國(guó)際貿(mào)易外文文獻(xiàn)資料及譯文

1、<p><b>　　外文資料譯文及原文</b></p><p><b>　　譯文（一）</b></p><p>　　新制度主義與新貿(mào)易理論：反思比較優(yōu)勢(shì)和貿(mào)易政策</p><p>　　比較優(yōu)勢(shì)理論在國(guó)際貿(mào)易理論中一直占主導(dǎo)地位。</p><p>　　這一理論的主張，除了少數(shù)負(fù)面例子外，大多

2、數(shù)國(guó)家的貿(mào)易都因此而變好。雖然如此，這個(gè)理論也承認(rèn)（斯托爾珀和薩繆爾森1941）貿(mào)易的收益因資本和勞動(dòng)力份額的多少而變動(dòng)，并且個(gè)體因素會(huì)帶來(lái)更大的損失。然而，失去的因素，原則上在貿(mào)易中仍然可以得到充分補(bǔ)償。雖然這些現(xiàn)象在實(shí)踐中由于政治經(jīng)濟(jì)原因是很少發(fā)生的。</p><p>　　比較優(yōu)勢(shì)理論起到了促進(jìn)自由貿(mào)易和全球化的中心作用。雖然大多數(shù)專(zhuān)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家都接受這個(gè)理論，但其中還有一些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家就充分就業(yè)的存在和市場(chǎng)能力對(duì)

3、國(guó)家生產(chǎn)（帕利2003得）及全球配置理論的假設(shè)產(chǎn)生質(zhì)疑。制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家也質(zhì)疑其體制形式不很?chē)?yán)密，特別是跨國(guó)公司及其復(fù)雜的對(duì)外合作對(duì)貿(mào)易格局的影響。 比較優(yōu)勢(shì)貿(mào)易理論中的批評(píng)也越來(lái)越多地夾雜在政治層面。因此，更多的政治家和市民質(zhì)疑貿(mào)易全球化到底能帶來(lái)多大的利益。特別是，越來(lái)越擔(dān)心未來(lái)境外生產(chǎn)及外包很可能對(duì)人們的福利產(chǎn)生巨大影響。 本文探討了當(dāng)前戈莫里和鮑莫爾（2000）和薩繆爾森（2004）最近的工作 -GBS- 研究了這些

4、問(wèn)題。特別是觀點(diǎn)的一致性，本文著重在挖掘和澄清戈莫里以及鮑莫爾在經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題上的分歧。</p><p>　　GBS在比較優(yōu)勢(shì)的均衡理論（尤其是薩繆爾森）在傳統(tǒng)理論中占有優(yōu)勢(shì)，同時(shí)它還探討了如何改變?nèi)蛏a(chǎn)模式從而帶來(lái)貿(mào)易收益分配的影響。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)在全球化貿(mào)易中隱含著比傳統(tǒng)貿(mào)易理論更多的東西。 GBS的研究結(jié)果也揭示了一些新古典貿(mào)易理論與貿(mào)易理論和制度主義融合的東西 。這種銜接工作表現(xiàn)在許多層面，從貿(mào)易的政策上來(lái)

5、分析。第二，GBS的論點(diǎn)強(qiáng)調(diào)了國(guó)家與國(guó)家之間的技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓和生產(chǎn)方法的交流，這些轉(zhuǎn)讓的背后隱含的現(xiàn)象對(duì)產(chǎn)品周期理論的鏈接是息息相關(guān)的。三，規(guī)模收益遞增（IRTS）發(fā)揮核心作用。戈莫里 - 貿(mào)易沖破鮑莫爾的分歧與后凱恩斯經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)一直強(qiáng)調(diào)的IRTS影響（卡爾多1981）相連。凱恩斯主義者往往強(qiáng)調(diào)通過(guò)Verdoorn規(guī)律，生產(chǎn)率的增長(zhǎng)在于市場(chǎng)規(guī)模和經(jīng)營(yíng)的動(dòng)態(tài)IRTS。第四，GBS看到了戰(zhàn)略性貿(mào)易政策，即從貿(mào)易中獲取更大收益，并與制度主義政策

6、思想的精神相聯(lián)系。 同樣重要的是了解GBS貿(mào)易理論的重新思考，這些與“貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義”無(wú)關(guān)。他們當(dāng)中有很多都贊成貿(mào)易會(huì)給各國(guó)帶來(lái)利益。然而，開(kāi)放的問(wèn)題將是如何讓這些收益的分配隨時(shí)間的改變而改變。這就提出了新的重要政策問(wèn)題，也就是可以采取什么措</p><p>　　在這方面，各國(guó)之間可能存在重大分歧。美國(guó)公司可以自由選擇他們?cè)谌蚧A(chǔ)上的經(jīng)營(yíng)策略，沒(méi)有考慮到美國(guó)的國(guó)家利益。事實(shí)上，考慮到美國(guó)的國(guó)家利益時(shí)，考慮

7、的將會(huì)違反信托義務(wù)，因?yàn)楣芾砣藛T有責(zé)任為股東價(jià)值最大化。截然不同，在中國(guó)，國(guó)民政府對(duì)企業(yè)施加重大控制，是把國(guó)家利益和經(jīng)營(yíng)策略的因素考慮在一起。從全國(guó)來(lái)看，這意味著相對(duì)美國(guó)中國(guó)是有利的，但在中國(guó)公司的股東，就沒(méi)有美國(guó)公司的股東那么好了。 第三個(gè)方面需要注意的是匯率政策。這個(gè)問(wèn)題是不解決GBS的，但在工作中隱含著。GBS的分析是基于純粹的貿(mào)易理論，只是從匯率問(wèn)題上看，它是很抽象的。實(shí)際上，它假定了匯率按購(gòu)買(mǎi)力平價(jià)值。但是，如果匯率偏

8、離這一點(diǎn)，他們可能會(huì)引起顯著的扭曲。 而且，即使在傳統(tǒng)的貿(mào)易理論上，讓匯率根據(jù)估值上升，比較優(yōu)勢(shì)和生產(chǎn)分配不當(dāng)也會(huì)帶來(lái)（布萊克2005年a）偏差。比較優(yōu)勢(shì)是一個(gè)平衡的貿(mào)易理論。因此，如果一個(gè)國(guó)家有一個(gè)被低估的匯率和貿(mào)易盈余并持續(xù)，這意味著它是一些出口產(chǎn)品國(guó)，它缺乏同樣具有比較優(yōu)勢(shì)的產(chǎn)品，該國(guó)持續(xù)的貿(mào)易赤字是運(yùn)行一些進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品，它可能是真正有比較優(yōu)勢(shì)產(chǎn)品。 失業(yè)的存在，它是由純貿(mào)易理論假設(shè)的，被低估</p>&

9、lt;p>　　選自：Journal ，Institutionalism and new trade theory: rethinking comparative advantage and trade policy，Journal of Economic Issues, March, 2008 by Thomas I. Palley</p><p><b>　　原文（一）</b><

10、;/p><p>　　Institutionalism and new trade theory: rethinking </p><p>　　comparative advantage and trade policy</p><p>　　Institutionalism and New Trade Theory.</p><p>　　Inter

11、national trade theory has long been dominated by the theory of comparative advantage. That theory claims, subject to a few pathological exceptions, countries are made better off by international trade. (1) That said, the

12、 theory also acknowledges (Stolper and Samuelson 1941) that capital and labor share differentially in the gains from trade, and individual factors can actually lose. However, factors that lose can still in principle be f

13、ully compensated for their losses out of the gains from</p><p>　　The theory of comparative advantage has played a central role in promoting the policy case for free trade and globalization. Though accepted b

14、y most professional economists, some economists question its theoretical assumptions regarding the existence of full employment and the ability of markets to bring about a global allocation of production on the basis of

15、country relative efficiency (Palley 2003). Institutional economists also question its lack of attention to institutional forms, particular</p><p>　　These theoretical critiques of comparative advantage trade

16、theory are also being increasingly joined at the political level. Thus, more politicians and members of the public are questioning the scale of benefits from trade and globalization. In particular, there are growing conc

17、erns about the welfare impacts of possible future developments regarding offshore outsourcing of production.</p><p>　　The current paper explores recent work by Gomory and Baumol (2000) and Samuelson (2004)--

18、henceforth GBS--examining these issues. In particular, the paper focuses on excavating and clarifying the economic argument of Gomory and Baumol, which is difficult to access in their book.</p><p>　　GBS work

19、 in the tradition of comparative advantage equilibrium theory (especially Samuelson) and explore how changing patterns of global production can affect the distribution of gains from trade. Their findings paint a much mor

20、e mixed picture of the benefits from globalization than implied by conventional trade theory.</p><p>　　GBS's findings also reveal the potential for some convergence between neoclassical trade theory and

21、institutionalist trade theory. This convergence operates at many levels, from the analysis of how trade works, to policy. First, expansions of trade may not be the win-win outcome conventionally claimed, and trade expans

22、ion may systematically create "country" winners and losers. Second, GBS's arguments emphasize transfers of technology and production methods between countries, and behind these tra</p><p>　　It

23、is also important to understand the character of GBS's re-thinking of trade, which has nothing to do with "protectionism." They are strongly in favor of trade, believing there are gains to be had by all. Wh

24、at is open to question is how the size of those gains and their distribution across countries may change over time. That raises important new policy issues regarding what can be done to maximize the U.S. share of gains f

25、rom trade and hold on to them, and it is this issue that is their ultim</p><p>　　Finally, GBS's analysis is conducted in terms of microeconomic theory, which is the basis of conventional trade theory. Th

26、at means their rethinking tackles conventional trade theory on its own terms, which strengthens their critique. To this can then be added macroeconomic critiques (Blecker 2005a; 2005b) and empirical critiques about the e

27、ffect of trade deficits on jobs and investment (Bivens 2004; Blecker 2006).</p><p>　　In this regard, there may be important differences across countries. American corporations are free to choose their busine

28、ss strategy on a global basis, without regard to American national interest. Indeed, taking account of American national interest would be a breach of fiduciary duty since managers have an obligation to maximize sharehol

29、der value. Contrastingly, in China the national government exerts significant control over corporations, and national interest is factored into business strat</p><p>　　A third area needing policy attention i

30、s exchange rates. This problem is not addressed by GBS, but is implicit in their work. GBS's analysis is based on pure trade theory, and as such it abstracts from exchange rate issues. In effect, it assumes that exch

31、ange rates are at purchasing power parity values. However, if exchange rates deviate from this they can give rise to significant costly distortions.</p><p>　　In a world of IRTS, countries can use undervalued

32、 exchange rates to give national firms a competitive advantage. Under-valued exchange rates lower the price of exports and increase the price of imports, thereby increasing product demand and output. In this fashion, und

33、er-valued exchange rates can help firms move down their average cost schedules and acquire ruling comparative advantage. Countries can therefore strategically use exchange rates to capture industries in which they were n

34、ot previous</p><p>　　Moreover, even in conventional trade theory exchange rate under-valuation gives rise to deviations from comparative advantage and misallocation of production (Blecker 2005a). Comparative

35、 advantage is a theory of balanced trade. Consequently, if a country has an under-valued exchange rate and a persistent trade surplus, it implies it is exporting some products that it lacks a comparative advantage in. Li

36、kewise, the country running persistent trade deficits is importing some products that it may t</p><p>　　In the presence of unemployment, which is assumed away by pure trade theory, under-valued exchange rate

37、s can be used strategically to poach aggregate demand from other countries and thereby reduce a country's unemployment at the expense of other countries. Long ago, this possibility was identified by Joan Robinson ([1

38、937] 1947, 156-70) who termed such policy a "beggar-my-neighbor" remedy for unemployment. (9)</p><p>　　The bottom line is that exchange rates matter significantly for global production and employme

39、nt outcomes. In a world without IRTS, under-valued exchange rates result in deviations of production from comparative advantage. These effects speak to making exchange rates a central part of trade policy and trade agree

40、ments. Yet currently, U.S. policy makers have rejected exchange rate intervention on the grounds that markets know best. This policy stance is at odds with reason and evidence. There are</p><p>　　Another for

41、m of strategic policy is domestic procurement. Here, countries can direct government purchases toward national companies, thereby scaling up production at those firms. In this fashion, they can help firms move down their

42、 average cost curve, thereby becoming the global low cost producer and grabbing global leadership.</p><p>　　Countries can also engage in labor exploitation to gain advantage. In this case they shift down bus

43、iness's average cost schedule rather than moving along it. This has direct relevance for trade with China, which American trade unions have accused of engaging in labor exploitation for purposes of gaining trade adva

44、ntages.</p><p>　　Labor exploitation is horrendous and unacceptable. However, a legitimate way of lowering business' costs concerns the method of providing health and social insurance. In the United State

45、s, such insurance is provided via jobs, making it a job cost. This raises the cost of U.S. based production, competitively disadvantaging U.S. producers and providing an incentive to offshore work. Providing health insur

46、ance through a national insurance system that is funded by federal tax revenues can potentiall</p><p>　　In sum, GBS's analysis of trade provides microeconomic justification for a collection of policies t

47、hat has some resemblance with what has historically been called industrial or competitiveness policy. However, the proposed policies do not involve policymakers "picking winners," something there is no reason t

48、o believe they can do. Instead, policy should be viewed as establishing the right economic climate, and that climate Structure refers to law, rules and institutions. It sets the frame in whic</p><p>　　From：J