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1、2800 英文單詞, 英文單詞,1.6 萬英文字符,中文 萬英文字符,中文 4900 字文獻(xiàn)出處: 文獻(xiàn)出處:Yazdanfar D , Peter Öhman. Debt financing and firm performance: an empirical study based on Swedish data[J]. Journal of Risk Finance, 2015, 16(1):102-118.Debt
2、financing and firm performance: an empirical study based on Swedish dataDarush Yazdanfar and Peter ÖhmanAbstractPurpose – The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between debt level and performance a
3、mong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).Design/methodology/approach – Unlike the vast majority of previous research, this study uses three-stage least squares (3SLS) and fixed-effects models to analyse a comprehen
4、sive, cross-sectoral sample of 15,897 Swedish SMEs operating in five industry sectors during the 2009-2012 period.Findings – This study confirms that debt ratios, in terms of trade credit, short-term debt and long-term d
5、ebt, negatively affect firm performance in terms of profitability. As a high debt ratio seems to increase the agency costs and the risk of losing control of the firm, SME owners and managers tend to finance their busines
6、ses with equity capital to a fairly high degree.Practical implications – As debt policy significantly influences firm performance, and thereby firm value and survival, SME owners and managers should focus on finding a sa
7、tisfactory debt level.Originality/value – To the authors’ best knowledge, this study is among the first to use 3SLS and fixed-effects models to analyse the relationship between debt level and firm performance. Moreover,
8、while most previous research has examined listed firms, this study highlights the issue among SMEs, which play a fundamental role in the economy.Keywords: Profitability, SMEs, Capital structure, Firm performance, Sweden,
9、 Debt policy1. IntroductionThe relationship between debt financing and firm performance is a crucial and frequently discussed issue in managerial finance. Debt financing is associated with the trade-off between costs and
10、 gains (Harris and Raviv, 1991), and there is an overall debt level beyond which the costs are higher than the benefits related to tax-sheltering. Reaching a satisfactory debt level is critical for any business, not only
11、 because of the need to achieve profitability and firm value, but also because it increases an organization’s ability to deal with its competitive environment.Several theoretical approaches have been developed to explain
12、 this relationship. According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), in a perfect capital market, a firm’s financing choice does not affect its capital cost, value or real operations, including performance. This view is based
13、on a number of assumptions; for example, that no taxes or transaction costs exist, that all investors have similar opportunities to borrow and lend money, that there is no information asymmetry and that agency costs exis
14、t. Although Modigliani and Miller (1963) suggested that firms can gain the benefits of tax-deductible interest payments by increasing the amount of debt in their capital structure, this view has been questioned due to it
15、s assumption of market perfection and its limited applicability to small firms (Grabowski and Mueller, 1972; Chaganti et al., 1995). Circumstances in the real to the creditors’ costs of monitoring expenditures and residu
16、al loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 2001).The higher a firm’s level of equity capital, the lower its debt agency costs (Casey and Anderson, 1997; Ooi, 2000). From an agency cost perspective, owners of high-leverag
17、e firms risk losing both their property and control over their firms (Holmes and Kent, 1991; Hamilton and Fox, 1998). Therefore, owners and managers of SMEs who endeavour to keep their independence rely relatively less o
18、n external financing (Hutchinson, 1995; Shrivastava and Grant, 1985).Theoretically, agency conflicts affect several financial variables, such as capital structure and profitability. According to Jensen (1986), debt finan
19、cing has a disciplinary effect if ownership and management are separated, as is usually the case in large companies. Debt financing increases the pressure on managers, encouraging them to perform more efficiently. As a r
20、esult, debt financing reduces moral hazard behaviour by reducing free cash flow. However, the effect of debt financing on small firms with no free cash flow is contradictory and likely to lead to inefficiency. To maintai
21、n independence and control over the firm, owners and managers of SMEs tend to follow a hierarchy (i.e. pecking order) in raising capital, preferring internal funds (i.e. equity capital and retained earnings) to external
22、capital sources (Myers and Majluf, 1984). If internal financing sources are insufficient for the investment and/or additional funds are required, owners and managers prefer low-risk debt. In other words, owners and manag
23、ers are not likely to start potentially profitable projects if they have to be financed through risky external capital sources.According to Fama and French (2002), excessive debt leads to higher agency costs, implying a
24、negative association between debt ratio and firm profitability. Moreover, a negative relationship between information asymmetry and debt agency costs has been observed (Barnea et al., 1980). The greater a firm’s age and
25、the longer its history of debt repayment, the better the firm’s reputation and the lower its debt agency costs (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Chittenden et al., 1996). Debt agency costs have also been found to be lower for l
26、arge companies than small firms (Um, 2001).2.2 Previous empirical studiesA growing body of empirical research treats the impact of financial leverage on firm performance, especially in terms of profitability. Majumdar an
27、d Chhibber (1999) used a regression model to investigate the relationship between debt ratio and performance, proxied by return on net value of total assets, among 1,043 Indian companies in various industry sectors over
28、the 1988-1994 period. The results indicated a significant negative relationship between debt ratio and firm performance. In another study, Simerly and Li (2000) adapted a regression model to analyse the effects of financ
29、ial leverage on the performance of a sample of 700 large US companies in a variety of industry sectors over the 1989-1993 period. The results suggested that the impact of financial leverage can be positive or negative, d
30、epending on whether the company is operating in a stable or a dynamic business environment.Mesquita and Lara (2003) used the ordinary least squares (OLS) method to study the impact of long-term, short-term debt and the r
31、ate of equity capital on rate of return (return on equity [ROE]) among 70 Brazilian industrial and service companies over the 1995-2001 period. The results indicated that long-term debt negatively (although insignificant
32、ly) affected rate of return, though the effect of short-term debt and equity capital on rate of return was significantly positive. An explanation of the positive impact of short-term debt on profitability was that this k
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