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1、<p>  本科畢業(yè)設計(論文)</p><p>  外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>  原文:</b></p><p>  A Reasonable Public Servant: constitutional foundations of administrative conduct in the United St

2、ates</p><p>  The constitution and a reasonable public servant</p><p>  In November 2004, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) arranged for seventy federal executives to visit the Natio

3、nal Constitution Center on Independence Mall in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The executives were on a management retreat. What could they gain from visiting a museum dedicated to the U.S. Constitution? What does the Const

4、itution have to do with public management? OPM Director Kay Coles James gave a short answer. The executives’ visit was part of a wider initiative to bring “he</p><p>  Understanding what the Constitution dem

5、ands of them is a matter of basic job competence for public servants. This fundamentally sets them apart from the world of private sector management, whether for profit or not profit. The Constitution regulates public se

6、rvants’ dealings with clients, customers, subordinate employees, prisoners, patients confined to public mental health facilities, contractors, and individuals involved in “street-level” encounters (such as police stops,

7、public school discipl</p><p>  Achieving competence in the constitutional aspects of public service requires at least two types of significant study and effort. First, one must understand the broad principle

8、s on which constitutional law rests. Second, and a more comprehensive challenge, one must learn the constitutional requirements that currently govern public service in the United States. Parts one and two of this book pr

9、ovides the analysis and information necessary to understand how constitutional law has to be factored in</p><p>  Although “[t]he Constitution is largely a document of the imagination”, gaining an understand

10、ing of a few of its fundamental principles goes a long way toward making constitutional law relatively concrete and accessible. These principles are especially important: incursions on constitutional rights must be nece

11、ssary and bounded, and the Constitution is always a work in progress.</p><p>  Personal responsibility</p><p>  In the United States, all pubic servants, elected or appointed, enter the public s

12、ervice by taking an oath that they will uphold the Constitution of the United States. Taking an oath is an act of commitment. The Constitution is ordained, as declares the Preamble, “in order to form a more perfect Union

13、, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” In the Bill of Rig</p><p> 

14、 The bottom line in any guarantee is “damages or nothing”. During the First Congress, the Bill of Rights was conceived with an “implicit” understanding that the administration of governmental affairs might cause the depr

15、ivation of rights guaranteed to individual citizens, and when such transgressions occur, the government would be responsible for the injuries. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall expressed his understanding of

16、this contractual responsibility, “The very essence of civil l</p><p>  Fast forwarding, courts today recognize an unrestricted cause of action for damages against local governmental bodies and restricted cau

17、se of action against federal and state governments. Courts, however, recognize a full cause of action against all public servants engaged in executive functions (possibly with the exception of the president), federal, st

18、ate, and local, under the Constitution and statutory schemes. A reasonable public servant taking an oath, therefore, understands that while the </p><p>  The distinction between personal and official account

19、ability is of critical importance to the life of a reasonable public servant who carries out the day-to-day public affairs at the street level. Official accountability applies when a public servant has caused the depriva

20、tion of a constitutional right of an individual while acting as an agent of the principal, that is, the government. Under the doctrine of respondent superior liability, the agent’s tort is vicariously imputed to the prin

21、cipal t</p><p>  Official responsibility</p><p>  Chapter 2 examined the constitutional standard of conduct expected of a reasonable public servant in his personal capacity. This chapter examine

22、s the constitutional standard of conduct expected of a reasonable public servant in his official capacity. The official-capacity conduct is the conduct expected of the public servant as an agent or representative of the

23、principal, that is, the government. The distinction between personal-capacity conduct and official-capacity conduct-although not always </p><p>  The official-capacity conduct is different; it is the act of

24、an agent representing the principal. The public servant, as an agent, carries out the official edict of the government he represents. To the extent that the edict has caused a constitutional tort, the tortious conduct wi

25、ll be imputed to the entity that issued it, although under some circumstances the public servant who implemented it may also be held liable. In Kentucky v. Graham, the Supreme Court made this distinction sharply in the &

26、lt;/p><p>  Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law. Official-capacity suits, in contrast, generally represent only ano

27、ther way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than n

28、ame, to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is not a suit against the offi</p><p>  Distinction between official-capacity and personal-capacity conduct</p><p>  An examination of §

29、1983 lawsuits shows that the complainants routinely name defendant officials in their personal, as well as official capacities. By naming public servants in their personal, as well as official capacity, complainants seek

30、 damages against their defendant public servants not only in their personal capacity but also against the municipality that they represent. Case law has been established that a suit against a public servant in his offici

31、al capacity is essentially the same as a</p><p>  The distinction between the conduct of official capacity and of personal capacity is a tricky business at times. Hafer v. Melo presented such a challenge. Se

32、veral former employees in Pennsylvania’s State Auditor’s Office sued Barbara Hafer, the newly elected state auditor of Pennsylvanie, in her personal capacity under § 1983 for terminating their employment in violatio

33、n of the Fourteenth Amendment. Upon winning the election, Hafer fired the employees because, as she claimed, they had procured t</p><p>  The employees sued Hafer in her personal capacity, seeking damages ag

34、ainst her, not against the state. Hafer, on the other hand, defended her action, asserting that her decision was “official” in nature and the Eleventh Amendment barred § 1983 suits against state officials in their o

35、fficial capacity. Hafer made an attempt, without success, to distinguish between the acts committed outside the official’s authority and those within the official’s authority that are germane to her official function<

36、/p><p>  In an unanimous opinion (with Justice Thomas not participating) the Supreme Court, per Justice O’Connor, observed that “Congress enacted § 1983 to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment ag

37、ainst those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it”, and determined that Hafer’s action represented a “personal” abus

38、e of authority under color of state law. To eliminate any lingering ambiguity betwee</p><p>  As we discussed in chapter 2, when the public servant is sued in his personal capacity, he has a right to assert

39、the defense of qualified immunity. When he is sued in an official capacity, however, he cannot assert the defense of qualified immunity. As the Supreme Court in Owen v. City of Independence explained, a damages claim aga

40、inst a public official in the official capacity is essentially the claim against his government employer. Since Monell already held that under § 1983 local governmenta</p><p>  Source: Yong S. Lee, Davi

41、d H. Rosenbloom. 2005. A reasonable public servant: constitutional foundations of administrative conduct in the United States. M. E. Sharpe, Inc. pp.3-58.</p><p><b>  譯文:</b></p><p>

42、  一個合理的公務員:在美國以憲法為基礎的行政行為</p><p>  憲法和一個合理的公務員</p><p>  2004年11月,美國人事辦公室安排了70個聯(lián)邦行政人員參觀了在費城賓夕法尼亞州獨立廣場的國家憲法中心。這些管理人員就好像處于一個管理避難所里。在參觀專門為美國憲法設立的博物館的過程中他們可以得到些什么?憲法與公共管理又有什么關系呢?美國人事辦公室總監(jiān)凱科爾斯詹姆斯給出了這樣

43、一個簡短的答案:對管理人員的訪問是一個更為廣大計劃的其中一部分,它使聯(lián)邦雇員堅持著“提高認識和尊重”的誓言。具體點的答案就是:今天“一個有合理能力的”公務員“應該知道控制他或她行為的法律”。該法的大部分是憲法性法律,即,法律由解釋憲法語言的法官制定,并且將它們運用在個別案件中。同樣地,州法官通過對州憲法進行解釋和說明從而制定州憲法。今天,憲法全面規(guī)定著美國政府的公共服務。就像詹姆斯所認為的,公務員在進行決策或采取其它行為的時候應遵循憲法

44、。</p><p>  對于公務員來說,理解憲法對他們的要求是一個基本工作能力的體現(xiàn)。這個從根本上將他們與私人領域管理分離開了,不論它是不是以利潤為營利目的。憲法規(guī)定了公務員與客戶、消費者、下屬員工、囚犯、僅限于公共精神衛(wèi)生設施的病患、承包商等的往來。與此相反,憲法并沒有涉及到純粹的私人關系和活動,除了1)禁止奴隸制和強迫勞逸(第十三修訂)2)限制了一類有限的私人實體的行為,這些實體被認為是為憲法目的而活動的國家

45、(“政府”)人。當一個公共管理者懲戒一個下屬甚至是一個見習者只因為他或她的演講,所參加的協(xié)會,在工作場所的宗教行為顯示或者其他憲法保護的行為,它會引起完全異于私人領域管理的憲法問題。私人領域的雇員可能為了成為好公民而學習憲法法律,公務員必須學習憲法法律從而成為一個好的雇員。一個自然的推論是,由于憲法法律在公共服務中起著重要的作用,所以制定法律的法官也有著同等的重要性。</p><p>  實現(xiàn)在憲法方面公共服務的

46、競爭力至少需要兩種類型的具有意義的研究和努力。首先,必須了解憲法法律所依據(jù)的廣泛的原則。第二,必須了解更為全面的挑戰(zhàn),就是必須學習目前管轄著美國政府公共服務的憲法規(guī)定。這本書的第一、二部分提供了分析和必要信息去了解憲法法律如何影響一個合理公務員的工作表現(xiàn)。他們解釋了公務員及其雇主因違反個人憲法權利的潛在責任,也說明了憲法程序的正當進程,自由言論,隱私以及平等保護等所要求的。</p><p>  雖然“憲法在很大程

47、度上是一個想象性的文件”,但是從獲得一些其基本原則的了解到制定相對具體以及可行的憲法法律還有很長一段路要走。以下原則尤其重要:一個是對憲法權利的侵犯必須是有必要的且有界的,另外,憲法始終是一個在進展中的工作。</p><p><b>  個人責任</b></p><p>  在美國,所有被選舉的或者任命的公務員進入公共服務領域都要宣誓他們將維護美國的憲法。宣誓是一種作

48、出承諾的行為。憲法的制定就像宣布了序言:“是為了建立一個更完善的國家,樹立正義,保障國家安定,加強國防,增進全民福利以及確保自由帶給我們以及我們后人的幸福?!?791過后不到三年,第一次代表大會通過的人權法案被批準了,它提到憲法契約性地向人民保證,當執(zhí)行一些功利性的目標時,政府將會保護與人們密切相關的權利,不論可否點算,要符合基本的公平性。在很大意義上說,宣誓是在道德和法律上做出了承諾,公務員都要在憲法條款范圍內(nèi)進行公共事務的行為。&l

49、t;/p><p>  任何保證的底線是“損害賠償或全無”。在第一次代表大會上,人權法案是以“隱”的理解構思出來的,意味著政府事務的管理可能導致個人被確保權力的剝奪,而且當這種行為發(fā)生了,政府就要為其負責。在馬伯里訴麥迪遜案件中,終審法院首席法官馬歇爾表達了他對這種合同責任的理解,“公民自由的一個大的本質(zhì)···在于每一個個人無論何時受到傷害都主張法律保護的權利。這個應當匆匆提一下,但是,縱

50、觀共和國歷史,個人尋求的針對政府和公務員的憲法性損害賠償已經(jīng)遇到了一個非常困難的法律障礙。這一部分是由于主權豁免的普通法原則,也有一部分是由于一些具體的,授權的立法的缺失。</p><p>  快速回到今天,法院意識到一個針對當?shù)卣畽C構無限制的損害賠償行為的原因以及針對聯(lián)邦和各州政府行為的有限制的損害賠償行為的原因。然而,法院認識到針對所有從事于行政職能(可能總統(tǒng)的情況除外),聯(lián)邦,州和地方,或者依據(jù)憲法及法定

51、計劃的公務員的損害賠償行為的一個完整的原因。因此,一個合理的公務員進行宣誓可以理解為憲法賦予他們權力和權威來積極履行公務,他們也擁有個人的民事賠償責任,這樣他們還會因為他人的憲法權利而產(chǎn)生違法行為嗎?</p><p>  個人問責制和官員問責制之間的區(qū)別對于在街道層面實施日常公共事務的一個合理的公務員的生活是至關重要的。官員問責制適用于當一個公務員扮演代理人,即政府的角色時,造成了個人憲法權利的剝奪。根據(jù)上級答辯

52、責任原則,代理人的侵權行為可替代地歸罪于他代表的當事人。個人問責制正值公務員迷途在授權范圍之外而發(fā)揮了作用,也就是說,在委托代理范圍之外引起的其他人憲法權利的剝奪。由于所謂的不正當行為已經(jīng)在職責范圍外發(fā)生了,損害賠償也許不會替代性地歸因于政府(最終的納稅人),卻歸因于公務員自身,除非當事人已經(jīng)通過某種方式對造成的傷害給予幫助。在現(xiàn)實世界里,個人與官方的界限往往是模糊的并且經(jīng)常在法庭上被爭議。現(xiàn)在看來足以指出,通過成文法和普通法的傳統(tǒng),個

53、人及官員問責制是屬于不同流派的,并且需要單獨分析。</p><p><b>  官方責任</b></p><p>  第二章審查了一個合理的公務員在個人身份行為上應有的憲法標準。本章將探討一個合理的公務員的官方身份行為應有的憲法標準。官方身份行為是公務員作為代理人或者主要代表的行為,即政府所期望的行為。個人身份行為與官方身份行為之間的區(qū)別(盡管不容易做出區(qū)分)對法律責

54、任的研究至關重要。正如我們在第二章中所見的,在憲法和法律受到侵害時,公務員沒有權利根據(jù)法律色彩濫用他的權力。在某種程度上,他從自身出發(fā)所做的事,他不能期望納稅人來掩藏他的錯誤行為并且他要對他所犯的侵權行為負個人責任。然而,對于公共服務和自我保護的利益,在哈洛訴杰拉德的案件中建立的普通法原則已經(jīng)給公務員提供權利去主張有限制的豁免權的防御。</p><p>  官方身份行為是不一樣的,它是代表當事人的代理人的行為。作

55、為代理人,公務員進行了他所代表的政府官員的法令。該法令已經(jīng)使得憲法受到侵害,在某種程度上,侵權行為將歸咎于做出這種行為的實體,雖然在某些情況下,公務員也可能被追究法律責任。在肯塔基訴格雷厄姆的案件中,最高法院使這種區(qū)別在損害賠償?shù)姆稍V訟中更急劇地體現(xiàn)出來。</p><p>  個人身份訴訟尋求將個人責任強加給那些根據(jù)國家法律的色彩而采取行動的政府官員。相反地,官方身份訴訟一般僅代表另一種對一個實體(官員為其代理

56、人)行為進行辯護的方式。只要政府實體收到通知就有機會作出回應,政府身份訴訟將被視為對實體的訴訟進行處理,這是考慮到各個方面而不僅僅因為一個名稱。這不是針對官員個人的訴訟,因為真正處于利益關系中的政黨是一個實體。因此,當一個官員以個人身份作出損害賠償,執(zhí)行判決時只可以針對官員的個人財產(chǎn),一個尋求在官方身份訴訟賠償判決中恢復的原告必須期待政府實體本身。</p><p>  官方身份行為和個人身份行為之間的區(qū)別<

57、/p><p>  1983年法律訴訟的檢查結果表明,投訴人經(jīng)常用被告人的個人身份指定被告人,官方身份也一樣。通過他們的個人身份以及官方身份指出公務員,投訴人尋求的不僅是被告公務員以個人身份的賠償,也尋求他們所代表的市政當局的賠償。判例法已經(jīng)確定,對一個公務員的官方身份的訴訟在本質(zhì)上和對他所代理的政府雇主的訴訟是一樣的。由于對官方身份的訴訟不是針對個人的,而是針對一個可能承擔了對他前任的訴訟的某個職位身份,一個當?shù)氐恼?/p>

58、府實體也許逃避不了責任只因為在這個職位上的承租人已經(jīng)改變了。</p><p>  官方身份行為和個人身份行為的區(qū)別有時也是一件棘手的事。哈弗米羅提出了這樣一種挑戰(zhàn)。在賓夕法尼亞州審計長的辦公室的若干雇員控告了新當選為賓夕法尼亞州國家審核員的芭芭拉哈,在1983年訴訟中,她以個人身份終止了他們的事務,這個行為違反了第十四條修正案。哈弗一旦贏得了選舉就解雇了員工,因為就像她所聲明的,他們已經(jīng)通過政治贊助促成了他們的就

59、業(yè)。值得注意的是在訴密歇根警察局一案中,最高法院支持1983年的訴訟案與政府官員的官方身份無關,卻與他們的個人身份有關。法院更關心的一點是:“根據(jù)1983年訴訟案,第十一修正案并沒有禁止在聯(lián)邦法庭對政府官員的個人身份的訴訟。</p><p>  員工以哈弗的個人身份起訴了她,尋求她的補償,而不是國家的補償。另一方面,哈弗為她的行動辯護,她聲稱她的決定是“官方”性質(zhì)的,而第十一修正案禁止了在1983年訴訟中對政府官

60、員的官方身份的訴訟。哈弗作出了嘗試以區(qū)別官方外權威的行為及與她官方職能密切相關的官方內(nèi)權威的行為,但沒有成功。她認為只有前者(“個人的”)是應該承擔1983年訴訟案中相關的責任的。</p><p>  最高法院法官奧康納提出一個一致的意見(法官托馬斯沒參加),“1983年國會頒布法律去執(zhí)行第十四修正案的規(guī)定,針對那些持有國家權威徽章并且代表某一種身份的人,無論他做了權責范圍內(nèi)的事或是濫用了權力”,并確定下來哈弗的

61、行動代表了“個人的”在國家的法律色彩下的權威的濫用。為了消除個人和官方身份訴訟之間的任何揮之不去的歧義,奧康納指出說:“‘以他們的官方身份行事’這句話在提及政府官員因什么身份被起訴時是一個很好的解釋,而不是以什么身份造成所謂的傷害”?!罢賳T以他們官方身份被起訴要求給予損害賠償不是以“個人的”目的的訴訟因為他們承擔了雇傭他們的政府的身份。相比之下,政府官員以個人身份被起訴是作為個體到法院去的。</p><p>

62、  正如我們之前我們討論的,當公務員以他的個人身份被起訴,他有權利主張有限制的豁免權的防御。然而,當他以官方身份被起訴,他就不能主張有限制的豁免權的防御。就如最高法院在歐文訴獨立城市一案中所解釋的,對一個公務員的官方身份的索賠要求實質(zhì)上是對他的雇主的索賠要求。莫奈兒已經(jīng)認為,根據(jù)1983年訴訟案,當?shù)卣畽C構既不是絕對的也沒有資格享受豁免權,如果法院允許公務員以他的官方身份主張有限制的豁免權的防御,那就產(chǎn)生了矛盾。</p>

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