人民幣國(guó)際化相關(guān)外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　中文3350字，2200單詞，1.2萬(wàn)英文字符</p><p>　　文獻(xiàn)出處：Eichengreen B, Kawai M. Issues for Renminbi Internationalization: An Overview[J]. 2014.1-7</p><p>　　http://www.wenku1.com/news/3ABCCE1CB3041C0C.h

2、tml</p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Issues for Renminbi Internationalization: An Overview</p><p>　　Barry Eichengreen; Masahiro Kawai</p><p><b>　　Abstract&

3、lt;/b></p><p>　　This paper provides an overview of the potential international role of the renminbi (RMB). Reviewing the current state, the paper finds that much progress has been made on RMB settlements

4、for trade involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and on RMB-denominated bond issuance in Hong Kong, China, but that RMB internationalization is still limited due to capital account controls. It argues that a high

5、 degree of RMB internationalization requires significant capital account liberalization, whi</p><p>　　Keywords: renminbi, yuan, international monetary policy, currency internationalization, foreign exchange,

6、 capital account liberalization, financial market</p><p>　　1. INTRODUCTION</p><p>　　人民幣國(guó)際化 Internationalization of the renminbi (RMB) is one of the more contentious and widely debated aspect

7、s of economic reform in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Wider use of the RMB in international transactions, both commercial and financial transactions and those undertaken by central banks and other official instit

8、utions, can be understood as a natural response to the growing weight of PRC trade and investment flows in the world economy. At the same time, top PRC officials have dec</p><p>　　So too is the role of RMB i

9、nternationalization in the process of the PRC’s economic growth and development. Some will say that the cause of RMB internationalization is being advanced mainly in the interest of financial institutions, which see scop

10、e for doing international business in the currency as a lucrative source of potential income. Others argue that currency internationalization is supported by PRC firms that see the ability to do cross-border business in

11、their own currency as a useful wa</p><p>　　Similarly, it is argued in some circles that RMB internationalization is a natural corollary of the process of financial development and deepening currently under w

12、ay in the PRC. As financial markets gain depth, width, and liquidity and are progressively opened to foreign investors, greater international use of the currency will come naturally. The counterpoint is that currency int

13、ernationalization and the capital account liberalization required to advance it can be or are being used to ratchet </p><p>　　Equally contentious is how quickly international use of the RMB is likely to expa

14、nd. The PRC is already the world’s largest exporter and will soon be the world’s largest economy as measured by gross domestic product (GDP)—previous studies like Chinn and Frankel (2007) suggesting that economic size is

15、 an important determinant of the extent of international use of a national currency create a presumption that there should be momentum for more widespread use of the RMB on this ground alone. Other s</p><p>

16、　　These are among the issues we seek to address in this paper. This overview is first concerned with establishing the facts. Most fundamentally, what is happening in terms of RMB internationalization? How, where, and why

17、 is the currency being adopted as an international unit of account, means of payment, and store of value? We are also interested in the economics and political economy of RMB internationalization. How does currency inter

18、nationalization fit into the larger process of the PRC’s econo</p><p>　　The PRC is not like other countries. This makes it important to ask, critically, how much can be learned about the prospects and pitfal

19、ls of RMB internationalization from the experience of other countries. In particular, the PRC has a much more extensively controlled capital account of the balance of payments, and a more heavily controlled financial sys

20、tem and economy generally, than any other country that has previously aspired to elevate its national unit to international currency status. Thus</p><p>　　We also inquire into the implications of RMB interna

21、tionalization not just for the PRC but for other countries and, more broadly, for the international monetary and financial system. The effects of economic policies and conditions in the PRC will be stronger on countries

22、that come to rely extensively on the RMB in their international transactions. Their commercial banks will come to rely more heavily on RMB funding. Their central banks are likely to place a heavier weight on the RMB when

23、 managin</p><p>　　This brings us, in turn, to the implications of RMB internationalization for the structure of the international monetary system. Does the emergence of the RMB imply a world of competing int

24、ernational currencies or a system of overlapping regional currency blocs? Is a system in which both the US dollar and the RMB play major global roles likely to display better or worse stability properties than our curren

25、t</p><p>　　dollar-based system? Will it make for the smoother and more stable provision of global liquidity over time? Will it make for more disciplined policies on the part of the reserve-currency countries

26、, since none of them will possess a monopoly of safe-haven status? Will it make for more volatile exchange rates between the major currencies, as investors making use of liquid markets in both currencies shift erraticall

27、y between the dollar and the RMB?</p><p>　　2. THE STATE OF PLAY</p><p>　　In line with its traditional approach to economic and financial reform, the PRC has pursued a strategy of gradualism in s

28、eeking to internationalize the RMB. In the first stage, it has encouraged cross-border use of the currency for trade settlement. As firms exporting to the PRC have acquired RMB receipts, they were allowed to maintain tho

29、se receipts in the form of RMB bank deposits in Hong Kong, China and, subsequently, other offshore financial centers. The banks and firms acquiring those balan</p><p>　　2.1 Renminbi Trade Settlement</p>

30、;<p>　　In the first step in the process of RMB internationalization, the PRC focused on promoting use of the currency for trade-related purposes. In July 2009, the PRC launched a pilot scheme that allowed use of t

31、he RMB in settlement of trade with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states as well as Hong Kong, China and Macau, China in five mainland PRC cities: Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan, and Zhuha

32、i. In mid-2010, coverage of the scheme was expanded to 20 provinces, permi</p><p>　　Initially, RMB trade settlement was skewed toward import settlement as opposed to settlement of PRC exports. At the end of

33、2010, for instance, the ratio of RMB receipts and payments was 1:5.5 (People’s Bank of China 2012). One interpretation of this bias is that it likely reflected the lack of availability of RMB abroad and the incentive to

34、hold RMB offshore in anticipation of the currency’s appreciation. In other words, it reflected speculative motives rather than the convenience of invoicing a</p><p>　　More recently, however, the ratio has na

35、rrowed. From 1:1.7 in 2011, it fell to 1:1.3 in the first half of 2013 (People’s Bank of China 2013). This trend is in line with the turnaround in expectations of a RMB appreciation since the latter part of 2011. Such co

36、nsistent expansion in the utilization of RMB in trade settlement, despite diminished expectations of RMB appreciation in recent years, suggests that RMB internationalization is now being driven by fundamental changes rat

37、her than just by spe</p><p>　　Together with the expansion in RMB trade settlement, RMB deposits in Hong Kong, China have risen dramatically. While banks in Hong Kong, China were allowed to open RMB accounts

38、as early as 2004, it was only in mid-2010, when the RMB settlement scheme was introduced, that RMB deposits in Hong Kong, China took off. Since then, the RMB has been allowed to flow back and forth between Hong Kong, Chi

39、na and the PRC for purposes related to trade settlement, as noted above. From about $9.2 billion at the</p><p>　　2.2 Renminbi-Denominated Investment</p><p>　　Although the PRC authorities have co

40、ntinued to control inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI), the controls in question have been relaxed in recent years. In addition, both the approval process in the use of the RMB for outward FDI by PRC enter

41、prises and the actual use of the RMB for inward FDI in the PRC have been streamlined with the announcement of the Renminbi Outward Direct Investment scheme in January 2011 and the creation of the Renminbi FDI scheme in O

42、ctober of the same year.</p><p>　　While the strictest controls are on portfolio investment flows, these controls have also been relaxed in recent years to expand the range of investors and the type of financ

43、ial assets that are permitted to engage in cross-border transactions using the RMB. Since April 2006, preapproved institutional investors from the PRC have been allowed to invest in RMB-denominated financial instruments

44、offshore, such as in Hong Kong, China. In August 2010, foreign central banks and certain types of foreign f</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　人民幣國(guó)際化問(wèn)題：一個(gè)概述</p><p>　　巴里.艾肯格林;濱崎

45、雅宏.卡瓦依</p><p><b>　　摘要</b></p><p>　　本文概述了人民幣(RMB)的潛在國(guó)際角色?；仡櫖F(xiàn)行狀態(tài),本文發(fā)現(xiàn),人民幣貿(mào)易結(jié)算上已經(jīng)取得了很大進(jìn)展,包括中華人民共和國(guó)(PRC)和在中國(guó)香港發(fā)行以人民幣計(jì)價(jià)的債券,但由于資本賬戶(hù)管制，人民幣國(guó)際化程度仍然有限。本文強(qiáng)調(diào),高度的人民幣國(guó)際化需要重要資本賬戶(hù)的自由化,從而倡導(dǎo)提高匯率的靈活性來(lái)使

46、中央銀行貨幣政策可以享受自治權(quán)。然而,這將成為中國(guó)當(dāng)局面臨的一個(gè)挑戰(zhàn)，草率的資本賬戶(hù)自由化可能暴露其金融市場(chǎng)危機(jī)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。本文還強(qiáng)調(diào)為了使人民幣成為一個(gè)真正的國(guó)際儲(chǔ)備貨幣，制度改革很重要。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞:人民幣，元，國(guó)際貨幣政策，貨幣國(guó)際化，外匯，資本賬戶(hù)自由化，金融市場(chǎng)</p><p><b>　　1.引言</b></p><p>

47、;　　人民幣（RMB）的國(guó)際化，其中一個(gè)具有爭(zhēng)議性和廣泛討論的方面是中華人民共和國(guó)(PRC)的經(jīng)濟(jì)改革。人民幣在國(guó)際交易中的廣泛使用, 由中央銀行和其他官方機(jī)構(gòu)從事的商業(yè)和金融交易,可以被理解為中國(guó)在世界經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易和投資流動(dòng)日益增長(zhǎng)的一個(gè)自然反應(yīng)。與此同時(shí),中國(guó)高層官員多次宣布貨幣國(guó)際化的政策目標(biāo),而中國(guó)人民銀行和其他政府機(jī)構(gòu)追求各種各樣的舉措以鼓勵(lì)貨幣的廣泛使用。因此,是否擴(kuò)大人民幣在國(guó)際上的應(yīng)用是一個(gè)自發(fā)的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)，也體現(xiàn)了中華人民共

48、和國(guó)日益增長(zhǎng)的能力，以及影響全球經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)的意愿。</p><p>　　人民幣國(guó)際化的作用同樣體現(xiàn)在中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)和發(fā)展的過(guò)程中。一些人認(rèn)為,人民幣國(guó)際化的原因主要在于金融機(jī)構(gòu)的利益,意識(shí)到貨幣國(guó)際業(yè)務(wù)是一個(gè)潛在的有利可圖的收入來(lái)源。但也有人認(rèn)為，貨幣國(guó)際化的支持來(lái)自中國(guó)公司，他們將貨幣跨境業(yè)務(wù)的能力作為一個(gè)節(jié)省成本、保持競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)的方式。這些公司沒(méi)有認(rèn)識(shí)到為什么他們應(yīng)該繼續(xù)承擔(dān)在美國(guó)(US)美元開(kāi)展此類(lèi)業(yè)務(wù)的額外成

49、本和對(duì)沖產(chǎn)生的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。</p><p>　　同樣,在學(xué)術(shù)界存在這樣一種爭(zhēng)論,人民幣國(guó)際化是目前金融發(fā)展和深化的一個(gè)自然推論的過(guò)程。隨著金融市場(chǎng)深度、寬度、和流動(dòng)性的增加,并逐步向外國(guó)投資者開(kāi)放,人民幣的國(guó)際化發(fā)展就是理所當(dāng)然的。貨幣國(guó)際化和資本賬戶(hù)自由化被用于加大中國(guó)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的壓力,加快國(guó)內(nèi)金融改革,加快金融發(fā)展和開(kāi)放的過(guò)程。</p><p>　　同樣有爭(zhēng)議的是人民幣國(guó)際化的速度很可能會(huì)擴(kuò)大

50、。中國(guó)已經(jīng)是世界上最大的出口國(guó),并且很快將成為世界最大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體——琴恩和弗蘭克爾(2007)先前研究表明貨幣國(guó)家化程度的一個(gè)重要的決定因素是經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模。其他學(xué)者強(qiáng)調(diào),發(fā)行國(guó)的市場(chǎng)流動(dòng)性、金融穩(wěn)定、國(guó)際貨幣地位和政治結(jié)構(gòu)決定因素說(shuō)明了必要的調(diào)整可能需要相當(dāng)長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間。樂(lè)觀主義者指出,中國(guó)現(xiàn)在的國(guó)際貿(mào)易以人民幣結(jié)算的比例高達(dá)17%,人民幣銀行存款以及在香港發(fā)行人民幣債券的快速增長(zhǎng)。悲觀主義者回應(yīng),大部分貿(mào)易來(lái)自于中國(guó)和香港，而在香港人民幣存款的

51、增長(zhǎng),反映了中國(guó)貨幣升值的預(yù)期可能不會(huì)持續(xù)下去。樂(lè)觀主義者指出,過(guò)去貨幣提升國(guó)際地位,美元在第一次世界大戰(zhàn)之后,能夠很快創(chuàng)建一個(gè)獨(dú)立的中央銀行來(lái)增強(qiáng)市場(chǎng)流動(dòng)性,并進(jìn)行了相關(guān)的制度改革。悲觀主義者則認(rèn)為,美元在1930年代的金融危機(jī)期間失去了許多國(guó)際收益。他們認(rèn)為應(yīng)當(dāng)優(yōu)先考慮貨幣國(guó)際化和資本賬戶(hù)自由化對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)金融發(fā)展和改革的影響。他們擔(dān)心允許資本賬戶(hù)自由化領(lǐng)先于國(guó)內(nèi)金融改革，這樣可能增加危機(jī)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。</p><p>

52、　　這些都是我們尋求解決的問(wèn)題。本文首先關(guān)注的是確立事實(shí)。最根本的是,就人民幣國(guó)際化而言發(fā)生了什么?如何、在哪里以及為什么人民幣被作為國(guó)際貨幣單位賬戶(hù),付款方式和存儲(chǔ)價(jià)值?我們同樣感興趣的是人民幣國(guó)際化的經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治經(jīng)濟(jì)。貨幣國(guó)際化如何適應(yīng)中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)改革?它如何適應(yīng)中國(guó)的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)?例如,誰(shuí)游說(shuō)和反對(duì)?這對(duì)國(guó)際貨幣體系來(lái)說(shuō)意味著什么?</p><p>　　中國(guó)不像其他國(guó)家。這使得詢(xún)問(wèn)變得很重要，根據(jù)別國(guó)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，我們了

53、解多少關(guān)于人民幣國(guó)際化的前景和陷阱。特別是,中國(guó)需要更廣泛的控制資本賬戶(hù)收支平衡,也需要更多的控制金融體系和經(jīng)濟(jì),相比其他任何國(guó)家,中國(guó)更加希望提高人民幣的國(guó)際貨幣地位。因此,之前關(guān)于資本賬戶(hù)自由化和相關(guān)的金融風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的經(jīng)驗(yàn),不僅存在于早期的儲(chǔ)備貨幣國(guó)家也存在于新興市場(chǎng)。</p><p>　　人民幣國(guó)際化的含義，對(duì)中國(guó)和其他國(guó)家,更廣泛地說(shuō),對(duì)于國(guó)際貨幣和金融體系都是非常重要的。他們的商業(yè)銀行將更多地依賴(lài)人民幣資金。

54、他們的中央銀行將更重視人民幣匯率和外匯儲(chǔ)備管理。我們主要討論亞洲國(guó)家,在此種情況下,人民幣可能會(huì)發(fā)展成全球貨幣嗎?</p><p>　　反過(guò)來(lái),我們探討人民幣國(guó)際化對(duì)國(guó)際貨幣體系結(jié)構(gòu)的影響。人民幣的崛起意味著一個(gè)世界國(guó)際貨幣的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)或一個(gè)系統(tǒng)的區(qū)域貨幣集團(tuán)嗎?美元和人民幣扮演的全球角色會(huì)比當(dāng)前以美元為基礎(chǔ)的體系穩(wěn)定屬性嗎?它會(huì)使全球流動(dòng)性更流暢和穩(wěn)定嗎? 由于沒(méi)有人會(huì)擁有壟斷的避險(xiǎn)地位，它會(huì)使國(guó)家儲(chǔ)備貨幣的政策更加

55、嚴(yán)格嗎? 由于投資者在流動(dòng)市場(chǎng)美元和人民幣之間的轉(zhuǎn)變不規(guī)律，它會(huì)使貨幣之間的匯率波動(dòng)更加不穩(wěn)定嗎?</p><p><b>　　2.當(dāng)前情況</b></p><p>　　與經(jīng)濟(jì)和金融改革的傳統(tǒng)方法一致,中國(guó)在尋求人民幣國(guó)際化的過(guò)程中奉行循序漸進(jìn)的策略。在第一階段,它鼓勵(lì)貿(mào)易結(jié)算中人民幣的跨境使用。由于公司出口中國(guó)可獲得人民幣收入,在香港，中國(guó)和其他金融中心，他們被允許

56、以人民幣銀行存款的方式去維護(hù)那些收入。銀行和公司為了維持收支平衡，允許他們逐漸擴(kuò)大在中國(guó)的投資范圍。與此同時(shí),中國(guó)人民銀行與外國(guó)央行談判雙邊貨幣互換協(xié)議,為提高人民幣流動(dòng)性，進(jìn)一步鼓勵(lì)外國(guó)當(dāng)局允許他們的銀行和企業(yè)在中國(guó)經(jīng)商。最近,中國(guó)當(dāng)局宣布打算在一個(gè)有限地理領(lǐng)域嘗試更全面的資本賬戶(hù)自由化,通過(guò)創(chuàng)建上海自由貿(mào)易區(qū),很大程度上打開(kāi)與世界其他地區(qū)的金融交易。</p><p>　　2.1人民幣貿(mào)易結(jié)算</p>

57、;<p>　　在人民幣國(guó)際化過(guò)程的第一步，中國(guó)專(zhuān)注于推廣使用人民幣進(jìn)行貿(mào)易。2009年7月,中國(guó)推出了一個(gè)試點(diǎn)計(jì)劃,允許使用人民幣與東南亞國(guó)家聯(lián)盟(ASEAN)成員國(guó)以及香港、澳門(mén)、中國(guó)大陸的五個(gè)城市:上海、廣州、深圳、東莞、珠海等進(jìn)行結(jié)算貿(mào)易。2010年中期,覆蓋的計(jì)劃已擴(kuò)大到20個(gè)省,允許公司在這些省份的貿(mào)易以人民幣結(jié)算。從那時(shí)起,授權(quán)以人民幣進(jìn)行貿(mào)易結(jié)算的范圍已經(jīng)擴(kuò)大到全國(guó)。</p><p>

58、　　最初,人民幣貿(mào)易結(jié)算是傾向于進(jìn)口結(jié)算而不是出口結(jié)算。例如,2010年底人民幣收支比率是1:5.5(中國(guó)人民銀行2012年)。對(duì)于這種偏見(jiàn)的一個(gè)解釋是,這可能反映了人民幣在海外缺乏有效性，以及持有人民幣偏離了人民幣升值的預(yù)期。換句話(huà)說(shuō),它反映了投機(jī)動(dòng)機(jī)而不是中國(guó)貨幣計(jì)價(jià)和結(jié)算的便利貿(mào)易。</p><p>　　然而, 最近這一比率已經(jīng)縮小。從2011年的1:1.7,到2013年上半年跌至1:1.3(中國(guó)人民銀行2

59、013年)。這種趨勢(shì)符合人民幣升值的預(yù)期。利用人民幣進(jìn)行貿(mào)易結(jié)算的擴(kuò)大,盡管近年來(lái)減少了人民幣升值的預(yù)期,它同樣表明人民幣國(guó)際化正在發(fā)生根本性的變化,而不是僅僅通過(guò)投機(jī)動(dòng)機(jī)。</p><p>　　隨著人民幣貿(mào)易結(jié)算的擴(kuò)大,中國(guó)香港人民幣存款大幅增加。雖然香港的銀行,中國(guó)允許在2004年初開(kāi)設(shè)人民幣賬戶(hù),但僅在2010年年中,當(dāng)人民幣結(jié)算方案出臺(tái)時(shí),在香港人民幣存款就開(kāi)始了。如上所述,人民幣被允許在香港和中華人民共

60、和國(guó)之間來(lái)回流動(dòng),用于貿(mào)易結(jié)算。截至2009年底約9.2美元(占中國(guó)香港全部存款的1.1% ) ；截至2010年底,人民幣存款激增至47.3美元(占存款總額的5.4% ) ,截至2011年底達(dá)到93美元( 9.5% ) ,到2012年底達(dá)到96美元(約9.0 )。2012年加息有所放緩,但這可能不反映人民幣對(duì)香港吸引力的任何削弱,中國(guó)從人民幣存款轉(zhuǎn)向其他人民幣計(jì)價(jià)的金融資產(chǎn)。根據(jù)這一解釋,中國(guó)香港人民幣存款的價(jià)值隨后繼續(xù)上升,截至201

61、3年10月底達(dá)到124.6美元,占存款總額的10.8%。</p><p>　　2.2人民幣計(jì)價(jià)的投資</p><p>　　盡管中國(guó)政府繼續(xù)控制內(nèi)外直接投資(FDI),但今年來(lái)的控制已變得松弛。此外,中國(guó)企業(yè)的對(duì)外直接投資中使用人民幣的審批流程，以及對(duì)外直接投資流入中國(guó)的人民幣實(shí)際使用被簡(jiǎn)化,2011年1月宣布人民幣對(duì)外直接投資計(jì)劃和在同年10月建立人民幣外商直接投資計(jì)劃。從2012年初至今

62、的數(shù)據(jù)有效,以人民幣計(jì)價(jià)和結(jié)算的外國(guó)直接投資約占三分之一。</p><p>　　雖然嚴(yán)格控制組合投資流動(dòng),近年來(lái)這些控制也有所放松，以擴(kuò)大投資者范圍和金融資產(chǎn)的類(lèi)型，允許使用人民幣進(jìn)行跨境交易。自2006年4月以來(lái),中國(guó)預(yù)先批準(zhǔn)的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者被允許以人民幣計(jì)價(jià)的金融工具進(jìn)行投資,如在香港。2010年8月,外國(guó)中央銀行和某些類(lèi)型的外國(guó)金融機(jī)構(gòu)獲準(zhǔn)在中國(guó)境內(nèi)銀行間債券市場(chǎng)投資。之后,2011年12月,人民幣合格境外機(jī)構(gòu)