關(guān)于稀土的畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯--中國(guó)的稀土產(chǎn)業(yè)西方能學(xué)到什么？

1、<p>　　China's Rare Earth Elements Industry: What Can the West Learn?</p><p>　　By Cindy Hurst</p><p>　　Corporate Author: INSTITUTE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL SECURITY WASHINGTON DC&

2、lt;/p><p>　　Personal Author(s): Hurst, Cindy</p><p>　　Report Date: MAR 2010</p><p>　　Pagination or Media Count: 43</p><p>　　Institute for the Analysis of Gl

3、obal Security (IAGS)</p><p>　　U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office, 731 McClellan Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 66027</p><p>　　Cindy Hurst is an analyst for the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military

4、 Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　China controls approximately 97 percent of the world's rare earth element market. These elements, which are not widely kn

5、own because they are so low on the production chain, are critical to hundreds of high tech applications, many of which define our modern way of life. Without rare earth elements, much of the world's modern technology

6、 would be vastly different and many applications would not be possible. For one thing, we would not have the advantage of smaller sized technology, such as the cel</p><p>　　Over the past few years, China has

7、 come under increasing scrutiny and criticism over its monopoly of the rare earth industry and for gradually reducing export quotas of these resources. However, China is faced with its own internal issues that, if not ad

8、dressed, could soon stress the country's rare earth industry.</p><p>　　This paper is designed to give the reader a better understanding of what rare earth elements are and their importance to society in

9、general and to U.S. defense and energy policy in particular. It will also explore the history of rare earth elements and China's current monopoly of the industry, including possible repercussions and strategic implic

10、ations if rare earth elements supply were to be disrupted.</p><p>　　The Issues China Faces</p><p>　　According to Zhao Shuanglian, Vice Chairman of Inner Mongolia’s Autonomous Regions, “Rare eart

11、h is a unique treasure, and it is also Inner Mongolia’s primary strategic resource.”While China possesses approximately 57 percent of the world’s reserves of rare earth elements, the industry within China is plagued with

12、 disorderly development and poor management practices. The Chinese government fears that if the current poor mining practices and lack of regulation continue, China will “become a rare-e</p><p><b>　　Sm

13、uggling</b></p><p>　　According to China Business News, due to the annual increased demand for rare earth elements, many buyers are resorting to smuggling rare earths out of China. In 2008, approximatel

14、y 20,000 tons of rare earth were reportedly smuggled from the country. Meanwhile, during that same year, according to official customs statistics, China exported 39,500 tons of rare earth oxide. This means that smuggling

15、 accounted for one-third of the total volume of rare earths leaving China.</p><p>　　One aim of China’s “Rare-Earth Industry Development Plan of 2009-2015” is to try to curb some of the smuggling by introduci

16、ng regulations and policies to punish the smugglers. Smuggling is potentially detrimental to China’s rare earth industry because it keeps prices low and depletes resources quicker. Smuggling also indicates a severe lack

17、of control over the industry and can lead to even greater repercussions such as more damage to the environment. Regulations on safe mining practice are nearl</p><p>　　Severe environmental damage</p>&

18、lt;p>　　A major concern surrounding China’s practice of mining rare earth elements is the negative impact it has to the environment due to lax mining practices. There are a number of potential environmental implication

19、s to mining rare earth elements if not done properly. Unfortunately, because of the revenue potential, many rare earth mines have been operating illegally, with no regulation, causing severe environmental hazards, which

20、exacerbates the problem.</p><p>　　In 2005, Xu Guangxian wrote that thorium was a source of radioactive contamination in the Baotou area and the Yellow River. According to a local source, who asked not to be

21、identified, “In the Yellow River, in Baotou, the fish all died. They dump the waste – the chemicals into the river. You cannot eat the fish because they are polluted.” Some 150 million people depend on the river as their

22、 primary source of water.</p><p>　　Under traditional technology means, refining rare earth elements requires such chemicals as ammonium bicarbonate and oxalic acid. The potential health hazards of ammonium b

23、icarbonate include: Irritation to the respiratory tract if inhaled, irritation to the gastrointestinal tract if ingested, redness and pain if it comes in contact with the eyes, and redness, itching, and pain if it comes

24、in contact with the skin. Oxalic acid is poisonous and potentially fatal if swallowed. It is also corrosive </p><p>　　Safety standards in China are lax. “People in their 30s have died of cancer working aroun

25、d the mines, possibly from radioactive materials,” said one local source. “I visited a factory many times. When I visit a factory or workshop, I tell the director of the workshop, ‘would you tell the laborers to put thei

26、r mask on when they are doing their job?’ He said, ‘Oh yeah. We do every time, but it’s too hot. They don’t want to keep their mask on.’ You can see that the air is dirty and they are breathi</p><p>　　While

27、China might have general pollution control standards, the country has never actually worked out pollutant discharge standards for the rare earth industry. As the rare earth industry in China has rapidly grown, there has

28、been no effective way to control the usual pollutants such as ammonia, nitrogen, and thorium dust, which are emitted during the production phase. Furthermore, general health and safety regulations are often ignored for a

29、 number of reasons, including:</p><p>　　? The industry is large and challenging to monitor.</p><p>　　? People and companies are not being held accountable. For example, in Western society, if an

30、 employee dies or becomes ill, repercussions could include a lawsuit or life-long pension which the company is obligated to fulfill. This is not the case in China.</p><p>　　Domestic consumption is a priority

31、</p><p>　　With 1.3 billion people and the fastest growing economy in the world, China is faced with the challenging task of ensuring it has adequate natural resources to sustain economic growth, while also t

32、rying to appease the international community, which has been protesting China’s cuts in rare earth export quotas.</p><p>　　According to Wang Caifeng, in 2008 China used 70,000 tons of rare earth elements. Gl

33、obal consumption was 130,000 tons. China exported 10,000 tons of rare earth magnets worth $400 million and 34,600 tons of other rare earth products worth $500 million.</p><p>　　There are numerous examples th

34、at point to China’s anticipated increase in rare earth consumption. For example, at the end of July 2008, China had 600 million cell phone users. Less than one year later, by the end of March 2009, China had 670 million

35、cell phone users. New technologies, such as the third generation (3G) networks, have boosted the sale of cell phones, a trend which will likely continue as more and more Chinese citizens buy cell phones and others upgrad

36、e to the new technologies. Put</p><p>　　In another example, the use of solar and wind power are set to increase exponentially in China. Green energy technology is expected to become the largest consumer of r

37、are earth elements in the future. According to Mark Smith, Chief Executive Officer of Molycorp Minerals, the company that owns and operates the Mountain Pass rare earth mine in California, “We’ve coined the term, ‘the gr

38、een elements.’ because there are so many applications right now hybrid electric vehicles, wind powered generation</p><p>　　China’s consumption of rare earth elements is also expected to increase dramatically

39、 as more and more foreign companies move their production sites to China to take advantage of the lower cost of rare earths and therefore reduce their overall production costs. This is part of China’s larger strategy to

40、maintain a tight hold on the industry.</p><p>　　China Fights Back before it’s too Late: Implications for the West</p><p>　　In 2005, Xu Guangxian called for protective measures in the rare earth

41、industry, warning that rare earth and thorium resources at Bayan Obo were in “urgent need of protection and rational utilization.” Xu pointed out that since Bayan Obo had started off exclusively as an iron ore mine, it d

42、id not properly consider ways to recover rare earths and thorium. Since 1958, when Baotou Iron and Steel Works began their mining operations, 250 million tons of ore had been mined at the main and eastern ore </p>

43、<p>　　With so much emphasis placed on the importance of rare earth elements in modern day technology, maintaining strict control over this resource will help to propel China into a position of greater political, ec

44、onomic, and military power. Prior to 2009, according to Dai Xu, an expert on military issues, “China had been selling these precious rare-earth metals at a dirt-cheap price for 20 years.”This has both been stripping the

45、country of one of its most important strategic resources and damaging th</p><p>　　In an effort to try to protect its resources, the Chinese government has been clamping down on its domestic industry in sever

46、al ways, including: restricting export quotas on rare earth elements; closing down smaller and illegal rare earth operations and consolidating larger ones in an effort to gain more control; trying to put into place incre

47、ased environmental laws regulating rare earth mining; and stockpiling. Much of the developed world regards these measures as threatening.</p><p>　　Restricting export quotas</p><p>　　Of most conc

48、ern to the international community, China has been restricting export quotas in order to have enough resources for its own industries and to regain control over its domestic operations. China currently restricts export q

49、uotas on dysprosium, terbium, thulium, lutetium, yttrium, and the heavy and scarcer rare earths. This reduction of export quotas has pushed up the international price of key rare earths, including neodymium which is so c

50、ritical for the neodymium-iron-boron permanent m</p><p>　　The Ministry of Land and Resources implemented a regulation stating that the 2009 export quota for rare earth ores would be set at 82,320 tons, 72,30

51、0 of which are light rare earth elements, the remaining 10,020 tons being heavy rare earth elements. These numbers were based on “controls of the total amount of extraction for” rare earth ore for 2008 and forecasts for

52、market factors in 2009. More cuts are expected in the future.</p><p>　　Of course, this brings about a new fear. China’s control over rare earth elements has the potential to increase foreign dependence on Ch

53、ina for finished goods. China has adopted various policies to further develop the rare earth industry at its roots. China’s vision is to increase industrial utilization of rare earth elements in order to draw in more rar

54、e earth enterprises, both within and outside of China, to set up operations in Inner Mongolia in the area of rare earth applications. Zhao Shuan</p><p>　　Closing smaller operations and consolidating larger o

55、nes to gain more control</p><p>　　China is striving to cut back and consolidate the industry to gain more control over it. It is achieving this by closing down smaller, illegal operations and consolidating a

56、nd merging larger producers. These steps will ultimately put complete control over Chinese rare earth elements into the government’s hands, which will completely restrict any type of private enterprise exchange.</p>

57、;<p>　　China’s rare earth resources are widely distributed across 22 provinces and regions throughout the country. Because of the scattered distribution of rare earth resources, it is difficult to carry out effici

58、ent oversight of the industry. According to one source, a revised draft of the 2009-2015 Plans for Developing the Rare Earth Industry will simplify management of China’s rare earth resources by “designating large distric

59、ts.” The new plan will divide China’s industry into three large districts </p><p>　　On 10 December 2008, Baotou Steel Rare Earth set up the Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare Earth High-Tech Co., a state-owned

60、 sole-proprietor company in the rare earths high-tech zone of Inner Mongolia; and Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare Earth High-Tech Co. was an eight-party, 700-million Yuan ($102.5 million) joint venture that included Bao

61、tou Huamei Rare Earth High-tech Co., Zibo Baosteel Lingzhi Rare Earth Hi-Tech Co., Inner Mongolia Baosteel and Rare-Earth Development Co. The new venture is </p><p>　　New regulations to protect the environme

62、nt</p><p>　　China does not have pollutant discharge standards for the rare earth industry. Environmental issues behind the mining of rare earth elements are a huge concern. The differences between Western mi

63、ning efforts and those seen in China today are staggering. Aware of the problem, the local government is reporting to be trying to find ways to improve the situation.</p><p>　　In July 2009, the Ministry of E

64、nvironmental Protection organized the “Rare Earth Industry Pollutant Discharge Standards.” These new standards will hopefully “eliminate backward production abilities and promote the upgrading and updating of China’s rar

65、e earth industry.”</p><p>　　The Ministry of Environmental Protection set discharge standards for six types of atmospheric pollutants – sulfur dioxide, particles, fluoride, chlorine, hydrogen chloride, and su

66、lfur trioxide. For water pollutants, discharge standards were set for 14 types of pollutants, including fluoride, total phosphorous, total carbon, total nitrogen, and ammonia nitrogen. In many southern regions with lakes

67、, the new standards implement special discharge limits for ammonia nitrogen discharge concentrations.</p><p>　　Stockpiling </p><p>　　Xu Guangxian, China’s “Father of Rare Earths,” has been pushi

68、ng to have China build up its strategic reserves of rare earths. According to Xu, “We (China) must set up a stockpiling system for rare earths and thorium (thorium for energy) and support leading domestic producers like

69、Baogang, Minmetals, and Jiangxi Copper to implement the stockpiling.”</p><p>　　According to Xu, Japan and South Korea have built up stockpiles, which are enough for 20 years of consumption, by taking advanta

70、ge of low market prices before 2008 when China began to restrict production, but China hasn’t set up a stockpiling system yet.</p><p>　　According to An Sihu, assistant director of the Rare Earth High-Tech Zo

71、ne Management Committee, China has major plans to build a national rare earth resources strategic reserves base. The tentative plan is to store up the raw materials that were not used up from the annual excavation at Bao

72、steel and use that to stabilize prices. Efforts currently are underway in Northern China to realize this goal. A new rare earth industry park began construction in July 2008 and is to be located in Northern Ch</p>

73、<p>　　Xu continually warns about depleting rare earth reserves from over production. Stockpiling rare earth elements will allow China to better regulate the pricing of rare earths as well as help ensure its own fut

74、ure supplies.</p><p>　　From http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA525378</p><p>　　中國(guó)的稀土產(chǎn)業(yè)：西方能學(xué)到什么？</p><p><b>　　辛蒂·赫斯特</b></p><p>　　集團(tuán)作者：華盛頓全球安全分析研

75、究所</p><p>　　個(gè)人作者：辛蒂·赫斯特</p><p>　　發(fā)表日期：2010年3月</p><p>　　全球安全分析研究所（IAGS）</p><p>　　堪薩斯州利溫沃斯堡麥克萊倫大街731號(hào)美國(guó)陸軍外國(guó)軍事研究室，66027</p><p>　　辛蒂·赫斯特：堪薩斯州利溫沃斯堡美國(guó)陸

76、軍外國(guó)軍事研究辦公室分析師。</p><p><b>　　引言</b></p><p>　　中國(guó)控制著全球約97%的稀土市場(chǎng)。這些元素并不廣為人知，因?yàn)樗麄冊(cè)谏a(chǎn)鏈中是如此之低，但卻是成百上千的高科技應(yīng)用的關(guān)鍵，其中的許多決定了我們的現(xiàn)代生活方式。沒(méi)有稀土元素，世界上大部分的現(xiàn)代科技將大大不同，許多應(yīng)用型產(chǎn)品也將無(wú)法使用。一方面，不使用稀土元素，我們就沒(méi)有微型技術(shù)的優(yōu)

77、勢(shì)，如手機(jī)和筆記本電腦。稀土元素對(duì)國(guó)防工業(yè)也是必不可少的，應(yīng)用于巡航導(dǎo)彈，精確制導(dǎo)武器，雷達(dá)系統(tǒng)和反應(yīng)裝甲。他們也是綠色技術(shù)得以發(fā)展的關(guān)鍵，如新一代的風(fēng)力發(fā)電機(jī)和插電式混合動(dòng)力汽車以及煉油廠，均需要稀土元素作催化劑。</p><p>　　在過(guò)去的幾年中，中國(guó)對(duì)其壟斷的稀土行業(yè)的審查和批評(píng)日益嚴(yán)格，并逐漸減少稀土的出口配額。然而，中國(guó)面臨著自身的內(nèi)部問(wèn)題，如果不解決，可能很快就會(huì)對(duì)其稀土行業(yè)產(chǎn)生不利影響。</

78、p><p>　　本文的目的是讓讀者更好地了解稀土元素和它們?cè)谏鐣?huì)上的一般重要性，以及對(duì)美國(guó)國(guó)防和能源政策的特殊性。本文還將探討稀土元素與中國(guó)目前的行業(yè)壟斷的歷史，包括在稀土元素供應(yīng)被中斷后可能產(chǎn)生的影響和戰(zhàn)略意義。</p><p><b>　　中國(guó)面臨的問(wèn)題</b></p><p>　　根據(jù)內(nèi)蒙古自治區(qū)副主席趙雙連所說(shuō)，“稀土是一種獨(dú)特的珍寶，也是

79、內(nèi)蒙古的主要戰(zhàn)略資源”。盡管中國(guó)擁有約占世界57%的稀土儲(chǔ)量，但中國(guó)的稀土行業(yè)存在的無(wú)序發(fā)展和管理不善的問(wèn)題。中國(guó)政府擔(dān)心，如果目前這種簡(jiǎn)陋的開(kāi)采方式和監(jiān)管的缺乏繼續(xù)下去，中國(guó)將成為“稀土貧乏的國(guó)家，甚至是一個(gè)沒(méi)有稀土資源的國(guó)家”。中國(guó)稀土行業(yè)面臨的其他問(wèn)題還有稀土走私和非法采礦活動(dòng)，惡劣開(kāi)采方式所造成的環(huán)境破壞以及確保不斷增長(zhǎng)的國(guó)內(nèi)稀土需求的挑戰(zhàn)。</p><p><b>　　走私</b>

80、</p><p>　　據(jù)第一財(cái)經(jīng)日?qǐng)?bào)，由于每年對(duì)稀土資源的不斷增長(zhǎng)的需求，很多買家都從中國(guó)走私稀土。據(jù)報(bào)道，2008年該國(guó)約20000噸稀土被走私。同時(shí)根據(jù)海關(guān)統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)，同一年中國(guó)出口了39500噸稀土氧化物。這意味著走私占中國(guó)出境稀土總量的三分之一。</p><p>　　“中國(guó)稀土產(chǎn)業(yè)2009-2015發(fā)展計(jì)劃”的一個(gè)目的是試圖通過(guò)引入懲罰走私者的法規(guī)和政策來(lái)遏制走私行為。走私對(duì)中國(guó)稀土

81、產(chǎn)業(yè)具有潛在的不利影響，它價(jià)格低，消耗資源也更快。走私也表明嚴(yán)重缺乏對(duì)行業(yè)的控制，這可能會(huì)造成更大的不利影響，如對(duì)環(huán)境產(chǎn)生更多的破壞。安全開(kāi)采方式的法規(guī)幾乎不可能在這種環(huán)境中執(zhí)行。實(shí)際上，由于糟糕的管理實(shí)踐和巨大的行業(yè)規(guī)模，中國(guó)在執(zhí)行提高安全的法規(guī)和貫徹稀土行業(yè)的環(huán)境保護(hù)措施方面具有難度。</p><p><b>　　嚴(yán)重的環(huán)境破壞</b></p><p>　　中國(guó)稀

82、土開(kāi)采的關(guān)注重點(diǎn)是由松懈的開(kāi)采方式對(duì)環(huán)境所造成的負(fù)面影響。如果做得不恰當(dāng)，會(huì)有許多潛在的環(huán)境因素影響稀土開(kāi)采。不幸的是，由于可觀的收入，許多稀土礦山缺乏監(jiān)管，非法經(jīng)營(yíng)，造成了嚴(yán)重的環(huán)境危害，這加劇了問(wèn)題的嚴(yán)重性。</p><p>　　2005年，徐光憲寫道，釷元素是包頭和黃河地區(qū)的放射性污染源。根據(jù)當(dāng)?shù)匾晃徊辉竿嘎缎彰娜耸?，“在黃河、包頭，魚都死了。他們把化學(xué)品廢棄物倒入河中。你不能吃魚，因?yàn)樗麄兌急晃廴玖??！?/p>

83、約1.5億人依靠河流作為他們的主要水源。</p><p>　　傳統(tǒng)的技術(shù)手段下，提煉稀土元素需要碳酸氫銨和草酸這樣的化學(xué)品。碳酸氫銨的潛在健康危害包括：如果吸入會(huì)刺激呼吸道，吸收后會(huì)刺激胃腸道，如果接觸眼睛會(huì)使其發(fā)紅和疼痛，如果與皮膚接觸會(huì)使其發(fā)紅、瘙癢甚至疼痛。草酸是有毒的，如果吞下則可能致命。它也具有強(qiáng)烈的腐蝕性，會(huì)對(duì)皮膚、眼睛和呼吸道造成嚴(yán)重的刺激和灼傷，如果吸入或通過(guò)皮膚吸收是十分有害的，會(huì)導(dǎo)致腎臟損傷。

84、但這些和其他化學(xué)物質(zhì)經(jīng)常流入黃河。</p><p>　　在中國(guó)的安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)比較寬松?！霸诘V山工作的人們30多歲就死于癌癥，很可能是由于放射性物質(zhì)”，一位當(dāng)?shù)厝耸空f(shuō)?！拔叶啻螀⒂^了一個(gè)工廠，當(dāng)我參觀一個(gè)工廠或車間，我問(wèn)車間主任：‘當(dāng)他們工作時(shí)你會(huì)告訴工人叫他們戴上面具嗎？’他說(shuō)：‘是的，我們每次都會(huì)，但它太燙了，他們不想戴著面具。’你可以看到，他們污濁的空氣都吸了進(jìn)去。”在包頭最常見(jiàn)的疾病是塵肺病，一般多稱為黑肺。有

85、5387個(gè)包頭居民患有黑肺，占據(jù)了自治區(qū)一半以上的病例。</p><p>　　雖然中國(guó)可能有一般污染控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，但國(guó)家還沒(méi)有制定出稀土工業(yè)污染物排放標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。中國(guó)的稀土產(chǎn)業(yè)在迅速成長(zhǎng)，但卻一直沒(méi)有控制如氨、氮以及釷塵等在生產(chǎn)階段產(chǎn)生的常見(jiàn)污染物的有效途徑。此外，一般的健康和安全規(guī)章制度往往由于各種原因而被忽視，包括：</p><p>　　? 行業(yè)龐大，實(shí)行監(jiān)測(cè)具有挑戰(zhàn)性。</p>

86、<p>　　? 個(gè)人和企業(yè)不承擔(dān)責(zé)任。例如，在西方社會(huì)，如果一個(gè)雇員死亡或生病，后果可能包括訴訟和終身年金，這是公司必須義務(wù)履行的，但在中國(guó)卻不是這樣的。</p><p>　　滿足國(guó)內(nèi)消費(fèi)是當(dāng)務(wù)之急</p><p>　　作為世界上具有13億人口和經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)最快的國(guó)家，中國(guó)面臨著具有挑戰(zhàn)性的任務(wù)，既要確保國(guó)內(nèi)具有足夠的自然資源來(lái)維持經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)，同時(shí)也試圖滿足已在抗議中國(guó)削減稀土出口配額

87、的國(guó)際社會(huì)。</p><p>　　根據(jù)王采風(fēng)，2008年中國(guó)消耗了7萬(wàn)噸稀土資源，全球消費(fèi)量為13萬(wàn)噸。中國(guó)出口1萬(wàn)噸稀土永磁體價(jià)值4億美元，34600噸的其他稀土產(chǎn)品價(jià)值5億美元。</p><p>　　有無(wú)數(shù)的例子指出中國(guó)的稀土消費(fèi)量預(yù)計(jì)增加。例如，2008年7月底，中國(guó)有6億手機(jī)用戶。不到一年后，2009年3月底，中國(guó)有6.7億手機(jī)用戶。新技術(shù)如第三代（3G）網(wǎng)絡(luò)增加了手機(jī)的銷量，這一

88、趨勢(shì)很可能會(huì)繼續(xù)，越來(lái)越多的中國(guó)公民會(huì)購(gòu)買手機(jī)，其他人員則將不斷升級(jí)達(dá)到最新技術(shù)。整體來(lái)看，中國(guó)大約一半人口擁有手機(jī)。國(guó)際無(wú)線通信協(xié)會(huì)在2008年10月報(bào)道，美國(guó)（截至2008年7月人口為3.04億）有超過(guò)2.62億的手機(jī)用戶。這意味著整個(gè)美國(guó)86%的人口擁有手機(jī)。如果中國(guó)遵循與美國(guó)相同的技術(shù)增長(zhǎng)模式，中國(guó)有一天可能會(huì)有大約11億的手機(jī)用戶甚至更多。</p><p>　　另一個(gè)例子中，太陽(yáng)能和風(fēng)能的使用在中國(guó)將以

89、指數(shù)方式增加。綠色能源技術(shù)有望成為未來(lái)稀土資源的最大消費(fèi)者。根據(jù)莫利礦業(yè)公司的首席執(zhí)行官馬克·史密斯，該公司擁有和經(jīng)營(yíng)加利福尼亞帕斯山的稀土礦，“我們創(chuàng)造了這個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ)‘綠色元素’，因?yàn)橛羞@么多的產(chǎn)品需要應(yīng)用稀土元素如混合動(dòng)力汽車、風(fēng)力發(fā)電機(jī)……永磁發(fā)電機(jī)、緊湊型熒光燈泡等等。稀土是必不可少的，沒(méi)有稀土他們（綠色技術(shù)）將無(wú)法正常運(yùn)作”。</p><p>　　隨著越來(lái)越多的外國(guó)企業(yè)將其生產(chǎn)基地轉(zhuǎn)移到中國(guó)，利用

90、其罕見(jiàn)的低成本稀土來(lái)降低整體生產(chǎn)成本，中國(guó)的稀土消費(fèi)也將急劇增加。這是中國(guó)為緊緊把握稀土行業(yè)的大戰(zhàn)略的一部分。</p><p>　　中國(guó)及時(shí)的對(duì)策措施：對(duì)西方的啟示</p><p>　　2005年，徐光憲呼吁對(duì)稀土產(chǎn)業(yè)實(shí)行保護(hù)措施，并提出警告白云鄂博的稀土和釷資源“迫切需要保護(hù)和合理利用”。徐指出，自從白云鄂博開(kāi)始專門生產(chǎn)稀土礦，它沒(méi)有適當(dāng)?shù)乜紤]回收稀土和釷元素的方式。1958年開(kāi)始，包頭

91、鋼鐵廠開(kāi)始采礦作業(yè)，2.5億噸的礦石已在主體礦和東部礦體開(kāi)采，留下剩余的3.5億噸礦石量。以中國(guó)現(xiàn)有的開(kāi)采速度，每年1000萬(wàn)噸，徐估計(jì)主礦和東礦會(huì)在35年內(nèi)完全耗盡。</p><p>　　不斷強(qiáng)調(diào)稀土資源在現(xiàn)代科技中的重要性，保持對(duì)該資源的嚴(yán)格控制，將有助于推動(dòng)中國(guó)提升到更高的政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)和軍事力量的地位。2009年之前，根據(jù)一位軍事問(wèn)題專家戴煦，“中國(guó)賤賣這些珍貴的稀土金屬已經(jīng)長(zhǎng)達(dá)20年”。這不但損耗了該國(guó)最重

92、要的戰(zhàn)略資源之一，還破壞了生態(tài)環(huán)境。</p><p>　　為了努力保護(hù)稀土資源，中國(guó)政府已經(jīng)采取幾種方式來(lái)嚴(yán)格限制其國(guó)內(nèi)行業(yè)，包括：限制稀土出口配額，關(guān)閉小型非法的稀土企業(yè)，鞏固大型企業(yè)努力獲取更多控制，試圖將增加的規(guī)范稀土開(kāi)采的環(huán)境保護(hù)法規(guī)付諸實(shí)踐，以及實(shí)行稀土儲(chǔ)備。許多發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家認(rèn)為這些措施對(duì)他們構(gòu)成威脅。</p><p><b>　　限制稀土出口配額</b><

93、;/p><p>　　國(guó)際社會(huì)最關(guān)注的是，中國(guó)為了使本國(guó)產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展有足夠的資源，并收回對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)企業(yè)的控制權(quán)，已經(jīng)采取了限制出口配額的制度措施。中國(guó)目前的出口配額限制針對(duì)鏑、鋱、銩、镥、釔元素……以及稀有的重稀土資源。出口配額的削減推動(dòng)了關(guān)鍵稀土資源國(guó)際價(jià)格的上漲，包括釹元素，它是制造釹鐵硼永磁體產(chǎn)品的關(guān)鍵元素。</p><p>　　國(guó)土資源部所實(shí)施的規(guī)定指出，2009年稀土礦的出口配額將定在823

94、20噸，其中72300噸是輕稀土元素，其余10020噸是重稀土元素。這些數(shù)字是根據(jù)從2008年的稀土礦中所提取的控制總量以及對(duì)2009年市場(chǎng)因素的預(yù)測(cè)所確定的。在未來(lái)預(yù)計(jì)會(huì)有更多的削減。</p><p>　　當(dāng)然，這帶來(lái)了一種新的恐懼。中國(guó)對(duì)稀土資源的控制具有提高國(guó)外對(duì)中國(guó)稀土成品依賴性的潛力。中國(guó)政府實(shí)行各種政策進(jìn)一步發(fā)展根本的稀土產(chǎn)業(yè)。中國(guó)的目標(biāo)是提高稀土資源的產(chǎn)業(yè)利用率，吸引更多的國(guó)內(nèi)外稀土企業(yè)在內(nèi)蒙古成立

95、稀土應(yīng)用領(lǐng)域的企業(yè)。趙雙連指出，內(nèi)蒙古想控制它的稀土資源，成為一個(gè)主要的工業(yè)基地。趙還表示，吸引更多國(guó)內(nèi)外企業(yè)對(duì)內(nèi)蒙古產(chǎn)生興趣的利益在于發(fā)展稀土行業(yè)。對(duì)中國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)這是一個(gè)理想情況，因?yàn)檫@將使政府實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)整個(gè)行業(yè)完全控制，并為制造業(yè)的中國(guó)公民提供更多的就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)。然而，那些由于依賴稀土資源而被迫將他們的生產(chǎn)基地轉(zhuǎn)移到中國(guó)的國(guó)家，其國(guó)民失去工作，也許更關(guān)鍵的國(guó)防安全、專利權(quán)甚至是關(guān)鍵技術(shù)都可能會(huì)因妥協(xié)而泄露。</p><p&g

96、t;　　關(guān)閉小企業(yè)、整合大型企業(yè)，獲取更多控制權(quán)</p><p>　　中國(guó)正在努力削減并整合行業(yè)以獲得更多控制權(quán)。通過(guò)關(guān)閉違規(guī)的小型企業(yè)、整合歸并較大的生產(chǎn)商來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)目標(biāo)。這些步驟最終會(huì)使中國(guó)的稀土資源完全掌控在政府手中，這將完全限制任何形式的民營(yíng)企業(yè)間的交流。</p><p>　　中國(guó)的稀土資源廣泛分布在全國(guó)22個(gè)省份和地區(qū)。由于稀土資源分布零散，難以對(duì)整個(gè)實(shí)行有效的全面監(jiān)管。根據(jù)一份原始

97、資料，用于開(kāi)發(fā)稀土行業(yè)2009-2015年發(fā)展規(guī)劃的修訂草案將通過(guò)“指定區(qū)域”來(lái)簡(jiǎn)化中國(guó)稀土資源的管理。新計(jì)劃將中國(guó)的產(chǎn)業(yè)分為三大區(qū)----南、北、西。南部地區(qū)是江西、廣東、福建、湖南以及廣西；北部地區(qū)是內(nèi)蒙古和山東；西部地區(qū)是四川。從2009到2015年，輕稀土資源將成為內(nèi)蒙古和四川的重點(diǎn)項(xiàng)目。中、重稀土開(kāi)采將是江西、廣東和福建的重點(diǎn)。工業(yè)和信息化部將通過(guò)對(duì)稀土萃取的專業(yè)檢查系統(tǒng)監(jiān)督整個(gè)行業(yè)。該系統(tǒng)將包括即興的現(xiàn)場(chǎng)視察和檢查以確保國(guó)家

98、指令計(jì)劃的實(shí)施和執(zhí)行。</p><p>　　2008年12月10日，包頭鋼鐵稀土成立內(nèi)蒙古包頭鋼鐵稀土高科技公司，是內(nèi)蒙古地區(qū)稀土高新技術(shù)領(lǐng)域的一家國(guó)有獨(dú)資企業(yè)；包頭鋼鐵稀土高科技有限公司是一個(gè)資產(chǎn)7億元（1.025億美元）由八大公司聯(lián)合經(jīng)營(yíng)的企業(yè)，包括包頭華美稀土高科技有限公司，淄博寶鋼靈芝稀土高新技術(shù)有限公司，內(nèi)蒙古寶鋼和稀土開(kāi)發(fā)有限公司。新的公司被認(rèn)為是稀土行業(yè)的統(tǒng)一控制聲音，使用統(tǒng)一組織和生產(chǎn)安排、統(tǒng)一采

99、購(gòu)、統(tǒng)一銷售的新的商業(yè)模式。在此之前，國(guó)家已經(jīng)有了建立兩個(gè)主要稀土集團(tuán)的想法，一個(gè)在北方，另一個(gè)在南方。然而，兩個(gè)集團(tuán)之間的利益難以平衡，這個(gè)計(jì)劃沒(méi)有能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)。有一個(gè)主要企業(yè)負(fù)責(zé)整個(gè)行業(yè)的最大優(yōu)勢(shì)在于能更容易地實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)統(tǒng)一定價(jià)的控制。中心企業(yè)也要便于將該地區(qū)變成稀土生產(chǎn)商品區(qū)。</p><p><b>　　保護(hù)環(huán)境的新法規(guī)</b></p><p>　　中國(guó)沒(méi)有稀土產(chǎn)業(yè)污