplayanimptantroleintheconstructionofthemarketeconomy.Therefmofstateownedenterpriseshasbeenpromotedpersistentlyasagreatpartofthecpategovernancethesalaryincentivemechanismhasbecomeanimptantcomponentoftheliste

5、denterprisesespeciallythestateownedlistedenterprises.However，falongtimeintherefmofthePropertyrightsofstateownedenterprisesthesalaryincentivesystemdidnotreceivemuchattentionthelackofhighrankstaffsalarysystemisthemainreaso

6、nofinsufficientinefficiencyofthestateownedenterprisesThedisadvantagesofsalaryincentivemechanismhavebecomethestumblingblockinChina’sstateownedenterprisesrefmhowtoestablishaeffectiveincentivepaysystemhasbeenahotissueinmana

7、gementstudies.ThepaperStateownedlistedcompaniesastheobject.itanalysisthehistyofpaysystemfStateownedenterprisesstateownedlistedbyusingprincipalagenttheyhumancapitaltheycpategovernancethey.Thepaperalsoanalyzesthesalary–per