知識產權相關外文翻譯--互補貿易結構與中美知識產權談判

1、附錄 外文譯文兩篇譯文一 互補貿易結構與中美知識產權談判 1Ka Zeng張欣 譯為了解釋上文列出的兩個現實性問題，我采用“雙層博弈論” （two-level games）來展示國內和國際政治是如何互動來影響談判結果的。雙層博弈論最初是羅伯特·普特曼提出的，它將國家領導看作是同時身處兩層談判中，一層是與其國際上的對手，而另一層是與他們各自的國內成員。主要談判人員不僅需要在國際談判桌上取勝，而且需要保證他們的國際層面上達成的任何

2、協(xié)議都能被國內成員接受，而這些成員往往有權反對或阻止這些協(xié)議的實施。通過將一系列過去的獨立的案例結合為一個單一的理論分析框架，雙層博弈論不僅解決了以往由結構現實主義主導的國際關系理論缺乏對國內變量的考慮的缺陷，而且為進一步的經驗分析奠定了基礎。通過將雙層博弈論作為我分析的起點，我建立了一套因果聯(lián)系，將國內的利益和偏好與國際的談判結果結合起來，而這套聯(lián)系中分析了國內的利益團體可能支持或反對一國在國際層面上的威脅的條件。本文將證明，中美兩國

3、之間高度互補的貿易結構造成了美國國內出口導向和進口導向的兩大利益集團之間的深刻分歧，而這一分歧嚴重損害了美國提出的威脅的可信性；同時，也使得美國難以將兩國在這方面的貿易糾紛上升為貿易戰(zhàn)。美國不同利益集團在中美貿易糾紛之中所處的相對位置的不同有力地支持了我的假設。按照我的預測，美國針對中國的知識產權問題提出的威脅收到了來自國內層面的部分反對。由于兩國互補的貿易結構，可能爆發(fā)的貿易戰(zhàn)在美國的不同產業(yè)之間造成了嚴重的分歧，其中一方將知識產權看

4、作它們擴大在中國市場份額的途徑，而另一方則是美國的進口商和零售商。而另外一些產業(yè)則只要求進入中國而對中國的知識產權現狀沒有其他想法，它們的立場進一步增強了反對方的力量。雖然一美國唱片業(yè)聯(lián)盟、國際知識產權聯(lián)盟、商業(yè)軟件聯(lián)盟、美國電影協(xié)會以及國際唱片業(yè)聯(lián)盟為代表的美國知識產權產業(yè)持續(xù)推動貿易制裁，其他商業(yè)團體，特別是高度依賴于中國市場的勞動密集型產品的進口1 East Asia, Spring, 2002附原文Complementary T

5、rade Structure and U.S.-China Negotiations over Intellectual Property RightsKa Zeng Spring 2002In approaching the two empirical puzzles outlined above, I draw on the notion of “two-level games“ to show how domestic and

6、 international politics interact to affect negotiation outcomes. The two-level game approach, in Robert Putnam's original formulation, views national leaders as engaging in two sets of negotiations simultaneously: on

7、e with their international counterparts and the other with their respective domestic constituents. Chief negotiators not only need to “win“ at the international table, but also have to make sure that any deal that is cut

8、 internationally will be accepted by those who could veto or block implementation of the deal at home. 9 By integrating a number of previously disparate observations into a single theoretical framework, the two-level gam

9、e approach not only helps to remedy the neglect of domestic variables resulting from the dominance of structural realism in international relations theory, but also provides a basis for organizing further empirical study

10、.Using the two-level game approach as the starting point of my analysis, I develop a causal logic that lays out clearly the linkage between the structure of domestic interests and preferences and international negotiatio

11、n outcomes by specifying the conditions under which threats are likely to be supported and ratified by domestic interest groups. It will be argued that the complementary trade relations between the United States and Chin

12、a created deep schisms between export-seeking and import-using groups in the United States, thus substantially reducing the credibility of American threats. This same factor also constrains the United States from escalat

13、ing the disputes to the level of a trade war. The relative positions of the American industry groups involved in the IPR disputes documented below provide substantial support for my hypothesis. As my theory predicts, Ame

14、rican threats against China on IPR issues suffered from factional conflict at the domestic level. Due to the complementary trade structure between the two sides, the prospect of a trade war had created a deep schism betw

15、een American industries that focused on IP as a means of expanding their share in the Chinese market on the one hand, and American importers and retailers on the other. Opposition by those industries insisting on market