外文翻譯---歐洲、美國的跨國并購經驗

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文1</b></p><p>　　Cross-border mergers and acquisitions:</p><p>　　the European–US experience</p><p>　　1. Facto

2、rs motivating cross-border acquisitions</p><p>　　In her extensive discussion of the merger and acquisition process McDonagh Bengtsson (1990) proposes that the following factors motivate many companies to acq

3、uire foreign firms: the desire to spread products and diversify risks geographically; to gain back-up products; to exploit synergies; and to attain economies of scale. However, she cautions that workforce problems, poor

4、facilities, as well as social and technological differences may expose the acquiring company to new risks. Other studies i</p><p>　　1.1. Favorable acquisition factors</p><p>　　Although there are

5、 a number of factors that favor acquisition activity, we focus on those that seem to affect cross-border acquisitions between the US and the EU. These factors include exchange rates, diversification, and economic conditi

6、ons in the home country, as well as technology and human resources.</p><p>　　1.1.1. Exchange rates</p><p>　　Current and forecasted future exchange rates affect the home currency equivalent of ac

7、quisition prices, as well as the present value of future cash flows accruing to the acquired firm; therefore, the dominant effect in any particular case is ultimately an empirical question. Existing studies, predictably,

8、 arrive at different conclusions concerning the role of exchange rates. For example, Froot and Stein (1991) propose that, while there is a relationship between the exchange rates and acquisition</p><p>　　1.1

9、.2. Diversification</p><p>　　This argument is based on the empirical observation that the covariance of returns across different economies, even within the same industries, is likely to be smaller than withi

10、n a single economy. It follows that the prospective acquiring company must first decide on its desired levels of risk and return. Only then should it attempt to identify countries, industries, and specific firms that fal

11、l within its risk class. In addition, by acquiring ongoing foreign concerns, companies may be able to </p><p>　　1.1.3. Economic conditions in the home country</p><p>　　Favorable cyclical conditi

12、ons in the acquiring firm’s home country should facilitate cross-border acquisitions as a means for increasing demand and levels of diversification. On the other hand, adverse economic conditions, such as a slump, recess

13、ion, or capital market constraints, may cause prospective acquiring firms to concentrate on their domestic business while postponing any international strategic moves.</p><p>　　1.1.4. Acquisition of technolo

14、gical and human resources</p><p>　　If a firm falls behind in the level of technological knowledge necessary to compete efficiently in its industry, and it is unable or unwilling to obtain the required techno

15、logy through research and development, then it may attempt to acquire a foreign firm which is technologically more advanced. In their study, Cebenoyan et al. (1992) support this point, showing that the expansion into new

16、 markets through acquisitions allows firms to gain competitive advantage from the possession of specialized </p><p>　　1.2. Unfavorable acquisition factors</p><p>　　The factors discussed thus far

17、 generally tend to encourage firms to make crossborder acquisitions. In contrast, there are other variables that often appear to restrain cross-border combinations. These include information asymmetry, monopolistic power

18、, as well as government restrictions and regulations.</p><p>　　1.2.1. Information asymmetry.</p><p>　　Roll (1986) contends that information about a prospective target firm (e.g. marketshare, sal

19、es, cash flow forecasts) is crucial in the decision-making process of an acquiring firm. If the necessary information is not available, Roll (1986) argues that the prospective acquiring firm may be forced to delay or dis

20、continue its plans, eventhough the foreign firm appears to be an attractive target. In contrast, Stoughton (1988) argues that information effects are not always harmful. He points out that</p><p>　　1.2.2. Mo

21、nopolistic power</p><p>　　If a firm enjoys monopolistic power (a difficult prospect in the US, due to antitrust laws), then entry into the industry becomes more difficult for potential competitors, domestic

22、or foreign. Moreover, a monopolist is much more likely to resist a takeover attempt. Other barriers to entry that make cross-border acquisitions especially difficult within a monopolistic environment include extensive ou

23、tlays for research and development, capital expenditures necessary to establish greenfield producti</p><p>　　1.2.3. Government restrictions and regulations</p><p>　　Most governments have some fo

24、rm of takeover regulations in place. In many instances, government approval is mandatory before an acquisition by a foreign firm can occur. In addition, there may exist government restrictions on capital repatriations, d

25、ividend payouts, intracompany interest payments, and other remittances. Scholes and Wolfson (1990) for example, discuss periods in the US where regulatory events discouraged acquisition activity; they cite the William’s

26、Amendments and the Tax Reform A</p><p>　　Author: R.J. Kish.</p><p>　　Nationality: Amarica</p><p>　　Originate form: Journal of Multinational Financial Management 1998(8) 434–43</p

27、><p><b>　　譯文1</b></p><p>　　歐洲、美國的跨國并購經驗</p><p>　　1. 激勵跨國并購的因素</p><p>　　McDonagh Bengtsson(1990)在關于合并和收購過程的廣泛討論中，提出下列激勵很多公司收購外國公司的因素: 第一，傳播產品和地理上分散風險的愿望;第二，獲得支撐

28、的產品;第三，充分發(fā)揮協(xié)同作用,最后達到經濟規(guī)模。然而,她警告說,勞動力問題,設施問題,還有社會和技術差異等等都可能暴露公司新的危機。在跨國并購地區(qū)的其他的研究有助于形成收購模式的幾個競爭因素,包括有利的與不利的。下面的討論調查的第一次檢查有利獲取變量（即變量出現(xiàn)影響該公司的有關跨境交易）的這些因素的取樣，然后是不利的因素取樣。我們要特別注意這些因素更直接關系到國家的。</p><p>　　1.1有利的并購因素&

29、lt;/p><p>　　雖然有很多有利于并購活動的因素,我們把關注的焦點放在那些可能影響美國和歐盟之間跨國并購的那些因素。這些因素包括匯率、多元化、在自己國家的經濟發(fā)展狀況以及技術和人力資源等。</p><p><b>　　1.1.1匯率</b></p><p>　　目前和預測未來外匯匯率的影響本國貨幣相當于收購價格, 收購公司應累算的未來現(xiàn)金流量

30、的現(xiàn)值,因此,在任何一個特定情況的主導作用是實證研究的問題。在現(xiàn)有研究成果的基礎上,可以預料到關于匯率作用不同的結論。例如,Froot和Stein (1991)指出,盡管并購活動與匯率有一定的關系,但是根據(jù)他們在美國的同行顯示，沒有證據(jù)能證明人民幣匯率的變動能提高跨國收購地位。他們聲稱,當美元的貶值,我們變成任何一個國內或是國外公司做生意更便宜的地方,。除此之外,他們淡化了跨國收購和匯率制度之間的關系,認為資本流動的提高導致平等和貼現(xiàn)率

31、的國際投資回報。歌德堡(1993)卻有不同的結論。她發(fā)現(xiàn)美元的貶值降低了在美國的外商直接投資。她還認為,相反的才是真理，那就是,如果美元強會增加外國公司收購美國公司的活動，美國公司收購外國公司則會呈現(xiàn)下降趨勢。然而, Harris和Ravenscraft(1991)提出了與Goldberg相反的實證證據(jù)。特別是,他們認為美元貶值會增加外方收購美國公司的數(shù)量。</p><p><b>　　1.1.2 多樣

32、化</b></p><p>　　這個爭論是基于實證的觀察, 在不同的經濟環(huán)境的哪怕同一個行業(yè)里，協(xié)方差的回報也可能是比在一個單一的經濟環(huán)境下小。它的意思是,潛在收購的公司必須首先要確定其預期的風險和回報。只有這樣它才能嘗試確定國家、行業(yè)、企業(yè)內的特定風險。在通過獲取持續(xù)的外交關系,公司可以躲避關稅壁壘和非關稅壁壘,從而通過降低非系統(tǒng)風險的水平來提高他們的交易風險回報。</p><p

33、>　　1.1.3 本國的經濟條件</p><p>　　收購公司在祖國擁有的良好的周期性條件應該作為一種減少需求和降低多樣化水平的手段來促進跨國并購。另一方面,不良的經濟條件,如在暴跌、經濟衰退或資本市場約束的條件下,可能導致潛在收購公司集中精力在他們國內的業(yè)務而推遲任何國際戰(zhàn)略遷移。</p><p>　　1.1.4 并購技術和人力資源的培養(yǎng)</p><p>　

34、　如果一個公司的有效競爭所必要科技水平落后于其行業(yè)水平,而且它不能或不愿去獲取并發(fā)展它需要的技術和研究,那么它可能試圖并購那些技術更加先進的外國公司。在他們的研究中, Cebenoyan et al (1992)支持這個觀點,即通過并購拓展新市場使公司能從獲得被并購公司擁有的專門的競爭優(yōu)勢。</p><p>　　1．2 不利的并購因素</p><p>　　到目前為止討論的因素，一般傾向于鼓

35、勵企業(yè)進行跨境并購。。相反,還有其他的變數(shù),經常出現(xiàn)抑制跨境合并。這些包括信息不對稱、壟斷權力,以及政府約束和規(guī)則。</p><p>　　1.2.1 信息不對稱。</p><p>　　Roll (1986)認為, 有關一個潛在目標公司（如市場份額，銷售，現(xiàn)金流預測）的信息是并購公司過程中至關重要的決策過程。如果必要的信息不可用,Rool(1986)認為潛在的收購公司可能會被迫延遲或中斷它的

36、計劃,盡管外國公司似乎是一個非常不錯的目標。相反, Stoughton (1988)則認為信息效果不一定是有害的。他指出,潛在的收購方可能可以獲取到目標公司其它市場參與者不能獲取的信息。</p><p>　　1.2.2 壟斷力量</p><p>　　如果一個公司享有壟斷力量(一個困難的前景,因為反托拉斯法法律),那么潛在無論是國內或國外的的競爭者要加入這個行業(yè)變得更難了。此外,壟斷者更抵制

37、收購的企圖。在壟斷環(huán)境中的其他成為跨國并購進入的主要障礙包括廣泛研究與發(fā)展支出,建立綠地的生產設施、產品差異化通過大規(guī)模的廣告宣傳活動等的資本必要支出。</p><p>　　1.2.3 政府約束和規(guī)則</p><p>　　大多數(shù)政府在地方有某種形式的收購規(guī)則。在許多情況下，政府批準之前，強制收購外國公司也可能發(fā)生。此外, 可能存在政府限制資本遣返，股息支出，公司內部利息支付和其他匯款。以S

38、choles和Wolfson (1990)為例, 討論了在美國監(jiān)管活動阻礙了并購活動期間，他們列舉了威廉的修正案，1969年稅收改革法案作為重要的法律和法規(guī)的變化，促成了在20世紀60年代并購活動明顯攤牌。此外, Scholes和Wolfson (1990)認為在20世紀80年代美國稅法的改革有一個同樣的影響,因為這些變化增加了我們在收購交易中成本包括賣方和國外買家。另一方面,Dewenter(1995)認為她在化學和零售行業(yè)中的發(fā)現(xiàn)的

39、實證結果與Scholes和Wolfson的觀點相矛盾(1990)。她總結了她的發(fā)現(xiàn),美國在80年代的稅收政策的變化沒有對外國投資者并購活動的水平提供任何解釋說明。然而,必須注意的是, 必須注意的是， Dewenter（1995年）只審查了在1978至1989年間約占16％的海外收購活動的兩個行業(yè)，而在從1968年到1987年的考察活動中，Scholes和Wolfson（1990）在他們的</p><p><

40、b>　　作者：基什</b></p><p><b>　　國籍：美國</b></p><p>　　出處：《跨國公司財務管理》，第8卷，第四期，1998年11月，434-437</p><p><b>　　原文2</b></p><p>　　Mitigating risks in cr

41、oss-border acquisitions</p><p>　　In the past 20 years, the volume of cross-border acquisitions for corporate assets has increased nearly three times faster than the volume of domestic acquisitions. Compared

42、to domestic acquisitions, cross-border acquisitions present greater challenges for a buyer because of institutions and cultural values that are unfamiliar to a foreign corporation. Firms acquiring assets in a foreign cou

43、ntry may face different accounting practices and disclosure requirements, which hamper the due diligence p</p><p>　　Acquiring firms can reduce investment uncertainty by structuring the payments so they are c

44、ontingent on performance of the assets. This paper analyzes two alternative contingent payments.First, buyers can pay with stock, sharing the risk of the acquisition with the sellers as they will retain an equity positio

45、n in the acquirer. Second, acquiring firms can use earn out payments contingent on the performance of the assets being acquired (Kohers and Ang, 2000).</p><p>　　Buyers and sellers can operate assets together

46、 in an equity joint venture (JV) to improve the exchange of information on the quality of the assets. Nanda and Williamson (1995) describe several JVs that were conceived as a mechanism to exchange information conducive

47、to an eventual acquisition. In a sample of predominantly domestic JVs, Mantecon and Chatfield (2007) find that JVs can be mechanisms to transfer assets in the presence of valuation uncertainty. </p><p>　　The

48、 purpose of this article is to understand which of these mechanisms for reducing uncertainty is more beneficial to acquirers of cross-border corporate assets. I hypothesize that the use of earnouts and stock as a method

49、of payment and the formation of equity JVs conducive to acquisitions should be more valuable when investment uncertainty is more severe. This article contributes to the existing literature by testing this hypothesis in a

50、 sample of 30,783 acquisitions announced from 1985 to 200</p><p>　　The results show that the valuation effects to acquirers in cross-border deals depend on the information obtained about the assets before th

51、e acquisition. Buyers experienced large gains in the acquisition of assets that were operated in a JV, suggesting that acquirers profited from the information obtained while jointly operating the assets. I hypothesize th

52、at these gains should be positively associated with the degree of uncertainty being resolved. Consistent with this hypothesis, acquirers exp</p><p>　　Mechanisms to ameliorate investment risk in cross-border

53、acquisitions.Although the evidence on the valuation effects to acquirers of cross-border acquisitions remains inconclusive, these buyers face higher levels of uncertainty for several reasons. The due diligence process is

54、 complicated by different accounting and disclosure requirements. Assimilation of assets is also more difficult because of cultural differences that determine how business is conducted. In addition, legal systems with di

55、ffe</p><p>　　How can buyers reduce the uncertainty associated with crossborder acquisitions? Reuer (2005) suggests the use of contingent payments and operational relationships. The use of stock as currency c

56、an be a contractual tool to reduce investment risk because it has a contingent-pricing effect (Hansen, 1987). The target firm, accepting stock, signals positive information on the value of the acquirer and on the assets

57、being transferred. Buyers in turn signal their own quality as they prefer to use their</p><p>　　Acquiring firms can also reduce uncertainty by using earnout payments. Reuer et al. (2004) find that US firms u

58、se more contingent payouts when purchasing assets in high-tech and services industries for a sample of 3098 deals in the period 1995–1998. Kohers and Ang (2000) analyze 938 mergers with earnout payments. They report that

59、 earnouts facilitate the transactions in the presence of high information asymmetries.</p><p>　　Buyers face higher levels of uncertainty in cross-border acquisitions. This article contributes to the extant l

60、iterature by analyzing different mechanisms buyers can use to reduce investment uncertainty in a large sample of cross-border acquisitions of assets located in 128 countries. The results from this analysis indicate that

61、buyers experienced lower gains when the assets were located in a different country. The findings suggest that these inferior gains can be explained by more severe agency</p><p>　　Author: Tomas Mantecon</p

62、><p>　　Nationality: Amarica</p><p>　　Originate form: Journal of Banking & Finance,2009(33),640-641,650.</p><p><b>　　譯文2</b></p><p><b>　　跨國并購風險的緩解<

63、/b></p><p>　　在過去的20年中，企業(yè)資產的跨國收購量比國內并購數(shù)量增加了近3倍。與國內并購相比，跨國并購面臨一個更大的挑戰(zhàn) 由于買方對外國公司的機構和文化價值觀不熟悉。公司并購國外企業(yè)資產可能面對不同的會計方法和披露要求，這阻礙了盡職調查的過程。決定如何指定商業(yè)策略和經營業(yè)務的文化特殊性使得進入買方內部資產業(yè)務結構更為復雜。收購公司也可能會遇到不同產權保護制度的法律，這一因素增加了未來現(xiàn)金流量

64、的不確定性。跨國并購中更大程度的不確定性減少了作為交換的資產價值（阿克洛夫，1970；斯蒂格利茨，2000），并作為跨國并購表現(xiàn)欠佳的解釋體現(xiàn)出來（Denis等人，2002年；Moeller和Schlingemann，2005）。 在這篇文章中，我會分析一些買家可以改善這些交易固有風險的不同方案。這一分析重要性是讓那些希望在國外市場擴大業(yè)務的企業(yè)理解最佳進入策略。 </p><p>　　收購公司調整投資結構可以減

65、少不確定性，所以他們取決于資產的績效。 本文分析了兩種可供選擇的有支出。第一，買家可以通過用股票支付與被并購方同時分擔并購風險，因為這樣可以使并購方和被并購方在并購活動中保持同等風險地位。第二，企業(yè)可以對所并購的資產進行分期付款（Kohers和Ang，2000）。</p><p>　　買家和賣家可以在一個合資企業(yè)（JV）中將資產運作聯(lián)合在一起，以提高資產信息交流的質量。Nanda和Williamson (1995

66、)描述被看作是一種機制的合資企業(yè)有利于交流信息直至最終并購購。例子中，Mantecon和Chatfield（2007年）發(fā)現(xiàn)，國內主要的合資企業(yè)，合資公司可以作為一種轉移資產估值存在的不確定性。</p><p>　　本文的目的是要了解哪些機制可以減少不確定性從而使得更為有利地行并購境外合資企業(yè)。本人假設，當投資更有價值的不確定性更加嚴重這種使用分期付款和股票作為支付方式和公平形成的合資企業(yè)投資應該是有利于收購，文

67、章從1985年到2005宣布收購的30783個樣本示例有助于現(xiàn)有文獻的檢驗這一假說。這個樣本的收購方來自75個國家，涉及6824個跨境的資產收購的來自128個國家。</p><p>　　研究結果表明，并購活動中的估值影響取決于對獲得的信息資產收購前。并購方在該合資企業(yè)經營資產中取得了巨大的收益，這表明并購雙方在共同獲得信息去經營資產的并購中獲利。筆者認為，這些成果應積極地與不確定性得到解決的程度聯(lián)系起來。根據(jù)這一

68、假說，在合資企業(yè)中取得較大收益的并購方所在的國家擁有較高水平的投資風險和更高水平的估值不確定性。這些結果表明，合資企業(yè)可以作為一個減少與跨界在嚴重的估值和收購國家的投資風險不確定性的過渡性使用機制。</p><p>　　改善投資機制跨境風險。雖然估值對跨國并購者的影響的證據(jù)仍沒有定論，但是這使買家面對更高水平的不確定性。原因有以下幾個：盡職調查過程由于不同的會計和信息披露要求而變得復雜；資產同化也由于決定企業(yè)如何

69、經營的文化差異而變得更加困難； 此外，對少數(shù)股東不同級別的保護法律制度和強制合同執(zhí)行都增加了未來現(xiàn)金流量的難度值。</p><p>　　并購者如何才能減少與跨境相關的不確定性收購？ Reuer（2005）建議使用的分期付款和業(yè)務關系。作為貨幣使用的股票可以是一個合同工具來降低投資風險，因為它有一個分期定價效應（Hansen，1987）。目標公司如果接受股票，并購者和被并購的資產表示看好。并購者則相反，如果并購者選

70、擇用股票收購說明他們高估了被收購企業(yè)及其資產（邁爾斯和麥吉羅夫，1984）。因此，最終的市場反應對并購中股票支付的使用取決于并購方和目標并購企業(yè)的信息不對稱程度以及作為其相對的議價地位。</p><p>　　收購公司也可以通過使用分期付款來減少并購價格的不確定性。Reuer等發(fā)現(xiàn)，在1995-1998年期間的3098個樣本中，美國企業(yè)在購買高科技資產和服務性領域的交易時更多使用分期付款。 Kohers 和Ang（

71、2000）分析938個并購使用分期付款。他們認為，分期付款為交易信息中存在較大不對稱性提供了便利。 </p><p>　　并購者跨國的并購中面對著更高水平的不確定性。本文通過分析現(xiàn)存的128個國家的資產跨國并購樣本文獻有助于并購者可以使用不同的機制，減少投資的不確定性。從這一分析的結果表明，當并購資產均位于在不同的國家時候，并購者獲得較少的收益。研究結果表明，可以由跨國并購的并購者中存在的較嚴重的代理問題來解釋這

72、些偏低的收益。結果表明，在跨國并購中獲取較大收益的并購是在一個共同經營資產收購的合資企業(yè)中的。這些較大收益的收購不能被解釋為是受上市的影響，或者由于合營企業(yè)合同中嵌入看漲期權的存在，或通過對目標公司小股東的剝奪。該研究結果顯示，分期付款與國內并購的較大收獲有直接關系，但沒有跡象表明在跨國并購中并購者受益于這些策略。結果表明，在合資企業(yè)所發(fā)生的信息交流提高了跨國并購交易的價值，通過存在著的較高的不確定性、估值水平和國家投資風險體現(xiàn)出來。因