微信營(yíng)銷外文翻譯—中國(guó)的移動(dòng)營(yíng)銷微信的廣告策略（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　字?jǐn)?shù)：英文3025單詞，15549字符；中文5192漢字</p><p>　　出處：Kontsevaia D B,Berger P D.Mobile Marketing in China: Can WeChat Turn Their New Advertising Strategy into a Sustainable Advantage?[J]. International Journal

2、 of Marketing Studies,2016,8(4):37-43.</p><p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)：　</b></p><p>　　Mobile Marketing in China: Can WeChat Turn Their New Advertising Strategy into a Sustainable Advantage?</p&g

3、t;<p>　　Abstract WeChat is China’s equivalent of WhatsApp, Facebook, and Paypal all combined into one app. In this paper, we examine mobile marketing in China, and specifically focus on WeChat’s strategy in openi

4、ng up its platform to advertising. There is profit potential and also risk potential for WeChat in adopting this strategy. We discuss aspects of this strategy along various dimensions, compare WeChat and Facebook where r

5、elevant, and stress how and why WeChat needs to be cautious as it goes forw</p><p>　　Keywords: WeChat, mobile marketing, social media, marketing in China</p><p>　　1.Introduction</p><p

6、>　　Mobile marketing is the latest acclaimed marketing strategy. At a time when other marketing channels are said to be losing effectiveness, “mobile” has become the best way to reach consumers. Executives from North A

7、merica are flocking to mobile as the biggest new solution. “Your mobile device quickly has become the easiest portal into your digital self,” proclaims Phil Nickinson from Android Central. And Google’s Eric Schmidt belie

8、ves that “Mobile is the future, and there’s no such thing as commu</p><p>　　Before getting carried away by wonderful quotes about mobile and its place in everyone’s future, however, one might reflect on the

9、following phrase from Matt Haig, author of Mobile Marketing: The Message Revolution: “End users, not technologies, shape the market. Consequently, marketers need to stay abreast not only of technological developments, bu

10、t also, of the way people respond to them” (Haig, 2002). In other words, while talking about mobile marketing, it is vital not to forget the users an</p><p>　　2.Wechat: The App That “Stole” Mobile in China&l

11、t;/p><p>　　WeChat emerged in 2011, and started out as a purely text-messaging platform created by Tencent Holdings. By 2015, the platform boasted some 600 million daily-active users (Bao, 2015). Its tremendous

12、growth over the last five years disrupted the telecommunications business, by replacing the need to send SMS, and even replaced the need for phone numbers, as people share their WeChat IDs, rather than phone numbers or e

13、-mail addresses. Moreover, since its launch, WeChat has developed an array of app</p><p>　　WeChat users can join the network by either giving their WeChat ID, by scanning a personalized QR code, or simply by

14、 shaking the phone and letting the device read the other people who have WeChat and are in the area. The massive number of users WeChat has attracted has not gone unnoticed by China’s commercial sector. There are QR code

15、s everywhere: on tables, TVs, and billboards, so people can scan them and subscribe to their favorite (or at least moderately interesting) brands in an instant. Bus</p><p>　　3.Differentiation and Revenue<

16、/p><p>　　According to Juniper Research, it will be a struggle for mobile messaging companies to sustain revenue, despite growing traffic (Juniper Research, 2015). Many predictions have been made that argue that

17、 just because traffic is going to increase, so will the revenue (e.g., Su-fang et al., 2016). Juniper shows, however, that this is not necessarily the case. According to their research, the revenue generated from each me

18、ssage sent over apps similar to those of WeChat will be less than 1% of what wi</p><p>　　3.1.Facebook: Why Mobile Needs to Differentiate</p><p>　　Facebook started out as a single social website

19、based in the United States and has since expanded its universe to include a variety of apps such as WhatsApp, a text communications app, Instagram, a photo sharing app, and Messenger, Facebook’s own text messaging app. F

20、acebook’s biggest challenge in an immensely competitive space is to ensure that their users stay engaged with their universe. Acquisition of apps such as WhatsApp and Instagram was a way to ensure that Facebook gets acce

21、ss to a vari</p><p>　　Of course, Facebook needs a lot of data to sustain their main source of revenue: native advertising. Facebook began using native advertising in 2011. While it did not exactly invent the

22、 practice, Facebook is the one that perfected it, by giving businesses access to an unprecedented product—a social-media platform that revolutionized communication, and thus, became ingrained and entrenched in the world’

23、s mind.</p><p>　　Facebook ads work on a pay-per-click or pay-per-impression basis, and vary in price, depending on the type of audience being targeted. Many businesses jumped on the opportunity to not only c

24、onnect with customers using their social profiles or “pages,” but also to directly impress upon a tailored audience. Indeed, Facebook remains one of the platforms with the most detailed targeting options available.</p

25、><p>　　Despite Facebook’s using their community as their main product, they have been very successful in remaining the number one social-media platform and have steadily begun their migration to mobile. In 2014

26、, Facebook’s Messenger was the number one messenger accessed per month in the USA, followed by Google+, then SnapChat, and fourth being Facebook-owned Instagram (Kokalitcheva, 2015). However, there are more changes comin

27、g. In the fast world of mobile advertising, it is no longer effective to rely</p><p>　　While diversification of its product may seem natural, it also comes at a time when Facebook posted drops in advertising

28、 revenues (Johnson, 2016). The revenue drop suggests that monetizing ads might no longer be enough to sustain growth in the long run, and that other business models might be necessary. The drop in revenues and differenti

29、ations supports Juniper Research’s findings that user growth does not always equal revenue growth, despite the disbelief it has received in the literature.</p><p>　　3.2.Revenue from New Markets</p>&l

30、t;p>　　Even if Juniper Research is wrong and the text messaging business will continue to grow at the current pace, turning traffic into revenue, it is not apparent how WeChat could replicate the same success as Facebo

31、ok. Recently, Facebook’s ad revenue came mainly from foreign countries, rather than from inside its “home” country, the United States (Gottfried, 2013). That is primarily because people in the U.S. have likely become des

32、ensitized to social ads, if not leaving the platform altogether.</p><p>　　If WeChat’s user base becomes similarly desensitized, expansion into foreign markets will prove very difficult, because 93% of its op

33、erations is concentrated in the Chinese Mainland. They have a small presence in the U.S., Hong Kong, Europe and other locations, but as noted, these markets account for only about 7% of their influence (Marketline, 2013)

34、. While WeChat can spend resources at dominating other local markets, it is unlikely that they will be able to replace the competition already with</p><p>　　4.Customer Perception and Personalization</p>

35、;<p>　　4.1.Chinese Consumers and Mobile Marketing</p><p>　　The Chinese consumer perception of mobile marketing has changed over time. While blanket marketing no longer works, personalized, timely ads,

36、 can still be effective. Utility is the key. Research conducted in Taiwan in 2006 suggested that users very much disliked the idea of mobile advertising; the majority perceived mobile ads as “annoying, excessive and offe

37、nsive” (Su-fang et al., 2016). In fact, when people received mobile advertisements, most put it aside to read later. Mobile was not an effe</p><p>　　When mobile ads are optimized, consumers tend to tolerate

38、them much better. What does “optimized” entail? It could mean security, localization for the market, delivering ease of use, or serving a specific purpose, such as communication or payment, or any combination of these. A

39、daptation to a certain market plays a limited role, in that there are specific features that Chinese consumers will appreciate, such as the ability to easily compare products and prices when shopping. Yet, that’s not the

40、 m</p><p>　　4.2.Dangers of Over-Advertising</p><p>　　WeChat knows that there is a potential risk of losing some of its user base. Thus, it began implementing mobile ads very cautiously. Asians,

41、on average, are less receptive to ads imbedded in mobile, as compared to Europeans and Americans (Olson, 2015). So, WeChat restricted access to its users. Indeed, at first, only vendors who talked directly to the platfor

42、m could launch a campaign.</p><p>　　There is a reason WeChat was aware that it needed to be cautious when implementing ads. It learned from Weibo’s experience only a few years before, when Weibo did the same

43、 thing with mobile marketing. Weibo is China’s Twitter-like microblogging platform that saw a rapid decline in its user base after it overwhelmed its users with a nonstop myriad of ads (Olson, 2015). Weibo ended up losin

44、g a lot of market share (to WeChat) because users were dissatisfied. Using Weibo's service simply became less</p><p>　　4.3.Data Protection</p><p>　　Data security could become a problem in th

45、e future. With the increased need for information about target audiences, many social-media platforms are now turning to mining images that are found on people’s profiles as a source of information (Macmillan, 2016). Giv

46、en WeChat’s fairly basic targeting-scheme, it seems unlikely that they will employ this technology soon; but, if they are to compete with the likes of Facebook, it is only a matter of time until they also have to adopt s

47、imilar technologie</p><p>　　WeChat has been excellent thus far in guessing its user needs, and has seen great growth because of that. By entering into the world of mobile marketing, it may have endangered it

48、s position simply by switching their main user-base from the people using the app, to the companies who will pay for their ads.</p><p>　　4.4.Me-Marketing</p><p>　　Alongside short-term revenue, W

49、eChat’s entry into mobile advertising is meant to push the envelope and immediately begin with personalized marketing. WeChat already showed that its advertising is going to be completely different, by raising demand for

50、 its “premium” users. Yet, it’s unclear how this model will evolve in the future. Will WeChat lower its prices and become China’s equivalent of Facebook advertising? If so, why not start out with low prices from the begi

51、nning, as Facebook did? The s</p><p>　　The first campaign was signed with BMW. BMW wanted to target only affluent, educated people in the so-called first and second tier cities (Beijing, Shanghai and other l

52、arge cities). People who did not fit the targeting criteria saw ads for soda and smartphones instead. People who did fit the category saw BMW ads pop up on their Moments page. The highly-anticipated opening to WeChat’s o

53、wn platform was noticed by many, and many also noticed the blatant targeting. While the BMW’s brand soared immed</p><p>　　5.In Summary—Focus On Utility</p><p>　　WeChat grew into a huge, successf

54、ul application, as a result of a combination of fortunate events and Chinese socio-cultural needs and characteristics. It began its successful rein as an innovator for the Chinese market, creating new app features specif

55、ically useful for the Chinese speaking population. Moreover, as noted earlier, little separation between private and professional life in China aided WeChat’s journey to becoming the one app that dominates the Chinese ec

56、ommerce, social media and t</p><p>　　From the beginning, Tencent’s WeChat put the customer at the center of its platform; thanks to that, it reaped huge benefits. Interestingly, this is not a “rocket science

57、” idea. For many years, the biggest change in the field of marketing, accompanied by the use of the internet, has been the movement from a transaction-based approach to a customer-centric approach. WeChat's approach

58、can be thought of as yet another extension of this very prevalent principle.</p><p>　　WeChat first dominated Chinese communications, then payments, and now it is moving into becoming a full-fledged mobile so

59、cial-platform, including mobile advertisements. Its success with this will depend on two vital factors. The first is that mobile ad revenue may actually decrease in the long run, despite increasing traffic. The evidence

60、of this potential decline is exemplified by Facebook’s attempt to differentiate their offering the way WeChat already has, by incorporating payments and other </p><p>　　The second vital factor is to remain r

61、elevant to its users. WeChat’s platform cannot work if all its users decide to leave. Are people actually going to be receptive to seeing ads among their Moments? Historically, Chinese users have not been too friendly to

62、 over-advertising, as the case of WeiBo’s decline suggests. Plus, WeChat may have already started off on the wrong foot with its first campaign featuring BMW that targeted only WeChat’s affluent users. Furthermore, there

63、 may be growing privac</p><p>　　The good news for WeChat is the fact that Chinese consumers seem to care mostly about the usefulness of their apps. Security and ease-of-use concerns do not influence their on

64、line behavior positively or negatively. The users who are already online understand the implications of engaging with online platforms, and giving up some private data does not discourage them from engaging and shopping

65、online. As a result, WeChat must focus specifically on remaining useful to its user base—exactly how it w</p><p>　　Mobile advertising is a potentially huge source of revenue, especially in the short term. To

66、 be sustainable in the long-run, however, WeChat must remember that mobile interaction is not just about the technology and the revenue. Rather, it’s also about the user and the utility the users are able to derive. User

67、s are the ones who shape the market, by choosing to log-on to a given social or mobile platform. Since it is their choice, mobile platforms must keep in mind that their users’ needs and th</p><p><b>　　

68、中文譯文：</b></p><p>　　中國(guó)的移動(dòng)營(yíng)銷：微信能將它們新的廣告策略</p><p>　　轉(zhuǎn)化為可持續(xù)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)嗎？</p><p>　　摘要 微信在中國(guó)，相當(dāng)于是WhatsApp、Facebook和Paypal這些組合而成的一個(gè)應(yīng)用程序。在本文中，我們研究了中國(guó)的移動(dòng)營(yíng)銷，特別是微信在公共平臺(tái)方面的廣告策略。微信的廣告策略既有盈利潛力，但

69、也暗含風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。我們?nèi)娣治隽诉@一廣告策略，比較了微信和Facebook的相關(guān)性，并強(qiáng)調(diào)了微信在發(fā)展過(guò)程中需要警惕的方面，以免重蹈微博的覆轍。本文討論的核心問(wèn)題包括差異化、個(gè)性化、客戶感知以及中國(guó)消費(fèi)者的獨(dú)特性。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞：微信，移動(dòng)營(yíng)銷，社交媒體，中國(guó)營(yíng)銷</p><p><b>　　1.簡(jiǎn)介</b></p><p>　　移動(dòng)營(yíng)

70、銷是最受好評(píng)的營(yíng)銷策略。當(dāng)其他營(yíng)銷渠道被認(rèn)為正在失效時(shí)，“移動(dòng)營(yíng)銷”已經(jīng)成為接觸消費(fèi)者的最佳方式。北美的高管們紛紛涌向移動(dòng)領(lǐng)域，將移動(dòng)營(yíng)銷視為最新的解決方案。安卓研究中心的菲爾?尼金森表示：“移動(dòng)就是未來(lái)，沒(méi)有任何通信可以超越它?！笨偠灾苿?dòng)營(yíng)銷是目前最受歡迎的營(yíng)銷方式！</p><p>　　然而，在被關(guān)于移動(dòng)營(yíng)銷及其在未來(lái)的重要性的精彩言論沖昏頭腦之前，《移動(dòng)營(yíng)銷》一書的作者馬特?海格就提出了令人反思的以下

71、話語(yǔ)：信息革命：“塑造市場(chǎng)的是最終用戶，而不是技術(shù)。因此，營(yíng)銷人員不僅需要了解技術(shù)的發(fā)展情況，還要及時(shí)了解人們對(duì)它們的反應(yīng)”（海格，2002）。換句話說(shuō)，在談?wù)撘苿?dòng)營(yíng)銷時(shí)，最重要的是不能忘記用戶以及他們?cè)谝苿?dòng)營(yíng)銷中所占據(jù)的地位。從某種意義上來(lái)講，這反映了通常適用于新產(chǎn)品的長(zhǎng)期概念，也反映了新服務(wù)的理念：技術(shù)推動(dòng)與需求拉動(dòng)之間存在差別，但這兩者同樣重要。</p><p>　　2.微信：中國(guó)移動(dòng)手機(jī)應(yīng)用程序</

72、p><p>　　微信于2011年出現(xiàn)，并成為騰訊控股公司創(chuàng)建的純文本消息平臺(tái)。到2015年，該平臺(tái)擁有約6億日?；顒?dòng)用戶（鮑，2015）。在過(guò)去五年中，其巨大的增長(zhǎng)擾亂了電信業(yè)務(wù)，取代了發(fā)送短信的需求，甚至取代了對(duì)電話號(hào)碼的需求，因?yàn)槿藗兎窒砹怂麄兊奈⑿臝D，而不是電話號(hào)碼或電子郵件地址。此外，自從推出以來(lái)，微信已經(jīng)在自己的應(yīng)用中開(kāi)發(fā)了一系列程序。例如，它添加了一個(gè)支付系統(tǒng)，鏈接到中國(guó)最大的在線商店之一的京東JD.c

73、om，確保人們?cè)絹?lái)越多地在微信自己的平臺(tái)上購(gòu)物。這反過(guò)來(lái)又損害了中國(guó)的電子商務(wù)巨頭阿里巴巴在電子商務(wù)領(lǐng)域的霸主地位（賴因，2015）。</p><p>　　微信用戶可以通過(guò)提供微信ID，掃描個(gè)性化的二維碼，或者通過(guò)手機(jī)搖一搖，讓設(shè)備讀取其他有微信和該地區(qū)的人來(lái)加入網(wǎng)絡(luò)。微信吸引的大量用戶并沒(méi)有被中國(guó)的商業(yè)界忽視。二維碼無(wú)處不在：桌子上、電視上和廣告牌上，所以人們可以掃描它們，并立即訂閱他們最喜歡的（或至少有中等興

74、趣的）品牌。眾所周知，企業(yè)通過(guò)制作自己的公眾號(hào)，使用該平臺(tái)成功與他們的用戶進(jìn)行聯(lián)系。</p><p><b>　　3.差異化與收入</b></p><p>　　根據(jù)朱尼普研究公司，盡管流量不斷增長(zhǎng)，但移動(dòng)通信公司仍然在會(huì)為維持收入而努力奮斗（朱尼普研究公司，2015）。許多預(yù)測(cè)都認(rèn)為，因?yàn)樵L問(wèn)量會(huì)增加，所以收入也會(huì)增加（例如，蘇方等人等人，2016）。但是，朱尼普研究

75、公司顯示，事實(shí)并非如此。根據(jù)他們的研究，通過(guò)類似微信的應(yīng)用程序發(fā)送的每條消息所產(chǎn)生的收入還不及SMS和MMS所產(chǎn)生的收入的1％（朱尼普研究公司，2015）。他們預(yù)測(cè)，即使移動(dòng)流量翻番，免費(fèi)消息平臺(tái)也將難以將流量轉(zhuǎn)化為收入，即使支持廣告的平臺(tái)也是如此。鑒于移動(dòng)通信平臺(tái)的收入可能停滯不前，移動(dòng)營(yíng)銷策略是否會(huì)通過(guò)削弱其對(duì)用戶的關(guān)注來(lái)傷害微信的收入呢？首先，我們來(lái)看看那些已經(jīng)在原生廣告方面取得成功的其他公司，以及他們未來(lái)的策略。</p&g

76、t;<p>　　3.1.Facebook：為什么移動(dòng)營(yíng)銷需要細(xì)分</p><p>　　Facebook開(kāi)始只是美國(guó)的一個(gè)單一的社交網(wǎng)站，后來(lái)逐漸擴(kuò)展了其應(yīng)用領(lǐng)域，囊括了各種各樣的應(yīng)用程序，例如，WhatsApp，文本通信應(yīng)用程序；Instagram，照片共享應(yīng)用程序；Messenger，F(xiàn)acebook自己的短信應(yīng)用程序。在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈的環(huán)境中，F(xiàn)acebook面臨的最大挑戰(zhàn)是確保用戶與其市場(chǎng)保持聯(lián)系。

77、收購(gòu)WhatsApp和Instagram等應(yīng)用程序是為了確保即使用戶沒(méi)有直接連接到Facebook，而Facebook也可以獲得各種用戶數(shù)據(jù)（約翰遜，2016）。</p><p>　　當(dāng)然，F(xiàn)acebook需要大量數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)維持其主要收入來(lái)源：原生廣告。Facebook在2011年就開(kāi)始使用原生廣告了。雖然原生廣告并不完全是由Facebook發(fā)明的，但Facebook卻將它進(jìn)行了完善，通過(guò)為企業(yè)提供一個(gè)前所未有的產(chǎn)品

78、——具有革命性的社交媒體平臺(tái)，從而在這個(gè)世界上變得根深蒂固和牢不可破。</p><p>　　Facebook廣告采用每次點(diǎn)擊付費(fèi)或每次觀看付費(fèi)，并且價(jià)格會(huì)有所不同，具體取決于受眾群體的類型。許多企業(yè)都抓住了這個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)，不僅可以利用他們的社交資料或“網(wǎng)頁(yè)”與客戶進(jìn)行聯(lián)系，而且還可以直接吸引目標(biāo)客戶。事實(shí)上，F(xiàn)acebook仍然是提供最詳細(xì)的定位選項(xiàng)的平臺(tái)之一。</p><p>　　盡管Face

79、book以其社區(qū)為主要產(chǎn)品，但仍然保留了第一大社交媒體平臺(tái)，并穩(wěn)步開(kāi)始移植到移動(dòng)平臺(tái)。在2014年，F(xiàn)acebook的Messenger是美國(guó)每月訪問(wèn)量最大的一個(gè)信息平臺(tái)，其次是Google+，然后是SnapChat，第四個(gè)是Facebook擁有的Instagram（Kokalitcheva，2015）。但是，還有更多的變化。在快速的移動(dòng)廣告領(lǐng)域，僅依賴用戶登錄網(wǎng)絡(luò)已經(jīng)不再有效了。人們必須參與；否則他們?cè)谑褂脩?yīng)用程序時(shí)就顯得沒(méi)有效用。這

80、就是為什么近年來(lái)，F(xiàn)acebook非常重視將消息平臺(tái)發(fā)展成為全面的通信平臺(tái)。其最新的挑戰(zhàn)是集成服務(wù)和最終付款，以確保用戶可以能夠持續(xù)受益（戈特弗里德，2013）。</p><p>　　盡管其產(chǎn)品多樣化且看起來(lái)都是自然而然的，但它們也出現(xiàn)在Facebook 公布廣告收入下降的時(shí)候 （約翰遜，2016）。收入下降表明，從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，營(yíng)利廣告可能不足以維持經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)，而其他商業(yè)模式是必要的。收入和差異化的下降支持了朱尼普研

81、究公司的發(fā)現(xiàn)，用戶的增長(zhǎng)并不總是等于收入的增長(zhǎng)，盡管這受到研究文獻(xiàn)的質(zhì)疑。</p><p><b>　　3.2.新市場(chǎng)收入</b></p><p>　　即使朱尼普研究公司的觀點(diǎn)是錯(cuò)誤的，文本信息業(yè)務(wù)將以目前的速度繼續(xù)增長(zhǎng)，能將流量轉(zhuǎn)化為收入，但是微信是否可以復(fù)制Facebook同樣的成功，這一點(diǎn)是不明顯的。最近，F(xiàn)acebook的廣告收入主要來(lái)自國(guó)外，而不是來(lái)自于美國(guó)

82、國(guó)內(nèi)（戈特弗里德，2013）。這主要是因?yàn)椋幢銢](méi)有完全離開(kāi)這個(gè)平臺(tái), 美國(guó)的人們也可能會(huì)對(duì)社交廣告變得麻木。</p><p>　　如果微信的用戶群也變得同樣麻木，那么擴(kuò)張到國(guó)外市場(chǎng)將是非常困難的，因?yàn)槲⑿?3％的業(yè)務(wù)集中在中國(guó)大陸。在美國(guó)、香港、歐洲和其他地方，微信的用戶數(shù)量很少，但如上所述，這些市場(chǎng)只占其影響的7%左右（Marketline，2013）。雖然微信可以將資源用于掌控其他當(dāng)?shù)厥袌?chǎng)，但是它也不可能取

83、代這些國(guó)家內(nèi)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。事實(shí)上，微信的成功歸功于其在本土市場(chǎng)上的創(chuàng)新。例如，考慮到中國(guó)語(yǔ)言的結(jié)構(gòu)，通過(guò)添加語(yǔ)音聊天記錄，微信成為了一個(gè)非常有用的工具（賴因，2015）。微信要進(jìn)入國(guó)外市場(chǎng)，就必須要復(fù)制它在本國(guó)市場(chǎng)上所展現(xiàn)的同樣的活力和本土化，這可能是困難的和昂貴的，甚至可能需要當(dāng)?shù)睾献骰锇榈膸椭?lt;/p><p>　　4.客戶感知和個(gè)性化</p><p>　　4.1.中國(guó)消費(fèi)者和移動(dòng)營(yíng)銷<

84、;/p><p>　　隨著時(shí)間的推移，中國(guó)消費(fèi)者對(duì)移動(dòng)營(yíng)銷的看法也發(fā)生了改變。雖然地毯式營(yíng)銷不再有效，但個(gè)性化、及時(shí)的廣告仍然存在效果。有效才是關(guān)鍵。2006年在臺(tái)灣進(jìn)行的研究表明，用戶非常不喜歡移動(dòng)廣告；大多數(shù)人覺(jué)得移動(dòng)廣告是“惱人的、過(guò)度的和帶有冒犯性的”（蘇方等人，2016）。事實(shí)上，當(dāng)人們收到移動(dòng)廣告時(shí)，大部分都會(huì)放在一邊，以后閱讀。手機(jī)不是一個(gè)有效的溝通渠道。然而，從那時(shí)起，移動(dòng)營(yíng)銷的做法和看法都發(fā)生了重大變

85、化，移動(dòng)營(yíng)銷已經(jīng)變得更加具有針對(duì)性、本地化和最優(yōu)化。</p><p>　　當(dāng)移動(dòng)廣告經(jīng)過(guò)優(yōu)化之后，消費(fèi)者往往能更好地接受它們?！皟?yōu)化”是指什么呢？它可能意味著安全、市場(chǎng)本地化、交付易用性或具有針對(duì)性，例如通信或付款，或這些的組合。因?yàn)橹袊?guó)消費(fèi)者喜歡特定功能，比如在購(gòu)物時(shí)容易比較產(chǎn)品和價(jià)格的功能，所以微信對(duì)某一市場(chǎng)的適應(yīng)作用有限。然而，這并不是中國(guó)消費(fèi)者在手機(jī)上花費(fèi)時(shí)間和金錢的最具影響力的一點(diǎn)。事實(shí)上，對(duì)移動(dòng)購(gòu)買行

86、為最積極的影響是感知有用性（龔等人，2013）。因此，應(yīng)用程序越具有獨(dú)特的功能，人們就越喜歡繼續(xù)使用它。此外，服務(wù)也在客戶滿意度中發(fā)揮了核心作用。那么微信如何通過(guò)廣告來(lái)增加收入，而不影響它為自己創(chuàng)造的現(xiàn)有效用呢？</p><p>　　4.2.過(guò)度廣告的危險(xiǎn)</p><p>　　微信知道，潛在的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)會(huì)導(dǎo)致丟失一些用戶。因此，它開(kāi)始非常謹(jǐn)慎地實(shí)施移動(dòng)廣告。與歐洲人和美國(guó)人相比，亞洲人對(duì)移動(dòng)廣告

87、的接受度一般較低（奧爾森，2015）。所以，微信限制了對(duì)其用戶的訪問(wèn)。實(shí)際上，起初，只有直接與平臺(tái)交談的供應(yīng)商才能發(fā)起廣告。</p><p>　　微信意識(shí)到在實(shí)施廣告時(shí)需要謹(jǐn)慎，還有一個(gè)原因。它從幾年前微博的經(jīng)驗(yàn)中學(xué)到，那時(shí)微博做著移動(dòng)營(yíng)銷的事。微博是中國(guó)的類似推特的平臺(tái)，在用戶不斷播放無(wú)數(shù)廣告后，其用戶群迅速下滑（奧爾森，2015）。因?yàn)橛脩舻牟粷M意，微博最終失去了很多市場(chǎng)份額（相對(duì)于微信）。由于過(guò)去廣告的泛濫

88、，使用類似微博的服務(wù)對(duì)（前）用戶來(lái)說(shuō)就變得不那么有用了。為了獲得潛在的廣告收入，并保持用戶的信心，微信做的最好的事情之一就是限制對(duì)觀眾的訪問(wèn)。然而，隨著程序的發(fā)展，對(duì)用戶的保護(hù)可能會(huì)被削弱，越來(lái)越多的廣告將出現(xiàn)在用戶訂閱中。</p><p><b>　　4.3.數(shù)據(jù)保護(hù)</b></p><p>　　數(shù)據(jù)安全可能會(huì)成為未來(lái)的一個(gè)問(wèn)題。隨著對(duì)目標(biāo)受眾信息需求的增加，許多社

89、交媒體平臺(tái)正在轉(zhuǎn)向挖掘人們的個(gè)人資料中的圖像作為信息來(lái)源（麥克米蘭，2016）。鑒于微信的目標(biāo)計(jì)劃相當(dāng)基礎(chǔ)，他們似乎不太可能會(huì)使用這種技術(shù)；但是，如果他們要與像Facebook這樣的對(duì)手進(jìn)行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，這只是時(shí)間問(wèn)題，到那時(shí)，為了向觀眾提供最清晰易懂的觀點(diǎn)，他們也必須要采用類似的技術(shù)。所有這些都是為了保證用戶不再是產(chǎn)品的中心；而是用戶成為了產(chǎn)品。</p><p>　　到目前為止，微信在推測(cè)用戶需求方面一直很出色，并因此

90、獲得了長(zhǎng)足的發(fā)展。進(jìn)入移動(dòng)營(yíng)銷領(lǐng)域，微信將他們的主要用戶群從應(yīng)用程序的用戶轉(zhuǎn)移到支付廣告的公司，這可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致危機(jī)。</p><p><b>　　4.4.個(gè)性化營(yíng)銷</b></p><p>　　除了短期收入，微信進(jìn)入移動(dòng)廣告領(lǐng)域是為了突破自我，并立即開(kāi)始個(gè)性化營(yíng)銷。微信已經(jīng)表明，通過(guò)提高對(duì)“溢價(jià)”用戶的需求，其廣告將會(huì)完全不同。然而，目前還不清楚這種模式在未來(lái)會(huì)如何演變

91、。微信降低其價(jià)格，并成為中國(guó)類似于Facebook的廣告嗎？如果是這樣，為什么不像Facebook那樣，從一開(kāi)始就以低價(jià)格起步呢？這個(gè)策略是不明確的，因?yàn)槠涞谝淮芜M(jìn)行的廣告活動(dòng)就引起了人們的質(zhì)疑和不滿。</p><p>　　第一個(gè)廣告是與寶馬簽約的。寶馬只想在所謂的一、二線城市（北京、上海和其他大城市）鎖定富裕、受過(guò)教育的人。不符合鎖定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的人只看到汽水和智能手機(jī)的廣告，而符合這一類別的人會(huì)在他們打開(kāi)頁(yè)面時(shí)彈出寶

92、馬廣告。許多人注意到微信平臺(tái)對(duì)自己的高度開(kāi)放，許多人也注意到了這種明目張膽的目標(biāo)廣告。寶馬的品牌在廣告后立即飆升，但很快就會(huì)受到了反彈，因?yàn)闆](méi)有看到寶馬的廣告出現(xiàn)在他們的新聞?lì)l道中的人們開(kāi)始將自己稱為屌絲，這是對(duì)失敗者的一種禮貌稱謂（洛拉斯，2015）。微信對(duì)于收到廣告的新聞媒體非常友好，然而，它也成功地疏遠(yuǎn)了一些社區(qū)，以大膽進(jìn)入移動(dòng)營(yíng)銷領(lǐng)域。顯然，個(gè)性化對(duì)創(chuàng)造成功是沒(méi)有好處的。</p><p>　　5.總結(jié)——

93、聚焦實(shí)用性</p><p>　　得益于幸運(yùn)事件以及中國(guó)社會(huì)文化的需求和特點(diǎn)，微信成長(zhǎng)為一個(gè)巨大而成功的應(yīng)用程序。它成功地成為中國(guó)市場(chǎng)的創(chuàng)新者，創(chuàng)建了新的應(yīng)用程序功能，特別適用于中國(guó)人。此外，如前所述，中國(guó)人的私人生活和職業(yè)生涯緊密相連，這有助于微信成為主導(dǎo)中國(guó)電子商務(wù)、社交媒體和電信領(lǐng)域的一個(gè)應(yīng)用程序。在數(shù)據(jù)隱私問(wèn)題方面，微信的母公司騰訊也比Facebook等類似的全球性公司更具優(yōu)勢(shì)，因?yàn)樗c中國(guó)政府進(jìn)行了強(qiáng)有力

94、的合作。它也間接地得益于這樣一個(gè)事實(shí)，即難以通過(guò)中國(guó)法院系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行民事訴訟。</p><p>　　從一開(kāi)始，騰訊的微信就將客戶置于其平臺(tái)的中心；由此，它獲得了巨大的收益。有趣的是，這并不是一個(gè)多么高深的想法。多年來(lái)，隨著互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的發(fā)展，營(yíng)銷領(lǐng)域的最大變化是從基于交易的方式轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橐钥蛻魹橹行牡姆绞?。微信的做法可以被認(rèn)為是這一非常普遍的原則的又一個(gè)延伸。</p><p>　　微信首先主導(dǎo)了中國(guó)通信

95、，然后是支付，現(xiàn)在它正在成為一個(gè)成熟的移動(dòng)社交平臺(tái)，包括移動(dòng)廣告。微信的成功取決于兩個(gè)重要因素。首先，盡管流量增加，但從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，實(shí)際上移動(dòng)廣告收入可能會(huì)下降。這種潛在的衰落已經(jīng)被Facebook證實(shí)，F(xiàn)acebook試圖在自己的應(yīng)用程序中納入支付和其他服務(wù)，來(lái)區(qū)分它的提供方式。</p><p>　　第二個(gè)重要因素是與用戶保持聯(lián)系。如果所有用戶都決定離開(kāi)，那么微信的平臺(tái)將無(wú)法正常工作。人們真的愿意時(shí)刻看到廣告嗎？

96、從歷史上看，中國(guó)用戶對(duì)于過(guò)度廣告并不太友善，正如微博的衰落所顯示的那樣。此外，微信可能已經(jīng)開(kāi)始了錯(cuò)誤的嘗試，其與寶馬進(jìn)行合作的首個(gè)廣告活動(dòng)僅針對(duì)微信的富裕用戶。另一方面，中國(guó)政府和社會(huì)尚未解決的隱私問(wèn)題可能會(huì)越來(lái)越多，例如圖像挖掘等問(wèn)題。在什么時(shí)候品牌會(huì)侵犯用戶隱私呢？</p><p>　　對(duì)于微信來(lái)說(shuō)，好消息是中國(guó)消費(fèi)者似乎更關(guān)心其應(yīng)用程序的實(shí)用性。安全性和易用性問(wèn)題不會(huì)對(duì)他們的在線行為產(chǎn)生積極或消極的影響。線

97、上用戶了解參與在線平臺(tái)互動(dòng)意味著什么，并放棄一些不影響他們上網(wǎng)購(gòu)物的私人數(shù)據(jù)。因此，微信必須專注于保持對(duì)其用戶基礎(chǔ)的有用性——確切地說(shuō), 就像它在起步時(shí)做的那樣。</p><p>　　移動(dòng)廣告是潛在的巨大收入來(lái)源，特別是在短期內(nèi)。然而，為了長(zhǎng)期可持續(xù)發(fā)展，微信必須記住，移動(dòng)交互不僅僅是技術(shù)和收入。相反，它也是關(guān)于用戶和用戶能夠派生的實(shí)用程序。用戶通過(guò)選擇登錄特定的社交或移動(dòng)平臺(tái)，從而塑造市場(chǎng)。由于這是出自用戶的選