外文翻譯---一個(gè)合理的公務(wù)員在美國(guó)以憲法為基礎(chǔ)的行政行為

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　A Reasonable Public Servant: constitutional foundations of administrative conduct in the United St

2、ates</p><p>　　The constitution and a reasonable public servant</p><p>　　In November 2004, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) arranged for seventy federal executives to visit the Natio

3、nal Constitution Center on Independence Mall in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The executives were on a management retreat. What could they gain from visiting a museum dedicated to the U.S. Constitution? What does the Const

4、itution have to do with public management? OPM Director Kay Coles James gave a short answer. The executives’ visit was part of a wider initiative to bring “he</p><p>　　Understanding what the Constitution dem

5、ands of them is a matter of basic job competence for public servants. This fundamentally sets them apart from the world of private sector management, whether for profit or not profit. The Constitution regulates public se

6、rvants’ dealings with clients, customers, subordinate employees, prisoners, patients confined to public mental health facilities, contractors, and individuals involved in “street-level” encounters (such as police stops,

7、public school discipl</p><p>　　Achieving competence in the constitutional aspects of public service requires at least two types of significant study and effort. First, one must understand the broad principle

8、s on which constitutional law rests. Second, and a more comprehensive challenge, one must learn the constitutional requirements that currently govern public service in the United States. Parts one and two of this book pr

9、ovides the analysis and information necessary to understand how constitutional law has to be factored in</p><p>　　Although “[t]he Constitution is largely a document of the imagination”, gaining an understand

10、ing of a few of its fundamental principles goes a long way toward making constitutional law relatively concrete and accessible. These principles are especially important: incursions on constitutional rights must be nece

11、ssary and bounded, and the Constitution is always a work in progress.</p><p>　　Personal responsibility</p><p>　　In the United States, all pubic servants, elected or appointed, enter the public s

12、ervice by taking an oath that they will uphold the Constitution of the United States. Taking an oath is an act of commitment. The Constitution is ordained, as declares the Preamble, “in order to form a more perfect Union

13、, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” In the Bill of Rig</p><p>　

14、　The bottom line in any guarantee is “damages or nothing”. During the First Congress, the Bill of Rights was conceived with an “implicit” understanding that the administration of governmental affairs might cause the depr

15、ivation of rights guaranteed to individual citizens, and when such transgressions occur, the government would be responsible for the injuries. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall expressed his understanding of

16、this contractual responsibility, “The very essence of civil l</p><p>　　Fast forwarding, courts today recognize an unrestricted cause of action for damages against local governmental bodies and restricted cau

17、se of action against federal and state governments. Courts, however, recognize a full cause of action against all public servants engaged in executive functions (possibly with the exception of the president), federal, st

18、ate, and local, under the Constitution and statutory schemes. A reasonable public servant taking an oath, therefore, understands that while the </p><p>　　The distinction between personal and official account

19、ability is of critical importance to the life of a reasonable public servant who carries out the day-to-day public affairs at the street level. Official accountability applies when a public servant has caused the depriva

20、tion of a constitutional right of an individual while acting as an agent of the principal, that is, the government. Under the doctrine of respondent superior liability, the agent’s tort is vicariously imputed to the prin

21、cipal t</p><p>　　Official responsibility</p><p>　　Chapter 2 examined the constitutional standard of conduct expected of a reasonable public servant in his personal capacity. This chapter examine

22、s the constitutional standard of conduct expected of a reasonable public servant in his official capacity. The official-capacity conduct is the conduct expected of the public servant as an agent or representative of the

23、principal, that is, the government. The distinction between personal-capacity conduct and official-capacity conduct-although not always </p><p>　　The official-capacity conduct is different; it is the act of

24、an agent representing the principal. The public servant, as an agent, carries out the official edict of the government he represents. To the extent that the edict has caused a constitutional tort, the tortious conduct wi

25、ll be imputed to the entity that issued it, although under some circumstances the public servant who implemented it may also be held liable. In Kentucky v. Graham, the Supreme Court made this distinction sharply in the &

26、lt;/p><p>　　Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law. Official-capacity suits, in contrast, generally represent only ano

27、ther way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than n

28、ame, to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is not a suit against the offi</p><p>　　Distinction between official-capacity and personal-capacity conduct</p><p>　　An examination of §

29、1983 lawsuits shows that the complainants routinely name defendant officials in their personal, as well as official capacities. By naming public servants in their personal, as well as official capacity, complainants seek

30、 damages against their defendant public servants not only in their personal capacity but also against the municipality that they represent. Case law has been established that a suit against a public servant in his offici

31、al capacity is essentially the same as a</p><p>　　The distinction between the conduct of official capacity and of personal capacity is a tricky business at times. Hafer v. Melo presented such a challenge. Se

32、veral former employees in Pennsylvania’s State Auditor’s Office sued Barbara Hafer, the newly elected state auditor of Pennsylvanie, in her personal capacity under § 1983 for terminating their employment in violatio

33、n of the Fourteenth Amendment. Upon winning the election, Hafer fired the employees because, as she claimed, they had procured t</p><p>　　The employees sued Hafer in her personal capacity, seeking damages ag

34、ainst her, not against the state. Hafer, on the other hand, defended her action, asserting that her decision was “official” in nature and the Eleventh Amendment barred § 1983 suits against state officials in their o

35、fficial capacity. Hafer made an attempt, without success, to distinguish between the acts committed outside the official’s authority and those within the official’s authority that are germane to her official function<

36、/p><p>　　In an unanimous opinion (with Justice Thomas not participating) the Supreme Court, per Justice O’Connor, observed that “Congress enacted § 1983 to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment ag

37、ainst those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it”, and determined that Hafer’s action represented a “personal” abus

38、e of authority under color of state law. To eliminate any lingering ambiguity betwee</p><p>　　As we discussed in chapter 2, when the public servant is sued in his personal capacity, he has a right to assert

39、the defense of qualified immunity. When he is sued in an official capacity, however, he cannot assert the defense of qualified immunity. As the Supreme Court in Owen v. City of Independence explained, a damages claim aga

40、inst a public official in the official capacity is essentially the claim against his government employer. Since Monell already held that under § 1983 local governmenta</p><p>　　Source: Yong S. Lee, Davi

41、d H. Rosenbloom. 2005. A reasonable public servant: constitutional foundations of administrative conduct in the United States. M. E. Sharpe, Inc. pp.3-58.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>

42、　　一個(gè)合理的公務(wù)員：在美國(guó)以憲法為基礎(chǔ)的行政行為</p><p>　　憲法和一個(gè)合理的公務(wù)員</p><p>　　2004年11月，美國(guó)人事辦公室安排了70個(gè)聯(lián)邦行政人員參觀了在費(fèi)城賓夕法尼亞州獨(dú)立廣場(chǎng)的國(guó)家憲法中心。這些管理人員就好像處于一個(gè)管理避難所里。在參觀專(zhuān)門(mén)為美國(guó)憲法設(shè)立的博物館的過(guò)程中他們可以得到些什么？憲法與公共管理又有什么關(guān)系呢？美國(guó)人事辦公室總監(jiān)凱科爾斯詹姆斯給出了這樣

43、一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)短的答案：對(duì)管理人員的訪(fǎng)問(wèn)是一個(gè)更為廣大計(jì)劃的其中一部分，它使聯(lián)邦雇員堅(jiān)持著“提高認(rèn)識(shí)和尊重”的誓言。具體點(diǎn)的答案就是：今天“一個(gè)有合理能力的”公務(wù)員“應(yīng)該知道控制他或她行為的法律”。該法的大部分是憲法性法律，即，法律由解釋?xiě)椃ㄕZ(yǔ)言的法官制定，并且將它們運(yùn)用在個(gè)別案件中。同樣地，州法官通過(guò)對(duì)州憲法進(jìn)行解釋和說(shuō)明從而制定州憲法。今天，憲法全面規(guī)定著美國(guó)政府的公共服務(wù)。就像詹姆斯所認(rèn)為的，公務(wù)員在進(jìn)行決策或采取其它行為的時(shí)候應(yīng)遵循憲法

44、。</p><p>　　對(duì)于公務(wù)員來(lái)說(shuō)，理解憲法對(duì)他們的要求是一個(gè)基本工作能力的體現(xiàn)。這個(gè)從根本上將他們與私人領(lǐng)域管理分離開(kāi)了，不論它是不是以利潤(rùn)為營(yíng)利目的。憲法規(guī)定了公務(wù)員與客戶(hù)、消費(fèi)者、下屬員工、囚犯、僅限于公共精神衛(wèi)生設(shè)施的病患、承包商等的往來(lái)。與此相反，憲法并沒(méi)有涉及到純粹的私人關(guān)系和活動(dòng)，除了1）禁止奴隸制和強(qiáng)迫勞逸（第十三修訂）2）限制了一類(lèi)有限的私人實(shí)體的行為，這些實(shí)體被認(rèn)為是為憲法目的而活動(dòng)的國(guó)家

45、（“政府”）人。當(dāng)一個(gè)公共管理者懲戒一個(gè)下屬甚至是一個(gè)見(jiàn)習(xí)者只因?yàn)樗蛩难葜v，所參加的協(xié)會(huì)，在工作場(chǎng)所的宗教行為顯示或者其他憲法保護(hù)的行為，它會(huì)引起完全異于私人領(lǐng)域管理的憲法問(wèn)題。私人領(lǐng)域的雇員可能為了成為好公民而學(xué)習(xí)憲法法律，公務(wù)員必須學(xué)習(xí)憲法法律從而成為一個(gè)好的雇員。一個(gè)自然的推論是，由于憲法法律在公共服務(wù)中起著重要的作用，所以制定法律的法官也有著同等的重要性。</p><p>　　實(shí)現(xiàn)在憲法方面公共服務(wù)的

46、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力至少需要兩種類(lèi)型的具有意義的研究和努力。首先，必須了解憲法法律所依據(jù)的廣泛的原則。第二，必須了解更為全面的挑戰(zhàn)，就是必須學(xué)習(xí)目前管轄著美國(guó)政府公共服務(wù)的憲法規(guī)定。這本書(shū)的第一、二部分提供了分析和必要信息去了解憲法法律如何影響一個(gè)合理公務(wù)員的工作表現(xiàn)。他們解釋了公務(wù)員及其雇主因違反個(gè)人憲法權(quán)利的潛在責(zé)任，也說(shuō)明了憲法程序的正當(dāng)進(jìn)程，自由言論，隱私以及平等保護(hù)等所要求的。</p><p>　　雖然“憲法在很大程

47、度上是一個(gè)想象性的文件”，但是從獲得一些其基本原則的了解到制定相對(duì)具體以及可行的憲法法律還有很長(zhǎng)一段路要走。以下原則尤其重要：一個(gè)是對(duì)憲法權(quán)利的侵犯必須是有必要的且有界的，另外，憲法始終是一個(gè)在進(jìn)展中的工作。</p><p><b>　　個(gè)人責(zé)任</b></p><p>　　在美國(guó)，所有被選舉的或者任命的公務(wù)員進(jìn)入公共服務(wù)領(lǐng)域都要宣誓他們將維護(hù)美國(guó)的憲法。宣誓是一種作

48、出承諾的行為。憲法的制定就像宣布了序言：“是為了建立一個(gè)更完善的國(guó)家，樹(shù)立正義，保障國(guó)家安定，加強(qiáng)國(guó)防，增進(jìn)全民福利以及確保自由帶給我們以及我們后人的幸福。”1791過(guò)后不到三年，第一次代表大會(huì)通過(guò)的人權(quán)法案被批準(zhǔn)了，它提到憲法契約性地向人民保證，當(dāng)執(zhí)行一些功利性的目標(biāo)時(shí)，政府將會(huì)保護(hù)與人們密切相關(guān)的權(quán)利，不論可否點(diǎn)算，要符合基本的公平性。在很大意義上說(shuō)，宣誓是在道德和法律上做出了承諾，公務(wù)員都要在憲法條款范圍內(nèi)進(jìn)行公共事務(wù)的行為。&l

49、t;/p><p>　　任何保證的底線(xiàn)是“損害賠償或全無(wú)”。在第一次代表大會(huì)上，人權(quán)法案是以“隱”的理解構(gòu)思出來(lái)的，意味著政府事務(wù)的管理可能導(dǎo)致個(gè)人被確保權(quán)力的剝奪，而且當(dāng)這種行為發(fā)生了，政府就要為其負(fù)責(zé)。在馬伯里訴麥迪遜案件中，終審法院首席法官馬歇爾表達(dá)了他對(duì)這種合同責(zé)任的理解，“公民自由的一個(gè)大的本質(zhì)···在于每一個(gè)個(gè)人無(wú)論何時(shí)受到傷害都主張法律保護(hù)的權(quán)利。這個(gè)應(yīng)當(dāng)匆匆提一下，但是，縱

50、觀共和國(guó)歷史，個(gè)人尋求的針對(duì)政府和公務(wù)員的憲法性損害賠償已經(jīng)遇到了一個(gè)非常困難的法律障礙。這一部分是由于主權(quán)豁免的普通法原則，也有一部分是由于一些具體的，授權(quán)的立法的缺失。</p><p>　　快速回到今天，法院意識(shí)到一個(gè)針對(duì)當(dāng)?shù)卣畽C(jī)構(gòu)無(wú)限制的損害賠償行為的原因以及針對(duì)聯(lián)邦和各州政府行為的有限制的損害賠償行為的原因。然而，法院認(rèn)識(shí)到針對(duì)所有從事于行政職能（可能總統(tǒng)的情況除外），聯(lián)邦，州和地方，或者依據(jù)憲法及法定

51、計(jì)劃的公務(wù)員的損害賠償行為的一個(gè)完整的原因。因此，一個(gè)合理的公務(wù)員進(jìn)行宣誓可以理解為憲法賦予他們權(quán)力和權(quán)威來(lái)積極履行公務(wù)，他們也擁有個(gè)人的民事賠償責(zé)任，這樣他們還會(huì)因?yàn)樗说膽椃?quán)利而產(chǎn)生違法行為嗎？</p><p>　　個(gè)人問(wèn)責(zé)制和官員問(wèn)責(zé)制之間的區(qū)別對(duì)于在街道層面實(shí)施日常公共事務(wù)的一個(gè)合理的公務(wù)員的生活是至關(guān)重要的。官員問(wèn)責(zé)制適用于當(dāng)一個(gè)公務(wù)員扮演代理人，即政府的角色時(shí)，造成了個(gè)人憲法權(quán)利的剝奪。根據(jù)上級(jí)答辯

52、責(zé)任原則，代理人的侵權(quán)行為可替代地歸罪于他代表的當(dāng)事人。個(gè)人問(wèn)責(zé)制正值公務(wù)員迷途在授權(quán)范圍之外而發(fā)揮了作用，也就是說(shuō)，在委托代理范圍之外引起的其他人憲法權(quán)利的剝奪。由于所謂的不正當(dāng)行為已經(jīng)在職責(zé)范圍外發(fā)生了，損害賠償也許不會(huì)替代性地歸因于政府（最終的納稅人），卻歸因于公務(wù)員自身，除非當(dāng)事人已經(jīng)通過(guò)某種方式對(duì)造成的傷害給予幫助。在現(xiàn)實(shí)世界里，個(gè)人與官方的界限往往是模糊的并且經(jīng)常在法庭上被爭(zhēng)議?，F(xiàn)在看來(lái)足以指出，通過(guò)成文法和普通法的傳統(tǒng)，個(gè)

53、人及官員問(wèn)責(zé)制是屬于不同流派的，并且需要單獨(dú)分析。</p><p><b>　　官方責(zé)任</b></p><p>　　第二章審查了一個(gè)合理的公務(wù)員在個(gè)人身份行為上應(yīng)有的憲法標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。本章將探討一個(gè)合理的公務(wù)員的官方身份行為應(yīng)有的憲法標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。官方身份行為是公務(wù)員作為代理人或者主要代表的行為，即政府所期望的行為。個(gè)人身份行為與官方身份行為之間的區(qū)別（盡管不容易做出區(qū)分）對(duì)法律責(zé)

54、任的研究至關(guān)重要。正如我們?cè)诘诙轮兴?jiàn)的，在憲法和法律受到侵害時(shí)，公務(wù)員沒(méi)有權(quán)利根據(jù)法律色彩濫用他的權(quán)力。在某種程度上，他從自身出發(fā)所做的事，他不能期望納稅人來(lái)掩藏他的錯(cuò)誤行為并且他要對(duì)他所犯的侵權(quán)行為負(fù)個(gè)人責(zé)任。然而，對(duì)于公共服務(wù)和自我保護(hù)的利益，在哈洛訴杰拉德的案件中建立的普通法原則已經(jīng)給公務(wù)員提供權(quán)利去主張有限制的豁免權(quán)的防御。</p><p>　　官方身份行為是不一樣的，它是代表當(dāng)事人的代理人的行為。作

55、為代理人，公務(wù)員進(jìn)行了他所代表的政府官員的法令。該法令已經(jīng)使得憲法受到侵害，在某種程度上，侵權(quán)行為將歸咎于做出這種行為的實(shí)體，雖然在某些情況下，公務(wù)員也可能被追究法律責(zé)任。在肯塔基訴格雷厄姆的案件中，最高法院使這種區(qū)別在損害賠償?shù)姆稍V訟中更急劇地體現(xiàn)出來(lái)。</p><p>　　個(gè)人身份訴訟尋求將個(gè)人責(zé)任強(qiáng)加給那些根據(jù)國(guó)家法律的色彩而采取行動(dòng)的政府官員。相反地，官方身份訴訟一般僅代表另一種對(duì)一個(gè)實(shí)體（官員為其代理

56、人）行為進(jìn)行辯護(hù)的方式。只要政府實(shí)體收到通知就有機(jī)會(huì)作出回應(yīng)，政府身份訴訟將被視為對(duì)實(shí)體的訴訟進(jìn)行處理，這是考慮到各個(gè)方面而不僅僅因?yàn)橐粋€(gè)名稱(chēng)。這不是針對(duì)官員個(gè)人的訴訟，因?yàn)檎嬲幱诶骊P(guān)系中的政黨是一個(gè)實(shí)體。因此，當(dāng)一個(gè)官員以個(gè)人身份作出損害賠償，執(zhí)行判決時(shí)只可以針對(duì)官員的個(gè)人財(cái)產(chǎn)，一個(gè)尋求在官方身份訴訟賠償判決中恢復(fù)的原告必須期待政府實(shí)體本身。</p><p>　　官方身份行為和個(gè)人身份行為之間的區(qū)別<

57、/p><p>　　1983年法律訴訟的檢查結(jié)果表明，投訴人經(jīng)常用被告人的個(gè)人身份指定被告人，官方身份也一樣。通過(guò)他們的個(gè)人身份以及官方身份指出公務(wù)員，投訴人尋求的不僅是被告公務(wù)員以個(gè)人身份的賠償，也尋求他們所代表的市政當(dāng)局的賠償。判例法已經(jīng)確定，對(duì)一個(gè)公務(wù)員的官方身份的訴訟在本質(zhì)上和對(duì)他所代理的政府雇主的訴訟是一樣的。由于對(duì)官方身份的訴訟不是針對(duì)個(gè)人的，而是針對(duì)一個(gè)可能承擔(dān)了對(duì)他前任的訴訟的某個(gè)職位身份，一個(gè)當(dāng)?shù)氐恼?/p>

58、府實(shí)體也許逃避不了責(zé)任只因?yàn)樵谶@個(gè)職位上的承租人已經(jīng)改變了。</p><p>　　官方身份行為和個(gè)人身份行為的區(qū)別有時(shí)也是一件棘手的事。哈弗米羅提出了這樣一種挑戰(zhàn)。在賓夕法尼亞州審計(jì)長(zhǎng)的辦公室的若干雇員控告了新當(dāng)選為賓夕法尼亞州國(guó)家審核員的芭芭拉哈，在1983年訴訟中，她以個(gè)人身份終止了他們的事務(wù)，這個(gè)行為違反了第十四條修正案。哈弗一旦贏得了選舉就解雇了員工，因?yàn)榫拖袼暶鞯模麄円呀?jīng)通過(guò)政治贊助促成了他們的就

59、業(yè)。值得注意的是在訴密歇根警察局一案中，最高法院支持1983年的訴訟案與政府官員的官方身份無(wú)關(guān)，卻與他們的個(gè)人身份有關(guān)。法院更關(guān)心的一點(diǎn)是：“根據(jù)1983年訴訟案，第十一修正案并沒(méi)有禁止在聯(lián)邦法庭對(duì)政府官員的個(gè)人身份的訴訟。</p><p>　　員工以哈弗的個(gè)人身份起訴了她，尋求她的補(bǔ)償，而不是國(guó)家的補(bǔ)償。另一方面，哈弗為她的行動(dòng)辯護(hù)，她聲稱(chēng)她的決定是“官方”性質(zhì)的，而第十一修正案禁止了在1983年訴訟中對(duì)政府官

60、員的官方身份的訴訟。哈弗作出了嘗試以區(qū)別官方外權(quán)威的行為及與她官方職能密切相關(guān)的官方內(nèi)權(quán)威的行為，但沒(méi)有成功。她認(rèn)為只有前者（“個(gè)人的”）是應(yīng)該承擔(dān)1983年訴訟案中相關(guān)的責(zé)任的。</p><p>　　最高法院法官奧康納提出一個(gè)一致的意見(jiàn)（法官托馬斯沒(méi)參加），“1983年國(guó)會(huì)頒布法律去執(zhí)行第十四修正案的規(guī)定，針對(duì)那些持有國(guó)家權(quán)威徽章并且代表某一種身份的人，無(wú)論他做了權(quán)責(zé)范圍內(nèi)的事或是濫用了權(quán)力”，并確定下來(lái)哈弗的

61、行動(dòng)代表了“個(gè)人的”在國(guó)家的法律色彩下的權(quán)威的濫用。為了消除個(gè)人和官方身份訴訟之間的任何揮之不去的歧義，奧康納指出說(shuō)：“‘以他們的官方身份行事’這句話(huà)在提及政府官員因什么身份被起訴時(shí)是一個(gè)很好的解釋?zhuān)皇且允裁瓷矸菰斐伤^的傷害”。“政府官員以他們官方身份被起訴要求給予損害賠償不是以“個(gè)人的”目的的訴訟因?yàn)樗麄兂袚?dān)了雇傭他們的政府的身份。相比之下，政府官員以個(gè)人身份被起訴是作為個(gè)體到法院去的。</p><p>

62、　　正如我們之前我們討論的，當(dāng)公務(wù)員以他的個(gè)人身份被起訴，他有權(quán)利主張有限制的豁免權(quán)的防御。然而，當(dāng)他以官方身份被起訴，他就不能主張有限制的豁免權(quán)的防御。就如最高法院在歐文訴獨(dú)立城市一案中所解釋的，對(duì)一個(gè)公務(wù)員的官方身份的索賠要求實(shí)質(zhì)上是對(duì)他的雇主的索賠要求。莫奈兒已經(jīng)認(rèn)為，根據(jù)1983年訴訟案，當(dāng)?shù)卣畽C(jī)構(gòu)既不是絕對(duì)的也沒(méi)有資格享受豁免權(quán)，如果法院允許公務(wù)員以他的官方身份主張有限制的豁免權(quán)的防御，那就產(chǎn)生了矛盾。</p>