【中英雙語】371關(guān)于我國雙邊國際跨國貿(mào)易出口進(jìn)口 (cafta)（rcep）（tpp）有關(guān)的外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯成品：建立自由貿(mào)易區(qū)后的中國與東盟經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系（中英文雙語對(duì)照）

1、此文檔是畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)外文翻譯成品（ 含英文原文+中文翻譯） ，無需調(diào)整復(fù)雜的格式！下載之后直接可用，方便快捷！本文價(jià)格不貴,也就幾十塊錢！一輩子也就一次的事！外文標(biāo)題：China–ASEAN economic relations after establishment of free trade area外文作者：Min-Hua Chiang文獻(xiàn)出處: THE PACIFIC REVIEW, 2019(如覺得年份太老，可改為近 2 年，畢竟

2、很多畢業(yè)生都這樣做)英文 5710 單詞，36058 字符(字符就是印刷符)，中文 8412 漢字。 （如果字?jǐn)?shù)多了，可自行刪減，大多數(shù)學(xué)校都是要求選取外文的一部分內(nèi)容進(jìn)行翻譯的。 ）China–ASEAN economic relations after establishment of free trade areaABSTRACT: This paper aims to contribute to an understanding

3、 about the major changes in China– ASEAN economic relations after establishment of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) in 2010. First, China’s merchandize trade balance with ASEAN has shifted from deficit to surplus

4、since 2012. This reflects China’s improving comparative advantage in manufacturing production vis-a-vis ASEAN as a whole. Second, with China’s wage hike, ASEAN investors can no longer take advantage of China’s cheap labo

5、r force. Concurrently, China’s investment in ASEAN has been increasing and become more diversified, ranging from energy to manufacturing and services. Singapore has remained the most important investment destination for

6、Chinese investors and the largest foreign investor in China among ASEAN countries. Third, China has comparative advantages in providing construction, telecommunications, computer and information services and other busine

7、ss services to ASEAN. On the other hand, ASEAN, led by Singapore, has opportunities in the financial services and tourism markets in China. Finally, the development of economic regionalism, notably the Regional Comprehen

8、sive Economic Partnership and Trans-Pacific Partnership, will remain critical for the CAFTA’s relevance in regional economic integration, as well as China–ASEAN relations in the future.other preferential treatments betwe

9、en China and ASEAN on different official occasions.The Asian financial crisis was another impetus for Sino-ASEAN economic rapprochement (Zha, 2002). The crisis had alerted Asian leaders of the need to construct a more co

10、operative framework among the states in the region so as to pre-empt future financial chaos. Many ASEAN countries were hard hit by the crisis; at the same time, ASEAN leaders considered the US and Asia-Pacific Economic C

11、ooperation (APEC) less than helpful during the crisis and the conditionality imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) unpalatable. The ASEAN+3 (namely ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea) became an important

12、means to re-establish ASEAN’s status and relevance. Owing to dis- agreement between China and Japan over the future formation of regionalism, the ASEAN+3 did not make significant advancement in the subsequent years (Chia

13、ng, 2013; Chung, 2010). The progressive development of the CAFTA became an outstanding achievement of regional economic engagement (Cheng, 2004).From China’s perspective, a stable and cooperative relation with ASEAN is i

14、mportant for Beijing to maintain its economic growth and social stability. The Communist party’s political legitimacy rests largely on the country’s economic success (Sun, 2009). The CAFTA also complements China’s ‘go ou

15、t policy’ which aims at promoting Chinese out-ward direct investment (ODI). The Chinese government believed that ODI in manufacturing sectors would promote its exports of intermediate goods to developing countries for fi

16、nal assembly and facilitate its domestic industrial upgrading (Ministry of Commerce). The cheap labor force, geographic proximity and similar culture made ASEAN an ideal investment destination for Chinese entrepreneurs.

17、Chinese firms could also actively participate in the highly developed regional division of labor through ODI in ASEAN. In addition, China was motivated by developing ASEAN’s market. The over- dependence on the Western ma

18、rket proved fragile after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. The economic sanctions after 1989 from the Western countries made Chinese leaders realize the necessity to diversify its export destinations (Wang, 2013).

19、There were also considerations of accelerating the development of China’s central and western provinces through economic cooperation with ASEAN countries which share borders with China (Chen, 2017; Cheng, 2013; Kuik, 200