我國上市公司財(cái)務(wù)治理理論及其模式研究.pdf

1、I中文摘要財(cái)務(wù)治理和財(cái)務(wù)管理僅一字之差但研究對象和內(nèi)容截然不同財(cái)務(wù)治理主要研究債權(quán)人股東和經(jīng)營管理者之間的關(guān)系而財(cái)務(wù)管理則主要研究資金的籌集運(yùn)用和分配二者屬于兩個不同的范疇對財(cái)務(wù)管理的認(rèn)識無論在理論界還是實(shí)務(wù)界都已深入人心但對財(cái)務(wù)治理的研究并沒有受到應(yīng)有的重視更談不上深入本文以財(cái)務(wù)治理為主線利用我國上市公司的豐富資料分析了我國上市公司存在的治理問題對我國上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)治理理論及其模式進(jìn)行了深入研究在回顧了公司治理的相關(guān)理論之后本文提出了

2、財(cái)務(wù)治理的理論框架包括財(cái)務(wù)治理的主體客體目標(biāo)模式以及其他相關(guān)內(nèi)容財(cái)務(wù)治理的主體是股東經(jīng)營管理者和債權(quán)人客體是財(cái)務(wù)沖突包括股東與經(jīng)營管理者的財(cái)務(wù)沖突和股東與債權(quán)人的財(cái)務(wù)沖突兩大類目標(biāo)是協(xié)調(diào)財(cái)務(wù)治理主體之間的財(cái)務(wù)沖突達(dá)到利益相關(guān)者價(jià)值最大化財(cái)務(wù)治理理論框架的提出一方面完善和系統(tǒng)化了我國關(guān)于財(cái)務(wù)治理的研究另一方面也揭示了在財(cái)務(wù)治理中核心的問題是對財(cái)務(wù)沖突的協(xié)調(diào)依據(jù)財(cái)務(wù)沖突的性質(zhì)將財(cái)務(wù)治理模式分為兩類一類是解決股東和經(jīng)營管理者財(cái)務(wù)沖突的財(cái)務(wù)激勵

3、治理模式另一類是解決股東和債權(quán)人財(cái)務(wù)沖突的財(cái)務(wù)監(jiān)控治理模式針對我國上市公司股東和經(jīng)營管理者關(guān)系的現(xiàn)狀筆者提出了財(cái)務(wù)治理的第一類模式即從顯性激勵方面進(jìn)行激勵報(bào)酬組合將薪酬和期權(quán)結(jié)合實(shí)現(xiàn)短期激勵與長期激勵的統(tǒng)一為保證兩方面激勵作用的發(fā)揮筆者認(rèn)為應(yīng)對我國上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)評價(jià)體系進(jìn)行重構(gòu)從隱性激勵角度筆者認(rèn)為應(yīng)該增加負(fù)債比例通過實(shí)證分析間接證明了負(fù)債融資對于經(jīng)營管理者存在隱性激勵的作用第二類模式的提出也是建立在對上市公司現(xiàn)狀分析的基礎(chǔ)上的債務(wù)契約

4、的軟約束可以通過債務(wù)契約的規(guī)范來解決但財(cái)務(wù)信息的規(guī)范化是其前提債務(wù)來源結(jié)構(gòu)的不合理依賴于企業(yè)債券發(fā)行力度的加大債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)的不合理依賴于短期負(fù)債和長期負(fù)債的協(xié)調(diào)債券設(shè)計(jì)中主要是對可贖回條款和可轉(zhuǎn)換條款的設(shè)計(jì)為了IIIAbstractFinancialgovernancehasonlyonewddifferentthatoffinancialmanagementbutthestudyoftheobjectthecontentsisquit

5、edifferent.Financialgovernancemainlystudiestherelationshipbetweenbondholdersshareholdersmanagers.Whilefinancialmanagementmainlydealswiththeraisingusingallocatingofthecapital.Wecanseefromthisthatfinancialgovernancefinanci

6、almanagementbelongtotwodifferentlevels.Howeverthestudyoffinancialgovernancehasnotbeengivendueattentionletalonethefurtherstudyofit.Withfinancialgovernanceasthemainthreadthearticleanalysesthegovernanceproblemsexistinginthe

7、behaviofthelistedcompaniesinourcountrystudiesexplesthefinancialgovernancetheymodeinourlistcompaniesbyusingrichmaterialsofthelistcompaniesinourcountry.Afterreviewingthetheyaboutcpationgovernancemoderncapitalstructuretheyi

8、ncentivetheytheframeofthefinancialgovernancetheyisputfward.theanalysesframeincludesthesubjecttheobjecttheassumptionthemodeotherrelatedcontentsofthefinancialgovernance.Thesubjectofthefinancialgovernanceisshareholdersmanag

9、ersbondholders.Theobjectisfinancialconflicts.Theconflictsaredividedintotwocategies:oneisthefinancialconflictsbetweenshareholdersmanagers.theotheristhefinancialconflictsbetweenshareholdersbondholders.Theobjectofthefinanci

10、algovernanceistocodinatethefinancialconflictsthespeficsubjectisthemaximizationofthecpatevalue.Thesignificanceofthefinancialgovernancetheyconsistintwoaspect.ononesidethestudyoffinancialgovernanceisperfectedsystematized.On

11、theothersideitopensoutthattheceprobleminfinancialgovernanceistocodinatethefinancialconflicts.Inaccdancewiththetwocategiesofthefinancialconflictsthearticlealsodividesthemodeoffinancialgovernanceintotwothatisthemodeofthego

12、vernanceofthefinancialincentivethemodeofthegovernanceofthefinancialmonitering.Themainacteristicsofthemodeoffinancialgovernanceistodealwiththefinancialconflictsbetweenshareholdersmanagers.Themainacteristicofthegovernancem

13、odeoffinancialmoniteringistodealwiththefinancialconflictsbetweenbondholdersshareholders.Aimingatthecurrentsituationoftherelationshipbetweenshareholdersmanagersinourlistcompaniesthefirstmodeisputout.Fromthewayofobviousinc

14、entiveIproposetofmthecombinationsalarymodel.Atthesametimetoensuretherealizationofthemodelthefinancialevaluationsystemmustbemodified.Abouthiddenincentive.Iproposetoincreasetheproptionofdebt.Atthesametimethearticleindirect