全球價值鏈治理外文翻譯（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　2000單詞，1.1萬英文字符,3600漢字</p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目： The governance of global value chains </p><p>　　出 處： Gereffi G, Humphrey J, Sturgeon T. The Gover

2、nance of Global Value Chain[J]. Review of International Political Economy, 2005, 12(1):78-104. </p><p>　　作 者： Gary Gereffi；John Humphrey；Timothy Sturgeon </p><p><b>　　原文：</b&

3、gt;</p><p>　　The Governance of Global Value Chains</p><p><b>　　ABSTRACT</b></p><p>　　This article builds a theoretical framework to help explain governance patterns in g

4、lobal value chains. It draws on three streams of literature – transaction costs economics, production networks, and technological capability and firm-level learning– to identify three variables that play a large role in

5、determining how global value chains are governed and change. These are: (1) the complexity of transactions, (2) the ability to codify transactions, and (3) the capabilities in the supply-base. The</p><p>　　K

6、EYWORDS：Global value chains; governance; networks; transaction costs; value chain modularity</p><p>　　The world economy has changed in significant ways during the past several decades, especially in the area

7、s of international trade and industrial organization. Two of the most important new features of the contemporary economy are the globalization of production and trade,1 which have fueled the growth of industrial capabili

8、ties in a wide range of developing countries, and the vertical disintegration of transnational corporations, which are redefining their core competencies to focus on innovatio</p><p>　　The evolution of globa

9、l-scale industrial organization affects not only the fortunes of firms and the structure of industries, but also how and why countries advance — or fail to advance — in the global economy. Global value chain research and

10、 policy work examine the different ways in which global production and distribution systems are integrated, and the possibilities for firms in developing countries to enhance their position in global markets. One of our

11、hopes is that the theory of global val</p><p>　　Types of Governance in Global Value Chains</p><p>　　If a theory of global value chain governance is to be useful to policymakers, it should be par

12、simonious. It has to simplify and abstract from an extremely heterogeneous body of evidence, identifying the variables that play a large role in determining patterns of value chain governance while holding others at bay,

13、 at least initially. Clearly, history, institutions, geographic and social contexts, the evolving rules of the game, and path dependence matter; and many factors will influence how firms</p><p>　　In the 1990

14、s Gereffi and others developed a framework, called “global commodity chains”, that tied the concept of the value-added chain directly to the global organization of industries (see Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994). This wor

15、k not only highlighted the importance of coordination across firm boundaries, but also the growing importance of new global buyers (mainly retailers and brand marketers) as key drivers in the formation of globally disper

16、sed and organizationally fragmented production an</p><p>　　highly competent supply-base upon which global-scale production and distribution systems could be built without direct ownership.</p><p&g

17、t;　　By highlighting explicit coordination in dis-integrated chains and contrasting them to the relationships contained within vertically integrated, or “producer driven” chains, the global commodity chains framework drew

18、 attention to the role of networks in driving the co-evolution of cross-border industrial organization. However, the global commodity chains framework did not adequately specify the variety of network forms that more rec

19、ent field research has uncovered.</p><p>　　While, research on the horticulture industry (Dolan and Humphrey 2000) and the footwear industry (Schmitz and Knorringa 2000) reinforced Gereffi's notion that g

20、lobal buyers (retailers, marketers, and traders) can and do exert a high degree of control over spatially dispersed value chains even when they did not own production, transport or processing facilities, recent research

21、on global production has highlighted other important forms of coordination.</p><p>　　Work on the electronics industry and contract manufacturing by Sturgeon (2002) and by Sturgeon and Lee (2001) contrasted t

22、hree types of supply relationships, based on the degree of standardization of product and process: (1) the "commodity supplier" that provides standard products through arm's length market relationships, (2)

23、 the "captive supplier" that makes non- standard products using machinery dedicated to the buyer's needs, and (3) the "turn-key supplier" that produces customized products </p><p>　　U

24、sing the approaches outlined above and empirical reference points taken from many studies of global value chains,7 we propose a more complete typology of value-chain governance. We acknowledge, as do most other framework

25、s that seek to explain industry organization — from transactions costs to global commodity chains to organizational theory — that market-based relationships among firms and vertically integrated firms (hierarchies) make

26、up opposite ends of a spectrum of explicit coordination, an</p><p>　　Markets. Market linkages do not have to be completely transitory, as is typical of spot markets; they can persist over time, with repeat t

27、ransactions. The essential point is that the costs of switching to new partners are low for both parties.</p><p>　　Modular value chains. Typically, suppliers in modular value chains make products to a custom

28、er's specifications, which may be more or less detailed. However, when providing “turn-key services” suppliers take full responsibility for competencies surrounding process technology, use generic machinery that limi

29、ts transaction- specific investments, and make capital outlays for components and materials on behalf of customers.</p><p>　　Relational value chains. In these networks we see complex interactions between buy

30、ers and sellers, which often creates mutual dependence and high levels of asset specificity. This may be managed through reputation, or family and ethnic ties. Many authors have highlighted the role of spatial proximity

31、in supporting relational value chain linkages, but trust and reputation might well function in spatially dispersed networks where relationships are built-up over time or are based on dispersed famil</p><p>　

32、　Captive value chains. In these networks, small suppliers are transactionally dependent on much larger buyers. Suppliers face significant switching costs and are, therefore, "captive". Such networks are frequen

33、tly characterized by a high degree of monitoring and control by lead firms.</p><p>　　Hierarchy. This governance form is characterized by vertical integration. The dominant form of governance is managerial co

34、ntrol, flowing from managers to subordinates, or from headquarters to subsidiaries and affiliates.</p><p>　　A Theory of Value Chain Governance</p><p>　　Having laid out this typology, our next st

35、ep is to develop an operational theory of global value chain governance. Under which conditions would we expect market, modular, relational, captive, or vertically integrated global value chain governance to arise? Build

36、ing on the work cited above, we will identify and discuss three key determinants of value chain governance patterns: complexity of transactions; codifiability of information; and capability of suppliers. In so doing, we

37、 acknowledge the p</p><p>　　Lead firms increase complexity when they place new demands on the value chain, such as when they seek just-in-time supply and when they increase product differentiation. However,

38、lead firms also adopt strategies to reduce the complexity of these transactions. One important way of doing this is through the development of technical and process standards. The complexity of information transmitted be

39、tween firms can be reduced through the adoption of technical standards that codify information and al</p><p>　　At the same time, the integration of new suppliers into global value chains also increases coord

40、ination challenges. Keesing and Lall (1992) argue that producers in developing countries are expected to meet requirements that frequently do not (yet) apply to their domestic markets. This creates a gap between the capa

41、bilities required for the domestic market and those required for the export market, which raises the degree of monitoring and control required by buyers.</p><p>　　These considerations lead us to construct a

42、theory of value chain governance based on three factors:</p><p>　　The complexity of information and knowledge transfer required to sustain a particular transaction, particularly with respect to product and p

43、rocess specifications;</p><p>　　the extent to which this information and knowledge can be codified and, therefore, transmitted efficiently and without transaction-specific investment between the parties to t

44、he transaction; and</p><p>　　the capabilities of actual and potential suppliers in relation to the requirements of the transaction.</p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p><b&g

45、t;　　全球價值鏈治理</b></p><p><b>　　摘要</b></p><p>　　本文建立了一個理論框架來幫助說明全球價值鏈的治理模式。它利用三種理論——交易成本經濟學，生產網絡,技術能力和企業(yè)層面的學習能力，來識別三個在全球價值鏈是治理和變化中扮演重要角色的變量。它們是：（1）交易的復雜程度；（2）識別交易的能力；（3）供應能力。這一理論把全

46、球價值鏈治理模式分為五種：等級型，領導型，關系型，模塊型和市場型——按照合作意愿和權力的不對稱性從高向低排列。本文通過四個簡短的工業(yè)個案研究強調了動態(tài)和重疊全球價值鏈治理：自行車、服裝、園藝和電子產業(yè)集中分析了全球價值鏈治理的動力和重疊的本質。</p><p>　　關鍵詞 全球價值鏈 治理 網絡 交易成本 價值鏈模塊</p><p><b>　　引言</b>&

47、lt;/p><p>　　在過去的幾十年里，全球經濟發(fā)生了巨大的變化，尤其在國際貿易和產業(yè)組織方面。當代經濟最重要的兩個新特征是生產和貿易的全球化，極大地推動了發(fā)展中國家生產能力，跨國公司的垂直解體。跨國公司逐漸把它們的核心競爭力專注于在營銷和服務方面的產業(yè)創(chuàng)新、產品戰(zhàn)略、市場服務的高附加值環(huán)節(jié)集中，同時大力削減一些非核心的功能如普通服務和批量生產等。本文的目的是為更好的理解全球價值鏈治理結構的轉變提供理論框架。我們希

48、望能夠為現實世界存在的價值鏈治理模式的治理提供一些普遍適用的基本原則。</p><p>　　全球范圍內生產組織的演變不僅僅影響公司發(fā)展和產業(yè)結構，而且對國家在全球經濟中如何及為何前進與后退都有著極大的影響。全球價值鏈的研究和政策制訂工作對全球生產和分配體系組織方式及發(fā)展中國家提升其在國際市場競爭地位的可能性進行了探討。我們的愿望之一就是為各國制訂產業(yè)升級、經濟發(fā)展、就業(yè)創(chuàng)造、減輕貧困相關政策提供一定的借鑒。<

49、;/p><p>　　一、全球價值鏈治理類型</p><p>　　如果全球價值鏈治理理論對決策者是有用的話，那么它應該是節(jié)省的。它應該對極端復雜的客觀情況進行簡化和提煉，辨別在決定價值鏈治理模式中占重要地位的變量，即使在其它變量不變，起碼最開始應該是這樣。很明顯，歷史，社會體制，地理環(huán)境和社會背景，游戲規(guī)則的演變，路徑依賴問題和許多別的因素會影響公司和企業(yè)群體在全球經濟中是如何鏈接起來的。然而，

50、一個簡單的框架是有用的，因為它分離了關鍵變量并為潛藏在具體的經驗情況下的根本動力提供了一個清晰的觀點。我們的目的是建立一個最簡單的理論框架，能產生與現實世界結果緊密相關的結論。</p><p>　　上世紀九十年代Gereffi和其他學者提出了全球商品鏈的理論框架。這一理論直接將價值增值鏈的概念與全球產業(yè)組織直接聯(lián)系了起來。這一框架不僅強調公司間協(xié)作的重要性，而且強調了全球新買家（主要是零售商和品牌銷售商）作為關鍵

51、驅動力在分布全球化、組織片段化生模式產和分銷網絡形成過程中日益增強的地位。Gereffi（1994）使用“購買者驅動的全球商品鏈”來說明全球買家是如何使用明確的合作來幫助建立一個高度勝任的供應基礎，使全球化規(guī)模的生產和分銷體系可以在沒有直接所有權的情況下建立起來。</p><p>　　通過強調非一體化鏈條上的明確合作并比較它和垂直一體的關系，或者是和生產者驅動鏈條進行比較，全球商品鏈框架關注網絡在驅動協(xié)同化跨境產

52、業(yè)組織演進中扮演的角色。然而，最近的實地研究表明全球商品鏈框架不能足以說明各種各樣的網絡模式。同時，在園藝業(yè)（Dolan，Humphrey,2000）和鞋類（Schmitz，Knorringa,2000）的研究鞏固了Gereffi的觀點，即全球買家（零售商，營銷商和貿易商）可以并且能夠對空間上分散的價值鏈進行了高度控制，即使它們并不擁有產品，運輸和加工設備，最近關于全球生產的研究強調了協(xié)作的其它重要模式。</p><

53、p>　　Sturgeon致力于電子工業(yè)和合同制造業(yè)的研究（2002,Sturgeon），并且和Lee（2001）對比了三種供應關系類型，基于生產和加工的標準化程度：（1）商品供應商，通過公平地市場關系提供標準的產品；（2）領導型供應商，通過體制致力于生產顧客需要的非標準化產品 （3）交鑰匙應商， 通過使用靈活的生產設備，使具有按客戶需求定制產品的能力。這一分析強調了公司間信息交換和生產設備中資產特異性程度的復雜性。Sturgeon

54、(2002)把依靠交鑰匙供應商的生產體系定義為“模塊化生產網絡”，因為一個高度勝任的供應商可能會根據需要在全球化生產安排中增加或者減少份額。與此同時，Humphrey和Schmitz(2000;2002)辨析了供應商和購買這間有如等級體系的關系，這種情況與“領導型體系下的供應商”相對應，</p><p>　　Humphrey和Schmitz強調了供應商權限在供應商決定對購買者附屬程度中所扮演的角色。如果全球買家需

55、要對供應商權限投資，他們不僅需要詳細說明供應商需要遵循的生產和加工的參數，還要保證其投資額在這一供應商上的優(yōu)勢地位，如果不是作為唯一的顧客。</p><p>　　使用上述概念以及從許多全球價值鏈研究中取得的經驗參考點，我們提出了一個更完整的價值鏈治理模式分類的辦法。我們承認，和許多其他試圖說明產業(yè)組織的理論框架一樣——從交易成本到全球商品鏈再到組織理論——以市場為基礎的公司間關系和垂直一體化的公司等級制產生了與明

56、確合作程度截然相反的兩個結果，而網絡關系模式則構成了全球價值鏈治理的中間部分。我們加強的這個概念是基于三種有區(qū)別的網絡模式分類的延伸，即：模塊型，關系型和領導型。這樣我們的分類方法區(qū)分出五種基本的價值鏈治理模式。它們是分析型的，而不是經驗總結型的，盡管它們中都有一部分是來自于實際觀察。它們包括：</p><p>　　1、市場型。市場聯(lián)系并不一定都是完全短暫的，和典型的現貨交易市場一樣，公司間的合作也可能會持續(xù)很久

57、，并且重復交易。重點是轉換新的合作伙伴的成本對雙方來說都很低。</p><p>　　2、模塊型價值鏈。典型的模塊型價值鏈中的供應商按照顧客要求生產產品，這只是細節(jié)上的或多或少的差別。然而，當提供交鑰匙服務的供應商對加工技術能力承擔全部責任，使用普通設備對交易型投資有限制性，以及代表顧客對零部件和原材料進行資本支出。</p><p>　　3、關系型價值鏈。在這種網絡中我們可以了解到買賣雙方中

58、復雜的相互影響，基于此常常會產生相互依賴和高度的資產特異性。這種模式可能通過個人聲望、家族和種族之間的連結來完成。許多學者則強調空間上的接近在輔助聯(lián)接關系型價值鏈上的地位，但是信任和聲譽在空間分散網絡中起到了良好的功效，而這種關系往往是建立在長期合作中，分散的家族和社會群體上的。</p><p>　　4、領導型價值鏈。在這些網絡中，小型供應商對大的購買商有著高度的依賴性。供應商面臨著重大的轉換成本，因此，對于“領

59、導級”也是如此。這種網絡的通常特征是供應商被領導企業(yè)高度監(jiān)視和控制。</p><p>　　5、等級制。這一治理模式的特點是通過垂直一體化治理。而治理的主要形式是管理控制，沿著從管理者到下級，或者從總公司到分子公司或分支機構的方向。</p><p><b>　　2、價格鏈治理理論</b></p><p>　　基于這種分類方法的提出，我們下一步就是

60、研究全球價值鏈治理的操作理論。在哪種情況下我們會期望出現市場型、模塊型、關系型、領導型或垂直一體化的全球價值鏈治理模式?；趯ι衔牡囊?，我們識別和討論價值鏈治理模式中的三個關鍵因素：交易的復雜性，識別供應商的交易的能力和供應能力。通過這樣做，我們了解到，資產特異性問題可以通過交易成本經濟學被識別，同時強調放在所謂的“領導型”交易成本中，這種成本包括在價值鏈中協(xié)調活動的成本。通常認為這種協(xié)調的，或全球化的交易成本會上升，當價值鏈生產非標

61、準化產品時，一體化結構產品或對時間敏感的產品時。</p><p>　　當他們在價值鏈中被寄予新的要求，例如尋找當下需要的供應品和增加產品差異性時機，領導企業(yè)的復雜性就增加了。然而，領導企業(yè)同時也會采用降低交易復雜性的措施。一種重要的方法就是通過技術和加工標準的研發(fā)。公司之間信息傳遞的復雜性可以通過采用技術標準將信息編成法典和允許貿易伙伴之間傳遞原始數據來降低。這些標準在價值鏈各環(huán)節(jié)的應用距離整個鏈條的提升還有很長

62、的距離。當這些約定的規(guī)范化傳遞標準被所有企業(yè)所熟知并遵循時，這個鏈條將獲得許多好處，例如那些被認同的模塊化產品設計，尤其是保留人們的努力成果，通過重復利用基礎系統(tǒng)，或者是模塊化，就好像新產品被引進。在模塊化價值鏈范圍內，供應商和客戶之間容易可以建立和中斷聯(lián)系，這導致了不固定的和靈活的網絡結構。同時其動力來源與市場型很類似，兩種模式保留著本質上的差異，因為非價格信息在公司間流動的大量變量，即使以一種規(guī)范的形式。此外，產品的高度差異性可以通

63、過有限的信息來提供，就好像通過一系列不含糊的，被廣泛接受的參數來定義差異性。在傳統(tǒng)上，公共和私有機構都可以定義產品的規(guī)格和標準，并且在某些情況下有權驗證產品是不是符合這些標準。在與質量相關的標準和認證發(fā)展過程中，勞</p><p>　　同時，新的供應商融入全球價值鏈也向協(xié)調提出了挑戰(zhàn)。Keesing和Lall（1992）認為發(fā)展中國家的制造商被期望能滿足在其國內市場并不適用的各項要求。這使得在國內能力要求和國外的

64、能力要求上出現了差距，也提高了購買者監(jiān)視和控制能力。</p><p>　　這些事項引導我們構建一個基于以下三要素的價值鏈治理理論：</p><p>　　A 維持一樁特殊的交易，尤其考慮到產品和加工規(guī)模所需要的信息和知識傳遞的復雜性。</p><p>　　B 信息和知識規(guī)范化程度，其結果是可以有效傳輸而且不需要在交易的各個環(huán)節(jié)額外專業(yè)化投資。</p>&