2013年-自由現(xiàn)金流量外文翻譯--+資本結(jié)構(gòu)，自由現(xiàn)金流量，多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)和企業(yè)績(jī)效（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　中文2588字，1380單詞,英文字符7790</p><p>　　出處：Park K, Jang S C S. Capital structure, free cash flow, diversification and firm performance: A holistic analysis[J]. international Journal of hospitality Manage

2、ment, 2013, 33: 51-63.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　資本結(jié)構(gòu)，自由現(xiàn)金流量，多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)和企業(yè)績(jī)效：整體分析</p><p>　　Kwangmin Park , SooCheong (Shawn) Jang</p><p><b>　　摘要</b&g

3、t;</p><p>　　本文綜合探究了資本結(jié)構(gòu)，自由現(xiàn)金流量，多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)和企業(yè)績(jī)效之間的相互關(guān)系。先前的研究曾分別調(diào)查過(guò)這四者中每?jī)烧咧g的關(guān)系，但這四者之間均存在著密切的聯(lián)系，并且存在內(nèi)生關(guān)系。因此，為了更好地理解資本結(jié)構(gòu)、自由現(xiàn)金流量、多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)和企業(yè)績(jī)效之間的相互聯(lián)系，進(jìn)行一次聯(lián)合調(diào)查是必要的。本文的研究結(jié)果顯示，不相關(guān)多元化折價(jià)不是由自由現(xiàn)金流量所導(dǎo)致，而是由多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效自身引起的。自由現(xiàn)金流量能同時(shí)

4、增加相關(guān)和不相關(guān)多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)熵，這與多元化折價(jià)是由自由現(xiàn)金流量的過(guò)度投資導(dǎo)致的假設(shè)是相悖的。本文同時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)，債務(wù)杠桿是減少自由現(xiàn)金流量和提高企業(yè)績(jī)效的有效方式。特別是對(duì)于存在不相關(guān)多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)的企業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō)，債務(wù)杠桿能直接減少企業(yè)績(jī)效的不相關(guān)多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)的負(fù)面影響，還能間接地通過(guò)自由現(xiàn)金流量平衡不相關(guān)多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)的水平。針對(duì)此問(wèn)題的深入探討和產(chǎn)業(yè)含義也將在本文中予以呈現(xiàn)。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵字：資本結(jié)構(gòu)，債務(wù)杠桿，自由現(xiàn)

5、金流量，多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)策略，企業(yè)績(jī)效，托賓q值</p><p>　　2.2 自由現(xiàn)金流量假設(shè)</p><p>　　如前所示，自由現(xiàn)金流量假說(shuō)（Jensen, 1986，1989, 1993; Jensen&Meckling, 1976）提出，過(guò)量的自由現(xiàn)金流量允許經(jīng)營(yíng)者追求個(gè)人目標(biāo)，而不用考慮股東價(jià)值。Richardson(2006) 將自由現(xiàn)金流量定義為除去必要的用來(lái)保持資產(chǎn)和為預(yù)期

6、新投資提供資費(fèi)的現(xiàn)金流量之外的現(xiàn)金流量。根據(jù)代理理論（Jensen, 1986; Jensen&Meckling, 1976), 如果一個(gè)企業(yè)擁有自由現(xiàn)金流量，即使負(fù)凈現(xiàn)值是在預(yù)料之中的，管理者還是會(huì)趨向于將多余的現(xiàn)金投資到新項(xiàng)目中。這種過(guò)度自由現(xiàn)金流量投資將會(huì)削弱企業(yè)價(jià)值。Titman等（2004）和Fairfield 等（2003）通過(guò)實(shí)證發(fā)現(xiàn)，存在過(guò)度投資的公司未來(lái)的股票收益普遍不佳。Dechow等（2008）同樣指出，保

7、持過(guò)度現(xiàn)金流量的企業(yè)降低了企業(yè)的未來(lái)績(jī)效。此外，Brush等（2000）發(fā)現(xiàn)，即使現(xiàn)金流量自身能促進(jìn)企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)，但是自由現(xiàn)金流量對(duì)企業(yè)發(fā)展也具有消極影響。結(jié)果就是過(guò)度的現(xiàn)金流量（自由現(xiàn)金流量）削弱了企業(yè)價(jià)值。相應(yīng)地，減少經(jīng)理自主權(quán)（自由現(xiàn)金流量）能減少代理費(fèi)用，轉(zhuǎn)而提高企業(yè)價(jià)值。因此，舉債籌資能</p><p>　　最后，為了克服先前估計(jì)方法的局限性，Richardson（2006）運(yùn)用現(xiàn)金流量表的信息，而不是損益

8、表和資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的混亂結(jié)合。為了獲取自由現(xiàn)金流量的來(lái)源，Richardson（2006）將總投資支出定義為用于維持現(xiàn)有資產(chǎn)和新投資的投資。維持現(xiàn)有資產(chǎn)的投資是指必要的用來(lái)維持現(xiàn)有資產(chǎn)的、作為總投資支出一部分的維護(hù)資產(chǎn)支出。此后，Richardson(2006) 將自由現(xiàn)金流量的來(lái)源估計(jì)為現(xiàn)存資產(chǎn)的自由現(xiàn)金流量與增長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)中所蘊(yùn)含的自由現(xiàn)金流量的差額。為了估計(jì)增長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)中的現(xiàn)金流量，Richardson（2006）運(yùn)用了新項(xiàng)目的預(yù)期投資和企業(yè)投

9、資決策模型（Hubbard，1998）。這是一種復(fù)雜的方法，但是它更具邏輯性，并考慮到了企業(yè)層面所有自由現(xiàn)金流量的構(gòu)成部分。因此，當(dāng)前的研究融合并修改了我們分析中提及的Richardson于2006年提出的方法。</p><p>　　2.3 多元化折價(jià)與自由現(xiàn)金流量</p><p>　　自從Rumelt（1974，1982）發(fā)現(xiàn)相比較不相關(guān)多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)，相關(guān)多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)能創(chuàng)造更好的績(jī)效之后，大

10、量的研究探尋了多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)策略對(duì)企業(yè)績(jī)效的影響。Rumelt（1974，1982）的觀點(diǎn)所蘊(yùn)含的原理植根于規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)和協(xié)同效應(yīng)假說(shuō)。從這個(gè)角度來(lái)說(shuō)，不相關(guān)多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)需要來(lái)自新的和不熟悉的商業(yè)環(huán)境的大量資金支撐，這會(huì)對(duì)企業(yè)價(jià)值造成嚴(yán)重?fù)p害。然而，內(nèi)部市場(chǎng)效率假說(shuō)卻認(rèn)為，不相關(guān)多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)能帶來(lái)更好的績(jī)效。內(nèi)部市場(chǎng)效率假說(shuō)（Higgins & Schall, 1975; Lewellen, 1971; Scherer & Ross

11、, 1970）揭示，由于擁有各種各樣的投資選擇，多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)的企業(yè)能比單一經(jīng)營(yíng)的企業(yè)更有效率地分配資本資源。結(jié)果就是，通過(guò)減少資本和最佳投資的成本，績(jī)效能夠得到提升。</p><p>　　Lang&Stulz(1994)與Berger&Ofek(1995)通過(guò)將多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)企業(yè)的商業(yè)部門(mén)與專(zhuān)業(yè)化企業(yè)相對(duì)比，獲得了“多元化折價(jià)”的相關(guān)證據(jù)。多元化折價(jià)是指一個(gè)企業(yè)在將其部門(mén)多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)之后產(chǎn)生的績(jī)效縮減（折

12、扣）。多元化折價(jià)產(chǎn)生的原因經(jīng)歷過(guò)嚴(yán)格的討論。其中一個(gè)影響因素是企業(yè)管理的低效資源分配，這使得公司價(jià)值受到損害（Shin&Stulz, 1998; Scharfstein&Stein, 2000; Rajan等，2000）。然而，這一概念最近也受到了批判。許多研究者認(rèn)為，多元化折扣源于多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)選擇的內(nèi)生性（Villalonga,2004），或是一種貧信息的產(chǎn)物（Villalonga,2004）。其他的影響因素指向從目標(biāo)企

13、業(yè)的獲得的折扣（Graham等，2002），或是企業(yè)多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)之前的折扣（Chevalier，2004）</p><p>　　然而，大多數(shù)學(xué)者認(rèn)為，管理代理存在的問(wèn)題能夠?qū)е露嘣劭?(Berger and Ofek, 1995; Comment & Jarrell, 1995; Lang & Stulz, 1994; Stulz, 1990）。例如，Berger&Ofek（1995）發(fā)

14、現(xiàn)，多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)企業(yè)的不相關(guān)部門(mén)對(duì)托賓值低的行業(yè)過(guò)度投資，會(huì)導(dǎo)致更高的多元化折扣。許多實(shí)證研究(Lang & Stulz, 1994; Berger & Ofek, 1995; Comment & Jarrell, 1995) 得出了與自由現(xiàn)金流量假說(shuō)（Jensen, 1986, 1989,1993）相一致的對(duì)多元化折扣的解釋。因此，代理理論提出了一則理論依據(jù)來(lái)解釋為什么多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)理論能使管理者受益卻會(huì)導(dǎo)致企業(yè)價(jià)值

15、受到損害。多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)與擴(kuò)大的企業(yè)規(guī)模之間，企業(yè)規(guī)模與管理層報(bào)酬之間也均存在著密切的關(guān)聯(lián)(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) 。這意味著管理者會(huì)不惜以損害企業(yè)價(jià)值為代價(jià)，追求多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)來(lái)增加其薪酬和保持其職位(Denis 等，1997; Rose & Shepard, 1997) 。</p><p><b>　　英文：</b></p>&l

16、t;p>　　Capital structure, free cash ?ow, diversi?cation and ?rm performance: A holistic analysis</p><p>　　Kwangmin Park , SooCheong (Shawn) Jang </p><p><b>　　Abstract </b></p>

17、;<p>　　This study jointly investigated the inter-relationships among capital structure, free cash ?ow, diver- si?cation and ?rm performance. Prior research has separately examined each individual relationship, but

18、 all four of these components are closely related and have complicated endogenous relationships. Thus, a joint examination is needed in order to better understand the inter-relationships among them. The results of this s

19、tudy showed that unrelated diversi?cation discount is not caused by free c</p><p>　　Keywords: Capital structure,Debt leverage ,Free cash ?ow,Diversi?cation strategy, Firm performance, Tobin’s q</p>&l

20、t;p>　　2.2 Free cash ?ow hypothesis</p><p>　　As indicated earlier, the free cash ?ow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986, 1989, 1993; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) states that excessive free cash ?ows allow managers to

21、pursue personal goals, regardless of stockholder value. Richardson (2006) de?ned free cash ?ow as cash ?ow beyond what is necessary to maintain assets and ?nance expected new investments. Under agency theory (Jensen, 198

22、6; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), if a ?rm has excessive free cash ?ows managers tend to invest the extra cash in new proje</p><p>　　Methodologically, the ?nance and strategic management litera- ture mentions a

23、 few ways to estimate free cash ?ow. One frequently used method measures the operating cash ?ow normalized by total assets such as free cash ?ow (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989). The rationale behind this measure is that norma

24、lized operating cash ?ows capture free cash ?ows, because free cash ?ows are simply an excess level of cash ?ow. However, this method is a simpli?ed proxy measure that does not account for investment opp</p><p

25、>　　Finally, to overcome the limitations of these prior measures, Richardson (2006) used information from cash ?ow statements as opposed to noisy combinations of income statements and balance sheets. To capture the sou

26、rce of free cash ?ow, Richardson (2006) de?ned total investment expenditures as investments toward maintaining existing assets and new investments. Investments to maintain existing assets refer to maintenance capital exp

27、enditures as a portion of the total investment expenditures necess</p><p>　　2.3 Diversi?cation discount and free cash ?ow</p><p>　　Since Rumelt (1974, 1982) found that related diversi?cation pro

28、duces superior performance as compared to unrelated diver- si?cation, a number of studies have investigated the effects of diversi?cation strategies on ?rm performance. The rationale behind Rumelt’s (1974, 1982) argument

29、 is rooted in economies of scale and the synergy hypothesis. From this perspective, unrelated diversi- ?cation requires certain substantial costs derived from new and unfamiliar business environments, which could adve<

30、;/p><p>　　Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) provided evidence of a “diversi?cation discount” by comparing business segments in diversi?ed ?rms with specialized ?rms. Diversi?ca- tion discount ref

31、ers to a performance diminution (discount) in a ?rm after it diversi?es its business. The cause of diversi?cation discount has been rigorously debated. One contributing factor is inef?cient resource allocation by corpora

32、te management, which destroys ?rm value (Shin and Stulz, 1998; Scharfstein and S</p><p>　　However, most scholars argue that managerial agency problems could contribute to the diversi?cation discount (Berger

33、and Ofek, 1995; Comment and Jarrell, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Stulz, 1990; Tang and Jang, 2010). For example, Berger and Ofek (1995) found that unrelated segments of diversi?ed ?rms overinvesting in low- q industries