政治學(xué)與行政學(xué)畢業(yè)論文中英文資料外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　中文9980字</b></p><p><b>　　畢業(yè)論文</b></p><p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)及譯文</b></p><p>　　專 業(yè)： 政治學(xué)與行政學(xué)</p><p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)</b>

2、;</p><p>　　The impact of land transfer on peasant stratification</p><p>　　--An analysis based on a survey of Jingshan country, Hubei province</p><p>　　Abstract: </p><p>

3、;　　Peasants’ motivation and purpose for transferring land vary from time to time. Based on a survey of 10 villages in Jingshan county, Hunan province, this article finds that the specificforms of rural land transfer incl

4、ude active long-term transfer, passive long-term transfer and short-term transfer. Land transfer has an important impact on the stratification of the peasantry. Present institutional arrangements for land ignore the legi

5、timate interests of migrant families and poor and weak villager</p><p>　　Keywords: land transfer, stratum, peasant stratification, land tenure arrangement</p><p>　　Land transfer is the focus of

6、current debates on the institutional change of land. Many scholarshave conducted research on the forms, causes and implications of land transfer and havecome upwith measures and countermeasures to standardize the transfe

7、r of land. Special attention has beenpaid to the role of land transfer in agrarian restructuring, industrialization, moderate-scale</p><p>　　operation, rural labor transfer and peasant income enhancement. Ho

8、wever, such studies rarely</p><p>　　involve land’s impact on changes in the hierarchical structure of current rural China. Chen</p><p>　　Chengwen and Luo Zhongyong (2006) focus on dissecting the

9、 overall rural structure and</p><p>　　examining the role of land transfer in reconstructing the rural social structure. Some scholars argue</p><p>　　that deregulating the transfer of land will l

10、ead to polarization among the peasantry (Wen Tiejun,</p><p>　　2008; Li Changping, 2008), but such an argument is merely a macrojudgment without factual</p><p>　　support at the micro level. China

11、 is a huge country with uneven development in rural areas;</p><p>　　peasant stratification is anything but a strange phenomenon. Therefore, we shall pay more</p><p>　　attention to observing the

12、stratification of the peasantry at the micro level.</p><p>　　In classical Marxist theory, the institutional conditions of land are an important basis of class and</p><p>　　stratification. In the

13、 1930s, Chen Hansheng, et al, proceeded with an observation of the land</p><p>　　tenure institutions and scientifically substantiated the feudal factor-driven class relations in rural</p><p>　　C

14、hina and the semi-colonial and semi-feudal nature of rural Chinese society. In times of</p><p>　　revolution, Mao Zedong (1982, 1991) also singled out the institutional conditions of land as an</p><

15、;p>　　important basis of class and stratification. He played a crucial role in understanding Chinese class</p><p>　　conditions at that time and justifying the necessity of launching a land revolution. Afte

16、r land</p><p>　　reform was launched in the People’s Republic of China, land no longer exerted a significant</p><p>　　impact on rural class stratification and hence scholars discussed the rural c

17、lass structure mainly</p><p>　　based on occupational stratification (Lu Xueyi, 2002). After the agricultural tax was abolished,</p><p>　　farming generated a handsome income for peasants and the

18、impact of land transfer on rural social</p><p>　　stratification and peasant stratification became increasingly pronounced. In September 2008, we</p><p><b>　　2</b></p><p>

19、;　　conducted a survey of 10 villages in two township jurisdictions of Jingshan county, Hubei</p><p>　　province. Based on the qualitative interview and quantitative statistics, this article attempts to</p&

20、gt;<p>　　discuss the impact of land transfer on the stratification of the peasantry.</p><p>　　I. The complex reality of land transfer</p><p>　　After introducing the household contract res

21、ponsibility system, the ruling Communist Party and</p><p>　　government have enacted a series of policies aimed at permitting and encouraging the transfer of</p><p>　　land use rights within the t

22、erm of contract while stabilizing rural land contract relations. The</p><p>　　central government has always intended to realize the transfer of land tenure rights according to</p><p>　　law and o

23、n a voluntary and compensatory basis and to effectively protect the rights and interests</p><p>　　of peasants. The reality is, however, very complicated. The motivation, purpose and method of</p><

24、p>　　rural land transfer vary from time to time. The actual conditions also vary across rural China. In</p><p>　　Jingshan county,, land transfer has gone through three different stages:</p><p>

25、;　　The first stage began in the 1980s. During this period, peasants transferred land before seeking</p><p>　　jobs or doing business in cities. The transition to a market economy started early in Jingshan and

26、</p><p>　　as a result, land transfer took place earlier here than elsewhere in rural areas of central and western</p><p><b>　　China.</b></p><p>　　The second stage starte

27、d in the late 1980s. At this stage, peasant burden became increasingly</p><p>　　cumbersome. Many peasants were unable to bear the burden of the new levies and as a result, they</p><p>　　had no a

28、lternative but to transfer or abandon their farmland and search for jobs in urban areas. The</p><p>　　abandoned land was transferred under the stewardship of village collectives or committees. This</p>

29、<p>　　was a prevalent phenomenon during the period from the 1990s until 2004, the year in which the</p><p>　　agricultural tax was repealed.</p><p>　　The third stage began in 2004. After a

30、bolishing the agricultural tax in 2004, the state no longer</p><p>　　levied fees on peasants and instead offered them various subsidies. Farming gradually became</p><p>　　lucrative and the once-

31、abandoned land suddenly became sought-after. In addition, there were</p><p>　　dramatic changes in the mode and state of land transfer. On one hand, peasants were less willing</p><p>　　to transfe

32、r land, and the proportion of land transferred was in decline. On the other hand, some</p><p>　　peasant households had to transfer their land because its size was too small to be profitable.</p><p

33、>　　In the face of different situations, peasants transferred their land in one of the three modes:</p><p>　　1. Active long-term land transfer</p><p>　　Active long-term land transfer is when p

34、easants choose to abandon contracted land in their home</p><p>　　villages after settling down in urban areas, or actively seek to transfer the contracted land because</p><p>　　they expect to set

35、tle down in urban areas. This form of land transfer existed from the 1980s</p><p>　　onward and after the agricultural tax was repealed. Among the 60 villagers who transferred a large</p><p>　　ar

36、ea of land in Caozhengong village, Jingshan county, 13 farmers transferred their land under this</p><p>　　method. Six of the 13 farmers went to cities without their spouses or became non-farmers (private<

37、/p><p>　　school teachers or temporary workers turned into full-time workers). The six villagers transferred</p><p>　　their land in a foolproof way, and they now are living a decent life. The other

38、seven villagers</p><p>　　abandoned their land due to an optimistic judgment in their ability to work and live in urban areas.</p><p>　　Six of those seven villagers are making a living in urban a

39、reas, and one of them returned to the</p><p>　　countryside and bought a house and a plot of land in a village in an adjacent township. Among the</p><p>　　six villagers settling down in urban are

40、as, four villagers live an affluent life and two villagers are</p><p>　　neither rich nor poor. Of the latter two villagers, one has bought a house with a tile roof in a town</p><p><b>　　3&

41、lt;/b></p><p>　　and makes a living by selling bean curd; the other makes a living by working in a barber shop.</p><p>　　When a peasant household actively transfers its land for a long period

42、of time, the transferee is</p><p>　　naturally entitled to acquire the land for the mutually agreed-upon period of time.</p><p>　　2. Passive long-term land transfer</p><p>　　Peasant

43、burden became increasingly heavy from the late 1980s to 2003, when the reform of the</p><p>　　tax and fee system was launched. Because grain prices were in decline and peasants lost money</p><p>

44、;　　tilling the land, many of them transferred their land without little consideration. Sometimes the</p><p>　　transferor even had to offer a subsidy of up to 300 yuan/mu to the transferee. Since taxes and fe

45、es</p><p>　　were levied on land, abandoning land meant leaving taxes and fees up in the air, so</p><p>　　grassroots-level governments forbade peasants from abandoning their land and forced them

46、to pay</p><p>　　taxes and fees even if their land was untilled. This is what Li Changping (2002) called “farmers</p><p>　　have to till their land against (their) will when they actually wish to

47、abandon it.” In this situation,</p><p>　　some peasant households transferred their houses and land together to non-native immigrants from</p><p>　　mountainous areas; some peasant households trie

48、d every means to move their registered</p><p>　　permanent residence elsewhere and even ended up becoming unregistered residents. Still more</p><p>　　peasant households preferred to just leave th

49、eir land behind and go work and do business</p><p>　　elsewhere. Consequently, a vast expanse of land was abandoned in rural areas. Some villagers</p><p>　　asked their neighbors to care for the l

50、and, but the land changed hands soon after or was abandoned</p><p>　　anyway. When villagers abandoned their land and went to work elsewhere, the township and</p><p>　　village governments could n

51、ot expect to collect taxes and fees, and as a result had to transfer the</p><p>　　abandoned land by every means.</p><p>　　The modes of land transfer conceived at township and village levels incl

52、ude “one land plot per</p><p>　　household” contract, low-price contract and change of land use. “One land plot per household”</p><p>　　contract means that in order to resolve land cultivation an

53、d irrigation issues, the village collective</p><p>　　or committee reallocated land and concentrated the land contracted to each peasant household in</p><p>　　one single plot of land to facilitat

54、e construction of small water conservancy facilities (He Xuefeng</p><p>　　et al, 2003), thus making it more attractive for peasants to take over the contracted land. Low price</p><p>　　contract

55、occurred when the village collective or committee transferred the abandoned land at a</p><p>　　price lower than the regular tax and fee burden. In this situation, village cadres often hold an</p><

56、p>　　attitude of “collecting a penny of tax and fee is better than collecting nothing.” Change of land use</p><p>　　means changing the farmland use to attract villagers to contract it. For instance, hillsi

57、de land can</p><p>　　be contracted to grow hybrid poplars; low-lying wetland can be used to dig a pond and raise fish.</p><p>　　Under the orchestration of village collectives and with every ende

58、avor of village cadres, the</p><p>　　peasants who abandoned their land are able to transfer the land to those who are willing to acquire</p><p><b>　　it.</b></p><p>　　Whe

59、n the first-round land contract expired in 1997, the central government required each province</p><p>　　to conduct a second round of land contracting. Peasants were not enthusiastic about the</p><

60、p>　　second-round contract because the farm tax and fee burden was too heavy and consequently, the</p><p>　　cadres of many local areas, including those of Jingshan county, had no alternative but to make th

61、e</p><p>　　second-round contract a mere formality. After the agricultural tax was repealed in 2004, farming</p><p>　　became lucrative and many villagers returned home and asked for land, thereby

62、 unleashing a</p><p>　　series of disagreements with the villagers who stayed in the farmland. The peasants who returned</p><p>　　home were lawfully entitled to the farmland contracting rights, w

63、hereas the peasant households</p><p>　　who stayed in the farmland had entered into contracts with village committees. The two parties</p><p><b>　　4</b></p><p>　　struggle

64、d in disagreement against each other, and the township and village cadres could not think</p><p>　　of an effective way to overcome the impasse. In this situation, Hubei province issued Opinions on</p>

65、<p>　　Improving the Second Round of Rural Land Contracting in November 2004 to “reconfirm land</p><p>　　rights” in rural areas. This policy document made it possible to solve land disputes through</

66、p><p>　　compromise by adopting flexible measures under the condition of preserving the current status of</p><p>　　land tenure without breaking the law.</p><p>　　In practice, Jingshan c

67、ounty government handled land disputes by confirming land rights based on</p><p>　　the existing land tenure institutions but requiring large farm households to give up a small piece of</p><p>　　

68、land (2 mu) to peasant households who had abandoned their land before the agricultural tax was</p><p>　　abolished. Disputes were very acute at that time, and township cadres stayed in villages to handle</

69、p><p>　　the land issues. Even so, there were still 29 groups of Cao township villagers lodging petitions in</p><p>　　2005. Today some villagers who have received confirmation of land rights from th

70、e government</p><p>　　are still unable to get their land. In consequence, the villagers who did not promptly return home</p><p>　　and ask for land in 2005 are forced to relinquish all of their l

71、and for a long period of time; those</p><p>　　who promptly returned home and asked for land are also forced to relinquish a large proportion of</p><p>　　land for a long period of time (2 mu of l

72、and per person or 10 mu per household in Jingshan</p><p>　　county). Among the 60 households in Gongcun village that transferred their land, 47 households</p><p>　　fall under this category. Now 2

73、4 of the 47 households have become “l(fā)andless peasants” in</p><p>　　non-suburban areas and three have become permanently “l(fā)andless peasants” because they sold</p><p>　　their house and land togeth

74、er to non-native immigrants, thus losing eligibility for confirmation of</p><p>　　land rights. The other 23 households have received 2 mu of subsistence land. By contrast, the</p><p>　　peasants

75、who acquired land through land transfer are unexpectedly entitled to long-term land</p><p>　　contracting rights due to policy and circumstance change.</p><p>　　3. Short-term land transfer</p&

76、gt;<p>　　This is a prevalent land transfer method adopted by peasant households due to their expectation on</p><p>　　long-term land possession and a sense of insecurity for other methods of making a l

77、iving. In the</p><p>　　rural areas of Jingshan, short-term land transfer is currently adopted by most peasant households</p><p>　　that acquired 2 mu of subsistence land through the confirmation

78、of land rights in 2005. In</p><p>　　Production Team 1 of Gongcun village, there are 18 peasant households with contracted land at</p><p>　　the present time: Only 10 households till the land at h

79、ome, while the other eight households have</p><p>　　only 2 mu of farmland each. These families transferred their land for a short period of time and</p><p>　　moved elsewhere to find employment.

80、In Production Team 3 of the village, there are 25 peasant</p><p>　　households, of which 12 households moved their families elsewhere. Now five of the 12</p><p>　　households have transferred thei

81、r subsistence land under the short-term scheme, but the other</p><p>　　seven households are without any subsistence land. Most of the peasant households that moved</p><p>　　elsewhere had left th

82、eir home villages before the agricultural tax was repealed and transferred land</p><p>　　in a passive way. Now a large proportion of them have stronger demand for land and choose not to</p><p>　

83、　transfer it for a long period of time because they are likely to return home to the land in the future.</p><p>　　By contrast, the peasants who acquired land through short-term land transfer are thus entitle

84、d to</p><p>　　short-term land contracting rights.</p><p>　　II. Land tenure status and peasant stratification</p><p>　　The foregoing analysis has revealed the existence of a number o

85、f different land transfer methods.</p><p>　　This phenomenon is related to the policies concerning agriculture, rural areas and farmers in</p><p><b>　　5</b></p><p>　　diff

86、erent periods, and to the different conditions of peasants in different periods. In different</p><p>　　periods and circumstances, peasants have adopted different land transfer methods. At present, land</p

87、><p>　　transfer has a significant impact on the well-being of peasants. In Jingshan, the villages are under</p><p>　　greater exposure or openness. Some leave home from time to time as a result of u

88、rbanization.</p><p>　　Non-native villagers can settle down in the villages by acquiring land through land transfer. In this</p><p>　　article, we will also analyze the stratification of the peasa

89、ntry at the village level based on the</p><p>　　detailed data about the economic and employment conditions of registered permanent residents in</p><p>　　three villages. Roughly Jingshan peasants

90、 can be aggregated into five strata: migrant businessman</p><p>　　stratum, peasant worker stratum, part-time peasant worker stratum, migrant family stratum and</p><p>　　poor villager stratum, as

91、 shown in the table below:</p><p>　　1. The migrant businessman stratum</p><p>　　This stratum refers to the upper stratum of peasants who have long been doing business elsewhere</p><p&

92、gt;<b>　　6</b></p><p>　　with almost no present dependence on rural land. They are completely dissociated with the</p><p>　　villages in which they are registered as permanent residents

93、. In the three villages, 10.4% of</p><p>　　households fall under this stratum. On average, a migrant businessman earns an annual income of</p><p>　　over RMB 30,000 and has a bank deposit of at l

94、east RMB 100,000. In Gongcun village, the two</p><p>　　wealthiest businessmen should each have a bank deposit of RMB 1 million. Among the 15 migrant</p><p>　　businessmen, 13 of them have houses

95、in urban areas, six of them have bought or built houses in</p><p>　　townships, and seven of them have bought houses in county towns or cities. In addition, some of</p><p>　　them also keep houses

96、 in the village that are now solely the residence of elderly family members.</p><p>　　Even though migrant businessmen are classified in the upper stratum of villagers, the vast</p><p>　　majority

97、 of them have become “urbanized,” and the most successful businessmen can move to</p><p>　　large cities. However, there are also a small number of businessmen who have met obstacles in the</p><p&g

98、t;　　urbanization process and have returned to their home villages. Deng Deyi, a farmer in Gongcun</p><p>　　village, went to Wuhan, capital of Hubei province, to sell rice in the 1990s but returned home in<

99、;/p><p>　　the face of tough business conditions. Returnees’ economic well-being is still in good condition</p><p>　　because of money they earned and saved while working in urban areas. After the ag

100、ricultural tax</p><p>　　was abolished, the land interest structure has become more rigid, thus making it impossible for</p><p>　　migrant businessmen to return to their home villages. Deng, 60, m

101、oved to a town to do business in</p><p>　　the 1990s and cancelled his registered permanent residence in the village but failed to qualify for</p><p>　　permanent resident status in the town. At t

102、he time of “confirmation of land rights,” he failed to</p><p>　　acquire any contracted land due to his lack of registered permanent residence. Now he earns a</p><p>　　meager income and wishes to

103、 return to his home village but cannot because he has no land there.</p><p>　　Generally speaking, most of the migrant businessmen in this stratum earn high income and do not</p><p>　　care about

104、land at all.</p><p>　　2. The peasant worker stratum</p><p>　　The peasant worker derives the name from his/her dual identity of working partly as a peasant and</p><p>　　partly as a w