經(jīng)濟(jì)管理專業(yè)外文翻譯---風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資行業(yè)面臨“中年危機(jī)”

1、<p>　　Mid-life Crisis? Venture Capital Acts Its Age</p><p>　　The bursting of the Internet bubble, several years of unfriendly public markets, and changes in Wall Street and financial regulations have be

2、en hard on venture capital over the past decade. But not all the pressures facing the industry are external, especially in Silicon Valley. The venture community there is showing signs of middle age -- moving more slowly

3、and cautiously than before, and hitting fewer home runs than it did in younger, leaner days. As a result, experts say, the sector is having</p><p>　　For context, consider that back in 1995, Fortune magazine

4、published a story questioning whether venture capital was getting too big and institutionalized to do what it did best: Generate big returns for investors by finding an entrepreneur in a garage with a good idea, and givi

5、ng him the money and support needed to grow. One sign of this unhealthy bigness, according to the article, was that the industry had raised an unprecedented $5 billion in 1994. By comparison, VC firms raised $7.5 billion

6、 i</p><p>　　To observers, the 2010 number represents both a comeback (firms raised nearly $1 billion less in the same period last year) and a rightsizing (the companies raised more than $14 billion in the fi

7、rst half of 2008, which is startling given the downward slide on Wall Street and in the economy as a whole later that year.)</p><p>　　But the criticisms in the Fortune article -- that increasingly fat funds

8、and accompanying fees were changing the venture firms' business model, and that the more money VCs raise, the harder it is to find companies that can generate big enough returns -- still hang over Sandhill Road (the

9、Menlo Park, Calif., street where a number of firms are located). In 1995, $250 million constituted a "mega-fund"; today, it's not unusual for a single firm to have more than $1 billion under management (via

10、 over</p><p>　　This time around, the VC community is also faced with a potent cocktail of high purchase valuations, long holding periods and cheaper exits, which are knocking the firms for a loop. But those

11、problems would go away, or become smaller, if fund sizes shrank. "The capital overhang has fluctuated a bit, but for the most part there is still a huge amount of money out there," says Bo Brustkern, a former v

12、enture capitalist who now runs Denver-based valuation firm Arcstone Partners. "It's a problem beca</p><p>　　All of those firms -- the excellent, the good and the so-so -- compete to place their cash

13、 into companies that need large venture investments, and that have the potential to multiply them several times over. The trouble, of course, is that "there are not a lot of places to put $30 million," notes Ch

14、ris Sacca, one of a handful of an emerging group of "super angels" who are raising small funds (anywhere from a few million dollars up to about $100 million) and investing in startups that need thousa</p>

15、<p>　　The competition to buy is keeping valuations inflated, according to experts. And the need to invest in six-figure chunks often means coming on board later in a startup's life cycle, when there's less

16、 risk and more ability to put large amounts of money to work. But at that point, it's also harder to attain the multiples the firm's investors, or limited partners, have grown used to. </p><p>　　More

17、over, the bigger the funds get, the less the general partners' financial interests are aligned with those of their investors. This is because firms get the same 1% or 2% annual management fee and 20% of returns (the

18、"carry") that they did when their funds were much smaller. The carry was supposed to be how they made money, while the annual fee was meant to cover operating expenses during the years the money was being inves

19、ted. But those expenses aren't likely to be three or five or seven tim</p><p>　　Long-term Trends</p><p>　　This is not to say that the venture industry's days are numbered or that bushy-t

20、ailed entrepreneurs aren't finding the capital they need; far from it. But "the flow of new funds to VCs is constricting and the industry is consolidating," says Wharton professor of entrepreneurship Raffi

21、Amit. In 2009, there were still more VC firms than there were in 1999, according to the National Venture Capital Association, but there were 10% fewer venture professionals and 15% fewer funds. This signals that "t&

22、lt;/p><p>　　Yet the industry is seeing plenty of the long-term trends and disruptive technologies that create opportunities. </p><p>　　The life science sectors in the United States are still robust

23、, and cleantech -- including clean energy, and environmental and green products and services -- is providing an entirely new and promising channel for venture money. Moreover, these companies seem well suited to receive

24、money from today's bigger VC funds, notes David Wessels, an adjunct professor of finance at Wharton. Taking a new drug, medical device, or wind or solar technology from conception to market requires time and sizable

25、su</p><p>　　Meanwhile, Anthony Hoberman, who advises investors on venture investments at Glenrock Capital Advisors in New York, points out that several technology trends -- including the rise of wireless com

26、munication, social media platforms like Facebook, and cloud computing services for businesses and consumers -- are creating "an environment where venture capitalists tend to do well." The firms "invest in

27、small companies that use their agility to overtake bigger, well-funded companies," he adds. "That ag</p><p>　　Vasan, whose focus is software investments, concurs. The growth of social media, smartp

28、hones and tablet applications, and web-based software products for consumers and businesses are "probably five to ten year trends," he says. "Bets have been placed over the past year and more bets will be

29、placed over the next year or two."</p><p>　　Adjusting Expectations</p><p>　　But finding companies that are interesting and viable, and that will earn a good return for their founders, is no

30、t the same as identifying companies that will provide the multiples that venture investors are seeking.</p><p>　　Conventional wisdom says that a VC firm has to expect about half of the companies in its portf

31、olio to fail, a few to earn decent returns and one or two to hit home runs big enough to make the numbers work. Without a robust IPO market, however, those out-of-the-park homeruns are few and far between. The majority o

32、f VC-backed companies have been acquired in the past few years. Unlike with an IPO, where the sky is the limit if a company can generate enough buzz, there is a cap on how much an M&A de</p><p>　　All in

33、all, the exits VCs are managing to secure, even via the public markets, don't put them ahead of their losses and fees by big enough margins. "You can't have six failures if your successes are going to have a

34、 cap on them," Wessels points out.</p><p>　　Look at the recent numbers: Venture-backed companies that went public in this year's second quarter took a median of 9.4 years to achieve liquidity, accor

35、ding to Dow Jones VentureSource. The $70 million median amount of venture capital these companies raised prior to liquidity was 65% higher than even a year ago.</p><p>　　Meanwhile, in that same 2010 quarter,

36、 15 IPOs by venture-backed companies raised $899 million, according to Dow Jones VentureSource. Seventy-nine M&A deals raised $4.3 billion in the same quarter. The IPOs had an average value of just under $60 million,

37、 while the M&A deals averaged only slightly less at $54 million. If one doesn't count Tesla, which raised large sums even by today's standards and accounted for $202 million of that IPO money, the 14 remainin

38、g deals only averaged $50 million apiec</p><p>　　The dot-com bubble "is becoming a distant event, and falling off the horizon for return calculations," Amit notes. Indeed, 2009 is the first post-bu

39、bble year to exclude 1999 from 10-year returns. Returns fell last year to a 1% loss, from a 35% gain as of the end of 2008. Five-year returns managed to outpace the public market indexes but still barely topped 4%. These

40、 are average numbers, but, Amit says, "most funds today are showing negative returns to their limited partners."</p><p>　　For returns to pick up, "valuations have to come down, exit values hav

41、e to go up or holding periods have to get shorter," Hoberman suggests. None of these events is likely to happen quickly, which means investors need to adjust their expectations. Reaping 30% returns is "unrealis

42、tic for any unleveraged investment," says Wessels, who believes funds can easily keep pace with the public markets, but didn't offer a prediction as to whether they could consistently beat them in the foreseeabl

43、e future.</p><p>　　"Go back to 1990s and venture capital was about starting a company, making it large enough to have an impact on its own and taking it public so it would be Wal-Mart or Procter & G

44、amble in 20 years," he says. "Lately, it's becoming a surrogate for internal R&D. Start-ups set out to build a product from scratch, prove it has legs with a small market and get swallowed by a larger c

45、ompany." So why invest in these illiquid, high-risk funds? "For diversification," he notes. "You're betting on stable r</p><p><b>　　FROM:</b></p><p>　　Nationa

46、l Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry</p><p>　　Title: Mid-life Crisis? Venture Capital Acts Its Age / editor,</p><p>　　Chunlai Chen.</p><p>　　Published : 2010.08.1

47、8</p><p><b>　　中文譯文</b></p><p>　　風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資行業(yè)面臨“中年危機(jī)”？</p><p>　　過(guò)去十年來(lái)，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫的破裂，公共市場(chǎng)持續(xù)數(shù)年的低迷，華爾街發(fā)生的巨大變化，以及金融監(jiān)管措施的出臺(tái)，讓風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資舉步維艱。但是，這個(gè)行業(yè)面臨的壓力并非全部來(lái)自外部，對(duì)硅谷來(lái)說(shuō)尤為如此。</p><p>

48、　　在硅谷，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資行業(yè)正在呈現(xiàn)步入中年的跡象——與更年輕、更精干的時(shí)候相比，現(xiàn)在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資業(yè)的行動(dòng)更為遲緩和謹(jǐn)小慎微了，同時(shí)大獲全勝的案例也更少見(jiàn)。專家認(rèn)為，結(jié)果是，這個(gè)長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)一直創(chuàng)造強(qiáng)勁業(yè)績(jī)的行業(yè)陷入了困境。這意味著投資者必須要以全新的方式，來(lái)審視風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)自己投資組合的影響。</p><p>　　為了解這一變化的脈絡(luò)，我們不妨回顧一下1995年的情況，那一年，《財(cái)富》（Fortune）雜志刊載了一篇文章，對(duì)

49、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的規(guī)模是否過(guò)大以及把他們最擅長(zhǎng)的工作制度化提出了質(zhì)疑。他們最擅長(zhǎng)的工作就是：通過(guò)發(fā)現(xiàn)車庫(kù)里擁有絕妙創(chuàng)想的企業(yè)家，并向其提供發(fā)展資金和其他支持，為投資者創(chuàng)造巨額回報(bào)。這篇文章認(rèn)為，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資龐大得陷入病態(tài)的一個(gè)表征就是，1994年全年，這個(gè)行業(yè)募集到了規(guī)模空前的50億美元資金。道瓊斯旗下機(jī)構(gòu)Dow Jones LP Source的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，在2010年上半年，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)募集到了75億美元。</p><p>

50、　　在觀察家們看來(lái)，2010年的數(shù)字表明資金已經(jīng)回流（去年同期，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)募集到的資金比今年少近10億美元），同時(shí)表明募集資金的規(guī)模正在恢復(fù)。2008年上半年，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司募集的資金超過(guò)了140億美元，考慮到當(dāng)年華爾街的頹勢(shì)和后半年整體經(jīng)濟(jì)的衰退，這個(gè)數(shù)字可謂令人震驚。</p><p>　　但是，《財(cái)富》雜志的那篇文章評(píng)論稱，日漸龐大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資基金以及與之相伴的費(fèi)用，正在改變風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的商業(yè)模式，雖然募集到的

51、資金大幅增多，卻難以找到能夠帶來(lái)巨額投資回報(bào)的投資對(duì)象，這個(gè)問(wèn)題今天依然盤桓在沙丘路（Sandhill Road）（位于加利福尼亞州門羅帕克（Menlo Park），為很多風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)所在地。）地區(qū)。1995年，2.5億美元就能組建一個(gè)“大基金”（mega-fund），而今天，單個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)管理10多億美元，或者單筆投資達(dá)到5億美元以上的情況已經(jīng)屢見(jiàn)不鮮了。</p><p>　　目前，還有些其他更復(fù)雜的問(wèn)題，比如高估值

52、，持有周期很長(zhǎng)，退出價(jià)格低等讓風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)頗感煩擾。如果基金的規(guī)?？s小，那么這些問(wèn)題至少能有所緩解?！百Y金的供應(yīng)量有些波動(dòng)，但是，對(duì)大部分風(fēng)投機(jī)構(gòu)來(lái)說(shuō)，還是有很多資金的?！?前風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家，目前負(fù)責(zé)運(yùn)營(yíng)設(shè)在丹佛的價(jià)值評(píng)估機(jī)構(gòu)艾克斯通合伙公司（Arcstone Partners）的布拉科（Bo Brustkern）談到?！斑@確實(shí)是個(gè)問(wèn)題，錢始終都是在流動(dòng)著的。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者先是尋求25家頂尖級(jí)的風(fēng)投機(jī)構(gòu)，卻無(wú)緣進(jìn)入。之后開(kāi)始尋求位次排在下面的2

53、5家，可那些公司也關(guān)閉了投資的入口，所以，他們只能再次退而求其次。他們的眼光不斷下移，直到找到一家可以將資金投入的風(fēng)投公司為止?！?lt;/p><p>　　所有的風(fēng)投機(jī)構(gòu)——無(wú)論是業(yè)績(jī)卓越還是表現(xiàn)平平的機(jī)構(gòu)——都競(jìng)相在需要大筆風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的企業(yè)中投資；所以，風(fēng)投數(shù)額有可能會(huì)超過(guò)企業(yè)需求的數(shù)倍。但是問(wèn)題在于，“沒(méi)有多少公司可以容得下3000萬(wàn)美元的投資?！?“超級(jí)天使基金”（super angels）的克莉絲·塞

54、卡（Chris Sacca）談到，超級(jí)天使基金是正在浮出水面的投資機(jī)構(gòu)群體，它們募集小額資金（從幾百萬(wàn)到1億美元不等），并將這些資金投資于需要數(shù)千美元而不是數(shù)百萬(wàn)美元的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)，以滿足它們發(fā)展的需要。</p><p>　　專家認(rèn)為，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)競(jìng)相購(gòu)買，導(dǎo)致投資對(duì)象的價(jià)格不斷攀升。必須要投入六位數(shù)的資金往往意味著，在初創(chuàng)企業(yè)的生命周期中，它們進(jìn)入的時(shí)機(jī)較晚，因?yàn)檫@時(shí)候，企業(yè)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)已經(jīng)較小，企業(yè)也有了運(yùn)作大筆資金的

55、更強(qiáng)能力。但是，在這種時(shí)候投資，就很難獲得他們已經(jīng)習(xí)以為常的數(shù)倍投資回報(bào)了。</p><p>　　此外，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本的規(guī)模越大，一般合伙人與其投資者之間經(jīng)濟(jì)利益的一致性也就越差。因?yàn)闊o(wú)論資本規(guī)模大小，風(fēng)投機(jī)構(gòu)的年度管理費(fèi)同樣為1%或者2%，投資回報(bào)率同樣都是20%。本來(lái)，投資回報(bào)才是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司盈利的途徑，而年度管理費(fèi)則是用來(lái)支付公司在投資期間的經(jīng)營(yíng)費(fèi)用的?？墒?，運(yùn)營(yíng)成本并不會(huì)因?yàn)橘Y本規(guī)模擴(kuò)大而同比例擴(kuò)大。所以，對(duì)風(fēng)

56、險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)來(lái)說(shuō)，管理費(fèi)用已經(jīng)成了重要的盈利來(lái)源，這對(duì)那些2000年以后投資回報(bào)欠佳甚至虧損的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)來(lái)說(shuō)更是如此?！耙?yàn)橛泄芾碣M(fèi)用的誘惑，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司依然想把基金規(guī)模做大?！比ㄖ赋觥?lt;/p><p><b>　　長(zhǎng)期趨勢(shì)</b></p><p>　　這并不是說(shuō)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資行業(yè)的日子已經(jīng)屈指可數(shù)了，也不是說(shuō)精明強(qiáng)干的創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)家不會(huì)去尋找自己所需的資金了，事實(shí)遠(yuǎn)非如此。

57、但是，“流向風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司的新資金確實(shí)在減少，同時(shí)，這個(gè)行業(yè)正在經(jīng)歷合并風(fēng)潮?！蔽诸D商學(xué)院創(chuàng)業(yè)學(xué)教授拉斐爾·阿密特（Raffi Amit）談到。</p><p>　　美國(guó)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資協(xié)會(huì)（National Venture Capital Association）的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，雖然2009年的風(fēng)投機(jī)構(gòu)數(shù)量依然超過(guò)1999年的水平，不過(guò)，風(fēng)投專業(yè)人員的數(shù)量卻減少了10%，同時(shí)，基金的數(shù)量也降低了15%。這表明，“那

58、些行將就木的機(jī)構(gòu)最終退出了這個(gè)行業(yè)。” 布拉科認(rèn)為。“所有那些延誤了退出時(shí)機(jī)或者根本就沒(méi)有退出的風(fēng)投機(jī)構(gòu)成了犧牲品。數(shù)年前，他們將資金投入了企業(yè)，但是并沒(méi)有得到更多的管理費(fèi)用，也沒(méi)有募集到新資金；可他們同時(shí)要承擔(dān)著信托責(zé)任，直到資金日趨減少。這些基金最終變成了行尸走肉?！?lt;/p><p>　　然而，這個(gè)行業(yè)同時(shí)也看到，有許多長(zhǎng)期趨勢(shì)以及顛覆性科技（disruptive technology）（也稱為“破壞性技術(shù)”

59、、“突破性科技”）正在創(chuàng)造投資的良機(jī)。</p><p>　　在美國(guó)，生命科學(xué)產(chǎn)業(yè)依然表現(xiàn)強(qiáng)勁，包括清潔能源、環(huán)境保護(hù)和綠色產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)在內(nèi)的清潔技術(shù)，為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資提供了全新的而且是前途無(wú)量的渠道。此外，這類公司似乎非常適合從規(guī)模更大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資基金接受資金，沃頓商學(xué)院金融學(xué)副教授大衛(wèi)·威塞爾斯（David Wessels）談到。</p><p>　　將一種新藥、醫(yī)療設(shè)備、風(fēng)能技術(shù)和太陽(yáng)

60、能技術(shù)從概念轉(zhuǎn)變成商品，不但需要時(shí)間，而且也需要大量的資金。但是，具有突破性的生物技術(shù)治療所帶來(lái)的回報(bào)也是頗為可觀的。最近，清潔技術(shù)公司已經(jīng)干成了一件近乎不可能的事情，那就是：為蕭條的美國(guó)首次公開(kāi)募股（IPO）市場(chǎng)注入了活力，其證據(jù)就是特斯拉公司（Tesla）的股票上市首日的大幅飆升?！疤厮估臼潜拘袠I(yè)的領(lǐng)頭羊，人們對(duì)這類替代能源技術(shù)很感興趣?！痹O(shè)在加利福尼亞州門羅帕克的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)梅菲爾德公司（Mayfield）的常務(wù)董事羅賓

61、83;瓦杉（Robin Vasan）談到，該公司已投資了三家能源技術(shù)企業(yè)。</p><p>　　與此同時(shí)，位于紐約的格林洛克資本公司（Glenrock Capital Advisors）的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資顧問(wèn)安東尼·霍伯曼（Anthony Hoberman）指出，包括無(wú)線通信、Facebook等社交媒體平臺(tái)以及企業(yè)和消費(fèi)者云技術(shù)服務(wù)等幾個(gè)技術(shù)趨勢(shì)的興起，正在創(chuàng)造“一個(gè)能讓風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家如魚(yú)得水的環(huán)境。”他還認(rèn)為，“

62、投資于小公司的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)，以其靈活性取代了規(guī)模更大、資金更為充裕的大型風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司。靈活性是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)可以有效利用的優(yōu)勢(shì)。而在變化緩慢以及變化可預(yù)期的時(shí)期，靈活性就沒(méi)有什么優(yōu)勢(shì)可言了?！?lt;/p><p>　　專注于軟件投資的瓦杉對(duì)此表示贊同。社交媒體、智能手機(jī)、平板電腦應(yīng)用軟件以及基于網(wǎng)絡(luò)的企業(yè)軟件產(chǎn)品和消費(fèi)者軟件產(chǎn)品的增長(zhǎng)，“很可能將是個(gè)會(huì)持續(xù)5年到10年的趨勢(shì)。”他談到?！叭ツ?，‘賭注’已經(jīng)投到了這些領(lǐng)域

63、，明年或后年，還會(huì)有更多的‘賭注’押寶這些領(lǐng)域的?！?lt;/p><p><b>　　調(diào)整期望值</b></p><p>　　不過(guò)，發(fā)掘那些有趣，有發(fā)展?jié)摿Α⒛軒?lái)不錯(cuò)回報(bào)的公司，與那些能給投資人帶來(lái)數(shù)倍投資回報(bào)的公司并不是同一件事。</p><p>　　傳統(tǒng)觀念認(rèn)為，在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資組合中，有一半公司最終會(huì)倒閉，少數(shù)可以帶來(lái)相當(dāng)不錯(cuò)的投資回報(bào)，只有一兩

64、家公司取得的巨大成功足以實(shí)現(xiàn)預(yù)期的盈利目標(biāo)。然而，如果沒(méi)有強(qiáng)勁的首次公開(kāi)募股市場(chǎng)，這種大賺其錢的機(jī)會(huì)就會(huì)少之又少。</p><p>　　過(guò)去幾年來(lái)，得到風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資支持的大部分公司都被收購(gòu)了。與IPO不同的是，購(gòu)并交易所能帶來(lái)的收益是有限的。因?yàn)橛腥绱硕嗟目萍计髽I(yè)在尋求買主，所以，谷歌、亞馬遜（Amazon）、雅虎、微軟以及強(qiáng)生（Johnson & Johnson）等大小通吃的買家可以壓低收購(gòu)價(jià)格。</

65、p><p>　　總而言之，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)緊抓不放的退出機(jī)制，哪怕是通過(guò)公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)的退出機(jī)制，給它們帶來(lái)的收益有時(shí)也不足以彌補(bǔ)損失和費(fèi)用?！耙胱屖找娉^(guò)損失，你就不能有超過(guò)六次的失敗?！蓖麪査怪赋?。</p><p>　　我們不妨來(lái)看看最近的數(shù)據(jù)，道瓊斯風(fēng)投資源（Dow Jones VentureSource）的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，在今年第二季度上市的接受風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的公司，平均花費(fèi)了9.4年的投資變現(xiàn)期。這些

66、公司在變現(xiàn)前所獲得的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的中間值為7000萬(wàn)美元，比一年前高出了65%。</p><p>　　同樣是在2010年的第二季度，15個(gè)獲得風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資支持的IPO，共募集到了8.99億美元。同一季度，79樁購(gòu)并交易募集到了43億美元，平均每筆5400萬(wàn)美元。15個(gè)公司中的特例特斯拉公司（Telsa）的首次IPO募集到了2.02億美元。不算特斯拉公司，其他14個(gè)公司IPO集到的資金平均只有近5000萬(wàn)美元，低于并購(gòu)交易

67、募集的平均值。因此，這個(gè)水平很難滿足風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資行業(yè)提升盈利水平的需要。</p><p>　　互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫時(shí)代“正在成為離我們遠(yuǎn)去的事件，人們?cè)谟?jì)算投資回報(bào)時(shí)已不再加以考慮。” 阿密特談到。的確，如果不把1999年計(jì)入10年投資回報(bào)期限，那么2009年就是后泡沫時(shí)代的第一年。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的回報(bào)率從2008年末的35%，下跌到了去年的虧損1%。五年期的投資回報(bào)率雖然超過(guò)了公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)指數(shù)，不過(guò)依然很難超過(guò)4%。再有，阿密特談到，

68、這些還都是平均數(shù)字，實(shí)際上，“現(xiàn)在，大部分風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資有限合伙人的投資回報(bào)率還是負(fù)數(shù)。”</p><p>　　要想提升投資回報(bào)水平，“對(duì)投資對(duì)象的估值必須降低，退出價(jià)格必須要上漲，或者持有時(shí)間要縮短?！被舨赋?。但是，其中的任何一個(gè)期望都不會(huì)很快實(shí)現(xiàn)，這就意味著，投資者必須調(diào)整自己的期望值?，F(xiàn)在要取得30%的投資回報(bào)率，“對(duì)任何非杠桿投資來(lái)說(shuō)都是不切實(shí)際的。” 威塞爾斯認(rèn)為，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的收益率可以輕松跟上公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)的步

69、伐，但是他并不確定，在可預(yù)見(jiàn)的未來(lái)是否會(huì)仍然如此。</p><p>　　“回顧20世紀(jì)90年代，當(dāng)時(shí)，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本開(kāi)始參與公司的創(chuàng)建，并幫助其發(fā)展壯大，等到公司擁有足夠影響力的時(shí)候，再將其推向股票市場(chǎng)，它們希望，20年以后，這些企業(yè)能成為沃爾瑪（Wal-Mart）或者寶潔（Procter & Gamble）那樣的公司?！彼劦??！暗罱@些被投資的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)開(kāi)始演變成了企業(yè)內(nèi)部研發(fā)的替代品。初創(chuàng)企業(yè)從零開(kāi)始研