金融學(xué)專業(yè)外文翻譯---宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策與現(xiàn)實(shí)

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯原文</p><p>　　外文題目：Theme: Macro Economic Policy and Reality——Deepening Rural Financial Markets: Macroeconomic, Policy and Political Dimensions</p><p>　　出 處：Rural Finance P

2、rogram </p><p>　　作 者：Claudio Gonzalez-Vega </p><p><b>　　原 文：</b></p><p>　　

3、Policies for rural financial deepening</p><p>　　A contemporary perspective acknowledges the urgency to adopt new policies, develop the necessary physical and institutional infrastructure, improve and dissemi

4、nate new financial technologies, and design and build new organizations, which would allow a more efficient, sustainable, and broadly-based provision of rural financial services in the developing world and economies in t

5、ransition.</p><p>　　Policies refer to public actions –government and donor interventions– needed to create an environment conducive to rural financial market development. Key policy interventions may requir

6、e revisions of legal systems (e.g., property rights, borrower and lender rights, contract design, judicial enforcement), new financial policies (e.g., interest rates, exchange rates, reserve requirements), and new regul

7、atory frameworks (e.g., entry and exit of financial organizations, degrees of market competit</p><p>　　These policies, legal systems, and regulatory frameworks are part of the institutional infrastructure ne

8、eded for the efficient and stable operation of rural financial markets . At best, the development of this infrastructure has been neglected; frequently in the past, interventionist policies actually repressed financial m

9、arket development. </p><p>　　Reforms of non-financial policies that constrain the profitability of client businesses and public investments and that reduce transaction costs for all market participants also

10、contribute to an expansion of both the demand and the supply of rural financial services. </p><p>　　The development of supporting institutional mechanisms (e.g., property registries, credit bureaus and rat

11、ing agencies) is also critical for rural financial market expansion. Because many of these supporting tools may be public goods, state intervention may be needed in order to accelerate their provision. </p><

12、p>　　Getting prices, policies and institutions right is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for rural financial deepening in developing countries and economies in transition. This goal will not be reached unles

13、s new, cost-effective lending and deposit-taking technologies are developed and implemented, in ways that allow an expansion of the supply of a broad range of financial services, delivered to wide segments of the rural p

14、opulation, at appropriate costs and risks for both the clients and </p><p>　　Because of externalities in the market for information and, in particular, in the market for innovations, private initiatives may

15、not be sufficient to bring about the desired level of experimentation and adoption. Although state intervention may be needed to promote technological change, the choice of how to accomplish this matters. Resources are

16、 scarce and successful loci of innovation are unknown before hand. Moreover, knowledge of appropriate financial technologies will not be sufficient, e</p><p>　　Such organizations are in short supply in the r

17、ural areas of developing countries and economies in transition. They are key to the effort, however. Robust and creative organizations will undertake a major part of the innovation required and will be in better positi

18、on to adopt and adapt knowledge and practices developed elsewhere. In contrast, the right policies and new technologies will be irrelevant, if the organizations that offer rural financial services are inefficient and no

19、t sustainable</p><p>　　Finally, assembling all of these ingredients in a coherent system requires that the structure of incentives engendered by the ownership structure and governance design of the organizat

20、ion be compatible with its outreach and sustainability objectives. An inconsistent mission and incompatible incentives will be a recipe for failure. Moreover, the legal and regulatory framework within which these organ

21、izations operate influences their ownership and governance structures. These structures must al</p><p>　　Promoting the Expansion of the Demand for Rural Financial Services </p><p>　　Optimum int

22、ervention in the promotion of rural financial deepening calls for a precise diagnosis, namely the identification of actually binding constraints to rural financial transactions (what are the nature and extent of the prob

23、lem?). Optimum intervention also requires the choice of policy tools that effectively overcome those constraints (what are the best instruments for the intervention?). Usually, the best instrument is an intervention th

24、at directly addresses the specific nature of the </p><p>　　First, failure reflected a misunderstanding of the true nature of finance, which resulted in attempts to use financial services when finance was not

25、 the appropriate instrument to address the problem or achieve the objectives of the authorities. Despite the best intentions, these interventions turned out to be unexpectedly harmful for the particular segments of the

26、rural population they had ostensibly set out to help. </p><p>　　Second, the failure of earlier interventions resulted from an incorrect diagnosis of the difficulties encountered in rural financial deepening

27、. Rural financial market shortcomings were attributed to evil exploitation by informal moneylenders or to the indifference of private bankers. The state was then asked to take responsibility for expanding the supply o

28、f rural financial services, but the difficulties to be overcome could not be eliminated by decree. The mistake was to attempt a political</p><p>　　The challenge of promoting rural financial deepening is the

29、refore complex, as the obstacles that must be overcome permeate all dimensions of the market. This section classifies constraints as binding on either the demand side or the supply side of the market. Both dimensions mat

30、ter for rural financial deepening. </p><p>　　Promoting the Expansion of the Supply of Rural Financial Services </p><p>　　Government and donor interventions are also needed to increase the sup

31、ply of rural financial services. The supply of rural financial services is constrained by: </p><p>　　(a) high transaction (operating) costs for lenders, which increase the costs of lending </p><p

32、>　　well above the opportunity cost of the funds and which can only be recovered with high intermediation margins; </p><p>　　(b) high transaction (operating) costs incurred in mobilizing deposits, which

33、increase the cost of funds for the financial intermediary well above the returns that must be offered to the depositors to attract their funds; </p><p>　　(c) additional costs of mobilizing deposits that eme

34、rge from the need to meet the regulatory requirements for deposit mobilization (e.g., reserve requirements, minimum safety requirements, internal control); </p><p>　　(d) high credit risks for lenders, which

35、 threaten with losses of income in case of arrears and losses of equity capital in case of default; </p><p>　　(e) high liquidity risks in deposit mobilization, which make it necessary to keep liquid, less a

36、ttractively remunerated reserves and which require additional financial costs in case of unexpected deposit withdrawals; </p><p>　　(f) imperfections of information about the ability and willingness to repay

37、 loans of </p><p>　　applicants, which increase both the operating costs and the losses from default of lenders; </p><p>　　(g) inability to raise interest rates as a rationing device, due to adv

38、erse selection problems, which leads to non-price credit rationing; </p><p>　　(h) absence of compatibility of the incentives that guide the behavior of potential borrowers and lenders, creating spaces for m

39、oral hazard (opportunistic borrower behavior), and thereby raising the operating costs and risks of lenders; </p><p>　　(i) absence of compatibility of the incentives that guide the behavior of deposit taker

40、s and potential depositors, creating spaces for moral hazard (opportunistic behavior of deposit-takers), and thereby raising the risks for depositors; </p><p>　　(j) absence, deficiencies, and high costs of

41、 formal contract enforcement mechanisms, which increase the credit risks and operating costs of lenders and the risks of depositors; </p><p>　　(k) the attenuated property rights and inefficient governance s

42、tructures of many rural financial intermediaries, which do not generate sufficient internal control or the adoption of business plans focused on outreach and sustainability; </p><p>　　(l) the destruction of

43、 social capital (e.g., a culture of repayment) that accompanies the politicized pardoning and rescheduling of loans, weakening the credibility of contract threats and obligations; </p><p>　　(m) market disto

44、rtions introduced by non-private intermediaries that refuse to operate on market terms, thereby undermining the operations of serious competitors ; </p><p>　　(n) the high covariance of cash flows of potenti

45、al rural depositors and borrowers, which creates significant seasonal challenges for the management of liquidity; </p><p>　　(o) the high covariance of incomes and of the outcomes of the productive efforts o

46、f borrowers, which reduces opportunities for portfolio diversification as a tool to manage risk by lenders; </p><p>　　(p) the small size and low density of the clientele in local markets, which reduces the

47、opportunities to dilute the fixed costs of any financial infrastructure;</p><p>　　(q) the public good nature of the information generated by an expansion of the supply of rural financial services, which kee

48、ps the rate of private investment in experiments to develop innovations in lending technology and the expansion of these services below the socially optimum rate of expansion. </p><p>　　Most of these difficu

49、lties are typical of all financial markets; the problem is that they are more acutely present in rural areas, thereby frequently raising the associated costs and risks to prohibitive levels. As a result, rural financial

50、 markets do not emerge. </p><p>　　Clearly, the provision of the same basic public goods (roads, communications, literacy, safety) that would reduce transaction costs and would facilitate the emergence of a

51、demand for financial services will also contribute to an expansion of supply. The extent to which the development of this physical and institutional infrastructure can contribute to rural financial deepening cannot be o

52、veremphasized. Financial policies have a powerful influence on the supply of rural financial services. </p><p>　　Two types of actions are needed. On the one hand, it is indispensable to further reform poli

53、cies, in order to reduce or eliminate the financial repression introduced by earlier interventions or to prevent the reintroduction of protectionist repressive approaches. On the other hand, it is necessary to develop a

54、 policy and regulatory framework that reduces the costs and risks for suppliers of rural financial services.</p><p>　　Promoting Financial Innovation </p><p>　　Rural financial deepening fundament

55、ally depends on innovations in financial technologies that make it possible to reach broader clienteles. Existing lending and deposit mobilization technologies do not allow cost-effective responses to the information,

56、incentive, and contract enforcement barriers that curb financial transactions in rural areas. Innovation, however, requires investments in experimentation, development, transfer, adoption, adaptation, and learning of th

57、e new technologies. Thes</p><p>　　Typically, the incentives for private investment to undertake these efforts are insufficient, given the significant externalities that emerge. Once the new technologies are

58、 developed, competitors may find it attractive to imitate their features and can thereby undermine the profitability of the initial investment, by charging less, because they have not paid for all the costs of research a

59、nd development. Moreover, competitors who have not incurred the costs of training and learning by doing can </p><p>　　State intervention in financial innovation, however, is problematic. Both the developmen

60、t and adoption of new financial technologies encounter significant difficulties. In effect, adaptation of a given practice to the features of a specific market segment is not a trivial task. </p><p>　　Firs

61、t, this effort requires a flexible framework for experimentation. Indeed, it has been their vast flexibility in exploring alternative solutions to the problems of financial transactions that has allowed microfinance org

62、anizations and credit unions to develop their notable innovations. Continuity of efforts is also needed. Specific donor assistance, frequently delivered through internationally based organizations that possess compar

63、ative advantages in institution building, have supported</p><p>　　Second, financial development is intensive in local information and requires long learning processes. Donors can assist in several ways. On

64、e is to offer access to the international pool of knowledge about new financial technologies. A clear understanding of general principles, lessons, and best practices is a critical starting point, but it is not sufficie

65、nt. Finance is essentially about the evaluation of risks, the management of information, and the creation of lender borrower relationships</p><p>　　Innovation is also required, moreover, with respect to the

66、 institutional design of rural financial organizations. In the end, policies will not be enacted, procedures will not be revised, technologies will not be adopted, if those who have to make the decisions do not find it

67、in their interest to do so. The institutional design of organizations (ownership, control, governance) constrains individual behavior and creates the structures of incentives that guide the decisions that determine perf

68、or</p><p>　　Unfortunately, the role of donors in influencing the institutional design of these organizations is not clearly and sufficiently understood. </p><p>　　Donor choices about investing

69、in, lending to, and making grants for technical assistance and other purposes to particular types of organizations will influence the course of institutional development. These issues will pose the greatest dilemmas and

70、 challenges to donors and governments in the development of rural financial markets.</p><p>　　譯 文：主題:宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策與現(xiàn)實(shí)</p><p>　　—— 深化農(nóng)村金融市場(chǎng): 宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)、政策和政治維度</p><p>　　一、深化農(nóng)村金融政策</p><

71、p>　　用發(fā)展的角度看待問(wèn)題，必須采用新政策，發(fā)展必要的物質(zhì)和制度基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，改善和傳播新的金融技術(shù),設(shè)計(jì)和建造新組織, 這將允許在發(fā)展中國(guó)家和轉(zhuǎn)型期經(jīng)濟(jì)中提供一個(gè)更有效率的、可持續(xù)的、廣泛的農(nóng)村金融服務(wù)業(yè)。</p><p>　　政策是指公共行動(dòng)——政府干預(yù)——需要?jiǎng)?chuàng)造一種有利于農(nóng)村金融市場(chǎng)發(fā)展的環(huán)境。重要政策干預(yù)可能需要修改法律制度(例如,產(chǎn)權(quán),借款人和貸款人的權(quán)利,合同設(shè)計(jì)、司法執(zhí)行)，新金融政策(例如,

72、利率、匯率、存款準(zhǔn)備金), 和新的監(jiān)管框架(例如,出入境的金融機(jī)構(gòu)、程度的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中,審慎監(jiān)管)。營(yíng)運(yùn)高效、穩(wěn)定的農(nóng)村金融市場(chǎng)需要一部分政策、法律體制、管理框架的保障。即使在最好的情況下,此基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的發(fā)展完全被忽視了；過(guò)去常常,干預(yù)政策其實(shí)壓制了金融市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展。非財(cái)務(wù)政策的改革約束客戶業(yè)務(wù)盈利能力和公共投資，降低市場(chǎng)參與者交易成本，有助于擴(kuò)大農(nóng)村金融服務(wù)的市場(chǎng)需求和供給。支持發(fā)展的制度機(jī)制(例如,財(cái)產(chǎn)注冊(cè)處組成,征信機(jī)構(gòu),評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)) 也

73、是農(nóng)村金融市場(chǎng)擴(kuò)張的關(guān)鍵。因?yàn)樗麄兊脑S多支持工具也許是公共物品,國(guó)家干預(yù)可能為了需要而提高存款準(zhǔn)備金率。</p><p>　　得到的價(jià)格、政策和制度必須是正確的,但發(fā)展中國(guó)家和經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型期的農(nóng)村金融深化并非是其的充分條件。如果沒(méi)有新的最符合成本效益的貸款和接受存款的技術(shù)開(kāi)發(fā)和實(shí)施, 這一目標(biāo)不會(huì)達(dá)到。對(duì)于客戶和組織在適當(dāng)?shù)娘L(fēng)險(xiǎn)和成本下,擴(kuò)大提供一系列涉及廣大農(nóng)村居民的金融服務(wù)。也就是說(shuō),這些成本將允許客戶承接項(xiàng)目產(chǎn)

74、生的邊際回報(bào)至少高達(dá)被產(chǎn)生經(jīng)濟(jì)和其他地區(qū)會(huì)允許組織來(lái)傳遞服務(wù)于一體的可持續(xù)和有利可圖的態(tài)度。</p><p>　　因?yàn)槭袌?chǎng)信息的外部性,特別是在轉(zhuǎn)會(huì)市場(chǎng)尋找創(chuàng)新,私人的各種計(jì)劃可能不足以帶來(lái)理想的試驗(yàn)和利用水平。盡管國(guó)家干預(yù)能促進(jìn)技術(shù)改變,選擇如何做到這一點(diǎn)很重要。資源稀缺和成功的基因改造后事先未必知道。此外,了解相應(yīng)的財(cái)務(wù)技術(shù)將是遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不夠的,或者說(shuō)永續(xù)擴(kuò)張的農(nóng)村金融市場(chǎng)是不夠的。提供這些服務(wù)的組織必須具備所需的

75、資源(人力資本、領(lǐng)導(dǎo)能力、網(wǎng)絡(luò)化、信息資本,并獲得基金), 他們必須實(shí)施的商業(yè)計(jì)劃,成功地追求一個(gè)任務(wù)為這一市場(chǎng)細(xì)分結(jié)合的本領(lǐng)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展。在發(fā)展中國(guó)家和經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型期的農(nóng)村地區(qū)，這些組織供應(yīng)不足。他們是努力的關(guān)鍵。良好的穩(wěn)健性和創(chuàng)造性是組織進(jìn)行的一項(xiàng)重要內(nèi)容,并且將在創(chuàng)新需要更好的位置來(lái)接受并適應(yīng)其它地方發(fā)展起來(lái)的知識(shí)和實(shí)務(wù)。相比之下,有適當(dāng)?shù)恼吆托录夹g(shù)將無(wú)關(guān)緊要,如果組織提供農(nóng)村金融服務(wù)效率不高,不會(huì)持續(xù)下去。</p>

76、<p>　　最后,裝配所有這些成分,在一個(gè)連貫系統(tǒng)需要結(jié)構(gòu)產(chǎn)生激勵(lì)機(jī)制的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和治理的組織設(shè)計(jì)符合其外展和可持續(xù)發(fā)展的目標(biāo)。一種不協(xié)調(diào)的使命和相容刺激措施將是為失敗開(kāi)的處方。此外,法律、監(jiān)管架構(gòu),這些使組織操作影響了他們的所有權(quán)和治理結(jié)構(gòu)。這些結(jié)構(gòu)也必須采用特色的金融技術(shù)。該制度的建立,獲取所需要的資源需要建立深思熟慮的制度的努力,這可能是政府和慈善援助的幫助。</p><p>　　二、促進(jìn)擴(kuò)大農(nóng)村金

77、融的需求服務(wù)</p><p>　　促進(jìn)農(nóng)村金融的最佳干預(yù)政策需要精確的策劃, 即識(shí)別實(shí)際上結(jié)合約束條件對(duì)農(nóng)村金融的交易(是什么性質(zhì)和范圍的問(wèn)題嗎?)。最佳干預(yù)也需要選擇的政策工具,有效地克服這些限制(什么是最好的干預(yù)工具?)。通常,最好的手段是一種方法直接針對(duì)特定的本質(zhì)問(wèn)題。許多過(guò)去的干預(yù)的失敗歸咎于違反這個(gè)匹配規(guī)則。</p><p>　　首先,失敗反映一種誤解金融的本性, 導(dǎo)致當(dāng)局金融服

78、務(wù)沒(méi)有試圖用適當(dāng)?shù)墓ぞ邅?lái)解決這一問(wèn)題或達(dá)到目的。盡管,這些干預(yù)的意圖最好結(jié)果竟然是他們表面上允諾協(xié)助，實(shí)際上對(duì)部分農(nóng)村人口有害。</p><p>　　第二,早期干預(yù)失敗是農(nóng)村金融在不正確的政策中深化。農(nóng)村金融市場(chǎng)的缺點(diǎn)是由于非正式放債者或私人銀行家過(guò)渡開(kāi)發(fā)。政府然后為承擔(dān)責(zé)任擴(kuò)大供應(yīng)的農(nóng)村金融服務(wù),但被克服的困難可能不會(huì)被淘汰。這個(gè)錯(cuò)誤是嘗試用政治方案解決生產(chǎn)技術(shù)問(wèn)題,金融服務(wù)在這個(gè)細(xì)分市場(chǎng)中是完全低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和成本的

79、。</p><p>　　提高農(nóng)民的挑戰(zhàn)金融深化因此是復(fù)雜的,因?yàn)檎系K需要克服穿透所有尺寸的市場(chǎng)份額。</p><p>　　三、促進(jìn)擴(kuò)大農(nóng)村金融服務(wù)的供給</p><p>　　政府干預(yù)還需要增加供應(yīng)農(nóng)村金融服務(wù)。供應(yīng)的農(nóng)村金融服務(wù)拘泥于:</p><p>　　高的交易(操作)成本,這增加了貸方的成本,貸款成本的機(jī)會(huì)成本遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于經(jīng)費(fèi),這只能高調(diào)解

80、回收利潤(rùn)。</p><p>　　高的交易(操作)費(fèi)用,在動(dòng)員存款、增加資金成本對(duì)金融中介遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)返回值是為了保護(hù)儲(chǔ)戶的同時(shí),必須吸引他們的資金。</p><p>　　額外費(fèi)用最低存款準(zhǔn)備金的動(dòng)員出現(xiàn)在需要滿足動(dòng)員存款的要求(如準(zhǔn)備金,基本安全規(guī)范、內(nèi)部控制)。</p><p>　　信譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)損失, 在違約時(shí)它威脅著貸款拖欠的情況下的收入的股份資產(chǎn)。</p>

81、<p>　　高流動(dòng)性存款動(dòng)員風(fēng)險(xiǎn),它要保持流動(dòng),更少的有吸引力的薪酬儲(chǔ)備和需要額外的財(cái)務(wù)費(fèi)用如意想不到的存款提貨。</p><p>　　信息的不足之處的能力和意愿來(lái)償還貸款增加的申請(qǐng)者損失運(yùn)行費(fèi)用和拖欠貸款者收回。</p><p>　　無(wú)法提高利率作為一個(gè)配給設(shè)備時(shí),由于逆向選擇問(wèn)題,導(dǎo)致非價(jià)格信貸配給</p><p>　　沒(méi)有兼容性的行為的成因,指導(dǎo)

82、的潛在借款人、貸款人,創(chuàng)造空間的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)(投機(jī)借款人行為),從而提高企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)成本和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的貸方。</p><p>　　削弱的產(chǎn)權(quán)和低效率治理結(jié)構(gòu)的許多農(nóng)村金融中介機(jī)構(gòu)、不產(chǎn)生足夠的內(nèi)部控制和采用的商業(yè)計(jì)劃專注于外展和可持續(xù)發(fā)展能力。</p><p>　　社會(huì)資本的破壞(例如,一種文化,伴隨著償還貸款的貸款績(jī)效和寬恕政治化,弱化了信譽(yù)合同威脅和義務(wù)。</p><p>

83、　　市場(chǎng)扭曲了非公有制中介機(jī)構(gòu)是拒絕使用市場(chǎng)而言的操作,從而破壞厲害的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手。</p><p>　　高協(xié)方差現(xiàn)金流量表潛在的農(nóng)村存款人和借款人,產(chǎn)生明顯的季節(jié)的挑戰(zhàn),以管理的流動(dòng)資產(chǎn)。</p><p>　　高協(xié)方差的收入和生產(chǎn)性努力取得的成果,從而降低借款人的投資組合多樣化的機(jī)會(huì)作為一種工具來(lái)管理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的抵押貸款。</p><p>　　小尺寸和低密度的客戶在當(dāng)?shù)厥袌?chǎng)

84、,從而降低了機(jī)會(huì)固定成本稀釋的金融基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。</p><p>　　農(nóng)村金融供給的擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)生公眾利益性質(zhì)的信息，在實(shí)驗(yàn)中發(fā)展創(chuàng)新,在貸款技術(shù)和擴(kuò)展這些服務(wù)在社會(huì)最優(yōu)擴(kuò)張的趨勢(shì)能保持私人投資率。</p><p>　　大多數(shù)這些困難都是典型的金融市場(chǎng)所有的;他們有更敏銳的問(wèn)題出現(xiàn)在農(nóng)村地區(qū),從而提高相關(guān)費(fèi)用,經(jīng)常禁止的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平。因此，農(nóng)村地區(qū)沒(méi)有金融市場(chǎng)。很明顯,所提供的相同的基本公共物品(道路、

85、通訊、識(shí)字、安全),將減少交易成本,會(huì)有助于出現(xiàn)一個(gè)金融服務(wù)需求也將有助于擴(kuò)大供給。在多大程度上物質(zhì)和發(fā)展的制度保障能有助于農(nóng)村金融深化，再怎麼強(qiáng)調(diào)也不為過(guò)。</p><p>　　財(cái)政政策已經(jīng)在農(nóng)村金融服務(wù)的供給上有很大的影響力。兩種行為是非常必要的。一方面,它是進(jìn)一步改革政策以減輕或消除其早期干預(yù)了金融壓制或預(yù)防恢復(fù)貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義的專制的方法不可缺少的。另一方面,它需要去發(fā)展政策和管理體系減少對(duì)供應(yīng)商的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和農(nóng)村

86、金融服務(wù)的成本。</p><p><b>　　四．金融創(chuàng)新</b></p><p>　　從根本上又取決于農(nóng)村金融深化金融技術(shù)創(chuàng)新,就有可能擁有更多的客戶。現(xiàn)有的貸款及存款動(dòng)員技術(shù)不允許具成本效益的反應(yīng),信息,激勵(lì),另外合同執(zhí)行障礙,遏制金融交易在農(nóng)村地區(qū)。創(chuàng)新,無(wú)論如何,是需要投資實(shí)驗(yàn)、開(kāi)發(fā)、傳播、適應(yīng)、學(xué)習(xí)新技術(shù)。這些投資是有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的,昂貴的,而且通常需要長(zhǎng)久無(wú)任何回

87、報(bào)的準(zhǔn)備。</p><p>　　典型地,刺激私人投資不足,從而向外延伸。一旦新技術(shù)發(fā)展,參與者可以找到它的吸引力模仿他們的特征，從而通過(guò)收取的初投資提高的盈利能力,因?yàn)樗麄儧](méi)有支付一切費(fèi)用的研制與開(kāi)發(fā)。此外,參與者們未實(shí)際發(fā)生的培訓(xùn)和學(xué)習(xí)的費(fèi)用也能獲得做新技術(shù)體現(xiàn)在貸款官員和其他工作人員的組織,以提供更有吸引力的工資。由于知識(shí)作為公共利益,這些外部性打消私人創(chuàng)新。</p><p>　　然而

88、，國(guó)家干預(yù)金融創(chuàng)新是有問(wèn)題的。發(fā)展和采用新的金融技術(shù)都遇到重大的困難。事實(shí)上,適應(yīng)給定的實(shí)踐所具有的某一特定商品的市場(chǎng)階段不是小的任務(wù)。首先,這種努力需要靈活的框架,用于實(shí)驗(yàn)。事實(shí)上,它被已他們大量的靈活的尋求另類的解決問(wèn)題的金融交易使得小額金融借貸組織和信貸協(xié)會(huì)開(kāi)發(fā)值得注意的創(chuàng)新。連續(xù)性的努力也同樣重要。協(xié)助,經(jīng)常特定捐款人交付通過(guò)基礎(chǔ)組織,即國(guó)際制度建立比較優(yōu)勢(shì),也支持這些創(chuàng)新。大多數(shù)情況下,這繁多的實(shí)驗(yàn)是必要的,適用于具體問(wèn)題的解

89、決方案是不可知能提前完成。如果是不合適的,例如,只支持組織,工作與集團(tuán)提供信用卡或只有那些個(gè)人貸款。</p><p>　　其次, 當(dāng)?shù)氐慕鹑诎l(fā)展資訊,并需要大量的長(zhǎng)期學(xué)習(xí)的過(guò)程。捐贈(zèng)人可以協(xié)助幾個(gè)方面。一個(gè)是提供獲取國(guó)際的知識(shí),新的金融技術(shù)。一個(gè)清晰的認(rèn)識(shí),一般原則和最佳實(shí)踐,教訓(xùn),都是一個(gè)重要的起點(diǎn),但這還是不夠的。金融的本質(zhì)上是風(fēng)險(xiǎn),并評(píng)價(jià)管理信息,和創(chuàng)造貸款借款人關(guān)系。這些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的確切性質(zhì)的結(jié)構(gòu)和精確的成因,

90、維持這些關(guān)系,從不同的細(xì)分市場(chǎng)來(lái)細(xì)分。累積的信息需要慢慢地降低成本改變局部,當(dāng)該組織了解客戶、市場(chǎng)在哪里運(yùn)行和默認(rèn)威脅的來(lái)源。經(jīng)過(guò)很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間的學(xué)習(xí),微型金融組織才成功,它往往伴隨著密切的相互作用的國(guó)際供應(yīng)商的技術(shù)支持。他通常需要一個(gè)長(zhǎng)期的捐贈(zèng)致力于機(jī)構(gòu)建立了運(yùn)動(dòng)。</p><p>　　而且,就制度設(shè)計(jì)的農(nóng)村金融組織而言，創(chuàng)新也是必需的。最后,如果那些必須盡快做出決定不能發(fā)現(xiàn)這些存在的意義，政策將不會(huì)制定、程序?qū)?/p>

91、不會(huì)更改、技術(shù)將不會(huì)被采納。企業(yè)的制度設(shè)計(jì) (所有權(quán)、控制、統(tǒng)治)限制個(gè)人行為和創(chuàng)造結(jié)構(gòu)刺激計(jì)劃,指導(dǎo)決策決定性能。金融組織,現(xiàn)在有一個(gè)出現(xiàn)在偏遠(yuǎn)地區(qū)的發(fā)展中國(guó)家制度設(shè)計(jì),經(jīng)常并不能促進(jìn)外展和可持續(xù)發(fā)展能力。</p><p>　　不幸的是,其捐贈(zèng)人制度設(shè)計(jì)的作用沒(méi)有明確的影響這些組織,并有足夠的理解。捐贈(zèng)的選擇,貸款投資獎(jiǎng)助金,使技術(shù)支持和其他用途特定的組織機(jī)構(gòu)類型將影響制度發(fā)展的過(guò)程。這些問(wèn)題將帶來(lái)的最大的困境