21中英文雙語(yǔ)法學(xué)專業(yè)外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯成品 合同第三方受益人的權(quán)利密歇根州受益合同條款履行效力

1、<p>　　外文標(biāo)題：Contracts： Rights of Third Party Beneficiary： Effect of Michigan Beneficiary Contract Statute 外文作者：GW Hueschen 文獻(xiàn)出處:《Michigan Law Review》 , 1951 , 50 (2) :336-339 英文2189單詞， 10769字符，中文3179漢字。</p>

2、<p>　　此文檔是外文翻譯成品，無(wú)需調(diào)整復(fù)雜的格式哦！下載之后直接可用，方便快捷！只需二十多元。</p><p>　　On agreement to make mutual wills, Stephen and his two sisters entered into an agreement whereby the sisters agreed to will to Stephen, or in

3、event Stephen predeceased them, to his wife, all property which they should receive from their father. Stephen did predecease the sisters, whereupon they executed new wills with no provision for Stephen’s widow. Upon de

4、ath of the last sister, the widow’s bill for specific performance of the agreement was dismissed by the circuit court. In affirming on app</p><p>　　The court’s treatment of the present fact situation as givi

5、ng rise to a binding agreement between the sisters to make mutual wills even though the consideration of Stephen was held nonexistent，1 is in line with Phelps v. Pipher2 as the</p><p>　　Moore v. Mitchell,

6、supra note 3.</p><p>　　With regard to whether a claim for premiums for workmen’s compensation insurance constitutes a claim for taxes for conflict of law purposes, there seems to be little authority. Some a

7、nalogy may be drawn to a number of decisions holding that unemployment and workmen’s compensation premium claims are taxes for purposes of bankruptcy. See 135 A.L.R. 1509 (1941); 161 A丄.R. 217 (1946). On the other hand,

8、 one New York City municipal court, on facts identical with the principal case, recently rejecte</p><p>　　It is possible that the entire agreement might have been held void on a basis that, since Stephen’s c

9、onsideration failed, the bargained for inducement was not received by either sister, this including some consideration from Stephen. See 1 Williston, Contracts §§100， 115 (1936).</p><p>　　320 Mich.

10、 663, 31 N.W. (2d) 836 (1948).</p><p>　　second consecutive case overlooking or ignoring the effect of the Michigan Beneficiary Contract Statute3 on the rights of a beneficiary. Historically, Michigan was on

11、e of the last jurisdictions to depart from the English rule prohibiting beneficiaries from suing on the contract, a rule which has “been abandoned or radically modified by exceptions and qualifications in almost every St

12、ate of the Union.，，4 After a period during which third party beneficiaries, with the exception of the mortgagee </p><p>　　Act 296, Public Acts of Michigan (1937), 19 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1949 Supp.) §

13、7;26.1231 to 26.1235.</p><p>　　Guardian Depositors Corp. v. Brown, 290 Mich. 433 at 438，287 N.W. 798 (1939). The more significant Michigan decisions are collected in “Mich. Anno, to the Restatement of Contra

14、cts,14 Mich. St. B.J. 156 (1935).</p><p>　　See 14 Mich. St. B.J. 156 at 168 (1935).</p><p>　　Id. at 165，166.</p><p>　　250 Mich. 302，230 N.W. 156 (1930). See 73 A.L.R. 1389 (1931); 2

15、9 Mich. L. Rev. 365 (1931). This case, in holding that a donee beneficiary had a right, after the death o£ one party to the contract, to sue in equity to enforce a promise to make mutual wills for his benefit, overr

16、uled dicta to the contrary in K.O.M.M. v. Sharp, 163 Mich. 449, 128 N.W. 786 (1910).</p><p>　　For the various “incursions” previously made into the old Michigan rule, see Smith v. Thompson, 250 Mich. 302, 23

17、0 N.W. 156 (1930), and especially as related to a donee beneficiary, see 14 Mich. St. B.J. 156 at 163 (1935).</p><p>　　19 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1949 Supp.) §§26.1231 to 26.1235.</p><p>　　S

18、upra note 2.</p><p>　　The wills were executed at the same time and evidence of previous agreement was undisputed. But in Eicholtz v. Grunewald, 313 Mich. 666，21 N.W. (2d) 914 (1946)， distinguished by the cou

19、rt, mere execution o£ identical wills at different times was held insufficient to establish an agreement. See cases in Eicholtz v. Grunewald, supra, at 677，678.</p><p>　　Ample authority for this proposi

20、tion exists in the Michigan cases. See, e.g., Smith v. T1 son, supra note 8; Eicholtz v. Grunewald, supra note 11.</p><p>　　e beneficiary under such agreement is a “donee，，or “gift，，beneficiary. See 1 Grismo

21、re, Contracts §231 (1947)； 2 Williston, Contracts §356 (1936)； 1 Contracts Restatement §133(a) (1932); 14 Mich. St. B.J. 156 at 161 et seq. (1935). This consideration is important since the Michigan benef

22、iciary statute distinguishes between “donee” and “creditor” beneficiaries. 19 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1949 Supp.) §26.1233.</p><p>　　19 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1949 Supp.) §§26.1231 to 26.1235 was apparen

23、tly ignored by counsel, reliance being placed on earlier cases. t is the contract to make the will, not the will itself, which is irrevocable. This is true only because ? ? ? equity will decree specific performance. ...

24、It is only the right of action to enforce the contract, if anything, which vests in the beneficiary at the death of one of the testators.” Keasey v. Engles, 259 Mich. 178 at 182, 183, 242 N.W. 878 (1932)</p><p

25、>　　parents before the death of either left the plaintiff without enforceable rights.16 Thus both in Phelps and in the instant case the plaintiff was denied specific performance, though the statute would appear to ind

26、icate a contrary result. Under the statute, the donee beneficiary s rights must vest at the moment the agreement is made, unless the court sees fit to read in some implied conditions or limitations, or to imply “some s

27、tipulation, agreement, or understanding ... to the contrary.” Nor </p><p>　　19 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1949 Supp.) §26.1233 provides that a donee beneficiary’s rights shall be deemed to have vested “subject a

28、lways to such express or implied conditions, limitations, or infirmities of the contract to which the rights of the promisee or the promise are subject, without any act or knowledge on his part, the moment the promise b

29、ecomes legally binding on the promisor, unless there is some stipulation, agreement, or undertaking in the contract to the contrary. . . Sec. 26.1235 prov</p><p>　　Such might even be implied from the very fa

30、ct that the contract is one to make a will, by its nature ambulatory.</p><p>　　Sec. 26.1235. Note 17 supra.</p><p>　　Hutchings v. Securities Exchange Corp., 287 Mich. 701, 284 N.W. 614 (1939) an

31、d Aiton v. Slater, 298 Mich. 469，299 N.W. 149 (1941) (dictum) in which §26.1231, giving beneficiary same right </p><p>　　Hutchings v. Securities Exchange Corp., 287 Mich. 701, 284 N.W. 614 (1939) and Ai

32、ton v. Slater, 298 Mich. 469，299 N.W. 149 (1941) (dictum) in which §26.1231, giving beneficiary same right of enforcement as promisee, was applied; Ireland v. Lester, 298 Mich. 154，298 N.W. 488 (1941) in which §

33、;26.1233，vesting beneficiary’s rights under contract at time it was executed, was applied. Indeed, in Lutz v. Dutmer, 286 Mich. 467 at 486，487，282 N.W. 431 (1938) and Guardian Depositor’s Corp. v. Brown, 290 M</p>

34、<p>　　criticism, as would the statute's application to contracts to make mutual wills executed subsequent to its enactment, as in effect depriving a will of its ambulatory nature,21 yet it is the contract and

35、not the will which is specifically enforceable;22 and it does not seem unjust to the contracting parties to require inclusion in the agreement of a condition or stipulation that the beneficial rights thereunder should

36、not vest upon execution of the contract, if such is in fact their intent..2</p><p>　　Gordon W. Hueschen, S. Ed.</p><p>　　See Ireland v. Lester, supra this note. Of course, it is possible to tak

37、e the approach that this would be varying a substantial right in that the beneficiary previously was held to have no rights until one o£ the parties to the agreement died, but since a law which gives validity to a v

38、oid contract, thus creating a legal duty where none existed before, is held to be constitutional, it would seem to follow that a statute can constitutionally expand a right in the beneficiary where a narrower one </p&

39、gt;<p>　　This was the original argument against allowing enforcement o£ a contract to make a will, which was discarded when it was recognized that it was the contract and not the will which was irrevocable. 6

40、 Corn. L.Q. 127 (1920); 15 Corn. L.Q. 358 (1930); 4 Iowa L. Bul. 189〔1918). So it would be in the case o£ a contract to make mutual wills; the contract would be irrevocable without the beneficiary's consent, not

41、 the will.</p><p>　　Note 15 supra.</p><p>　　Such view as to time o£ vesting accords with that o£ text writers and the Restatement. Note 16 supra. But see Page, “The Power o£ Cont

42、racting Parties to Alter a Contract for Rendering Performance to a Third Person,” 12 Wis. L. Rev. 141 (1937). It is noteworthy that some states have statutes making joint and mutual wills revocable, Bordwell, “Statute L

43、aw o£ Wills,” 14 Iowa L. Rev. 1 at 34 (1928)，but even such statutes would not appear to affect contract rights under an agreement pursuant to whi</p><p>　　1N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §14:13-1.1.</p&

44、gt;<p>　　合同：第三方受益人的權(quán)利：密歇根州受益合同條款履行效力</p><p>　　在雙方達(dá)成了一項(xiàng)協(xié)議的基礎(chǔ)上，斯蒂芬和他的兩個(gè)姐妹同意簽訂相互遺囑，即姐妹們同意將斯蒂芬或斯蒂芬之前提前給他們的遺囑，并告知妻子他們應(yīng)該從他們的父親那里得到的所有財(cái)產(chǎn)。斯蒂芬確實(shí)預(yù)先給了姐妹們，在那里他們執(zhí)行了新的遺囑，并沒(méi)有為斯蒂芬的遺囑提供任何條款。在最后一個(gè)姐姐去世后，巡回法庭駁回了當(dāng)事人關(guān)于具體履行

45、協(xié)議的法案。在申訴中可以肯定的是，密歇根蘇美法院認(rèn)為除了姐姐沒(méi)有考慮之外，關(guān)于斯蒂芬和所有其他人的協(xié)議，姐妹們每人都只能在另一方的選擇下接受約束，而且每一方都可以撤銷其他人的許可。新遺囑的執(zhí)行表明了一個(gè)共同的目的，即廢除所有協(xié)議，將任何事情都留給原告，每個(gè)姐妹的意愿都等于撤銷協(xié)議，而另一個(gè)姐妹的協(xié)議是在不存在的情況，相當(dāng)于是推斷就書(shū)面協(xié)議需改一些規(guī)定。羅斯與密西根州南密歇根國(guó)家銀行328密歇根州639,44 N.W. （2d）192（1

46、950）。</p><p>　　法院對(duì)目前事實(shí)情況的處理是，即使斯蒂芬的意見(jiàn)不存在，兩姐妹之間也達(dá)成了相互遺囑的約束協(xié)議，與菲爾普斯訴Pipher案件一樣，是連續(xù)第二起案件忽視或避開(kāi)密歇根州貝恩州“合同法”3對(duì)受益人權(quán)利的影響。</p><p>　　12摩爾 對(duì)米切爾，前注3。</p><p>　　13關(guān)于工人賠償保險(xiǎn)費(fèi)索賠是否構(gòu)成法律沖突的稅收索賠，似乎沒(méi)有什么威

47、懾力。一些論可能是因?yàn)橐恍Q定認(rèn)為失業(yè)和工人補(bǔ)償保費(fèi)索賠是用于破產(chǎn)目的而執(zhí)行的稅收。見(jiàn)135 A.L.R. 1509（1941）; 161 A丄.R。 217（1946）。另一方面，紐約市一家市級(jí)法院根據(jù)與主要案件相同的事實(shí)，最近駁回了關(guān)于工人賠償保險(xiǎn)費(fèi)索賠屬于稅收或刑事索賠的說(shuō)法，理由是國(guó)家正在進(jìn)行這種收集是以專有而非公共的身份行事。俄亥俄州訴威爾科克斯建公司，100 N.Y.S. （2d）508（1950）。</p>

48、<p>　　可能整個(gè)協(xié)議可能被認(rèn)為是無(wú)效的，因?yàn)樗沟俜业南敕](méi)有得到執(zhí)行失，所以兩個(gè)姐姐都沒(méi)有收到其他相關(guān)的條款，這包括斯蒂芬的一些考慮。參見(jiàn)Williston，合同§§100,115（1936）。</p><p>　　320 密歇根州. 663, 31 N.W. (2d) 836 (1948).</p><p>　　從歷史上看，密歇根州是最后一個(gè)違反英國(guó)禁止

49、受益人起訴合同的管轄區(qū)之一，該條約“幾乎在每個(gè)國(guó)家中都被廢除，或者進(jìn)行理性修改”。在這期間，第三方受益人，除抵押權(quán)受益人和保險(xiǎn)受益人之外，任何人單方面無(wú)權(quán)享有合同下的權(quán)利，Smith 訴Thompson的案例將密歇根州的法律化為符合其他地方幾乎都遵照的法規(guī)。最后，這個(gè)問(wèn)題被認(rèn)為是1937年福利合同法規(guī)定的終止。至少律師不會(huì)承認(rèn)任何法律適用于簽訂相互意愿的合同。在菲爾普斯訴Pipher案中，法院在夫妻雙方通過(guò)證據(jù)確立相互和相互的意愿后達(dá)成

50、協(xié)議，雖然以假釋為依據(jù)，但在原告兒子的協(xié)議下原告兒子為受益人，他的父母并有權(quán)以股權(quán)方式為特定目標(biāo)提起訴訟.但是，由于受益人的權(quán)利僅在合同一方當(dāng)事人死亡的情況下被授予，因此在父母離開(kāi)原告之前，由其父母撤銷沒(méi)有可執(zhí)行的權(quán)利。</p><p>　　1密歇根州公立法案（1937年），19密歇根州統(tǒng)計(jì)局。安。 （1949 Supp。）§§26.1231至26.1235。</p><p

51、>　　2監(jiān)護(hù)人委托人 Corp. v。Brown，290 Mich。433 在 438,287 N.W. 798（1939）。在密歇根州收集更重要的密歇根州決案。 Anno，重申合同，14 Mich。St. B.J.156（1935）。</p><p>　　3參見(jiàn)密歇根州圣路易斯市密歇根大街146號(hào)（168）（1935）。</p><p>　　4ID。在165,166。</p&

52、gt;<p>　　5250 Mich。302,230 N.W. 156（1930）。見(jiàn)73 A.L.R. 1389（1931）; 29密歇根L. Rev. 365（1931）。這種情況下，認(rèn)為受贈(zèng)人有權(quán)在合同一方死亡后，起訴公平執(zhí)行承諾，為他的利益制定相互遺囑，在K.O.M.M.中駁回了相反的意見(jiàn)。訴Sharp，163 Mich。449,128 N.W. 786（1910）。</p><p>　　[

53、6]對(duì)于先前在密歇根州舊規(guī)則中所做的各種“入侵”，見(jiàn)Smith v。Thompson，250 Mich。302，230 N.W. 156（1930），特別是與受贈(zèng)受益人有關(guān)的情況，參見(jiàn)密歇根大學(xué)圣約翰分校156第163期（1935年）。</p><p>　　719 Mich。Stat。安。 （1949 Supp。）§§26.1231至26.1235。</p><p>&

54、lt;b>　　8Supra注2。</b></p><p>　　9遺囑在同一時(shí)間被確定，先前協(xié)議的證據(jù)無(wú)可爭(zhēng)議。但在Eicholtz v。Grunewald，313 Mich。666,21 N.W. （2d）914（1946），由法院區(qū)分，只是在不同時(shí)間執(zhí)行相同意愿不足以建立協(xié)議。見(jiàn)Eicholtz v。Grunewald案，見(jiàn)上文，677,678。</p><p>　　在

55、密歇根州的案例中存在這種主張的很多權(quán)力。參見(jiàn)例如Smith訴T1兒子，前注8; Eicholtz v。Grunewald，前注11。</p><p>　　根據(jù)該協(xié)議受益人是“受贈(zèng)人”或“受益人”。參見(jiàn)Grismore，合同§231（1947）; 2威利斯頓，合同§356（1936）; 1復(fù)合重述§133（a）（1932）; 14 Mich。St. B.J. 156，161 et se

56、q。 （1935年）。由于密歇根受益人法規(guī)區(qū)分了“受贈(zèng)人”和“債權(quán)人”，因此要考慮這一重要的點(diǎn)。 19 Mich。Stat。安。 （1949 Supp。）§26.1233。</p><p>　　19 Mich。Stat。安。 （1949 Supp。）§§26.1231至26.1235顯然被律師忽視，依賴于先前的案件。 制定遺囑合同，而不是遺囑本身，這是不可撤銷的。這僅僅是因?yàn)???股

57、權(quán)決定的具體表現(xiàn)。 ......只有行為權(quán)才能執(zhí)行合同，如果有的話，其中一個(gè)遺囑人因其離世后而歸屬于受益人。“Keasey v。Engles，259 Mich。178 at 182,183,242 N.W. 878（1932）</p><p>　　因此，無(wú)論在菲爾普斯還是在本案中，原告都被剝奪了具體的履行條款，盡管該法規(guī)似乎表明了具有相反的結(jié)果。根據(jù)該法規(guī)，除非法院認(rèn)為適合在某些隱含的條件或限制條件下得以適用，或

58、者隱含“某些規(guī)定、協(xié)議或條款”，否則受贈(zèng)人的權(quán)利必須在達(dá)成一致意見(jiàn)的時(shí)刻得到歸屬。 “相反，”合憲性問(wèn)題也不應(yīng)妨礙其追溯適用的規(guī)約，因?yàn)樵谝?guī)約生效后決定的幾個(gè)案例中，其適用是追溯性的。</p><p>　　19Mich,Stat,安,（1949年增補(bǔ)）第26.1233條規(guī)定，受贈(zèng)人的權(quán)利應(yīng)被視為已歸屬.“受制于受約人或承諾權(quán)利受約束的合同書(shū)面或隱含條款，限制或削弱承諾人對(duì)被承諾人的法律約束力，沒(méi)有任何約束，除非在

59、合同中有相反的規(guī)定、協(xié)議或承諾 26.1235規(guī)定：“本法的條款應(yīng)解釋為適用于制定前的合同 - 除非此類條款構(gòu)成違憲。 </p><p>　　這種情況甚至可能是由于遺囑的存在，以致其性質(zhì)是動(dòng)態(tài)的。 </p><p>　　26.1235。上文注17。</p><p>　　哈欽斯訴證券交易公司，287密歇根州701，284 N.W. 614（1939）和Aiton訴Sl

60、ater，298 Mich。469,299 N.W. 149（1941）（格式），其中§26.1231給予受益人同樣的權(quán)利 26.1235。上文注17。</p><p>　　其中第26.1231款給予受益人與承諾人相同的執(zhí)行權(quán); Ireland v。Lester，298 Mich。154,298 N.W. 488（1941），其中第26.1233節(jié)規(guī)定了受益人在合同簽署時(shí)的權(quán)利。事實(shí)上，在Lutz v。

61、Dutmer，286 Mich。467，486,487,282 N.W. 431（1938）和Guardian Depositor's Corp.訴Brown，290Mon.433,287 N.W. 798（1939年）案例中，追溯適用法規(guī)已被憲法明確認(rèn)定，是對(duì)權(quán)力的補(bǔ)充,房屋建筑和貸款協(xié)會(huì)。 v。Blaisdell，290 U.S. 398 at 430,54 S.Ct. 231（1934）。沒(méi)有任何理由可以說(shuō)明法律在憲法上可

62、能與在合同中授予受益人權(quán)利以制定相互遺囑的時(shí)間在憲法上有什么不同。由于這種情況下的受益人有權(quán)在協(xié)議的一方當(dāng)事人死亡之前，在該法規(guī)頒布之前（在史密斯訴湯普森之后）具體履行股權(quán)，所以追溯適用該法規(guī)，受益人合同的履行，是給受益人一種更有效的補(bǔ)救辦法。</p><p>　　雖然這種法規(guī)的積極應(yīng)用無(wú)疑會(huì)受到相當(dāng)大的批評(píng)，法規(guī)的合同申請(qǐng)將在其頒布后執(zhí)行相互遺囑，這實(shí)際上是剝奪了其遺囑性質(zhì)，是合同而不是具體可執(zhí)行的遺囑; 并且

63、要求合同雙方在協(xié)議中包含一項(xiàng)條件或規(guī)定，其中的有益權(quán)利不應(yīng)該歸于執(zhí)行人。如果這實(shí)際上是合同的話.，希望在下一個(gè)出現(xiàn)在最高法院的這種類型的案件中，受益人法規(guī)的履行效力問(wèn)題律師應(yīng)充分考慮到。</p><p>　　Gordon W. Hueschen, S. Ed.</p><p>　　請(qǐng)參閱本章節(jié)的愛(ài)爾蘭訴萊斯特。當(dāng)然，可以采取這樣的方式，即這樣做的實(shí)質(zhì)性權(quán)利可能是變化的，即受益人先前在協(xié)議雙

64、方當(dāng)事人死亡之前是沒(méi)有權(quán)利，但是由于一項(xiàng)法律賦予了無(wú)效的效力合同，從而創(chuàng)造了以前沒(méi)有的合法義務(wù)，這被認(rèn)為是合憲的，似乎可以認(rèn)為法規(guī)可以在憲法上擴(kuò)大受益人的權(quán)利，只要這種權(quán)利已經(jīng)存在，受益人和相關(guān)責(zé)任與承諾人自愿承擔(dān)承諾一致。見(jiàn)Grismore，“密歇根州的受益人合同”，底特律第1版，18以及以下。 （1938）和Guardian Depositor's Corp.訴Brown，上述有說(shuō)明，第443,444頁(yè)。</p>

65、<p>　　21這是反對(duì)允許執(zhí)行合同訂立遺囑的原始論據(jù)，當(dāng)它被承認(rèn)是合同而不是不可撤銷的遺囑時(shí)就被終止了。 Corn L.Q. 127（1920）; 15Corn L.Q. 358（1930）; 4愛(ài)荷華L. Bul。 189〔1918）。所以在合同中就會(huì)出現(xiàn)相互遺囑;如果沒(méi)有受益人的同意，合同將是不可撤銷的，而不是遺囑。</p><p><b>　　22注15見(jiàn)上文。</b>

66、</p><p>　　23關(guān)于時(shí)間上的敘述，與文本作者和重述符合一致。注16見(jiàn)上文。但請(qǐng)參見(jiàn)“合同雙方簽訂第三方權(quán)力”，12版，L.Rev.141（1937）。值得注意的是，有些國(guó)家的法律規(guī)定共同的相互遺囑是可以撤銷的，Bordwell，“法律與遺囑”，14（1928），愛(ài)荷華L.Rev.1，但即使是這樣的法規(guī)，也不會(huì)影響合同根據(jù)協(xié)議可能產(chǎn)生的共同意愿。</p><p>　　1N.J. R