股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效以印度為例【外文翻譯】

1、外文翻譯原文OwnershipStructureCpatePerfmance:EvidencefromIndiaMaterialSource:InternationalJournalofHumanitiesSocialScienceAuth:AmanSrivastavaAbstractOwnershipstructureofanycompanyhasbeenaseriousagendafcpategovernancethatofperf

2、manceofafirm.Thuswhoownsthefirm’sequityhowdoesownershipaffectfirmvaluehasbeenatopicinvestigatedbyresearchersfdecades.Thustheimpactofownershipstructureonfirmperfmancehasbeenwidelytackledinvariousdevelopedmarketsmerecently

3、inemergingmarketsbutwaslessdiscussedbefeinIndiainrecentchangingenvironment.Thispaperisamoderateattempttoaddresstherelationshipofownershipstructureofthefirmitsperfmance.Itinvestigateswhethertheownershiptypeaffectssomekeya

4、ccountingmarketperfmanceindicatsoflistedfirms.The98mostactivelylistedcompaniesonBSE100indicesofBombayStockExchangeofIndiawhichconstitutethebulkoftradingwerechosentoconstitutethesampleofthestudyasofendof200910.Thefindings

5、indicatethepresenceofhighlyconcentratedownershipstructureintheIndianmarket.Theresultsoftheregressionanalysesindicatethatthedispersedownershippercentageinfluencescertaindimensionsofaccountingperfmanceindicats(i.e.ROAROE)b

6、utnotstockmarketperfmanceindicats(i.e.PEPBVratios)whichindicatethattheremightbeotherfacts(economicpoliticalcontextual)affectingfirmsperfmanceotherthanownershipstructure.Keywds:Ownershipstructurecpateperfmancecpategoverna

7、nceIndia1.IntroductionOwnershipstructureofanycompanyhasbeenaseriousagendafcpategovernancethatofperfmanceofafirm.Thuswhoownsthefirm’sequityThefirm’sequityhowdoesownershipaffectfirmvaluehasbeenatopicinvestigatedbyresearche

8、rsfdecadeshowevermostofthestudiesinthiscontextareconductedoutsideofIndia.ThestudyfailedtodocumentanyrelevantstudyonthetopicinIndiancontext.FamaJensen(1983a&b)addressestheagencyproblemstheyexplainedthatamajsourceofcosttos

9、hareholdersistheseparationofownershipcontrolinthemoderncpation.Evenindevelopedcountriestheseagencyproblemscontinuetobesourcesoflargecoststoshareholders1.DemstezLehn(1985)arguedboththattheoptimalcpateownershipstructurewas

10、firmspecificthatmarketcompetitionwouldderivefirmstowardthatoptimum.Becauseownershipwasendogenoustoexpectedperfmancetheycautionedanyregressionofprofitabilityonownershippatternsshouldyieldinsignificantresults.Mck.(1988)byt

11、akingpercentageofsharesheldbytheboardofdirectsofthecompanyasameasureofownershipconcentrationholdingbothTobin’sQaccountingprofitasperfmancemeasureof500Ftunecompaniesusingpiecewiselinearregressionfoundapositiverelationbetw

12、eenTobin’sQboardownershiprangingfrom0%to5%anegativerelationfboardownershiprangingfrom5%to25%againapositiverelationfthesaidownershipabove25%.Itisarguedthattheseparationofownershipfromcontrolfacpatefirmcreatesanagencyprobl

13、emthatresultsinconflictsbetweenshareholdersmanagers(JensenMeckling1976).Theinterestsofotherinvestscangenerallybeprotectedthroughcontractualarrangementsbetweenthecompanyconcernedstakeholdersleavingshareholdersastheresidua

14、lclaimantswhoseinterestscanadequatelybeprotectedonlythroughtheinstitutionsofcpategovernance(ShleiferVishny1997).LodererMartin(1997)tookshareholdingbytheinsiders(i.e.direct’sownership)asameasureofownership.Takingthesaidme

15、asureasendogenousvariableTobin’sQasperfmancemeasuretheyfound(throughsimultaneousequationmodel)thatownershipdoesnotpredictperfmancebutperfmanceisanegativepredictofownership.SteenThomsenTbenPedersen(1997)examinetheimpactof

16、ownershipstructureoncompanyeconomicperfmanceinthelargestcompaniesfrom12Europeannations.AccdingtotheirfindingsthepositivemarginaleffectofownershiptiestofinancialinstitutionsisstrongerinthemarketbasedBritishsystemthanincon